AYRE THINK TANK

# THE AYRE INDEX

## THE 2026 COMMONWEALTH YOUTH AI READINESS INDEX

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INCLUSIVITY • CONNECTIVITY • PROGRESS

# FOREWORD

## The AI revolution must not leave Commonwealth youth behind

As the Principal of a university I know exactly how much artificial intelligence is changing young people's lives, and that the change is happening faster than our institutions can measure its impact. We are seeing it in how students learn and how businesses operate. It is determining how employers recruit. There now can be no doubt that, for a generation entering adulthood, AI will shape their future. What remains unknown is if they will have the tools to enable them to shape that future themselves, not only as users of these new emerging technologies but also as their makers.

For the Commonwealth, this is a question that matters enormously. More than 730 million young people live across its 56 member states. They live in hugely different economies and societies, from some of the world's largest and most bustling countries to beach-rimmed small islands whose entire population is smaller than many global cities. The opportunity they face to benefit from AI is equally varied. Yet the debates on policy so far have largely focused on the capacity of governments and economies rather than on the young people who will have to live with those consequences.

The Ayre Index is a welcome step towards addressing this. The study's 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index has been developed by the Ayre Think Tank to ask a practical question: can young people access AI, use it competently and turn it into worthwhile opportunities in education, employment and enterprise? It also asks what their countries are doing to equip and protect them. This is a more demanding test than counting internet connections or announcing a national AI strategy. It is about focusing on whether young people are being given the chances to take advantage of the opportunities AI brings.

The findings cannot help but concentrate minds. On the index, Singapore scores 77.6 out of 100, while Malawi scores 26.3. It shows how the price of mobile data relative to income, which is so vital for any young person in most countries if they want to engage with the latest technologies, varies by more than sixtyfold across member states. In 25 countries electricity access is universal; in Malawi, the World Bank figures for 2024 record that electricity reaches only around one person in six. These may be familiar development divides, but they acquire new significance when access to increasingly powerful tools depends on infrastructure, skills and resources that many young people still lack.

There is a second finding, however, that is just as important and that is that we do not yet know enough about how young people themselves actually experience AI. Some of the most relevant information that would enable this knowledge simply has not been collected, particularly in the Commonwealth's smallest states. The index therefore publishes alongside its main findings a separate measure of data gaps. The Bahamas, for example, lacks evidence for 78 of the 111 indicators examined, and our host at the 2026 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Antigua and Barbuda, is also found to be among the most affected. An absence of evidence should never be mistaken for an absence of ability or ambition. Rather, it is a gap that our own institutions, universities among them, should be working to help to close.

When I look at my own university campus in a small island state, I find this especially significant. We know from our own experience that countries like mine cannot assume technologies designed for larger markets will reflect our own institutions, environmental conditions, economic priorities or even languages. Imagine a young Antiguan developing tools to interpret local rainfall or the risks posed by extreme weather. Such work needs computing power and technical training, but it also needs local data, scientific knowledge and an understanding of the communities that are likely to be affected. To get the best solution, it will be necessary to draw upon this local knowledge.

The same principle applies throughout the Commonwealth. AI can bring all kinds of benefits from helping teachers extend support to pupils, assisting health professionals working with limited resources or making small enterprises more successful for their owners. Yet these are just possibilities. Technology can never automatically compensate for weak education systems or create decent jobs. Nor should we ever be in a situation where young people are expected to trust automated decisions they are not ready or able to question or challenge.

That is why any analysis of AI readiness must at its core include the questions of human judgement and agency. Young people need to know when an AI system is useful and when it is wrong. They should have the confidence to change or reject its recommendations. That is why one factor that must not be overlooked is the need for them to have a voice in the rules governing its use.

The value of this White Paper therefore lies as much in what it makes visible as in the rankings it presents. The research draws on the available evidence but it also makes clear where important information is still missing, particularly about young people's experiences of AI. The authors are explicit about these limitations, recognising that identifying what we do not yet know is itself an important contribution. That candour is a strength. It gives governments, educators, employers and development partners a starting point from which to ask better questions, direct investment more intelligently and measure whether their interventions are working.

The Commonwealth has a unique opportunity here. Its members share institutions and networks, but they also face sharply different circumstances. This means they can learn from one another without assuming that one model will work everywhere. Better youth data, stronger teaching, affordable access, opportunities to build local solutions and meaningful safeguards are all areas in which cooperation can make a practical difference and should be areas of priority for the future.

We need to make sure that the next generation will be able to do more than just consume AI products made elsewhere. Access must come with its own agency and a real equitable stake in how these systems are governed. Young people should be equipped to question these new tools, to improve them and to be supported in building alternatives suited to their own needs. Whether that happens, however, will depend on choices made now. This index gives us a clearer view of where those choices are most urgent. We should use it.

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# PART I | FINDINGS

## INTRODUCTION

The Ayre Think Tank has been established to examine through independent thinking, research and collaboration the opportunities and challenges shaping our future across four interconnected themes: inclusivity, connection, prosperity and progress, thereby turning ideas into perspectives that can help technology deliver meaningful, lasting impact. Working with the Calvin Ayre Foundation, its output is driven by a simple conviction. Emerging technologies offer extraordinary possibilities, but their value ultimately depends on how widely those possibilities can be realised and shared.

That is why this inaugural White Paper addresses one of the most consequential questions of the new technological age in which we are all now living: how well prepared are young people to benefit from the myriad changes that are transforming the world around them?

Its starting point is artificial intelligence (AI) as this is the most discussed emerging technology of our time. Generative AI is spreading with extraordinary speed. Research in the United States suggests it is the most rapidly adopted general-purpose technology in that country's history[1], and one worker in four worldwide is estimated to already be in an occupation with some exposure to it[2]. No one can be in any doubt that AI has the potential to transform how people learn, work, build businesses and even how they can participate in society. Yet the reality is that having access to these increasingly powerful tools is only part of the equation. Young people must also have the connectivity, education and skills to use them effectively. They need to have the opportunity to turn those capabilities into better livelihoods and greater prosperity.

The research undertaken for this White Paper focuses on the 56 countries of the Commonwealth, which are home to approximately 732 million young people aged 15 to 29. Despite the profound changes AI promises to bring, there has previously been no comparable assessment of the conditions affecting young people's readiness across all the Commonwealth's member states. That is the gap this study seeks to fill. Addressing it is essential if governments and other institutions are to make informed decisions about the opportunities and challenges facing the next generation. The timing is also particularly fortunate. Antigua and Barbuda, where the Calvin Ayre Foundation has its roots, is hosting the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in St John's from 1 to 4 November 2026, thereby providing an ideal occasion to bring this research to the attention of Commonwealth leaders.

The Commonwealth provides an unusually valuable setting for such research. Few international organisations bring together countries of multiple different sizes, levels of economic development and social circumstances united within a shared institutional framework. It contains some of the world's largest economies and populations but also some of its smallest island states. This diversity means that the Ayre Index can therefore examine how one emerging technology, in this case AI, may create profoundly different opportunities and challenges for young people. Understanding those differences will help ensure that the benefits of AI can

be shared across the Commonwealth, and that its next generation is equipped to participate in shaping not only their own but their home country's future.

Drawing together the available evidence, the Ayre Index therefore compares the conditions that may help young people benefit from AI. It seeks to identify existing strengths, expose weaknesses and reveal where important information is still missing. Crucially, it also examines the economic gains and opportunities that stronger AI readiness could help countries realise. This gives the research significance beyond just technology by connecting the question of preparedness to economic development and the future prosperity of young people. By seeking to establish how countries presently stand, where the greatest opportunities are and what may be holding them back, the White Paper hopes to aid governments, funders, educators and other partners to make better-informed decisions about where their efforts and resources could achieve the greatest impact.

This White Paper is the beginning of a wider programme of research. It is seen as a starting point for examining more closely what young people need to participate in the technological changes shaping their futures. The Ayre Think Tank's purpose is to help ensure that the extraordinary possibilities of emerging technologies translate into something that matters in people's lives and it is our hope that the Ayre Index is a first step in being able to enable greater opportunity, better connections and the means for young people to shape their own futures.

### Attribution notice

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Online references should include a link to the original Ayre Think Tank publication.

### Version and corrections

This White Paper reflects the evidence and source material reviewed during the research period. The Ayre Think Tank welcomes factual corrections and relevant new evidence that may help improve the accuracy and completeness of future editions.

## KEY TERMS

| Term | Meaning in this White Paper |
|---|---|
| AI use and AI capability | AI use means using or interacting with AI tools. AI capability means having the skills and understanding to use and assess them effectively. Using AI frequently does not, by itself, demonstrate competence. |
| Artificial intelligence (AI) | Computer systems that can perform tasks such as recognising patterns, making predictions or recommendations and producing content, including text, images and code. |
| Conservative, moderate and optimistic scenarios | Three illustrations of possible AI-related GDP-level effects after ten years. The conservative and optimistic scenarios use the lower and upper estimates published by the IMF for the relevant economic group. The moderate scenario is their arithmetic midpoint, calculated by this study rather than separately provided by the IMF. |
| Data Gap Index | A separate weighted score, out of 100, measuring missing qualifying source evidence across all eight pillars and 111 indicators. Each pillar carries equal weight, with sub-pillars and indicators weighted equally within their respective groups. Permitted estimates count as missing evidence, while qualifying published stand-ins count as available evidence. A higher score indicates more missing information, not necessarily lower readiness, and does not affect the readiness score. |
| Data strength | A separate assessment, on a scale from 0 to 10, of how well the evidence fits the indicator and age group, how it was produced and how recent it is. It does not change the readiness score. |
| Illustrative economic opportunity and illustrative AI-related GDP gain | Two reporting labels applied to IMF-based illustrations of possible effects on the level of GDP after ten years. For countries at or above the readiness benchmark, the study labels the calculated amounts illustrative AI-related GDP gains; for those below it, illustrative economic opportunities. Both use the relevant IMF economic-group scenarios. Neither measures the additional GDP caused by crossing the benchmark, and neither represents a guaranteed gain, an annual addition to GDP or a country-specific forecast. |
| Indicator estimate | A value calculated when qualifying source evidence is missing, using the research's permitted estimation rules. An estimate can be used to calculate a readiness score but still counts as missing evidence in the Data Gap Index. |
| Index score | Each country's combined readiness score, out of 100, calculated from the pillars on which it has a score, from four to all seven. A score of 70 does not mean that 70 per cent of its young people are AI-ready. |
| Legal-indicator classifications | Labels such as "in force", "partial" or "absent" describe how a particular law or policy was recorded for an indicator at the source date. They are not comprehensive legal opinions about a country's laws or how well those laws are enforced. |

| Term | Meaning in this White Paper |
|---|---|
| Pillar, sub-pillar and indicator | A pillar is a broad area of readiness, a sub-pillar is a more specific subject within it and an indicator is a measure used to assess that subject. The full framework has eight pillars, 39 sub-pillars and 111 indicators. Seven pillars and 102 indicators contribute to the present ranking. |
| Readiness benchmark | A fixed score of 53 out of 100 on this index. Countries at or above it meet the study's benchmark; those below it have not yet reached that benchmark. The line is a research classification, not an IMF threshold. |
| Region | The Commonwealth's own grouping of its members, Africa, Asia, Caribbean and Americas, Europe and Pacific, used in the profiles and in Figure 4. Canada belongs to Caribbean and Americas. |
| Small youth states | The 21 Commonwealth members outside Europe whose total populations were below one million in the study's population figures. Each has fewer than 230,000 young people aged 15 to 29, the smallest youth populations in the Commonwealth outside Europe. Malta is excluded because it has comparatively extensive access to European statistics. This is a research-specific group, not the Commonwealth Secretariat's official small-state classification. |
| Scoring coverage | The number of scored indicators for which a country has a usable value, including permitted estimates, out of 102. This is different from the number of indicators supported by qualifying source evidence. |
| Sensitivity analysis | A check of how the results or rankings change when reasonable alternative calculation or inclusion rules are applied. It shows how much particular findings depend on those choices. |
| Stand-in | A published figure for a different age group, wider population or closely related measure, used only where the research rules allow. It provides useful evidence but must not be presented as a direct observation of all people aged 15 to 29. |
| Youth | People aged 15 to 29, the age range used in the Commonwealth Youth Development Index. Where the evidence allows, the study also distinguishes ages 15 to 17, 18 to 24 and 25 to 29. |
| Youth AI readiness | The ability of young people to benefit from AI, together with the access, skills, opportunities and protections that help make this possible. The index assesses these conditions using available evidence; it does not directly test every young person's readiness. |
| Youth unemployment and NEET | Youth unemployment is the share of young people in the labour force who are unemployed. NEET means not in employment, education or training and is measured as a share of all people in the specified age group. The two rates cannot be compared as though they measure the same thing. |

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Artificial intelligence could transform the economic prospects of an entire generation. Across the Commonwealth, approximately 732 million young people aged 15 to 29 are growing up in a world in which AI will increasingly shape education, work, business and public life. Whether this technological revolution widens opportunity or deepens existing inequalities will depend in large part on how prepared countries are to help their young people benefit.

The Ayre Index, the 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index, provides the first comparable assessment of the conditions facing young people across all 56 Commonwealth member states. Drawing together published evidence on connectivity, digital skills, education, employment, enterprise, safeguards and attitudes towards AI, it asks a practical question: where are the foundations for benefiting from AI strongest, and where must countries act?

### The readiness divide

The results reveal a striking divide in the conditions that Commonwealth countries provide for young people to benefit from AI. Singapore leads the index with a score of 77.6 out of 100, followed by Malta at 75.0, while Lesotho scores 27.8 and Malawi just 26.3. But where should the line be drawn between countries with stronger foundations for harnessing AI and those that still have significant ground to make up? To answer this, the researchers applied six statistical methods, comparing the index with established international measures of AI preparedness, including those of the International Monetary Fund and Oxford Insights, while also examining how the Commonwealth's own scores divide and how consistently countries perform across different areas of readiness.

Although the methods produced different results, five of their six uncertainty ranges overlapped between 52.4 and 53.7, and 53 lies inside all five. The sixth, based on scoring at least 50 on a majority of pillars, runs from 54.0 to 58.4. On that basis the study sets its readiness benchmark at 53, a fixed line against which countries can measure their progress in future editions. Just 15 of the Commonwealth's 56 members meet the readiness benchmark, while 41 fall below it. The dividing line falls naturally between Nigeria, ranked fifteenth with a score of 54.5, and Seychelles, ranked sixteenth with 51.8. Under the three other ways of combining scores set out in Annex D, between 12 and 20 members reach 53, and the published split rests on the index's own method. This provides a distinction of considerable significance. Those above the line have stronger measured foundations for benefiting from AI, while those below have further progress to make if they are to capture more of the opportunities it could offer.

The benchmark makes the index more than a league table. It gives countries a fixed reference point for assessing progress and focuses attention on the 41 members whose foundations for benefiting from AI remain comparatively weak under the study's measures. Yet the countries below 53 face very different difficulties. An effective response cannot be the same everywhere.

### The economic opportunity

The significance of this divide extends far beyond technological preparedness. It raises a fundamental question about the future economic prosperity of 41 Commonwealth countries

and the opportunities available to their young people. AI has the potential to make businesses more productive, create new industries, improve public services and open up employment and entrepreneurial opportunities. Countries that are better equipped to adopt and use it will be in a stronger position to capture those benefits, while those that fall behind risk seeing existing economic inequalities widen.

To illustrate the scale involved, the Ayre Think Tank applied economic scenarios developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the 41 Commonwealth countries below the readiness benchmark. The results identify a combined illustrative economic opportunity of $29.2 billion under the moderate scenario, rising to $44.1 billion in the optimistic case and standing at $14.4 billion in the conservative case. These figures represent possible AI-related effects on GDP after ten years, rather than gains generated by crossing the benchmark, but they nevertheless put an important financial scale on the opportunity. Each country's figure is its GDP multiplied by the IMF's percentage for its economic group, so the figures show economic scale, and the index decides only whether a figure is labelled a gain or an opportunity. Stronger AI readiness could help countries capture more of the economic growth that this technological revolution makes possible, with potentially transformative consequences for the lives and prospects of millions of young people.

The individual amounts calculated for each country make the scale tangible. In the moderate scenario, Bangladesh has an illustrative economic opportunity of $8.2 billion, Pakistan $8.1 billion, Kenya approximately $2 billion and Ghana $1.7 billion. For Malawi, the lowest-ranked member, the figure is approximately $216 million. For countries seeking to create jobs, raise productivity and improve living standards, even a portion of the possible economic benefits that AI can bring would be important.

### Connectivity is not the same as opportunity

Rwanda's recorded 4G network covers 98.8 per cent of the population, yet only 33.4 per cent of young people report using the internet. In Togo, the equivalent figures are 99.7 per cent and 44.9 per cent. Coverage alone cannot show whether young people can afford devices and data, access dependable electricity or use a connection regularly for learning and work.

Elsewhere, even the foundations are limited. In Malawi, the World Bank's internationally comparable data records electricity access at 15.6 per cent of the population[3], and reported youth internet use stands at 27.4 per cent. In Papua New Guinea, the selected mobile-data basket costs more than 30 per cent of the income of the poorest 40 per cent. Extending networks remains important, but a signal must become affordable, reliable access before it can improve people's prospects.

### Young people are interested, but skills and opportunities lag behind

One of the most encouraging findings is the appetite for AI among young people in countries on both sides of the benchmark. Approximately 90 per cent of Nigerian respondents and 76.3 per cent of Bangladeshi respondents in the examined research expected to use AI for education or work within the following year. In Fiji, 62.5 per cent reported using AI for study and 49.3 per cent for work.

Yet the Digital, data, media and AI capability pillar scores just 0.8 out of 10 in Nigeria, 2.3 in Bangladesh and 3.6 in Fiji. These scores draw on particular conventional digital tasks and are not comprehensive tests of AI competence. Even so, the contrast points to a major opportunity: to turn young people's interest into practical abilities to evaluate information, solve problems, create useful work and build productive businesses.

**Skills must lead to livelihoods**

The labour-market findings show why readiness has to connect to real economic opportunity. South Africa ranks thirteenth and meets the benchmark, yet its sources record youth unemployment of 46.3 per cent and 39.6 per cent of young people outside employment, education or training. Eswatini records youth unemployment of 52.6 per cent. Uganda demonstrates entrepreneurial initiative, but widespread informal work remains a constraint.

AI may help enterprises raise productivity, find customers and develop services. Those possibilities will matter most if young people have access to practical training, employers, finance and markets. Countries cannot assume that a stronger digital-skills score, on its own, will create stable employment or successful businesses.

**Local relevance, safety and evidence**

The index also draws attention to who technology is built for. Digital-language resources assessed in the study provide limited support for several Commonwealth languages, including Kinyarwanda, Chichewa and a number of Pacific languages. Young people should have opportunities to create tools suited to local problems as well as use systems developed elsewhere. They also need safeguards that allow them to question AI outputs and challenge automated decisions affecting their lives.

An especially important finding is how little comparable information exists about young people's actual experiences. The researchers examined 1,128 sources, but only 59 non-population sources cover the full age group of 15 to 29. The Bahamas has the highest weighted Data Gap Index, at 78.5 out of 100, with missing evidence for 78 of 111 indicators. Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis each lack evidence for 79 indicators. Missing evidence does not mean missing ability, but it makes sound investment and policy decisions harder.

**From a benchmark to meaningful progress**

Taken together, the findings identify five practical priorities: affordable and reliable access; education that develops real capabilities; stronger routes from training into employment and enterprise; technology suited to local languages and needs; and effective protections. The relative urgency of each will differ. Ghana scores 51.2, Kenya 48.7 and Uganda 47.0, but their combinations of connectivity, skills and labour-market constraints are not identical.

The next task is therefore to determine which improvements would matter most to young people in the 41 countries below the benchmark. That requires better evidence of the obstacles they face, the opportunities they value and which interventions actually work. The index shows where countries stand and makes the potential economic stakes more visible. The next stage of the Ayre Think Tank's work will build on those findings, helping identify the practical measures most likely to expand opportunities for young people.

## METHODOLOGY

The Ayre Index, the 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index, compares how well the 56 Commonwealth countries are equipped to help young people aged 15 to 29 benefit from AI. It brings together existing research and statistics, measures them against a common set of standards and gives each country a score out of 100.

The aim is to capture the different conditions that influence whether young people can benefit from AI, recognising that access to the technology is only part of the picture.

### What does the index measure?

The research examines eight areas, known as pillars. Together, they address a series of practical questions.

Can young people get online, afford suitable devices and access AI tools? Do they have the digital skills to use technology effectively? Are they using AI in their studies, work and everyday lives? Are schools and training institutions preparing them for a changing world? Can their skills lead to worthwhile employment or business opportunities? Are their rights protected, and do they have a say in decisions affecting them? And how confident and motivated are they about using AI?

The eighth area concerns young people's ability to question AI, recognise when it is wrong and exercise their own judgement. This is an essential part of readiness, but there is not yet enough comparable information to give countries reliable scores in this area. It is therefore included in the research framework but excluded from the current readiness ranking.

Each pillar is divided into more specific subjects, called sub-pillars, which are measured using indicators drawn from published research and statistics. The complete framework has 39 sub-pillars and 111 indicators. Of these, 102 indicators across seven pillars contribute to the current index.

### Where does the information come from?

The researchers examined 1,128 sources, including international databases, official statistics, household surveys and published research. These provide information on matters ranging from internet access and digital skills to education, employment and attitudes towards AI. The research cut-off date for this edition is 6 October 2026, and the published counts, scores and tests reflect the evidence available at that date.

Not every country publishes the same information, and much of the available evidence does not describe young people aged 15 to 29 specifically. Some figures relate to a narrower age group, while others describe the wider population. The research records these differences and assesses how closely each source reflects what the index is trying to measure. Where a country has no survey of its own young people on an indicator of AI use, a student sample, a poll of young volunteers or the conversation records of one AI assistant's users of all ages may stand in, labelled as such, and a country whose Purposeful use and creation score rests wholly on such figures is marked in Table 1.

### How are countries scored?

Each indicator is given a score from 0 to 10 using the same predefined scoring rules for every country. The available indicator scores are then averaged to produce a score for each sub-pillar. These are averaged into pillar scores, and the pillars on which a country has a score, from four to all seven, are combined, with equal weight, to give its overall score out of 100 (Figure 1). Each figure was scored against its indicator's written bands by an AI model, Claude Opus 5.5, following a fixed rubric. Every score was checked against its band, and a second scoring of up to ten countries per indicator gave the same answer in 1,848 of 1,854 cases. The data file and the code that turns it into scores are published with the index, so every score can be recomputed from the stored inputs (Part II, Audit trail and reproducibility).





*Figure 1. How a country's score is built. Missing figures, and gaps filled by an estimate, are counted separately in the Data Gap Index.*

This allows the 56 countries to be compared using a common framework. A higher score indicates stronger performance across the measures available for that country.

The score is a comparison of measured conditions. It does not mean that the equivalent percentage of young people in a country are ready for AI. For example, a score of 70 out of 100 does not mean that 70 per cent of young people have demonstrated AI readiness.

### How is the readiness benchmark established?

The researchers used six statistical tests to compare the index with international measures of AI preparedness and to examine how its scores divide. Five of the six include 53 in their range, and the study sets its readiness benchmark at 53 out of 100. Fifteen countries score 53 or above and 41 score below it. The line lies between Nigeria, ranked fifteenth at 54.5, and Seychelles, ranked sixteenth at 51.8.

### How is the illustrative economic opportunity calculated?

To show the possible economic scale of AI, the study applies IMF estimates of AI's potential effect on the level of GDP after ten years. Each Commonwealth member is assigned to the relevant IMF economic group. The lower and upper IMF estimates are used as the conservative and optimistic scenarios, with the moderate scenario set halfway between them. The percentages are applied to 2025 GDP in current US dollars, except The Bahamas, for which 2024 is used[4].

These calculations illustrate the economic opportunities associated with stronger AI preparedness. Each value depends only on the country's GDP and IMF group. They do not predict the additional GDP a country would generate simply by crossing the readiness benchmark of 53. The IMF's modelling treats preparedness as one of several factors affecting economic outcomes, rather than as a threshold at which benefits automatically begin. The findings nevertheless demonstrate why differences in countries' ability to adopt and use AI matter: unless those differences are addressed, technological progress could reinforce existing economic inequalities.

### How should the results be used?

The index provides a common basis for comparing countries, but the scores must be read alongside the evidence supporting them. Countries with similar scores may have very different strengths and weaknesses, and some results depend on more complete information than others.

The readiness ranking shows what the available measures tell us about each country. The Data Gap Index shows where important evidence remains missing. Reading them together gives a more useful picture of both the opportunities facing young people and the areas where further research is needed.

### Further information

The Technical Methodology in Part II and supporting annexes in Part III provide the full indicator definitions, sources, calculations, assumptions and checks underpinning these results.

## LIMITATIONS

The Ayre Index, the 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index, provides a valuable picture of how prepared Commonwealth countries are to help young people benefit from AI. However, it is built from information collected for different purposes, at different times and about different groups of people. It does not directly test the AI skills of every country's young people. This means that two countries with similar scores may have quite different strengths and weaknesses. One country's score may also rest on more complete information than another's.

### Not enough information about young people

One of the biggest challenges is that much of the available research does not cover the full age group of 15 to 29. Of the 1,128 sources examined, only 110 cover this entire age range. Of these, 51 provide population counts, leaving just 59 other sources covering the full group. Many surveys stop at age 24, while others describe adults generally or particular groups, such as students.

Where necessary, the index uses permitted figures for wider or different age groups. These can provide useful indications of conditions facing young people, but they cannot tell us precisely what every person aged 15 to 29 experiences.

### What we still do not know about AI

There is considerably more information about internet access, education and employment than about how young people actually use AI, what they understand about it or how it affects their lives.

This is particularly important for the pillar covering critical judgement and human agency. It concerns whether young people can recognise mistakes in AI-generated information, question its recommendations and make informed decisions for themselves. The nine indicators covering this area have evidence for only three to 28 Commonwealth countries each, depending on the indicator, with particularly limited coverage among the small youth states.

There is therefore not enough comparable evidence to include this pillar in the current ranking. Until more information is collected, the index cannot provide a complete picture of young people's ability to judge and challenge AI. Filling in that knowledge gap will be a focus of subsequent work conducted by the Ayre Think Tank.

### Using technology is not the same as being skilled at it

Some sources rely on people describing their own abilities or reporting how often they use particular technologies. Someone saying they can use AI, install software or find information online does not necessarily mean they can do so competently.

Surveys also differ in whom they question. Some cover nationally representative populations, while others are limited to students, volunteers or users of particular services. Some have

relatively few young respondents. Their findings cannot automatically be applied to all young people in a country.

Information from AI platforms presents another challenge. It may count conversations rather than individual users, and the ages of those users are not always known. Frequent use of AI, including for studying or coding, does not establish whether the work produced is accurate, useful or economically valuable.

### Some indicators measure the conditions around young people

Many of the indicators describe circumstances that influence readiness, rather than measuring young people's abilities or experiences directly.

For example, electricity access and mobile-network coverage are largely measured for the population as a whole. They do not necessarily show whether young people themselves have reliable access. The research found that the available evidence leaves uncertainty about the scoring band for young people in 51 countries for 4G coverage and 30 countries for electricity access. The measure of disrupted internet connections comes from surveys of businesses rather than young people.

The same distinction applies to education, employment and rights. School attendance or curriculum provision does not establish how effectively AI is being taught. Most of the 21 employment and enterprise indicators describe general labour-market conditions rather than jobs created or displaced by AI. Similarly, the existence of a law or regulatory safeguard does not establish whether it is being enforced or whether young people can use it to obtain protection or redress.

These measures remain useful because they describe important conditions affecting opportunity. They should not, however, be mistaken for direct evidence of the benefits young people are receiving from AI, the effectiveness of education or compliance with legal obligations.

### Some information may be out of date

The index draws on a wide range of published sources, including official statistics, international databases and research studies, collected in different years. Some predate the rapid expansion of generative AI, while others may not reflect recent changes in government policy, education or infrastructure.

A country may have introduced a new programme or law since the information used in the index was collected. Equally, a policy announced before the research cut-off may not yet have been implemented. The index reflects the evidence available at the time of the research, rather than every subsequent development.

### A score does not mean all the evidence exists

Where information is missing, the research rules sometimes allow an estimate to be used so that a country can still receive a readiness score. But an estimate does not replace the missing source evidence.

The separate Data Gap Index makes these gaps visible. It covers all 111 indicators across the framework. Permitted estimates continue to count as gaps, while permitted stand-ins based on qualifying published sources count as available evidence.

The differences between countries are substantial. The Bahamas has gaps on 78 of the 111 indicators, compared with 18 in Bangladesh. A country can therefore have scores for every scored pillar while still lacking much of the underlying information needed for a more complete assessment.

Two pillars, Motivation and confidence and Purposeful use and creation, have no score for 28 and 23 countries respectively, most of them small youth states. Where countries do have these scores, they average about 7 out of 10, compared with 3.2 to 4.6 for Rights, safety and participation, Education and training provision and Decent work, enterprise and transitions, which every country has. A country without them therefore tends to rank lower, and the Data Gap Index shows where this applies.

The Data Gap Index does not reduce a country's readiness score. It shows how much source evidence is missing and helps identify where further research is most needed.

**The exact rankings are not definitive**

The researchers also tested what would happen if different reasonable rules were used to combine the available information.

Some countries' positions changed considerably. When every available indicator was given equal weight, rather than every pillar, Samoa moved from forty-first to thirtieth and Sierra Leone from thirty-third to fifty-second. Under a separate calculation using a geometric mean, Papua New Guinea moved from thirty-second to forty-fourth. Counted under those two calculations, and on the four pillars that every country has, the number of countries at or above the readiness benchmark of 53 is 20, 13 and 12, against 15 in the published index.

Another test required countries to have figures for at least half of the 102 scored indicators before receiving a rank. Under that rule, 20 countries would not qualify, although all 56 remain included in the published index.

These tests do not invalidate the published ranking. They show that some positions depend on how the available evidence is combined and how missing information is treated. The research does not establish statistical confidence intervals for each country's final position, so small differences in scores should not be treated as proof that one country is definitively better prepared than another. Two further points are set out in Part II. Sri Lanka's position against the benchmark depends on the reading given to one sub-pillar, the use of AI for health, money and personal matters, where more use scores higher, and the Motivation and confidence figures for most countries come from a 2021 poll, taken more than a year before ChatGPT was released.

The most useful approach is to read each country's readiness score alongside its Data Gap Index and the strength of the evidence behind it. Together, these offer a better understanding of what is known, what remains uncertain and where further investigation or action may be most valuable.

**Readiness benchmark and GDP illustrations**

The readiness benchmark of 53 is a study-defined classification. The statistical tests support its use as a common benchmark, but they cannot prove that a country crossing it would immediately receive an economic benefit. The IMF's model treats preparedness and exposure as factors that influence AI-related gains, rather than as a switch that turns at a particular score.

The financial figures apply the IMF's ten-year GDP-level effects for broad groups of economies to a reference year's GDP. They are illustrative economic opportunities, not country-specific forecasts, annual recurring gains or the total accumulated over ten years. Nor are the figures an estimate of the additional GDP caused solely by crossing 53.

There is also an important distinction between the two bodies of research. The index examines the conditions affecting young people, while the IMF estimates concern entire economies. The financial illustrations do not establish what proportion of any eventual economic gains would accrue to young people. The White Paper's argument is that improving youth readiness could help countries capture and share more of AI's economic benefits, but the distribution of those benefits will depend on wider economic and policy decisions. A full account of the benchmark, country assignments, assumptions and limitations appears in Part II, while the calculations for all 56 countries are provided in Annex F.

## THE INDEX

The Ayre Index, the 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index, ranks all 56 member countries by the conditions that help young people benefit from AI. Each country receives a score out of 100, reflecting access to technology, digital capability, education, work, rights and other measures of readiness. Singapore leads with 77.6. Malawi scores 26.3 (Figure 2). The results show how widely the foundations for sharing in AI's benefits differ across the Commonwealth.

The horizontal line in Table 1 marks the study's fixed readiness benchmark of 53. The 15 countries above the line meet that benchmark; the 41 below it have not yet reached it. The line falls between Nigeria (54.5, fifteenth) and Seychelles (51.8, sixteenth).

The final two columns show how many of the 102 scored indicators have usable values and the separate Data Gap Index (Figure 4), where a higher figure means more source evidence is missing. Each country's score averages the pillars for which it has figures, from four to all seven, and Annex D shows each country's rank when all 56 are scored on the same four pillars. Asterisks identify the small youth states, and daggers the countries whose Purposeful use and creation score rests wholly on student samples, polls of young volunteers or the conversation records of one AI assistant's users of all ages, each labelled in Annex A. The Technical Methodology in Part II explains the benchmark and scoring rules in detail, while Annex E contains the complete pillar scores (Figure 3)[5].

**Table 1.** Complete Ayre Index: 56 countries ranked by score. The line at 53 separates the two study-defined readiness groups.

| Rank | Member | Index | Scoring coverage (of 102) | Data Gap Index (of 100) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Singapore | 77.6 | 75 | 37.7 |
| 2 | Malta | 75.0 | 68 | 41.4 |
| 3 | Australia | 71.0 | 76 | 26.2 |
| 4 | United Kingdom | 70.8 | 84 | 20.1 |
| 5 | Canada | 70.2 | 76 | 31.8 |
| 6 | Malaysia | 69.0 | 72 | 29.0 |
| 7 | Cyprus | 67.4 | 74 | 34.1 |
| 8 | Mauritius † | 64.4 | 61 | 49.4 |
| 9 | New Zealand | 63.9 | 55 | 50.1 |
| 10 | Brunei Darussalam * | 62.3 | 57 | 56.3 |
| 11 | India | 60.6 | 80 | 20.7 |
| 12 | Fiji * | 56.9 | 60 | 47.9 |
| 13 | South Africa | 56.8 | 75 | 32.0 |
| 14 | Trinidad and Tobago † | 56.5 | 58 | 56.6 |
| 15 | Nigeria | 54.5 | 82 | 17.4 |
| 16 | Seychelles * | 51.8 | 39 | 73.1 |

| Rank | Member | Index | Scoring coverage (of 102) | Data Gap Index (of 100) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17 | Ghana † | 51.2 | 73 | 31.7 |
| 18 | Jamaica † | 50.7 | 61 | 51.2 |
| 19 | Sri Lanka † | 49.9 | 54 | 52.7 |
| 20 | Zambia † | 48.8 | 65 | 40.5 |
| 21 | Bangladesh | 48.7 | 84 | 14.4 |
| 22 | Kenya | 48.7 | 66 | 42.9 |
| 23 | Uganda † | 47.0 | 61 | 50.0 |
| 24 | Pakistan | 46.4 | 84 | 15.7 |
| 25 | Tanzania † | 45.5 | 63 | 41.0 |
| 26 | Gabon | 45.3 | 43 | 67.1 |
| 27 | Antigua and Barbuda * | 45.2 | 41 | 70.6 |
| 28 | Maldives * | 44.9 | 41 | 71.4 |
| 29 | Cameroon † | 44.9 | 54 | 53.9 |
| 30 | The Bahamas * | 44.7 | 35 | 78.5 |
| 31 | Guyana * | 44.5 | 49 | 65.5 |
| 32 | Papua New Guinea † | 44.1 | 38 | 67.9 |
| 33 | Sierra Leone † | 43.6 | 64 | 46.5 |
| 34 | Barbados * | 43.0 | 43 | 70.5 |
| 35 | Belize * | 42.8 | 50 | 65.2 |
| 36 | Namibia † | 42.7 | 52 | 56.2 |
| 37 | Togo † | 42.6 | 58 | 51.8 |
| 38 | Grenada * | 41.7 | 45 | 66.2 |
| 39 | Nauru * | 41.6 | 44 | 69.2 |
| 40 | Dominica * | 41.3 | 37 | 75.1 |
| 41 | Samoa * | 41.0 | 47 | 65.1 |
| 42 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 39.5 | 38 | 72.1 |
| 43 | Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 39.0 | 37 | 75.1 |
| 44 | Mozambique † | 38.9 | 53 | 58.1 |
| 45 | Botswana † | 38.9 | 63 | 53.8 |
| 46 | Kiribati * | 38.4 | 44 | 66.9 |
| 47 | Rwanda † | 38.1 | 60 | 50.2 |
| 48 | Tonga * | 37.9 | 49 | 62.8 |
| 49 | Saint Lucia * | 37.5 | 52 | 61.6 |
| 50 | The Gambia † | 37.3 | 63 | 41.9 |
| 51 | Vanuatu * | 37.1 | 48 | 64.7 |
| 52 | Eswatini | 36.9 | 51 | 62.7 |
| 53 | Solomon Islands * | 32.0 | 36 | 75.6 |

| Rank | Member | Index | Scoring coverage (of 102) | Data Gap Index (of 100) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 54 | Tuvalu * | 31.6 | 42 | 69.1 |
| 55 | Lesotho | 27.8 | 55 | 54.9 |
| 56 | Malawi | 26.3 | 59 | 53.0 |





*Figure 2. Index scores of the 56 Commonwealth countries, out of 100. The dashed line is the readiness benchmark of 53. Asterisks mark the small youth states. Each country's scoring coverage and Data Gap Index are in Table 1.*





*Figure 3. Average pillar scores of the five highest-ranked and the five lowest-ranked countries, out of 10. Each average is taken over the countries with a score on that pillar. Source: Annex E.*





*Figure 4. Data Gap Index of each country, by Commonwealth region. A higher figure means more source evidence is missing. Each line is the region's average, weighted by its people aged 15 to 29. Countries with more young people count for more, so in every region most countries lie above the line. Sources: Annexes B and C.*

## THE READINESS BENCHMARK: THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Applied to Commonwealth economies, the IMF's scenarios show an illustrative economic opportunity of considerable significance. Forty-one of the Commonwealth's 56 member countries have yet to reach the readiness benchmark that the Ayre Index, the 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index, associates with stronger foundations for benefiting from AI. Improving their position could help them capture more of the productivity, employment and business opportunities emerging from AI.

### Where the line falls

The researchers established a fixed readiness benchmark of 53 out of 100, drawing on six methods that compare the Commonwealth scores with international AI preparedness measures and the distribution of the index's own results. Fifteen countries score at or above 53; 41 are below. The dividing point sits naturally between Nigeria, in fifteenth place with 54.5, and Seychelles, in sixteenth with 51.8. A score of 53 provides a consistent point against which countries can measure their own improvement in future editions.

### What is at stake

The IMF estimates how AI could raise the level of GDP over ten years, with different effects according to countries' economic structures and capacity to adopt the technology. The Ayre Think Tank has applied the IMF's low and high estimates for each economic group to Commonwealth countries, using national GDP figures to show their scale in US dollars. The moderate estimate sits halfway between the IMF's two cases[6].

| Readiness position | Conservative | Moderate | Optimistic |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15 countries at or above 53: illustrative AI-related GDP gain | $196.9bn | $389.2bn | $581.4bn |
| 41 countries below 53: illustrative economic opportunity | $14.4bn | $29.2bn | $44.1bn |

The opportunity is not evenly distributed. Bangladesh, ranked twenty-first, has an illustrative economic opportunity of $8.2 billion under the moderate scenario; Pakistan, ranked twenty-fourth, has a similar figure of $8.1 billion. Kenya's is approximately $2.0 billion and Ghana's $1.7 billion. At the other end of the index, Malawi's opportunity is about $216 million in the moderate case, ranging from $104 million to $328 million across the three scenarios. For economies facing persistent pressure to create jobs and raise incomes, even a share of such potential gains could matter.

The 15 countries above the line have a combined illustrative AI-related GDP gain of $389.2 billion in the moderate scenario. The United Kingdom alone accounts for approximately $126 billion in that case, while the corresponding figures are $64 billion and $188 billion in the conservative and optimistic cases. These amounts reflect only the countries' economic size and IMF group.

**Why this matters for young people**

The most important question is what improved readiness could mean in practice. Reliable access would allow more young people to learn and work with AI tools. Better teaching could give them the confidence to check answers and create solutions of their own. Stronger links between training, employers and enterprise could help translate those skills into productive work, especially where large numbers of young people are currently unemployed or working informally. Locally relevant technologies could help small businesses and communities make use of information and services that have previously been out of reach.

The readiness benchmark is a prompt for action, not an automatic economic switch. The IMF does not find that countries below 53 receive no benefits from AI, and the study has not calculated the incremental GDP caused by a country crossing that line. Its illustrative economic opportunity figures show the potential scale of AI's economic effects under an explicit scenario assumption. They should not be read as guaranteed gains, annual additions to GDP or losses already incurred. Full calculations and qualifications appear in the Technical Methodology and Annex F[7].

## MEMBER STATE PROFILES

The financial figures accompanying each country profile in the Ayre Index, the 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index, are illustrative estimates of AI-related effects on the level of GDP after ten years. For countries at or above the readiness benchmark of 53, they are described as illustrative AI-related GDP gains; for those below it, as illustrative economic opportunities. Each figure is the country's GDP multiplied by the IMF's percentage for its economic group. The scoring-coverage figures include permitted estimates, while the separate Data Gap Index identifies missing source evidence.

### Antigua and Barbuda

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 93,772 | Youth population: 20,398

**Rank: Twenty-seventh | Index: 45.2/100 | Scoring: 41/102 | Data Gap Index: 70.6/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $16m | Moderate $34m | Optimistic $51m**

Young Antiguans and Barbudans live in a country with much of the basic infrastructure needed to use AI. Electricity access is recorded as universal, 4G covers 99 per cent of the population and the selected mobile-data basket costs 2.26 per cent of average income. That helps explain the relatively strong Meaningful access score of 8.4 out of 10. The employment evidence is more mixed: the 2023 labour force survey records 14.4 per cent of young people outside work, education and training, although most school leavers who had jobs described them as stable or satisfactory.

What is less clear is how young people actually use AI or what skills they have. There are no qualifying scores for Digital, data, media and AI capability, Purposeful use and creation or Motivation and confidence, and only 41 of 102 scored indicators have figures. The education measure does not record computing as implemented in the curriculum under the research classification.

### Australia

Region: Pacific | Population: 26.7 million | Youth population: 5.4 million

**Rank: Third | Index: 71.0/100 | Scoring: 76/102 | Data Gap Index: 26.2/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $28.776bn | Moderate $56.653bn | Optimistic $84.530bn**

Australia is third in the index and combines strong access with generally high reported confidence about AI. Yet its strongest scores do not eliminate practical weaknesses. The Meaningful access pillar scores 8.7 out of 10, even though 60.7 per cent of surveyed firms reported a disrupted internet connection. The Digital, data, media and AI capability score of 7.5 draws on AI-specific observations because the qualifying household digital-skills measures are absent from four of its sub-pillars. A seemingly broad capability result therefore needs to be read with care.

The more striking contrast is employment. Decent work, enterprise and transitions scores 5.3, and the research records 46.2 per cent of young employees on temporary contracts in 2021. Australia has information for all seven scored pillars and a relatively complete record, but that does not turn favourable access and attitudes into proof that young people are moving into secure jobs. The profile points towards the value of connecting AI education to real labour-market outcomes.

### The Bahamas

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 401,283 | Youth population: 89,175

**Rank: Thirtieth | Index: 44.7/100 | Scoring: 35/102 | Data Gap Index: 78.5/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $111m | Moderate $230m | Optimistic $348m**

The Bahamas illustrates how a country can appear well connected while remaining hard to assess. Electricity is universal, 4G covers 95 per cent of the population and an ITU estimate puts internet use across the whole population at 92.5 per cent. Meaningful access consequently scores 8.2 out of 10. Its labour force survey offers a further glimpse. In 2024, 11 per cent of young Bahamians in the labour force were unemployed, and an ILO model puts 15 per cent of those aged 15 to 24 outside work, education and training in 2025.

Much else remains unknown. The Bahamas has the highest weighted Data Gap Index score in the study, at 78.5 out of 100, with missing evidence for 78 of the 111 indicators. Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis each lack evidence for more indicators, at 79, but The Bahamas has the largest weighted gap because of where its missing evidence falls within the framework. There is no qualifying score for young people on Digital, data, media and AI capability, Purposeful use and creation or Motivation and confidence. Its Education and training provision score of 2.0 rests on only three measures, including general teacher training rather than AI teaching.

### Bangladesh

Region: Asia | Population: 173.6 million | Youth population: 48.3 million

**Rank: Twenty-first | Index: 48.7/100 | Scoring: 84/102 | Data Gap Index: 14.4/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $4.107bn | Moderate $8.214bn | Optimistic $12.321bn**

Bangladesh offers one of the clearest contrasts between enthusiasm for AI and conventional digital skills. It scores 8.7 out of 10 for Motivation and confidence, and 76.3 per cent of surveyed young people expected to use AI for education or work in the following year. Its Digital, data, media and AI capability score, however, is just 2.3. In a 2023 household survey, 39.6 per cent of young respondents reported installing software and 0.8 per cent reported writing a computer program.

Those figures measure particular digital tasks, not all the abilities needed to use generative AI. The gap nevertheless suggests an important question about practical preparation. Only 28

per cent of young respondents in the relevant AI survey reported using it for study, and 12 per cent for work. Bangladesh has one of the fullest evidence records in the index, with figures for 84 of 102 scored indicators. The opportunity is to investigate how interest in AI can become stronger skills and productive activity.

### Barbados

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 282,467 | Youth population: 54,900

**Rank: Thirty-fourth | Index: 43.0/100 | Scoring: 43/102 | Data Gap Index: 70.5/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $56m | Moderate $116m | Optimistic $176m**

Barbados has many of the foundations of connectivity in place. Electricity access is universal and the recorded broadband performance is relatively strong. Meaningful access scores 8.0 out of 10. But connectivity does not fully describe the experience of young Barbadians: the reported internet-use figure is a whole-population stand-in, and the language measures cannot establish whether AI handles everyday Bajan speech well. The research provides no qualifying scores for young people on Purposeful use and creation, Motivation and confidence or Digital, data, media and AI capability.

The economic picture is also less comfortable than the infrastructure figures imply. Historical labour-market sources record high informality among young workers and unemployment among those who previously had jobs. Education and training provision scores 2.8, with computing classified as planned rather than implemented under the selected curriculum measure. Only 11 of the 43 available scored figures directly describe young people. For Barbados, the question is how strong infrastructure translates into skills and opportunity, something the present evidence cannot yet answer.

### Belize

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 410,919 | Youth population: 112,351

**Rank: Thirty-fifth | Index: 42.8/100 | Scoring: 50/102 | Data Gap Index: 65.2/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $23m | Moderate $48m | Optimistic $73m**

Belize stands out for relatively widespread recorded access among young people: 82.4 per cent owned a mobile phone and 92.2 per cent used the internet in the relevant surveys. Its Meaningful access pillar scores 8.0 out of 10, helped by near-universal electricity. There are drawbacks, including 4G coverage of 87 per cent and internet interruptions reported by more than half the firms in the source survey. Good availability therefore does not necessarily mean every young person enjoys dependable service.

Some 22.5 per cent of young people were outside employment, education and training. Education and training provision scores only 2.0, and the selected curriculum source does not record computing as implemented. There are no qualifying scores for Digital, data, media and AI capability, Purposeful use and creation or Motivation and confidence. The findings

point to a need for more visible routes to technical learning and better direct measurement of the opportunities available to young Belizeans.

### Botswana

Region: Africa | Population: 2.52 million | Youth population: 0.74 million

**Rank: Forty-fifth | Index: 38.9/100 | Scoring: 63/102 | Data Gap Index: 53.8/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $139m | Moderate $289m | Optimistic $438m**

For Botswana, employment presents a sharper challenge than internet reach. Meaningful access scores 7.2 out of 10, but Decent work, enterprise and transitions scores only 2.9. The underlying labour-market data report unemployment among 39.6 per cent of young people in the labour force, with many of those unemployed searching for more than a year. High reported informality and temporary employment point to a difficult transition from education into stable livelihoods.

The digital-skills findings are also weak. In a 2024 household survey, 19.4 per cent of young people had installed software and 3.8 per cent had written a computer program. The country's challenge is therefore both to strengthen practical opportunity and to gather better evidence about whether young people can use emerging technology to improve their prospects.

### Brunei Darussalam

Region: Asia | Population: 455,500 | Youth population: 112,300

**Rank: Tenth | Index: 62.3/100 | Scoring: 57/102 | Data Gap Index: 56.3/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $150m | Moderate $301m | Optimistic $451m**

Brunei Darussalam enters the top ten, with strong access and a score of 9.0 out of 10 for Purposeful use and creation. That result comes from a revealing observation: 59.3 per cent of surveyed 15 year olds reported using AI chatbots for schoolwork at least weekly. It shows that AI has entered some classrooms. However, it is the only qualifying sub-pillar within that broader use score, so it cannot tell us how widely young people use AI for work, enterprise or other activities.

Other evidence is promising but mixed. A 2024 survey found 69.6 per cent of young people had installed software, while the research records only partial curriculum provision for computing. Around 42.8 per cent of unemployed young people had been seeking work for at least a year. The country's index position should therefore lead to questions about breadth: can school-based engagement develop into sustained skills and employment opportunities?

### Cameroon

Region: Africa | Population: 29.1 million | Youth population: 8.0 million

**Rank: Twenty-ninth | Index: 44.9/100 | Scoring: 54/102 | Data Gap Index: 53.9/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $530m | Moderate $1.061bn | Optimistic $1.591bn**

Cameroon sits near the middle of the index, but the evidence suggests two very different stories. On attitudes, young people were divided: 35.2 per cent thought AI would mostly help their country and 36.6 per cent thought it would mostly cause harm. On enterprise, 25.3 per cent of people aged 18 to 29 were starting or running a business in the cited research. These findings point to interest and initiative, but neither establishes that AI is creating economic opportunities.

The barriers remain significant. The labour-market sources record extensive informal work, and the Rights, safety and participation pillar scores 2.1 out of 10 under its specified indicators. Purposeful use and creation is inferred from the conversations of all users of one AI assistant, rather than direct evidence about young Cameroonians. There is also no qualifying Digital, data, media and AI capability score. Cameroon needs better evidence about the skills behind its entrepreneurial activity and the protections young people experience when using AI.

### Canada

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 41.2 million | Youth population: 8.0 million

**Rank: Fifth | Index: 70.2/100 | Scoring: 76/102 | Data Gap Index: 31.8/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $37.118bn | Moderate $73.077bn | Optimistic $109.035bn**

Canada combines excellent connectivity with a comparatively strong evidence base. Meaningful access scores 9.4 out of 10, and the index places it fifth overall. Young people's attitudes towards AI are generally favourable, but reported behaviour is more varied: 37.7 per cent of surveyed young people used AI for their studies and 10 per cent for work.

The less obvious weakness is Education and training provision, which scores 5.3. The selected curriculum evidence records computing in some schools or districts, while the national teacher-policy indicator does not explicitly mention AI. Canada also records entrepreneurial activity among young adults, but this cannot by itself show that AI skills are creating successful businesses. The policy question is how strong infrastructure and interest are converted into consistent teaching, practical capability and worthwhile economic opportunities.

### Cyprus

Region: Europe | Population: 1.36 million | Youth population: 0.23 million

**Rank: Seventh | Index: 67.4/100 | Scoring: 74/102 | Data Gap Index: 34.1/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $618m | Moderate $1.216bn | Optimistic $1.814bn**

Cyprus combines strong internet access with substantial reported AI use. Its Meaningful access score is 9.2 out of 10, and only 4.6 per cent of firms in the cited survey reported connection disruptions. In the relevant European survey, 86 per cent of young respondents used AI for their studies or work, while many also reported using it for advice or translation. This helps explain its relatively high Purposeful use and creation score of 8.0.

The figures also reveal reasons to look beyond usage. Only 26.8 per cent of surveyed young people had changed privacy settings and 8.4 per cent had written a computer program. Teacher training is similarly uneven: the cited survey reports 31.5 per cent of teachers using AI in teaching despite a high general teacher-training figure. Cyprus performs well across the seven scored pillars, but its next challenge is to ensure that frequent use is accompanied by informed judgement, broader skills and consistent educational support.

### Dominica

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 66,205 | Youth population: 13,656

**Rank: Fortieth | Index: 41.3/100 | Scoring: 37/102 | Data Gap Index: 75.1/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $5m | Moderate $10m | Optimistic $16m**

Dominica's young people appear well connected in the available evidence. Electricity access is universal and 97.9 per cent of young people reported using the internet. Nevertheless, mobile speeds and affordability are weaker than those headline figures suggest. A 2024 household survey also shows a mixture of everyday digital familiarity and more specialised skills. Among young people who had used a computer or tablet in the previous three months, 70.7 per cent had sent a message with a file attached, while 6.4 per cent had written a computer program.

Education is more constrained. The Education and training provision score is 1.7 out of 10, among the lowest in the index, and the selected curriculum measure does not record computing as implemented. Only 44.4 per cent of secondary teachers were classified as trained in the source series, a general teaching indicator rather than an AI-specific one. Without its five estimates, Dominica ranks forty-first rather than fortieth, and its estimates allow any rank from twenty-fifth to fifty-second (Annex D).

**Eswatini**

Region: Africa | Population: 1.24 million | Youth population: 0.36 million

**Rank: Fifty-second | Index: 36.9/100 | Scoring: 51/102 | Data Gap Index: 62.7/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $36m | Moderate $75m | Optimistic $114m**

Eswatini illustrates the difference between reaching the internet and being able to build a livelihood around digital skills. The index records 66.3 per cent internet use among young people and electricity reaching 89.3 per cent of the population. Yet the selected mobile-data basket costs 17.37 per cent of income for the poorest 40 per cent, making regular use far more difficult for lower-income households. Its Meaningful access score is 7.1 out of 10, but Digital, data, media and AI capability scores only 1.2.

The employment challenge is particularly stark. The source data report unemployment among 52.6 per cent of young people in the labour force, the highest rate in the study, alongside substantial informal work. A household survey also records low participation in selected computer tasks. There are no qualifying scores for actual AI use or young people's attitudes. The picture is of connected opportunities that remain hard to afford, learn from and convert into stable work.

**Fiji**

Region: Pacific | Population: 928,784 | Youth population: 229,382

**Rank: Twelfth | Index: 56.9/100 | Scoring: 60/102 | Data Gap Index: 47.9/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $43m | Moderate $90m | Optimistic $136m**

Fiji is one of the most interesting countries in the index because young people's reported relationship with AI is unusually visible. In a 2025 survey, 62.5 per cent said they used AI for study and 49.3 per cent for work; 85.3 per cent expected to use it for education or employment in the next year. Purposeful use and creation scores 9.9 out of 10 and Motivation and confidence 9.3.

The foundations look much less even. Digital, data, media and AI capability scores 3.6 and Education and training provision 3.8 under their different measures. Internet reliability is a concern, with 71.2 per cent of firms reporting a disruption, while local-language digital support is limited under the selected indicator. Fiji shows why high AI interest should be matched by practical training, dependable access and more evidence about economic benefits. Scored on the four pillars that every country has, which leave out its Purposeful use and creation score, Fiji ranks thirty-seventh rather than twelfth (Annex D).

### Gabon

Region: Africa | Population: 2.54 million | Youth population: 0.63 million

**Rank: Twenty-sixth | Index: 45.3/100 | Scoring: 43/102 | Data Gap Index: 67.1/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $150m | Moderate $311m | Optimistic $471m**

Gabon has substantial recorded access to the internet but a much more difficult employment picture. A reported 81 per cent of young people use the internet and 84.7 per cent own a mobile phone; Meaningful access scores 7.5 out of 10. Yet the labour-market findings are troubling. The research records 33.7 per cent youth unemployment, prolonged job searches for many unemployed young people and very high shares of informal and temporary work.

The Decent work, enterprise and transitions pillar consequently scores only 2.7, one of the lowest results in the index. Education and training provision performs better at 4.7, although the selected curriculum measure does not record computing as implemented. No qualifying scores are available for Digital, data, media and AI capability or Purposeful use and creation. Gabon's profile therefore raises a direct question: even where devices and networks are available, how can young people acquire usable skills and find secure opportunities?

### The Gambia

Region: Africa | Population: 2.42 million | Youth population: 0.72 million

**Rank: Fiftieth | Index: 37.3/100 | Scoring: 63/102 | Data Gap Index: 41.9/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $18m | Moderate $38m | Optimistic $57m**

In The Gambia, basic affordability is an immediate obstacle. The selected data basket costs 8.68 per cent of average monthly income and nearly a fifth of income for the poorest 40 per cent. Mobile speeds are also among the slowest recorded, despite significant phone ownership and reported internet use among young people. Meaningful access scores 5.0 out of 10. This combination suggests that a connection may be available without being convenient or affordable for frequent use.

The Digital, data, media and AI capability score is just 0.5, based on older household-survey questions about tasks such as installing software and writing computer programs. Meanwhile, a higher Purposeful use and creation score comes from a survey of university students aged 18 to 29 who already use ChatGPT, taken between October 2024 and February 2025. Of the 83 Gambian students who answered, 56.6 per cent said they use ChatGPT to help them study at least sometimes. The work evidence also records extensive informal employment. The Gambia's priority is to remove affordability and skills barriers while finding out how young people actually use AI, rather than assuming that university students' use describes them.

### Ghana

Region: Africa | Population: 34.4 million | Youth population: 9.3 million

**Rank: Seventeenth | Index: 51.2/100 | Scoring: 73/102 | Data Gap Index: 31.7/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $799m | Moderate $1.656bn | Optimistic $2.513bn**

Ghana has a striking divide between reported AI activity and the digital skills captured by conventional surveys. Purposeful use and creation scores 8.7 out of 10, drawn mostly from university students who already use ChatGPT, while Digital, data, media and AI capability scores just 1.6. The lower figure relies on household data from 2017 to 2018, before today's widely used generative AI services. It records only 0.6 per cent of young people writing a computer program. The difference says as much about what is measured, and when, as it does about present-day capability.

Connectivity offers a stronger foundation: 4G coverage reaches 99.3 per cent of the population, and 80.7 per cent of young people reported using the internet in the 2021 census. But Ghana's labour-market evidence includes widespread informal work and long periods of unemployment for many jobseekers. Computing is recorded as mandatory in primary and secondary schools under the selected curriculum measure. The next question is whether learning and use are translating into stronger skills and more secure work.

### Grenada

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 117,208 | Youth population: 25,988

**Rank: Thirty-eighth | Index: 41.7/100 | Scoring: 45/102 | Data Gap Index: 66.2/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $10m | Moderate $21m | Optimistic $31m**

Grenada's access figures initially look encouraging. Almost all young people in the cited survey used the internet and electricity reached most of the population. Yet mobile data consumed 13.05 per cent of income for the poorest 40 per cent, and the device-ownership figure is missing. The digital-skills survey also shows a familiar contrast among young people who used a computer or tablet. Sending a message with a file attached was common, but fewer reported installing software or using spreadsheet formulas, and only 3.9 per cent reported writing a computer program.

The labour-market evidence points to both initiative and difficulty. A substantial proportion of self-employed young workers employed others, but the cited unemployment series shows a very high share of unemployed young people searching for more than a year. Education and training provision scores 2.7, with no implementation of computing recorded under the chosen curriculum measure. Grenada has promising access, but the findings suggest that affordability, deeper skills and job transitions deserve closer attention.

### Guyana

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 831,086 | Youth population: 219,318

**Rank: Thirty-first | Index: 44.5/100 | Scoring: 49/102 | Data Gap Index: 65.5/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $190m | Moderate $393m | Optimistic $596m**

Guyana is unusual because its economic-opportunity indicators are stronger than might be expected from its connectivity record. Decent work, enterprise and transitions scores 6.0 out of 10; the cited data record relatively high shares of young workers employing others and school leavers reporting stable or satisfactory jobs. At the same time, 31.5 per cent of young people are outside work, education and training.

Access also varies considerably. Reported internet use and mobile ownership among young people are high, and the selected data basket is relatively affordable. But 4G reaches only about half the population in the source data, while digital language support is weak. Digital, data, media and AI capability scores 3.1 on older household observations. Guyana's challenge is to link its reported enterprise activity with more inclusive, reliable infrastructure and stronger practical skills.

### India

Region: Asia | Population: 1.45 billion | Youth population: 381.8 million

**Rank: Eleventh | Index: 60.6/100 | Scoring: 80/102 | Data Gap Index: 20.7/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $39.561bn | Moderate $79.121bn | Optimistic $118.682bn**

India illustrates the scale of the Commonwealth youth opportunity. The study counts approximately 382 million people aged 15 to 29. It ranks eleventh, helped by widespread 4G coverage and low selected data costs. Young people's reported interest in AI is especially high. In the relevant survey, 88.8 per cent expected to use AI for education or work in the coming year and 60.1 per cent expressed confidence in controlling their interactions with it.

The harder question is whether that enthusiasm can reach India's enormous and varied workforce. The research records 30.4 per cent of young people outside work, education and training and 85.8 per cent of young workers in informal employment. Only 66.5 per cent of young people owned a mobile phone in the cited data, despite strong national network coverage. India's findings make the case for looking beyond nationwide infrastructure towards affordable individual access, useful learning and pathways into decent work.

### Jamaica

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 2.84 million | Youth population: 0.72 million

**Rank: Eighteenth | Index: 50.7/100 | Scoring: 61/102 | Data Gap Index: 51.2/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $159m | Moderate $329m | Optimistic $500m**

Jamaica's score places it in the upper third of the 56-country table, but evidence about young people's actual AI use remains thin. Meaningful access scores 7.4 out of 10 and the work indicators record some favourable outcomes, including school leavers in stable or satisfactory jobs. Yet the Purposeful use and creation score is drawn from the conversations of all users of one AI assistant. It cannot say how many young Jamaicans are using AI for education, work or enterprise.

The directly observed digital-skills measures paint a more cautious picture. In household surveys, 15.6 per cent of people aged 15 to 24 installed software in 2023, and 2.9 per cent wrote a computer program in 2021. Rights, safety and participation scores 2.8 under the specified governance indicators. Jamaica would benefit from direct research into young people's AI use and digital judgement alongside measures of whether emerging tools support better work and education.

### Kenya

Region: Africa | Population: 56.4 million | Youth population: 16.7 million

**Rank: Twenty-second | Index: 48.7/100 | Scoring: 66/102 | Data Gap Index: 42.9/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $952m | Moderate $1.971bn | Optimistic $2.991bn**

Kenya is among the more interesting mid-ranked members because its governance and education indicators reveal both effort and remaining barriers. The index records a data-protection authority and a safeguard covering certain automated decisions under its specific legal measure. Its Rights, safety and participation score of 4.7 is comparatively strong outside the top ten. Among 15 year olds in the cited education survey, 55.5 per cent reported judging AI-generated material in lessons, although computational problem-solving results were weak.

Connectivity reaches much of the population, with 4G coverage at 97.3 per cent, but only 77 per cent electricity access is recorded and many firms reported disruptions. Decent work, enterprise and transitions and Digital, data, media and AI capability both score relatively poorly. Kenya therefore has signs of institutional preparation and classroom engagement without enough evidence that they consistently develop practical skills or improve employment. The specific legal scores describe the index's coding, not the effectiveness of every available remedy[8].

### Kiribati

Region: Pacific | Population: 134,518 | Youth population: 34,851

**Rank: Forty-sixth | Index: 38.4/100 | Scoring: 44/102 | Data Gap Index: 66.9/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $2m | Moderate $5m | Optimistic $8m**

Kiribati shows why the geography of small island states matters. The index records electricity access approaching universality, but 4G reaches only 62 per cent of the population and both mobile and fixed-network response times are among the slowest surveyed. In older 2018 to 2019 figures, just over half of young people owned a mobile phone or used the internet. Those figures are dated, but they indicate practical barriers to using online learning or AI services regularly.

Digital, data, media and AI capability scores 2.2 out of 10, with few young people in the household survey reporting more specialised computer tasks. The work indicators record a high share outside work, education and training, together with widespread informal employment. Kiribati's priority is to understand whether reliable, affordable access and appropriate training can be provided in ways suited to dispersed island communities.

### Lesotho

Region: Africa | Population: 2.34 million | Youth population: 0.67 million

**Rank: Fifty-fifth | Index: 27.8/100 | Scoring: 55/102 | Data Gap Index: 54.9/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $18m | Moderate $37m | Optimistic $57m**

Lesotho's profile is dominated by the difficulty of securing good work. Its Decent work, enterprise and transitions score is 2.5 out of 10, the lowest in the index. The underlying research records high unemployment, prolonged job searches, extensive informal employment and a very small share of young people in apprenticeships or other work-based learning. These figures describe a fundamental obstacle to turning any new skill into a livelihood.

Access is uneven rather than uniformly poor. Mobile network speeds can be comparatively fast, and many young people report phone ownership, but electricity reaches only 60.6 per cent of the population. The selected mobile-data basket takes nearly a quarter of the income of the poorest 40 per cent. The dated digital-skills survey yields a score of 0.9 and there is no qualifying AI-use score. Better practical training will matter, but affordability and employment pathways are equally central.

### Malawi

Region: Africa | Population: 21.7 million | Youth population: 6.5 million

**Rank: Fifty-sixth | Index: 26.3/100 | Scoring: 59/102 | Data Gap Index: 53.0/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $104m | Moderate $216m | Optimistic $328m**

Malawi is last in the published index, and the underlying access figures explain much of its position. Electricity reaches just 15.6 per cent of the population, the lowest share recorded, while 27.4 per cent of young people use the internet and 42 per cent own a mobile phone in the cited data. Mobile data is costly relative to income. These obstacles can prevent young people from reaching online tools long before the question of AI skills arises.

The Digital, data, media and AI capability pillar scores 0 out of 10 on its selected household-survey tasks. That is not a claim that no Malawian young person has digital or AI skills. The available surveys recorded very low rates of installing software, using spreadsheets and writing computer programs. Education and training provision also scores poorly and there are no qualifying indicators for AI use or motivation. Malawi's findings point first to electricity, usable connectivity and skills provision, accompanied by direct youth research.

### Malaysia

Region: Asia | Population: 34.1 million | Youth population: 8.9 million

**Rank: Sixth | Index: 69.0/100 | Scoring: 72/102 | Data Gap Index: 29.0/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $4.722bn | Moderate $9.444bn | Optimistic $14.166bn**

Malaysia's sixth-place ranking reflects strong access and high observed digital capability. A 2024 household survey found 41.9 per cent of young people had written a computer program, the highest recorded share among the top ten. Reported AI-related activity is also extensive, although several of those AI-use figures come from university students who already use ChatGPT, and those figures measure how often they use it. The country therefore has convincing strengths, alongside some gaps in what can be said about its entire youth population.

The weakest scored pillar is Rights, safety and participation, at 3.8 out of 10. That refers to the index's specified legal and governance indicators, not an absence of data-protection legislation or regulatory guidance. The selected education sources also indicate that national teacher policy does not name AI, despite recorded classroom activity. Malaysia's next challenge is to ensure that technical strength is matched by consistent teaching, informed use and practical protections[9].

**Maldives**

Region: Asia | Population: 571,891 | Youth population: 148,736

**Rank: Twenty-eighth | Index: 44.9/100 | Scoring: 41/102 | Data Gap Index: 71.4/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $54m | Moderate $112m | Optimistic $170m**

Maldives has many of the foundations for digital access. Electricity and 4G coverage are recorded as universal, while the latest qualifying youth-ownership and internet-use observations are high. Meaningful access scores 8.1 out of 10. But those youth observations date to 2016, making them less useful for understanding how today's teenagers and young adults experience AI. Dhivehi also scores as a low-resource language under the study's selected AI-language measure.

The labour-market findings are more mixed: 26.2 per cent of young people were outside work, education and training in the cited 2019 survey, while many people aged 25 to 29 were recorded in high-skill jobs. Teacher training is widespread, but there is little specific information about AI teaching.

**Malta**

Region: Europe | Population: 568,846 | Youth population: 104,932

**Rank: Second | Index: 75.0/100 | Scoring: 68/102 | Data Gap Index: 41.4/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $417m | Moderate $819m | Optimistic $1.222bn**

Malta ranks second and offers unusually direct evidence of young people's digital capability and use of AI. Its Digital, data, media and AI capability score is 9.2 out of 10. In a 2026 survey of 57 people aged 15 to 24, 92 per cent reported using AI for their studies or work, the highest recorded share in the index. Eurostat's 2025 survey of people aged 16 to 29 found 41.5 per cent using AI for education and 38.5 per cent for work. Strong access and comparatively favourable work indicators also support the result. The figures indicate extensive engagement, although frequency of use does not by itself establish quality or benefit.

The weaker points concern teaching and language. Malta's Education and training provision score is 6.1, with more modest results on computational problem solving and AI training for teachers than some other leading members. Maltese is a low-resource language in the relevant AI measure, despite otherwise favourable connectivity. Malta shows how close AI use and access can be, but also why education quality and local-language usefulness must be assessed separately.

### Mauritius

Region: Africa | Population: 1.25 million | Youth population: 0.26 million

**Rank: Eighth | Index: 64.4/100 | Scoring: 61/102 | Data Gap Index: 49.4/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $113m | Moderate $234m | Optimistic $355m**

Mauritius appears in the top ten, supported by good access and positive attitudes towards AI. In the source survey, 57.4 per cent of young respondents expected AI mostly to help people, supporting a Motivation and confidence score of 9.0 out of 10. Yet the higher Purposeful use and creation score does not come from a direct survey of young Mauritians: the available figures describe the conversations of all users of one AI assistant. The national result therefore tells us less about their actual AI habits than its position might suggest.

The work indicators reveal some comparatively favourable conditions, including a low share of young employees on temporary contracts, but evidence on enterprise is limited. Rights, safety and participation scores 3.0 under the study's particular indicators. This should not be taken to mean Mauritius lacks automated-decision protections or complaint arrangements under its data-protection legislation. Mauritius would benefit from clearer measures of young people's skills and use, alongside the recorded infrastructure and attitudes[10].

### Mozambique

Region: Africa | Population: 34.6 million | Youth population: 9.7 million

**Rank: Forty-fourth | Index: 38.9/100 | Scoring: 53/102 | Data Gap Index: 58.1/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $156m | Moderate $324m | Optimistic $491m**

Mozambique faces basic barriers to digital opportunity. Electricity reaches 36.9 per cent of the population, around half of young people own a mobile phone and only 35 per cent use the internet in the cited evidence. Data is also costly relative to household income. Meaningful access consequently scores 4.7 out of 10, limiting the practical reach of any AI initiative that assumes regular online access.

The work indicators are equally concerning. The research records very high informal employment, 80.5 per cent of employed young people living in poverty and a small share of people aged 25 to 29 in high-skill jobs. Motivation and confidence is more positive, but there is no qualifying Digital, data, media and AI capability score, while the Purposeful use and creation pillar rests on the conversations of all users of one AI assistant. The immediate questions for Mozambique concern affordable electricity, connectivity, relevant skills and the quality of available livelihoods, before claims can be made about economic gains from AI.

### Namibia

Region: Africa | Population: 3.03 million | Youth population: 0.80 million

**Rank: Thirty-sixth | Index: 42.7/100 | Scoring: 52/102 | Data Gap Index: 56.2/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $106m | Moderate $219m | Optimistic $332m**

Namibia's clearest problem is the transition into work. The index records unemployment among 47 per cent of young people in the labour force, the second highest rate in the comparison, and lengthy job searches for many of those unemployed. Decent work, enterprise and transitions consequently scores 3.1 out of 10. Some school leavers who do find work report satisfactory employment, illustrating how different the experience of those inside and outside the labour market can be.

Connectivity is similarly uneven. Phone ownership and internet use are substantial, but electricity reaches only 59.3 per cent of the population, fixed broadband is slow and many firms reported disrupted connections. The relevant curriculum measure does not record computing as implemented, despite a high general teacher-training figure. There is no qualifying Digital, data, media and AI capability score or direct youth score for Purposeful use and creation. Namibia needs evidence that connects access, practical skills and routes into reliable work.

### Nauru

Region: Pacific | Population: 11,947 | Youth population: 2,961

**Rank: Thirty-ninth | Index: 41.6/100 | Scoring: 44/102 | Data Gap Index: 69.2/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $1m | Moderate $3m | Optimistic $4m**

Nauru's record is unusually direct for a small youth state: 20 of its 44 available scored observations describe young people themselves. Its 2021 census records relatively low unemployment and its 2024 household survey relatively low temporary employment, but also a striking 49.9 per cent of young people outside work, education and training. Those figures describe different groups and make it important to ask who is missing out, even where employed young people report positive outcomes.

Most young respondents report access to phones and the internet, while electricity is universal. Nevertheless, slow mobile network response times and limited AI-language resources remain concerns. A 2023 digital-skills survey offers more concrete evidence than is available for many other island countries, including 13.2 per cent of young people reporting writing a computer program. Nauru's priority is to connect its relatively good youth data with better explanations of participation and exclusion.

### New Zealand

Region: Pacific | Population: 5.29 million | Youth population: 1.02 million

**Rank: Ninth | Index: 63.9/100 | Scoring: 55/102 | Data Gap Index: 50.1/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $4.225bn | Moderate $8.318bn | Optimistic $12.411bn**

New Zealand's ninth-place position rests on strong access and several encouraging educational measures. In the relevant source, 68.8 per cent of teachers used AI in teaching and 53 per cent of school students said AI is taught at their school. Motivation and confidence scores 8.5 out of 10, while comparatively few young respondents expected AI mostly to harm people. These indicators suggest an environment where AI is already part of education and public discussion.

The gaps are less obvious. The Digital, data, media and AI capability pillar scores just 3.0 and rests on a single question about how much young people say they know about AI. Two AI-use measures come from the conversations of all users of one AI assistant rather than from young people directly. Only 55 of 102 scored indicators have figures, the thinnest record among the top ten.

### Nigeria

Region: Africa | Population: 232.7 million | Youth population: 65.7 million

**Rank: Fifteenth | Index: 54.5/100 | Scoring: 82/102 | Data Gap Index: 17.4/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $2.617bn | Moderate $5.234bn | Optimistic $7.851bn**

Nigeria combines remarkable levels of reported enthusiasm for AI with relatively weak measures of conventional digital skills. Some 90 per cent expected to use AI for education or work within a year, the highest share in the index, and 67.8 per cent felt confident controlling their interactions with it. Motivation and confidence scores 8.7 out of 10. By contrast, the Digital, data, media and AI capability score of 0.8 rests mainly on a 2021 household survey in which few young people reported installing software or writing computer programs.

Nigeria also records substantial entrepreneurial and work-based learning activity, including a comparatively large number of young people in apprenticeships, internships or traineeships. Yet the labour market remains dominated by informal work, and very few people aged 25 to 29 are recorded in high-skill jobs. Nigeria's central challenge is to translate evident AI interest and entrepreneurial activity into more widespread skills and better-quality work, while updating the measures that may no longer reflect today's technology.

### Pakistan

Region: Asia | Population: 251.3 million | Youth population: 70.2 million

**Rank: Twenty-fourth | Index: 46.4/100 | Scoring: 84/102 | Data Gap Index: 15.7/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $4.073bn | Moderate $8.146bn | Optimistic $12.219bn**

Pakistan has relatively affordable mobile data and widespread electricity access, but these advantages have not produced equally widespread internet use. In the cited surveys, 49.8 per cent of young people used the internet and 58.4 per cent owned a mobile phone; the research also records very slow mobile downloads. The country scores 6.5 out of 10 for Meaningful access. Its youth digital-skills data show limited participation in tasks such as verifying online information, setting up security measures and writing computer programs.

Interest in AI is stronger than some of those foundations. Purposeful use and creation includes young respondents using AI for study, but fewer for work, and the larger reported AI-use figures, for translation, personal advice and creative writing, come from university students who already use ChatGPT. Education and training provision scores 2.5, with limited recorded provision across schools and teacher policy. Pakistan's opportunity is to close the distance between low-cost network availability, actual youth access and practical learning that can support employment.

### Papua New Guinea

Region: Pacific | Population: 10.6 million | Youth population: 2.9 million

**Rank: Thirty-second | Index: 44.1/100 | Scoring: 38/102 | Data Gap Index: 67.9/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $227m | Moderate $471m | Optimistic $715m**

Papua New Guinea presents perhaps the clearest warning against reading a single pillar score in isolation. Purposeful use and creation scores an exceptional 9.5 out of 10, but that result rests on one survey of 77 students at the University of Papua New Guinea, reported in 2026, in which 72 per cent said they use AI tools daily or weekly for any purpose. It does not establish that young people across the country use AI frequently or benefit from it. Meanwhile, its Meaningful access score of 3.3 is the lowest in the index, reflecting the formidable barriers to getting online.

The selected mobile-data basket costs 11.43 per cent of average income and 30.28 per cent for the poorest 40 per cent; electricity reaches 43.3 per cent of the population. Older youth observations record low phone ownership and internet use, while support for local languages is extremely limited under the selected measure. Papua New Guinea needs better access and direct youth evidence before its high inferred AI-use score can be treated as a broader success. On the four pillars that every country has, Papua New Guinea ranks fifty-fifth rather than thirty-second (Annex D).

### Rwanda

Region: Africa | Population: 14.3 million | Youth population: 4.0 million

**Rank: Forty-seventh | Index: 38.1/100 | Scoring: 60/102 | Data Gap Index: 50.2/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $115m | Moderate $237m | Optimistic $360m**

Rwanda shows why national network coverage is not the same as digital participation. The index records 4G coverage of 98.8 per cent and comparatively affordable data, but only 33.4 per cent of young people using the internet. Electricity reaches 72 per cent of the population and phone ownership is less widespread than the network figures might suggest. Its Meaningful access pillar scores 6.8 out of 10: an extensive network is a starting point, not proof that every young person can use it.

The Digital, data, media and AI capability score is 0.7 on the household-survey tasks, including spreadsheet work and writing computer programs. The curriculum measure records computing at one level of schooling, while the broader Education and training provision pillar scores 4.0. Purposeful AI use can be assessed only through the conversations of all users of one AI assistant, and motivation cannot be scored. Rwanda's practical challenge is to understand what keeps young people offline and what training would help them use existing infrastructure more effectively.

### Saint Kitts and Nevis

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 46,843 | Youth population: 9,876

**Rank: Forty-third | Index: 39.0/100 | Scoring: 37/102 | Data Gap Index: 75.1/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $8m | Moderate $17m | Optimistic $26m**

Saint Kitts and Nevis has an impressive basic connectivity record. Electricity and 4G reach the full population under the selected sources, the mobile-data basket is relatively affordable and 94.2 per cent of young people report internet use. Meaningful access scores 8.4 out of 10. Yet mobile download speeds are slow, some reliability information is estimated and there is no qualifying phone-ownership figure. The good headline numbers do not tell the whole story of service quality.

More importantly, there is very little evidence about what connected young people can do. Only 37 of 102 scored indicators have figures, and most of the employment measures are estimates rather than national youth observations. Without its five estimates, Saint Kitts and Nevis ranks fifty-second rather than forty-third, and its estimates allow any rank from thirty-fourth to fifty-second (Annex D).

### Saint Lucia

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 179,744 | Youth population: 41,933

**Rank: Forty-ninth | Index: 37.5/100 | Scoring: 52/102 | Data Gap Index: 61.6/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $19m | Moderate $39m | Optimistic $58m**

Saint Lucia combines very high reported youth internet use with a weaker picture of digital skills and economic opportunities. Electricity is universal and 99.4 per cent of young people in the relevant survey used the internet, but mobile speeds are slow and the selected data basket is costly for lower-income households. The Meaningful access pillar scores 7.5 out of 10. In the 2024 household survey, many young people who used a computer or tablet could send a message with a file attached, but far fewer reported installing software, using spreadsheet formulas or writing computer programs.

Education and training provision scores 3.5, with limited participation in education under the relevant measure. The labour-market sources also point to unemployment among young people and uneven work conditions. There is no qualifying score for Purposeful use and creation or Motivation and confidence. Saint Lucia's findings indicate that internet use is already common, but more evidence is needed on advanced skills and the routes from learning into productive employment.

### Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 100,616 | Youth population: 21,755

**Rank: Forty-second | Index: 39.5/100 | Scoring: 38/102 | Data Gap Index: 72.1/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $9m | Moderate $18m | Optimistic $28m**

Most young people in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines report using the internet, and electricity is universal. Nevertheless, frequent firm-level connection disruptions, slow mobile speeds and relatively expensive data limit the quality of access. Meaningful access scores 6.9 out of 10. The youth household survey tells a similar story about skills. Among young people who used a computer or tablet, 78.6 per cent had sent a message with a file attached, but just 2.9 per cent reported writing a computer program.

Employment is the sharper concern. ILO model estimates record unemployment among 41.9 per cent of those aged 15 to 24 in the labour force, while 25.7 per cent of that age group are outside employment, education or training. Education and training provision scores 2.5 under the specified measures. There are no qualifying scores for AI use or motivation, and 76 of 111 indicators lack evidence. Better evidence is needed, but the documented skills and employment pressures already justify close attention. Without its three estimates, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ranks fifty-first rather than forty-second, and its estimates allow any rank from thirty-seventh to fifty-second (Annex D).

### Samoa

Region: Pacific | Population: 218,019 | Youth population: 52,491

**Rank: Forty-first | Index: 41.0/100 | Scoring: 47/102 | Data Gap Index: 65.1/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $9m | Moderate $19m | Optimistic $28m**

Samoa has some promising employment indicators that sit uneasily beside an uncertain digital-access picture. The research records a comparatively high share of young workers employing others and a low share on temporary contracts. Yet 35.8 per cent of young people are outside work, education and training. Decent work, enterprise and transitions scores 5.5 out of 10, the country's second-strongest pillar, reflecting this mixed but sometimes positive picture.

Electricity is universal and 4G coverage is extensive, but the only internet-use figure is an ITU estimate for the whole population in 2014, which puts just 21.2 per cent online. That figure is too old to describe current habits confidently. More recent digital-task observations are modest, and there are no qualifying AI-use or motivation scores. Samoa also moves substantially under an alternative index weighting, reminding readers that the exact rank is sensitive to the calculation chosen.

### Seychelles

Region: Africa | Population: 130,418 | Youth population: 27,213

**Rank: Sixteenth | Index: 51.8/100 | Scoring: 39/102 | Data Gap Index: 73.1/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $17m | Moderate $35m | Optimistic $53m**

Seychelles is comparatively high in the index because much of the evidence it does have is encouraging. A 2025 labour force survey records low youth unemployment, limited informal employment and a high share of school leavers reporting stable or satisfactory work. Electricity is universal and the selected data basket is affordable. These findings suggest useful foundations for young people to benefit from new technology.

But Seychelles has a serious information problem. Only 39 of the 102 scored indicators have qualifying figures, and the wider Data Gap Index score is among the largest in the Commonwealth. There is no scored evidence for Digital, data, media and AI capability, Purposeful use and creation or Motivation and confidence. The access record also includes frequent reported disruptions and limited support for Seychellois Creole. The country's sixteenth-place ranking should therefore be understood as a promising but incomplete picture rather than proof of widespread AI readiness. On the four pillars that every country has, Seychelles ranks fourteenth rather than sixteenth (Annex D).

**Sierra Leone**

Region: Africa | Population: 8.64 million | Youth population: 2.50 million

**Rank: Thirty-third | Index: 43.6/100 | Scoring: 64/102 | Data Gap Index: 46.5/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $52m | Moderate $108m | Optimistic $164m**

Sierra Leone's full 10.0 out of 10 for Purposeful use and creation is eye-catching, but the basis matters. It comes from a single online poll of 122 volunteers aged 18 to 35, taken in March 2026, in which 79.3 per cent said they use AI for academic support. It is neither a direct measure of young Sierra Leoneans' AI use nor evidence that they are creating businesses or improving learning outcomes. At the opposite extreme, the Digital, data, media and AI capability score is 0, based on a much older 2017 household survey that records very low participation in particular computer tasks.

Access and employment offer further contrasts. The study records relatively responsive networks but electricity reaching only 39.2 per cent of the population. Some employment indicators appear favourable, including apprenticeship participation, while informal work is very widespread and stable or satisfactory jobs among school leavers are much less common. Sierra Leone needs current, direct evidence to clarify these apparent contradictions rather than letting either extreme pillar score dominate its story.

**Singapore**

Region: Asia | Population: 5.83 million | Youth population: 1.48 million

**Rank: First | Index: 77.6/100 | Scoring: 75/102 | Data Gap Index: 37.7/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $9.662bn | Moderate $19.022bn | Optimistic $28.382bn**

Singapore leads the index with strong connectivity, reported digital capability and generally favourable youth attitudes towards AI. Its Motivation and confidence pillar scores 10.0 out of 10, while Digital, data, media and AI capability scores 9.6. These are impressive results under the stated indicators. However, the motivation evidence dates from 2021, before today's mainstream generative-AI chatbots, so the findings should be refreshed rather than treated as a permanent description of young people's expectations.

The largest contrasts are elsewhere. Decent work, enterprise and transitions scores 5.7, held back partly by enterprise and employment-support measures, while Rights, safety and participation scores 4.3 under the chosen coding. That is not a claim that Singapore lacks a privacy regulator or AI guidance. Only five of 14 Purposeful use and creation indicators have figures. Even for the leading country, the index makes a case for more direct evidence on young people's actual AI activity, outcomes and experiences of safeguards[11].

**Solomon Islands**

Region: Pacific | Population: 819,198 | Youth population: 224,130

**Rank: Fifty-third | Index: 32.0/100 | Scoring: 36/102 | Data Gap Index: 75.6/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $12m | Moderate $25m | Optimistic $38m**

Solomon Islands faces fundamental problems of connectivity. The research records 4G reaching 35.2 per cent of the population, an ITU estimate of only 29 per cent for internet use across the whole population and a costly selected mobile-data basket. The Meaningful access score is 4.0 out of 10, the second lowest in the index. Language support also scores poorly under the study's available proxy. These conditions make it difficult to assume that online education or AI tools can reach young people consistently.

The employment evidence is also old. A 2013 survey records low measured unemployment, but other indicators show a small share of high-skill jobs and limited young entrepreneurship. Treating the low unemployment figure as proof of plentiful good work would therefore be misleading. Digital, data, media and AI capability, Purposeful use and creation and Motivation and confidence cannot be scored. The clearest priorities are current youth evidence and investment decisions grounded in real conditions of access and opportunity across the islands.

**South Africa**

Region: Africa | Population: 64.0 million | Youth population: 16.0 million

**Rank: Thirteenth | Index: 56.8/100 | Scoring: 75/102 | Data Gap Index: 32.0/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $4.699bn | Moderate $9.184bn | Optimistic $13.670bn**

South Africa ranks thirteenth, and the available youth surveys show considerable AI interest and activity. About half of young respondents reported using AI for study, while 88.2 per cent expected to use it for education or work in the following year. Meaningful access and also Motivation and confidence each score close to 8 out of 10. These figures suggest that many young people are already looking for ways to use AI, though use itself does not prove economic success.

The labour market is the central obstacle. The research records unemployment among 46.3 per cent of young people in the labour force, prolonged searches for many jobseekers and 39.6 per cent outside work, education and training. Decent work, enterprise and transitions scores 3.6. Education and training provision also scores relatively poorly despite recorded teacher training. South Africa's challenge is to turn active engagement with technology into better learning and wider access to decent employment.

### Sri Lanka

Region: Asia | Population: 21.8 million | Youth population: 4.8 million

**Rank: Nineteenth | Index: 49.9/100 | Scoring: 54/102 | Data Gap Index: 52.7/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $762m | Moderate $1.578bn | Optimistic $2.394bn**

Sri Lanka appears in the upper half of the ranking largely on the strength of connectivity and a number of broader institutional measures. Meaningful access scores 8.1 out of 10. But the research offers little direct evidence of young Sri Lankans' AI use or conventional digital skills. The Digital, data, media and AI capability score comes from a single awareness measure for ages 18 to 34, while the Purposeful use and creation score comes from the conversations of all users of one AI assistant. Neither gives a rounded picture of young people's actual capabilities.

The economic findings warrant attention. The source data record unemployment among young people, widespread informal work and a high share of temporary employment. Education and training provision scores 4.3, with computing recorded in some schools.

### Tanzania

Region: Africa | Population: 68.6 million | Youth population: 19.2 million

**Rank: Twenty-fifth | Index: 45.5/100 | Scoring: 63/102 | Data Gap Index: 41.0/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $631m | Moderate $1.307bn | Optimistic $1.983bn**

Tanzania's reported AI-use score is high, but it does not come from a direct survey of young Tanzanians. Purposeful use and creation scores 8.3 out of 10 and rests on two stand-ins. One is a survey of university students aged 18 to 29 who already use ChatGPT, taken between October 2024 and February 2025. Of the 319 Tanzanian students who answered, 67.1 per cent said they use ChatGPT to help them study at least sometimes. The other is the conversation records of one AI assistant's users of all ages. Against that, the access findings are distinctly less favourable: only 32.3 per cent of young people use the internet, 58.4 per cent own a mobile phone and electricity reaches 52.4 per cent of the population. The contrast calls for further investigation.

The labour-market figures indicate extensive informality, temporary work and working poverty, even alongside a relatively low measured unemployment rate. Education and training provision scores 2.3 and the reported share of young people attending education is particularly low.

### Togo

Region: Africa | Population: 8.41 million | Youth population: 2.24 million

**Rank: Thirty-seventh | Index: 42.6/100 | Scoring: 58/102 | Data Gap Index: 51.8/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $83m | Moderate $172m | Optimistic $262m**

Togo's networks cover much of the population, with 4G availability approaching universality, but affordability and reliability remain major problems. The selected mobile-data basket costs 9.46 per cent of average income and more than a fifth of income for the poorest 40 per cent; 74.4 per cent of firms reported disrupted connectivity. Less than half of young people used the internet in the relevant data. This helps explain a Meaningful access score of 5.2 out of 10 despite extensive reported network coverage.

Education and training provision scores just 2.5 out of 10, compared with 3.6 for Decent work, enterprise and transitions. The education result is particularly striking because participation in education is relatively high, yet the teacher-training source records a low proportion of trained teachers and the selected curriculum classification does not record computing as implemented. Formal unemployment is low, yet informal and temporary work are widespread. Purposeful use and creation rests on the conversations of all users of one AI assistant, with no qualifying Digital, data, media and AI capability score. Togo's key challenge is turning network reach into affordable access, useful skills and dependable livelihoods.

### Tonga

Region: Pacific | Population: 104,176 | Youth population: 27,317

**Rank: Forty-eighth | Index: 37.9/100 | Scoring: 49/102 | Data Gap Index: 62.8/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $5m | Moderate $10m | Optimistic $15m**

Tonga has reliable foundations in some parts of the access picture: electricity is universal, mobile download speeds are relatively fast and data costs less than 3 per cent of average income under the chosen basket. In the 2021 census, 69 per cent of people aged 15 to 29 owned a phone and 71.8 per cent used the internet. Meaningful access scores 7.0 out of 10. Yet Tongan is treated as a low-resource language by the AI-language proxy, which raises questions about how well digital services address local needs.

The digital-skills findings show more familiarity with security settings and checking online information than with installing software or writing computer programs. Employment indicators include low measured unemployment and relatively stable jobs among employed school leavers, but little evidence of young workers becoming employers.

### Trinidad and Tobago

Region: Caribbean and Americas | Population: 1.51 million | Youth population: 0.29 million

**Rank: Fourteenth | Index: 56.5/100 | Scoring: 58/102 | Data Gap Index: 56.6/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $182m | Moderate $376m | Optimistic $571m**

Trinidad and Tobago performs especially well on basic connectivity. The available youth data record almost universal phone ownership and internet use, producing a Meaningful access score of 9.2 out of 10, among the highest in the index. Digital, data, media and AI capability scores 6.1 under its selected survey tasks, while Education and training provision gives a more moderate picture of general teacher preparation and computing provision. The country illustrates how strong access can give young people a useful platform for developing new skills.

The employment evidence needs closer scrutiny. Although measured youth unemployment is relatively low, some work figures are estimates and the figures on starting a new business and owning an established business date from 2014. Motivation and confidence cannot be scored at all. The index therefore establishes connectivity more clearly than it establishes what young people are doing with AI or how their activity affects their prospects.

### Tuvalu

Region: Pacific | Population: 9,646 | Youth population: 2,345

**Rank: Fifty-fourth | Index: 31.6/100 | Scoring: 42/102 | Data Gap Index: 69.1/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative <$0.5m | Moderate $1m | Optimistic $1m**

Tuvalu has some favourable foundations, including universal electricity and relatively affordable mobile data under the selected measure. Yet 4G reaches only 31.3 per cent of the population, the lowest coverage in the index, and an ITU estimate for 2017 put internet use at just 35.2 per cent of the whole population. The Meaningful access pillar scores 5.5 out of 10. Its Digital, data, media and AI capability record offers more useful detail, with some young respondents reporting file-handling and software tasks, but there are no comparable observations about actual AI use.

Employment and education are equally mixed. More than a third of young people in the cited study were outside work, education and training, while the records also show some higher-skill jobs among employed adults aged 25 to 29. Rights, safety and participation scores 0 under its defined indicators, which must not be read as a definitive judgement on every national protection.

### Uganda

Region: Africa | Population: 45.9 million | Youth population: 13.4 million

**Rank: Twenty-third | Index: 47.0/100 | Scoring: 61/102 | Data Gap Index: 50.0/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $434m | Moderate $899m | Optimistic $1.364bn**

Uganda has a strong tradition of measured youth enterprise activity, but the underlying findings show why business creation is not the same as secure prosperity. The cited 2014 study records 41.9 per cent of people aged 18 to 29 starting or running a new business and 20.6 per cent owning an established one. Yet informal employment is widespread, many employed young people are poor and only a small share of those aged 25 to 29 work in high-skill jobs. The enterprise figures are also old and need updating.

Access remains a constraint. Electricity reaches 55.3 per cent of the population and less than half of young people report using the internet, while data is expensive for poorer households. The relatively high AI-use score comes from a survey of 609 volunteers aged 18 to 35, taken in person and online in March 2026, and from the conversations of all users of one AI assistant. Digital, data, media and AI capability cannot be scored. Uganda's challenge is to connect entrepreneurial ambition with affordable access, practical skills and better economic returns.

### United Kingdom

Region: Europe | Population: 69.1 million | Youth population: 12.7 million

**Rank: Fourth | Index: 70.8/100 | Scoring: 84/102 | Data Gap Index: 20.1/100**

**AI-related GDP gain (US$): Conservative $64.041bn | Moderate $126.082bn | Optimistic $188.122bn**

The United Kingdom is fourth overall, with strong connectivity, high recorded digital capability and comparatively high scores for governance measures. Meaningful access scores 9.3 out of 10. But the evidence suggests that these strengths do not automatically translate into extensive AI use by young people. Purposeful use and creation scores 4.7, the lowest among the top ten, with 31.5 per cent of young respondents reporting AI use for study and smaller shares for news, financial matters or translation.

Education and training provision scores 5.5, and the figures behind it show how little of this use begins in school. In a 2025 survey, 42.4 per cent of 15 year olds said their school lessons had asked them to judge what an AI chatbot produced, and 17.4 per cent said this happened often. Both are the lowest shares among the members with a figure. In England, 35 per cent of secondary teachers had been trained to use generative AI by early 2025. The United Kingdom's task is to turn strong conditions into broad, informed and beneficial use.

### Vanuatu

Region: Pacific | Population: 327,777 | Youth population: 82,463

**Rank: Fifty-first | Index: 37.1/100 | Scoring: 48/102 | Data Gap Index: 64.7/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $9m | Moderate $20m | Optimistic $30m**

Vanuatu is one of the countries where access remains a major obstacle to AI opportunity. In the 2020 census, 26.2 per cent of people aged 15 and over used the internet. Electricity reached 65.5 per cent of the population and many firms reported connection disruptions. Language resources also score poorly in the study's available proxy. Meaningful access scores 5.4 out of 10 despite relatively affordable data and substantial phone ownership in the source survey.

The Digital, data, media and AI capability score is 1.2 on the household-survey tasks, with few young respondents reporting software installation or computer programming. Employment findings show high informality, limited high-skill jobs and less favourable reported job stability among school leavers. Vanuatu's priorities are practical connectivity and education suited to its circumstances, backed by direct evidence about what young people need and can currently do.

### Zambia

Region: Africa | Population: 21.6 million | Youth population: 6.3 million

**Rank: Twentieth | Index: 48.8/100 | Scoring: 65/102 | Data Gap Index: 40.5/100**

**Economic opportunity (US$): Conservative $202m | Moderate $419m | Optimistic $635m**

Zambia appears in the top twenty, helped in part by a high reported Purposeful use and creation score of 7.7 out of 10. But that score rests on two stand-ins. One is a survey of university students aged 18 to 29 who already use ChatGPT, taken between October 2024 and February 2025. Of the 168 Zambian students who answered, 80.4 per cent said they use ChatGPT to help them study at least sometimes. The other is the conversation records of one AI assistant's users of all ages. The survey measures how often those already using ChatGPT turn to it, which is a different thing from how many young Zambians use AI. The country's access record is less favourable: fewer than half of young people use the internet, electricity reaches 53.6 per cent of the population and data is relatively costly for poorer households.

The work picture is also complicated. Older sources record substantial youth entrepreneurship, while newer indicators reveal widespread informal work, working poverty and prolonged unemployment for many jobseekers. Digital, data, media and AI capability cannot be scored and Education and training provision is modest under the selected measures. Zambia's next step is to test the inferred enthusiasm for AI against direct youth experience and to strengthen pathways from connectivity and enterprise into better-paid work. On the four pillars that every country has, Zambia ranks forty-fifth rather than twentieth (Annex D).

## ANALYSIS

### 1. The economic stakes are substantial, but the route to readiness differs between countries

The readiness benchmark of the Ayre Index, the 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index, reveals 41 countries whose foundations for benefiting from AI remain comparatively weak under the study's measures. Applying IMF economic scenarios to those countries produces an illustrative economic opportunity of $29.2 billion in the moderate case. The central policy question is therefore how countries can strengthen the particular conditions that limit their ability to benefit from AI.

Those foundations differ across countries. Ghana, with an index score of 51.2, is closer to the benchmark than Kenya at 48.7 or Uganda at 47.0, but the obstacles are not identical. Ghana combines widespread 4G coverage with modest measured digital capability; Kenya has signs of institutional and classroom preparation alongside electricity and employment constraints; Uganda has a strong tradition of enterprise but limited affordable access and extensive informal work. The same destination will require different routes, a reason to use the country findings as a guide to investigation rather than adopt one Commonwealth-wide programme.

### 2. A mobile signal is only the beginning of meaningful access

The spread of 4G has not removed the divide between being covered by a network and being able to use it. Rwanda records 98.8 per cent population coverage by 4G, while only 33.4 per cent of young people reported using the internet in the selected source. In Togo the corresponding figures are 99.7 and 44.9 per cent. Infrastructure reaches many communities in which young people are still not regular internet users. Device ownership, data costs, reliable electricity and the conditions in which young people can study or work help explain why a connection alone cannot be treated as opportunity.

For some economies even the foundations remain thin. Malawi has recorded electricity access of 15.6 per cent and youth internet use of 27.4 per cent. In Papua New Guinea the selected mobile-data basket costs more than 30 per cent of the income of the poorest 40 per cent. These are formidable constraints on using online courses, developing services or supporting enterprises with AI. Closing them could make existing education and entrepreneurship efforts far more effective.

### 3. Young people show an appetite for AI that their economies may struggle to reward

Interest in AI is already visible well beyond the countries with the strongest infrastructure. In Nigeria, 90 per cent of young respondents in the relevant survey expected to use AI for education or work within the following year. In Bangladesh the figure was 76.3 per cent. Fiji provides unusually direct evidence of current activity: 62.5 per cent of young respondents reported AI use for study and 49.3 per cent for work. These findings suggest curiosity and willingness to experiment, assets on which practical learning and enterprise support could build.

Yet confidence and use are only a starting point. Nigeria's score on the Digital, data, media and AI capability pillar is 0.8, and Bangladesh's is 2.3, while Fiji's is 3.6. These scores reflect specific measured tasks and should not be mistaken for direct tests of present-day AI competence. The deeper question is whether young people can evaluate outputs, solve useful problems and turn AI-assisted activity into better learning, paid work or stronger businesses. Future interventions will have greater value if they measure those outcomes rather than course enrolment or chatbot use alone.

### 4. The missing link between digital skills and decent work may be decisive

A country can perform well in readiness and still struggle to offer good jobs. South Africa ranks thirteenth, above the benchmark, but its labour-market sources record unemployment among 46.3 per cent of young people in the labour force and 39.6 per cent outside work, education and training. Elsewhere, Eswatini records 52.6 per cent youth unemployment and Namibia 47.0 per cent. The emergence of AI does not remove these difficulties. It increases the value of understanding whether new skills can meet actual demand.

Entrepreneurship is another incomplete measure of opportunity. Uganda's older source records 41.9 per cent of young adults starting or running businesses, but other indicators show widespread informality and working poverty. In Nigeria and Mozambique many young workers are also employed informally. Technology could help small firms reach markets, manage information or improve productivity, but those benefits depend on affordable tools, working capital, customer demand and viable businesses. Readiness policy must therefore be linked to jobs and enterprise, rather than confined to training programmes.

### 5. Education can turn familiarity with AI into a lasting capability

Schools and colleges are already encountering AI, but the scale and quality of preparation vary. In New Zealand, the relevant surveys report 68.8 per cent of teachers using AI in teaching and 53 per cent of school students saying AI is taught at their school. Malta records 37.4 per cent of teachers trained in AI within the source period, while the equivalent measure for the United Kingdom, for secondary teachers in England, is 35 per cent. These figures show engagement, but their questions differ and they do not establish whether students can check AI-generated answers or apply the technology competently.

The opportunity is to give education a more practical purpose. Students need to understand when AI is helpful, where it makes mistakes and how to use it responsibly to learn, create and solve problems. Teachers need training and equipment to deliver that instruction. In countries below the benchmark, improving the transition from basic digital access to applied capability may be one of the most direct ways of making economic opportunity more widely available to young people.

### 6. Locally useful AI could be as important as access to global tools

AI is most valuable when people can use it in the languages they speak and for the problems they face. The index points to relatively limited digital-language resources for Kinyarwanda, Chichewa, Dhivehi, Samoan and several Pacific languages. A young person with an internet

connection may still find AI less useful if relevant educational material, reliable translation or local knowledge is poorly represented. This is an opportunity to build tools that serve communities on their own terms.

Examples such as Vavanagi, a platform the Hula community in Papua New Guinea built with AI coding tools to document its language[12], show the importance of local participation in digital content, without demonstrating any national improvement in AI readiness. The larger prospect is for young people to become creators of locally useful technology. Whether the need is agriculture, health information, business services or disaster preparedness, countries that invest in local skills and knowledge may be better placed to turn international advances into domestic opportunity.

### 7. Trust and protection belong in the economic conversation

Successful adoption also requires people to be able to question tools that influence their lives. The Rights, safety and participation pillar scores 4.3 for Singapore and 3.8 for Malaysia, even though both perform strongly overall. Kenya records 4.7 under the index's specific governance measures. These figures do not provide a complete judgement on a country's laws. They do show that legal and institutional conditions vary independently of connectivity and skills.

Young people may encounter AI when applying for work, studying, borrowing money or seeking public services. They need to know when an automated decision affects them and whether they can obtain a meaningful review. Trustworthy systems and accessible safeguards can support participation, especially for those who may otherwise be excluded or harmed. Measuring young people's real experiences of these protections will be essential in deciding how to strengthen them.

### 8. The smallest countries must not be excluded from the opportunity

Some of the most significant gaps in evidence concern the small youth states. The lack of published information says little about young people's ambition or ability, but it can make their needs less visible in international programmes and investment decisions. Seychelles, just below the 53-point benchmark, illustrates how promising conditions and incomplete evidence can coexist.

The small youth states may have particular opportunities to design targeted initiatives quickly, work across institutions and build technology around local needs. Those possibilities cannot be assumed from population size alone. They require listening to young people about access, useful skills, languages and businesses, then testing which changes make a difference. The index identifies where that enquiry is urgent; the next phase must establish which solutions have the best prospects of working.

## CONCLUSION: TURNING READINESS INTO OPPORTUNITY

The Ayre Index, the 2026 Commonwealth Youth AI Readiness Index, establishes something that has been missing from the debate about AI: a country-by-country picture of the conditions shaping whether young people will be able to benefit. Across 56 countries and approximately 732 million young people, it reveals immense potential alongside profound differences in access, skills, education, work and the institutions that support them.

Its most important finding is the scale of the opportunity still to be realised. Only 15 countries reach the study's readiness benchmark of 53. Forty-one remain below it. Applying the IMF's published economic scenarios, the analysis shows an illustrative economic opportunity of $29.2 billion for those 41 countries in the moderate case, with a range of $14.4 billion to $44.1 billion. These are conditional illustrations, not guaranteed gains from crossing a score, yet they show why improving readiness deserves serious attention from governments, investors and development partners.

The rankings also show why progress cannot be measured by connectivity alone. A phone signal is of limited value to a young person who cannot afford data or electricity. Enthusiasm for AI is of limited economic use without the ability to question its output or apply it productively. Training has limited benefit where graduates cannot find work or build sustainable businesses. The promise of AI lies in connecting these elements so that young people can acquire skills, create useful solutions and improve their prospects.

The findings now present a clear policy challenge. For 41 Commonwealth countries, the readiness benchmark identifies an ambition worth pursuing, and the economic scenarios illustrate why progress could matter. But national statistics cannot answer the question on which successful action depends: what, in each country, is actually preventing young people from turning AI into useful learning, better work and viable businesses?

The gaps are not simply a shortage of statistics. Published indicators can show high mobile coverage alongside low youth internet use, or enthusiasm for AI alongside weak measured skills. They tell us far less about why a young person remains offline, whether an employer values the training on offer, which AI tools work in local languages or what would persuade a young entrepreneur to adopt them. Even within the same country, the answers will differ between young people in school and those seeking work, between rural and urban communities and across the ages of 15 to 29.

This is why the next stage of research must be to go directly to young people in the 41 countries below the readiness benchmark. The index has identified the broad conditions that affect their opportunities. What it cannot yet establish is which obstacles matter most in their daily lives, which improvements they would value or which interventions would make the greatest practical difference.

Representative research can help answer those questions. It must reach young people who are offline, outside formal education, unemployed or working informally, as well as those already making use of AI. The findings would help distinguish problems that could be addressed through affordable connectivity from those requiring better teaching, stronger links to employers, access to finance or technologies suited to local needs. This would provide a clearer

basis for deciding which interventions to pursue, testing whether they work and measuring progress against the readiness benchmark.

**The next step: a representative survey**

The following five priorities provide a framework for that work, combining direct evidence from young people with comparable national data and practical tests of the measures most likely to improve readiness.

1. Begin with young people in the 41 countries below the readiness benchmark

*Researchers should design representative, country-specific surveys asking young people aged 15 to 29 which opportunities AI could offer them, what stops them from benefiting today and which changes they would prioritise. The aim should be to inform and evaluate routes towards greater readiness, rather than prescribe the same intervention everywhere. Their design will also need to address appropriate ethical review, safeguarding, informed consent or assent and data protection, particularly for participants aged 15 to 17. Requirements will need to be assessed in each participating country. The Data Gap Index in Annex C also shows large gaps in some members above the benchmark, among them Trinidad and Tobago, Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand, and the survey's design should weigh where evidence is thinnest as well as where scores are lowest.*

2. Publish data for all three stages of youth

*Statistical agencies and researchers should report comparable findings for the full 15 to 29 age range wherever possible, including ages 15 to 17, 18 to 24 and 25 to 29. Of the study's 1,128 sources, just 59 non-population sources cover the complete 15 to 29 range, making direct observation a priority.*

3. Close evidence gaps in countries with very small populations

*The small youth states deserve particular attention in the next phase of research. Very small populations can be overlooked by international datasets and may be difficult to analyse separately in larger surveys. Governments, statistical agencies and research partners should improve youth-specific data collection and ensure that these countries are adequately represented in Commonwealth-wide comparisons. The group should be a priority for investigation without assuming that every member has the same data gaps.*

4. Measure whether AI is actually taught

*There is a need to gather comparable evidence from teachers and learners about training, practical AI instruction, assessment and the ability to check outputs. General school enrolment or teacher qualifications are not sufficient substitutes for these observations.*

5. Measure whether safeguards can be used

*Researchers should investigate young people's knowledge of automated decisions, practical routes to review or challenge and the remedies obtained. Counting a written provision or formal institution does not establish that protection works in practice.*

The index has established where the Commonwealth stands and why improving readiness matters. The next stage will be to establish how progress can be achieved, particularly in the 41 countries below the benchmark. By putting young people's experiences and ambitions at the centre of that work, the Ayre Think Tank will help turn a measure of preparedness into a practical guide for economic and social progress.

# PART II | TECHNICAL METHODOLOGY

This part explains how the index was built. It describes what each pillar measures and why, where the indicators come from, how each figure was scored, and how the scores were combined into the index. It then explains how missing figures were handled, how the readiness benchmark was set, how the economic estimates were made, and how much the results change when the rules are varied. It ends by showing where the published evidence runs out. The survey in the second stage of this work is designed to fill those gaps.

## Background

Young people across the Commonwealth already use AI for their studies, at work and in daily life. Whether they benefit from it depends on more than the technology. They need a connection, a device and electricity to reach it. They need the skills to use it well. And they need education and work in which those skills pay off. The index measures all of these conditions as well as the use of AI itself. Direct evidence on young people's use of AI is the scarcest part of the index, and the survey will add most there.

A new index was needed because existing measures of AI readiness describe countries, not young people. The Government AI Readiness Index asks how far each of 195 governments can harness AI to benefit the public[13]. The Commonwealth's own Youth Development Index covers the same ages, but its only measure of digital experience is the share of young people who have used the internet for five years or more, based on ITU data from 2013, and it has no measure of AI[14]. None of the indexes reviewed for this study reports a figure on AI for young people.

The research was carried out in a system built for the study. It holds every source collected, the data file, every decision and every score. Each source was saved as a read-only copy, and its date was certified by two independent timestamping authorities. Every figure was scored by an AI model, Claude Opus 5.5, against a written rubric for its indicator. The rubric was built from the indicator's goalposts and scoring bands. Each score is stored with the evidence the model was given, its answer and the time. The audit trail at the end of this part sets this out in full.

## Scope

### Population and age band

The index describes young people aged 15 to 29 in each of the 56 Commonwealth member states. This is the Commonwealth's own definition of youth[15] and the band used by its Youth Development Index, so the two can be read side by side.

Few sources publish exactly this band. Each indicator is therefore brought to it by the first of three routes that applies:

1. **Published for 15 to 29.** The figure is used as it stands.

2. **Computed from the survey's own data files.** Where the publisher releases person-level data, the figure is recomputed for respondents aged 15 to 29 with the survey's weights, and the sample size is recorded.

3. **A narrower youth band.** Where only another band is published, such as 15 to 24, 16 to 24, 18 to 24 or 15 year olds in school, that figure is used and its band is recorded in the data file beside the value.

A narrower band is a similar measure, not the same one. How such a figure is carried to ages 15 to 29, with the range the figure for young people must lie in, is set out under Missing data, and the method used is recorded against every figure.

A narrower band stands in for the full band only in the score. In the data map it is recorded as what it is: a figure for 15 to 24 covers the first two reporting stages below and leaves the third, ages 25 to 29, without a figure.

Regional and group averages are weighted by each member's population aged 15 to 29, as set out under Number of young people in each member.

### Reporting bands

Within the 15 to 29 band, results are reported for three stages of life:

- **15 to 17.** Young people who are still children in law. Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as every human being below the age of 18, unless national law sets an earlier age of majority[16]. Figures for this group are read against child-specific safeguards.
- **18 to 24.** The main transition from education to work.
- **25 to 29.** Early career: settling into work, starting enterprises and retraining.

Five-year bands, 15 to 19, 20 to 24 and 25 to 29, are also produced for statistical comparison. These are the bands in which the World Population Prospects, the ILO's youth labour market statistics[17] and the DHS and MICS household surveys publish their figures, so results in these bands can be set directly beside published data.

Published sources rarely match the three stages. Most international youth series on digital access and skills stop at 24: the ITU, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and the World Bank's Global Findex report ages 15 to 24, which covers the first two stages and says nothing about the third. Adult surveys such as Afrobarometer and AmericasBarometer interview people aged 18 and over, so they can inform the second and third stages but not the first. The data map therefore records, for every indicator and member, which of the three stages the available figure covers. A stage with no figure is a gap for the survey of young people to fill.

The survey records each respondent's exact age rather than an age group. Every band above can then be produced from it, and survey figures can be cut to match any published band when the two are compared.

### Number of young people in each member

The index uses the number of people aged 15 to 29 in each member to weight regional and group averages, to turn a share into a number of young people, and to show the size of the population each member's figures describe. The Commonwealth Secretariat defines young people as those aged 15 to 29[18] but does not publish their number member by member. For each member the index takes the figure of the national statistics office or that of the United Nations World Population Prospects 2024[19], whichever rests on the more recent official count or records: the national figure for 14 members and the United Nations figure for the other 42.

On these figures the 56 members had 732,379,648 people aged 15 to 29 in 2024, 26.5 per cent of their combined population. India has 381.8 million of them, and 32 members have fewer than one million. Annex B gives the figures for every member and sets out how the figure for each was chosen.

## Notation

Throughout, $c$ denotes a member, $j$ an indicator and $p$ a pillar. $x_{cj}$ is the figure for young people aged 15 to 29 on indicator $j$ in member $c$. Where the published figure describes another group, $x^{B}_{cj}$ is the figure for another age band $B$ and $x^{W}_{cj}$ the figure for the whole population. $a_c$ is the share of the population of member $c$ aged 15 to 29, and $b_c$ the share of its 15 to 29 year olds who fall in band $B$. $L_j$ and $U_j$ are the two goalposts of indicator $j$: the worst point, and the best point or the point that is enough. $s_{cj}$ is the score of member $c$ on indicator $j$, the points of the band in which its figure falls, and $d_{cj}$ is the data strength grade of that figure.

## Pillars

Each pillar is defined below with its sub-pillars and, for each sub-pillar, what its indicators measure, how many of the 56 members have a figure, the goalposts and the spread of scores. Annex A sets out in full the rationale for each pillar and sub-pillar, with its evidence, the sources and limits of every indicator, and every member's score on it.

### Pillar 1: Meaningful access

**Definition.** A young person's dependable, affordable, accessible and private opportunity to use a suitable device, a connection and AI tools, in a language they understand, whenever they need to.

The pillar follows the ITU's framework of meaningful connectivity[20] and adds access to AI tools themselves: their cost, the languages they work in and the ages at which young people may use them. Because most young people are already online, it concentrates on the quality of their access. Gaps in access by sex, location, disability and income are reported.

**Sub-pillars.** The pillar is measured through eight sub-pillars: **Coverage**, whether an internet network reaches the places where young people aged 15 to 29 live, learn and work; **Device**, whether young people aged 15 to 29 have a way to get online when they need it: a device

of their own, a shared one, a connection at home, or a public place such as a school, library or internet café; **Cost**, whether young people aged 15 to 29 can afford to get connected and to stay connected; **Internet use**, whether young people aged 15 to 29 use the internet, and how often; **Electricity**, whether young people aged 15 to 29 have the electricity needed to get online; **Network performance**, whether a young person's connection is fast and responsive enough for what they need to do online; **Reliability**, whether a young person's connection keeps working when they need it, without dropping or cutting out; **AI tools**, whether the tools themselves are open to a young person: in a language they use, and at an age the rules allow.

**Indicators: Coverage.** Coverage is measured by the share of young people who live within reach of at least a 4G mobile signal. No source publishes coverage by age, so each member's figure is the ITU's figure for its whole population in 2024[21], kept with the range the figure for young people must lie in. Every member has a figure, 15 of them estimated by the ITU. It is scored on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent, universal coverage being the ITU's target for 2030: scores run from 3 to 10, with five members at 10, and data strength averages 7.2 out of 10. For 51 members the range for young people crosses a band limit, so better data could move their score.

**Indicators: Device.** Device is measured by the share of young people who own a mobile phone. Forty-five of the 56 members have a figure, from the Demographic and Health Surveys for ages 15 to 29 exactly (20 members)[22], the Global Findex survey of 2024 for ages 15 to 24 (33 members)[23] and national household surveys and censuses (nine members); where a member has more than one, the figure with the higher data strength enters, and the newer on a tie. Ownership is scored on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent, universal ownership being the ITU's target: scores run from 4 to 10, with three members at 10; data strength averages 9.3 out of 10, and for 37 members the gap between women's and men's figures, or the range of a figure for ages 15 to 24, crosses a band limit. Eleven members have no figure for young people; for seven of them only a figure for a wider age group is published, and it is not used. Ownership is one part of the definition, which also counts shared devices, a connection at home and public places; those parts are not measured in this edition.

**Indicators: Cost.** Cost is measured by two indicators that share one price, the ITU's basket of 5 GB of mobile data a month in 2025[24]: the price as a share of average income (all 56 members) and as a share of the income of the poorest 40 per cent (46 members). Both are scored turned round, as the share of income left after paying for the data: 10 at 98 per cent or more, a price under 2 per cent of income being the ITU's target, and 0 at the 2.5th percentile of the members' own figures, 90.83 per cent on average income and 75.7 per cent for the poorest 40 per cent. On average income, scores run from 0 to 10, with 25 members at 10, three at 0, and every figure's data strength is 7; on the income of the poorest 40 per cent, scores run from 0 to 10, with ten members at 10, two at 0, and data strength averages 6.4 out of 10, as the year of each income share sets recency. Neither describes what young people earn, which no international series records; that question is put to the survey.

**Indicators: Internet use.** Internet use is measured by the share of young people aged 15 to 29 who used the internet in the past three months, the measure of SDG indicator 17.8.1[25]. Every member has a figure, reached in different ways: for ages 15 to 29 exactly in four members

and on a close measure in two; by a step borrowed from the same country's household survey in 15; as an upper limit, from use in the past 12 months, in three; and as a labelled stand-in in 32, 21 of them for a narrower youth band and 11 for the whole population, each kept with the range the figure for young people must lie in. It is scored on the recorded figure, on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent: scores run from 1 to 10, with four members at 10. Data strength averages 7.7 out of 10, and for 47 members a figure for ages 15 to 29 alone could fall in another band.

**Indicators: Electricity.** Electricity is measured by the share of young people with access to electricity. All 56 members have a figure. Twenty-five are at 100 per cent for the whole population, so the figure applies to every age group as published; Pakistan's is worked out for ages 15 to 29 from a research workbook built on the respondent file of its household survey of 2024 to 2025; the other 30 carry the whole-population figure with the range the figure for young people must lie in[26]. It is scored on the recorded figure, on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent, universal access being the target of SDG 7: scores run from 1 to 10, with 25 members at 10, and data strength averages 7.3 out of 10. For 30 members the range for young people crosses a band limit, so better data could move their score.

**Indicators: Network performance.** Network performance has six indicators: download speed, upload speed and delay, each on mobile networks and on fixed broadband, from the open map tiles of Speedtest results for the four quarters of 2025[27]. All 56 members have a figure on each. They describe the connections of users of every age; no source reports speed or delay by age. Each is scored in ten equal steps on a logarithmic scale from the members' 2.5th percentile up to the speed, or the delay, that is enough: 50 megabits a second for download, 10 for upload and 50 milliseconds for delay, counted as 20 answers a second; a connection at or beyond that point scores 10. Scores reach 10 for 29 members on mobile download, 45 on fixed download, 53 on each upload speed, 35 on mobile delay and 43 on fixed delay, and 0 for between two and five members on each. Every figure's data strength is 7 out of 10, except Tuvalu's mobile figures, which rest on 25 tests and take 6. On upload speed the members' 2.5th percentile, 8.86 megabits a second on mobile networks and 9.36 on fixed broadband, lies close to the 10 that is enough. Each band is therefore between about 0.06 and 0.11 megabits a second wide, and the two indicators work almost as a pass mark at 10. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, at 9.16 megabits a second on mobile networks, scores 2, and The Gambia, at 10.06, scores 10.

**Indicators: Reliability.** Reliability is measured by the share of firms whose internet connection was disrupted in the last complete fiscal year, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys[28], for 49 of the 56 members, with survey years from 2022 to 2025. It describes firms, not people; no published source reports reliability for young people. It is scored turned round, as the share of firms whose connection was not disrupted, on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent; the figure is graded a close stand-in for young people's own connections. On the published figures, scores run from 2 to 9, with four members at 9, each with a data strength of 6 out of 10. The seven members without a figure carry the index's estimate, the average of the members most like them (the smaller-population Caribbean peers with a figure for Dominica, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis and The Bahamas, the smaller-population Pacific peers for

Nauru and Tuvalu, and the other African members outside the smaller-population peer group for South Africa): South Africa scores 6 and the other six score 4 each, with a data strength of 5, labelled as estimates that still count as gaps.

**Indicators: AI tools.** AI tools is measured through language by two indicators: whether the member's main language is well served by AI, a high, mid or low label for all 56 members[29], and the digital language support score of the GSMA's Mobile Connectivity Index (49 members)[30]. The label scores High 10, Mid 5 and Low 0, and the support score is scored on the GSMA's own scale of 0 to 100. On the label, 25 members score 10, five score 5 and 26 score 0; on the support score, scores run from 0 to 9, with none at 10, one at 0. Neither is about people of any age, so each figure takes 1 of 4 for age fit and grades 7 for data strength. The two disagree for 18 members, and like every sub-pillar, AI tools is the plain average of its indicators. The age rules of the leading AI services are nearly the same in every member, so the age gate is left to the survey.

### Pillar 2: Digital, data, media and AI capability

**Definition.** What a young person is able to do with digital technology and AI: operate devices and software, find and manage information and tell a sound source from an unsound one, interpret data, communicate and create content, solve unfamiliar problems, keep themselves and their data secure, and understand what AI is, how it works and where it fails.

The pillar follows the seven core digital skills identified in a systematic review[31] and the five competence areas of the European Union's digital competence framework, DigComp 3.0, which builds AI into all 21 of its competences[32]. It therefore includes understanding what AI is, how it works and where it fails. Frequent use is not taken as evidence of capability.

**Sub-pillars.** The pillar is measured through five sub-pillars: **Technical operation**, whether a young person can work a device, an application and an account, and get somewhere when the task is unfamiliar; **Information and data**, whether a young person can find what they need, tell a sound source from an unsound one, keep track of it, and make sense of figures and claims; **Creation and communication**, whether a young person can make something and reach other people with it; **Safety and security**, whether a young person can protect themselves, their device and their data while using it; **Understanding AI**, whether a young person knows what these systems are, how they work and where they fail.

**Indicators: Technical operation.** Technical operation is measured by two items of SDG indicator 4.4.1: the share of young people who, in the last three months, installed and configured software or an app, and the share who connected and installed a new device. Thirty-three of the 56 members have a figure, 15 of them for ages 15 to 29 exactly and the rest for a nearby youth band; the other 23 have no figure and are not scored on either indicator. Both are scored on equal bands from 0 to 50 per cent, the ITU's 2030 level for intermediate skills, which names both tasks among its activities: on installing software, scores run from 0 to 10, with six members at 10, three at 0; on connecting a device, scores run from 0 to 10, with four members at 10, five at 0; data strength averages 8.1 out of 10 on each.

**Indicators: Information and data.** Information and data is measured by three activities from the same household-survey question as Technical operation, each as the share of young people who did it in the last three months: used a basic arithmetic formula in a spreadsheet (34 of the 56 members), verified the reliability of information found online (16 members) and copied or moved a file or folder (22 members). The formula and the file are scored against the ITU's targets for 2030, 50 per cent for an intermediate skill and 70 per cent for a basic one, and verifying information, which no target names, against the average of the five best members, 54.52 per cent. On the formula, scores run from 0 to 10, with six members at 10, five at 0; on verifying information, scores run from 0 to 10, with one member at 10, one at 0; on copying a file, scores run from 0 to 10, with three members at 10, four at 0; data strength averages between 8.1 and 8.2 out of 10. Twenty-two members have no figure for any of the three. Tested ability is published for too few members to be an indicator and is used as supporting evidence. Whether a young person can find what they need has no published measure and is put to the survey.

**Indicators: Creation and communication.** Creation and communication is measured by three activities from the same household-survey question, each as the share of young people who did it in the last three months: created an electronic presentation (35 of the 56 members), sent an email or message with a file attached (35 members) and wrote a computer program (34 members). Presentations, an intermediate skill, are scored up to the ITU's target of 50 per cent and attachments, a basic one, up to its 70 per cent; writing a program has no target and reaches 10 at 24.04 per cent, the average of the five highest members. On presentations, scores run from 0 to 10, with six members at 10, eight at 0; on attachments, scores run from 0 to 10, with nine members at 10, six at 0; on programs, scores run from 0 to 10, with one member at 10, ten at 0; data strength averages 8.1 out of 10 on each. Twenty-one members have no figure for any of the three. Whether a young person has published something of their own is known for four members only and is put to the survey.

**Indicators: Safety and security.** Safety and security has three indicators. Two are activities from the same household-survey question, each as the share of young people who did it in the last three months: set up security measures on their devices and accounts (15 of the 56 members) and changed their privacy settings (17 members). Neither activity has a target, so each reaches 10 at the average of its own five best members: 81.16 per cent for security measures and 72.14 per cent for privacy settings. The third is the share with at least basic safety skills (six members), scored on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent. On security measures, scores run from 0 to 10, with three members at 10, one at 0; on privacy settings, scores run from 1 to 10, with one member at 10; on safety skills, three members score 9 and three score 7; data strength averages 8.0 out of 10 on each. Thirty-nine members have no figure on any of the three. A fourth indicator, the share who know what an application or AI tool collects about them, has no figure in any member and goes to the survey.

**Indicators: Understanding AI.** Understanding AI has two indicators, both self-reported: the share of young people who say they know a lot or some about AI (nine of the 56 members, six of them for ages 15 to 29 exactly) and the share who have heard or read a lot about it (12 members, ages 18 to 34). Knowing a lot or some about AI is scored on equal 10-point

bands between 0 and 100 per cent: scores run from 2 to 5, with none at 10, and data strength averages 8.7 out of 10. Having heard or read a lot about AI reaches 10 at 62 per cent, where its five highest members average: scores run from 1 to 10, with four members at 10; every figure's data strength is 9. Forty-one members have no figure on either. Neither indicator shows whether a young person knows how AI works or where it fails; no published source tests that in any member, and it is put to the survey.

### Pillar 3: Purposeful use and creation

**Definition.** What young people actually do and achieve with AI: using it for learning and work, civic and community life, culture and identity, and health and personal development, and making content, tools and solutions that are accurate, useful and relevant to their communities.

The purposes counted follow the four domains in which research measures the outcomes of internet use: economic, social, cultural and personal[33]. Use that is mainly for entertainment is not counted. Public benefit is counted through civic and community use and through the local relevance of what young people make.

**Sub-pillars.** The pillar is measured through five sub-pillars: **Learning and work**, what young people get done with AI in their studying, their training and their paid work; **Civic and community life**, what young people do with AI in public life and in the groups and communities they belong to; **Culture and identity**, what young people do with AI that belongs to their own language, place and sense of who they are; **Health and personal development**, what young people do with AI for their own health, wellbeing and development; **Making things**, what young people produce with AI, and whether it is accurate, useful and relevant where they live.

**Indicators: Learning and work.** Learning and work is measured by three indicators: the share of young people who use AI for their studies, the share who use AI for their work, and the share who use AI for either. No survey asks the same question in every member, so each member takes the best published figure for young people, labelled with its question, age band and year: 16 of the 56 members have a figure for study, ten for work and ten for either; a further seven members carry a student or volunteer sample as a labelled stand-in for study, and 13 members with a figure for study alone carry it on the combined indicator as its lowest possible value, so their study figure counts twice. No figure about the internet stands in for one about AI. What young people got done with AI is published for no member and is put to the survey. Each indicator is scored on equal bands from 0 to the average of its five best members' own figures, all from surveys of young people in general; a stand-in is scored against that bar but does not set it: 10 at 58.86 per cent for study, 35.72 for work and 73.98 for either. On study, scores run from 4 to 10, with eight members at 10; on work, scores run from 2 to 10, with three members at 10; on either, scores run from 4 to 10, with five members at 10. Data strength averages 8.6, 9.6 and 8.0 out of 10: a member's own figure grades 9 or 10, a stand-in 5 or 7.

**Indicators: Civic and community life.** Civic and community life is measured by two indicators: the share of young people who use AI to deal with government and public services, and the share who use AI chatbots to follow the news. The first has a figure for seven of the 56

members, for ages 15 to 29 (18 to 29 in Australia). The second has a figure for nine: published for a youth band in two, and for the other seven worked out for ages 18 to 29 from the survey's figure for online adults and the member's population by age, labelled as worked out. Only figures about AI are scored; figures on using the internet for the same purposes run far higher and are kept as supporting evidence. Public services reaches 10 at 17.54 per cent and the news at 28.52, the average of the five highest members in each case: on public services, scores run from 3 to 10, with two members at 10; on the news, scores run from 2 to 10, with three members at 10. Data strength averages 9.9 and 8.2 out of 10, the seven worked-out figures being graded as modelled. Whether young people use AI to take part in public or community life, and what comes of it, is published for no member and is put to the survey.

**Indicators: Culture and identity.** Culture and identity is measured by two indicators: the share of young people who say AI fits their own place, and the share who use AI to translate. The first has a survey figure for seven of the 56 members, for ages 15 to 29 (18 to 29 in Australia); polls of volunteers that asked a different question are not scored and are kept as supporting evidence. The second has a figure for 11 members, each from a sample of university students aged 18 to 29 who use ChatGPT, labelled as such. The language young people use with AI, and what they use it for in their own culture, are published for no member and are put to the survey. Forty-two members have no figure on either indicator. As no target names either, both reach 10 at the average of their five best members, 33.72 and 64.68 per cent: on the first, scores run from 4 to 10, with three members at 10; on the second, scores run from 3 to 10, with two members at 10. Data strength averages 9.9 out of 10 on the survey figures and 7.0 on the student samples.

**Indicators: Health and personal development.** Health and personal development is measured by four indicators: the share of young people who use AI for their health, the share who use AI for their money, the share who ask AI for advice on personal matters, and the share of conversations with one AI assistant that are about health, wellbeing and money. The first two have a figure for ages 15 to 29 (18 to 29 in Australia) for seven of the 56 members, and for the United Kingdom at ages 16 to 29 on a different question. The third has a figure for 11 members, each from a sample of university students aged 18 to 29 who use ChatGPT. These three reach 10 at the average of their five best members, 24.44 per cent for health, 30.32 for money and 74.66 for personal advice: on health, scores run from 4 to 10, with two members at 10; on money, scores run from 4 to 10, with three members at 10; on personal advice, scores run from 4 to 10, with two members at 10. Data strength averages 9.6 out of 10 on the first two and 7.0 on the third. The fourth is published for 28 members for all users of the service, with no ages; it is applied unchanged to the member's young people as one group and labelled, with the range set out for such figures under Missing data. It reaches 10 at 9.29 per cent of conversations, the average of the five highest members: scores run from 0 to 10, with three members at 10, one at 0. A share of conversations for all users, it is graded a partial measure, and its data strength averages 5.2 out of 10; for ten members some of the four topics are too rare to publish, and their figure is a floor. Turning to AI for mental health or emotional support, what young people did with an answer and whether anyone else was involved are put to the survey. Twenty-six members have no figure of any kind.

**Indicators: Making things.** Making things is measured by three indicators: the share of young people who make creative things with AI, the share who use AI to help write code, and the share of conversations with one AI assistant that produce software or a creative work. The first two have a figure for 11 of the 56 members, each from a sample of university students aged 18 to 29 who use ChatGPT, except that the United Kingdom's first figure is an official one for ages 16 to 24 on a different question. Each reaches 10 at the average of the five highest student figures: 56.16 per cent for creative things and 58.6 for code. On creative things, scores run from 5 to 10, with two members at 10; on code, scores run from 3 to 10, with two members at 10; data strength averages 7.1 and 7.0 out of 10. The third is published for 28 members for all users of the service, with no ages; it is applied unchanged to the member's young people as one group and labelled, with the range set out for such figures under Missing data. It reaches 10 at 22.21 per cent of conversations, its five best members' average: scores run from 5 to 10, with three members at 10; as a partial measure for all users, its data strength is 5.0 out of 10. What young people made, who it was for, whether anyone else used it, and whether it is accurate, useful and relevant where they live are published for no member and are put to the survey. Twenty-seven members have no figure of any kind.

### Pillar 4: Education and training provision

**Definition.** The education and training that reaches young people and builds their capability with AI, in school, in technical and vocational training, in higher education and outside formal education, judged by how many young people it reaches, how well it is taught and how well prepared its teachers are.

Provision is judged by how many young people it reaches and how well it is taught, not by whether programmes exist: programmes change what young people know about AI more than their skills, attitudes or ethics[34]. Provision reaches young people mainly through teachers, whose competences UNESCO sets out[35]; coaching teachers improves teaching and achievement, although large programmes achieve only a fraction of the effects of small ones[36].

**Sub-pillars.** The pillar is measured through three sub-pillars: **Reach**, how many young people are actually taught about AI, in school, in technical and vocational training, in higher education and outside formal education; **Quality of teaching**, how well what reaches young people is taught, and whether it is fitted to where they are; **Teacher preparation**, how well prepared the people doing the teaching are, and whether that preparation reaches them at scale.

**Indicators: Reach.** Reach has four indicators. Two are about AI: the share of young people who say they have been taught about AI or have completed AI training (six of the 56 members, each from a different survey question), and the share of 15 year olds whose school lessons had them judge what an AI chatbot produced (ten members, from PISA 2025). Both are scored on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent: on being taught about AI, scores run from 1 to 5, with none at 10, and data strength averages 6.7 out of 10; on judging AI output in lessons, scores run from 4 to 8, with none at 10, and every figure's data strength is 9. Two describe the foundation: the share of people aged 15 to 29 attending education (51 members), which counts education in general, and the place of computing in the official school curriculum (all 56 members), which records what is written down. Attending education reaches 10 at 50.12

per cent, the average of its five highest members, because not every 15 to 29 year old is meant to be in education: scores run from 3 to 10, with two members at 10; data strength averages 8.9 out of 10, and for nine members the range left by unrecorded attendance crosses a band limit. Computing in the curriculum records what is written down, so it scores at most 5, in equal steps across the publisher's categories in their order of provision, from no evidence of computing (0) to computing compulsory at both primary and secondary level (5), with 10 kept for dated evidence that computing is taught as written: five members score 5, 12 score 4, 14 score 2 and 25 score 0, a plan for computing counting as none once points are rounded down; as the code is not about people of any age, every figure's data strength is 7. Forty-four members have no figure about AI teaching, and the question is put to the survey.

**Indicators: Quality of teaching.** Quality of teaching has three indicators. One is about AI: the share of 15 year olds whose school lessons often had them judge what an AI chatbot produced (nine of the 56 members, from PISA 2025), which uses the Reach question at a higher frequency to separate teaching in substance from teaching touched on. One is a tested result: the mean score of 15 year olds in computational problem solving (nine members, from PISA 2025). One describes the foundation: the World Bank's harmonised learning score (53 members), which measures the quality of schooling in general. Judging AI output often reaches 10 at 41.04 per cent, what the five best members average: scores run from 4 to 10, with two members at 10, and every figure's data strength is 9; the test score runs from 315 points, the 2.5th percentile of the members' scores, to 534.8, the average of the five best: scores run from 0 to 10, with one member at 10, one at 0, every figure grading 9; the learning score runs from 298.35, set the same way, to 625, the top of the World Bank's scale: scores run from 0 to 9, with none at 10, nine at 0. Describing school pupils, not young people, the learning score is graded 1 of 4 for age fit, and its data strength averages 6.9 out of 10. Forty-seven members have no figure on how well AI is taught, and the question is put to the survey.

**Indicators: Teacher preparation.** Teacher preparation has six indicators, and the people measured are teachers. Three are about AI: the share of teachers whose training in the last 12 months covered using AI (eight of the 56 members, six of them from the OECD's survey of lower secondary teachers), the share of schools where most or all teachers had training on dealing with pupils' use of AI chatbots (nine members, from heads' reports in PISA 2025), and the share of teachers who used AI in their teaching in the last 12 months (eight members). The first two are scored on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent: on training that covered AI, scores run from 0 to 7, with none at 10, one at 0, and every figure's data strength is 5; on schools where most or all teachers were trained, scores run from 2 to 5, with none at 10, and the data strength of each is 7 out of 10. Describing teachers and schools, not young people, these figures take 1 of 4 for age fit. The third, teachers' own use of AI, has no target and is not expected of every teacher, so it reaches 10 at 61.68 per cent, the average of its five highest members: scores run from 5 to 10, with three members at 10, every figure grading 5 out of 10 for data strength. One is about digital teaching in general: the share of heads who say their teachers have the skills to teach with digital devices (12 members), scored on the same 0 to 100 bands: scores run from 5 to 9, with none at 10, with 7 out of 10 for data strength in every case. One describes the foundation: the share of secondary teachers who are trained (46 members), which counts teachers' training in general, scored on the same bands:

scores run from 3 to 10, with seven members at 10; data strength averages 6.6 out of 10. Six of the ten members with no trained-teacher figure, Botswana, Gabon, Samoa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, carry the index's estimate, the average of the members in their region and of their size, 74.7 to 79.5 per cent, and score 7; Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have no comparable member with a figure and are unscored. One records what is written down: whether national policy on teachers names AI (52 members), held as a code. Naming AI scores 5 and not naming it 0, the other 5 points being kept for dated evidence that the policy is paid for and reaches teachers, which a code cannot show: India, Malta and Singapore score 5 and the other 49 score 0, each code grading 7 for data strength. Forty-four members have no figure on teachers and AI, and teachers' confidence to teach about AI is measured comparably in none; both are gaps for a question set put to teachers.

### Pillar 5: Decent work, enterprise and transitions

**Definition.** Whether young people move into decent work or viable enterprise as AI changes the tasks in their jobs, and whether they keep that work and progress in it. Decent work is work that is fairly paid and reasonably secure. The pillar also covers whether employment services help young people find work, and change jobs when their tasks change.

One worker in four worldwide is in an occupation with some exposure to generative AI, and the most likely effect is that jobs change rather than disappear[37]; the early evidence on employment concerns young workers most[38]. Help with moving into work works best when services are combined and each young person is followed up[39].

**Sub-pillars.** The pillar is measured through five sub-pillars: **Entry**, whether young people are getting hired as AI changes what jobs consist of; **Decent work**, whether the jobs young people hold are fairly paid and reasonably secure; **Enterprise**, whether young people can start something of their own and keep it going; **Staying and progressing**, whether young people keep the job they get and move up in it as its tasks change; **Employment support**, whether the services meant to help young people find work and change jobs actually reach them.

**Indicators: Entry.** Entry is measured by four indicators for young people aged 15 to 29: the share not in work, education or training (54 of the 56 members), the unemployment rate (54 members), the share of the unemployed who have been looking for work for a year or more (42 members), and how much more exposed to generative AI young people's jobs are than older workers' (38 members). Almost all the figures are for ages 15 to 29 exactly, from the ILO's youth labour market tables. The first three are scored turned round. Not being in work, education or training is scored as the share in work, education or training, from 51.3 per cent, the realistic worst in the world, to 100: scores run from 0 to 8, with none at 10, one at 0, and data strength averages 9.7 out of 10; Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis, the two members with no figure, carry the index's estimate, the average of the smaller-population Caribbean peers holding one, and score 5. Unemployment is scored as the share of the young labour force with a job, from 56.2 per cent, the realistic worst in the world, to 97.6 per cent, the average of its five best members: scores run from 0 to 10, with three members at 10, four at 0; data strength averages 9.9 out of 10. The share looking for a year or more is taken among the unemployed whose length of search is recorded. Those with no recorded length are left

out of the share, as in the OECD's figures, and the share left out is stated on each member's line. Looking for a year or more is scored as the share looking for less than a year, on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent: scores run from 2 to 9, with none at 10, and data strength averages 9.6 out of 10; seven members without a published figure carry the index's estimate, Barbados and Saint Lucia from their own older figures (2021 and 2016) and five from the average of their region's members of the same size, and the seven smaller-population Pacific peers without a figure are unscored, since only two in their group have one. The fourth indicator is the one published measure that links entry with AI for each member. It sets young people's exposure beside older workers' in the same member, so that it does not simply follow how rich a member is, and is turned round as a precautionary reading of the risk to their entry: it reaches 10 where young people are no more exposed than older workers and 0 at 63.89 per cent more exposed, the 2.5th percentile of the members: scores run from 0 to 10, with 19 members at 10, three at 0; data strength averages 9.4 out of 10. It has no figure for 18 members; that gap, and whether young people are turned down, screened by automated systems or asked for AI skills, are put to the survey.

**Indicators: Decent work.** Decent work is measured by four indicators: the share of young workers aged 15 to 29 in informal work (41 of the 56 members) and the share of young employees aged 15 to 29 on a temporary contract (44 members), the two measures of security; the share of employed young people aged 15 to 24 living in poverty (34 members), the measure of pay; and the share of school leavers aged 15 to 29 in work whose job is stable or satisfactory (29 members). Like every sub-pillar, it is the plain average of its indicators. Informal work and working poverty are scored turned round, on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent. On informal work, scored as the share of young workers whose job is formal, scores run from 0 to 9, with none at 10, 16 at 0, with an average data strength of 9.6; of the 15 members with no published figure, the seven smaller-population Caribbean and Pacific peers carry the index's estimate, the average of the smaller-population peers nearby, and score 6 or 5, while Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Malta, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have no similar member with a figure, and Malaysia and Singapore are left unscored because their group's figures, all from South Asia, would put both at 82.8 per cent. On working poverty, scored as the share of employed young people not in poverty, scores run from 1 to 9, with none at 10, and the data strength of each is 8 out of 10. The temporary contract is scored turned round too, as the share of young employees not on one, and reaches 10 at 90.04 per cent, the level of its five best members, since some temporary work is normal: scores run from 0 to 10, with two members at 10, one at 0, with an average data strength of 9.8; stable or satisfactory work reaches 10 at 98.22 per cent, set the same way: scores run from 1 to 10, with two members at 10, and the average data strength is 9.7 out of 10. None measures the effect of AI, and no pay measure exists for 22 members, among them 13 of the 16 high-income members; both gaps are put to the survey.

**Indicators: Enterprise.** Enterprise is measured by six indicators. Two are worked out from the ILO's youth tables for ages 15 to 29: the share of employed young people who are employers (47 of the 56 members) and, of those who work for themselves, the share who employ others (47 members). Neither has a target and not every young worker is meant to run a business, so each reaches 10 at the average of its five best members, 5.68 and 39 per cent.

On employers, scores run from 0 to 10, with two members at 10, eight at 0, and its figures average 9.6 out of 10 for data strength; on employing others, scores run from 0 to 10, with two members at 10, 11 at 0, with 9.6 out of 10 on average. Three come from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor for ages 18 to 29: the share starting or running a new business and the share who own an established one (24 members each, six of them for 2022), and the share of young business starters who started because jobs are scarce (seven members). Starting because jobs are scarce is scored turned round, as the share who did not, on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent: scores run from 0 to 5, with none at 10, one at 0; data strength averages 8.9 out of 10. Starting or running a new business reaches 10 at 40.62 per cent and owning an established one at 14.02 per cent, each the average of its five best members; 18 of the 24 figures date from before 2021. On starting, scores run from 0 to 10, with two members at 10, one at 0; on owning an established business, scores run from 0 to 10, with two members at 10, four at 0; data strength averages 8.2 out of 10 on each. The sixth, new entrepreneurs who expect AI to be very important to their business, covers five members and is not split by age. Its five members are also its five best, so it reaches 10 at their average, 40.48 per cent: scores run from 8 to 10, with two members at 10; its figures, for all ages from 18 to 64, each have a data strength of 7. No published source records whether young people's businesses use AI or survive; both gaps are put to the survey.

**Indicators: Staying and progressing.** Staying and progressing is measured by five indicators: the share of employees aged 15 to 29 in their job for less than 12 months (seven of the 56 members); unemployed 15 to 29 year olds who have worked before, as a share of the labour force of that age (35 members); the share of employed 25 to 29 year olds in high-skill jobs (50 members) and the step up in that share from ages 20 to 24 (50 members); and 15 to 29 year olds in apprenticeships, internships and traineeships (31 members). The share new to their job is scored turned round, as the share of young employees in the same job for 12 months or more, from 53.2 per cent, the realistic worst among the countries in the OECD's tenure table, to 68.84 per cent, the average of the five best members: scores run from 4 to 10, with two members at 10; data strength is the full 10 for every figure. Being unemployed after a job is scored turned round, as the share of the young labour force who are not, from 84.3 per cent, the realistic worst in the world, to 100: scores run from 0 to 9, with none at 10, three at 0; data strength averages 9.1 out of 10. Twenty of the 21 members without a published figure carry the index's estimate, the average of the members in their region and of their size, and score between 5 and 8; New Zealand, which could only borrow Australia's figure, is unscored. High-skill jobs at ages 25 to 29 reach 10 at 58.62 per cent, the average of the five best members, as not every job is high-skill: scores run from 0 to 10, with two members at 10, three at 0; the average data strength is 8.9 out of 10. The step up reaches 10 at 23.66 percentage points, the average of the five largest, and 0 below a tenth of that, which takes in any member whose share falls with age: scores run from 0 to 10, with two members at 10, six at 0, and its figures average 8.9 out of 10 for data strength; apprenticeships, internships and traineeships reach 10 at 74.42 per 1,000, set the same way: scores run from 0 to 10, with three members at 10, 12 at 0, with 8.8 out of 10 for data strength on average. No published source records whether young workers' tasks have changed, whether they were trained for the change, or whether pay

or responsibility moved with it, and young workers' use of AI at work is published for three members; these gaps are put to the survey.

**Indicators: Employment support.** Employment support is measured by two indicators: the share of unemployed young people who registered with, or used, a public employment service (four of the 56 members), and whether a national youth employment strategy is in operation, SDG indicator 8.b.1 (55 members). The first is the measure that fits and is put to the survey so that it can be completed for every member; it is scored on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent, and three members score 1 and one scores 0, with 8.0 out of 10 for data strength on average. The second shows that a system exists, not that it reaches anyone. As a record of what is written down and reported, it scores at most 5, with 10 kept for dated evidence that the strategy is funded and reaches young people: in operation 5, adopted 3, being developed 1 and none 0, so 16 members score 5, 24 score 3, 14 score 1 and one scores 0, each code grading 7 out of 10 for data strength. No published source records what an employment service did for a young person, or says member by member whether such services use AI.

### Pillar 6: Rights, safety and participation

**Definition.** The protection of young people's rights when AI systems are used to make or inform decisions about them, in education, work, public services, credit and policing. It covers safety, privacy, non-discrimination, transparency, human oversight and the means to challenge a decision, with specific protection for those aged 15 to 17 as children. It also covers whether young people have a say in how AI is governed. Protections count where they are enforced and reach young people in practice.

A young person's skill cannot protect them from an opaque or unfair system used to make decisions about them: in 2020, England's algorithm for calculating school leavers' grades collapsed under appeal, protest and legal action[40]. International standards set out the duties that apply[41], and for those aged 15 to 17 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child warns that automated profiling and decision-making based on biased data can discriminate against children[42]. Because such standards are widely adopted on paper, the pillar asks whether protections are enforced and reach young people. Where only what is written down is known, it is labelled as such, and the four laws and the treaty scored in the pillar earn at most half marks until dated evidence shows them used.

**Sub-pillars.** The pillar is measured through six sub-pillars: **Safety**, whether young people are protected from harm done through these systems, and can get help when it happens; **Privacy and data protection**, whether what is known about a young person is protected, and whether they have any say over it; **Fair treatment**, whether decisions made about young people by machine are free of bias against them; **Transparency and redress**, whether a young person can find out that a machine decided, and get the decision looked at again; **Protection as children**, whether the extra safeguards owed to 15 to 17 year olds exist and are applied; **Participation**, whether young people have a say in how these systems are governed where they live.

**Indicators: Safety.** Safety is measured by four indicators from published data: the share of people aged 15 to 24 who received unwanted and offensive messages, photos or videos on their phone in the past 12 months (12 of the 56 members) and the share who were asked for money

by a stranger by call or text (21 members), both from the Global Findex survey[43]; the share of young people harmed online who told someone or reported it (one member); and the score for government action on AI safety in the Global Index on Responsible AI (33 members)[44]. The two harm indicators are scored turned round, as the shares who received no such messages and who were not asked for money, from 76.3 and 59.3 per cent, the realistic worst in the world, to 100: on offensive messages, scores run from 0 to 5, with none at 10, two at 0; on requests for money, scores run from 0 to 8, with none at 10, five at 0; the data strength of each is 9 out of 10. Telling someone or reporting it is scored on equal 10-point bands between 0 and 100 per cent; the one member with a figure scores 6, with a data strength of 8. The Global Index's safety score is banded in tens up to 100, the top of its scale, and like the Global Index's other scores is not halved for what is written down, for the reason given under Transparency and redress: scores run from 0 to 7, with none at 10, 16 at 0. As a measure of governments, its figures have an age fit of 1 of 4 and a data strength of 7 out of 10. A member without a figure for young people has none: no figure for adults, and none for children younger than 15, stands in. Three further indicators, young people harmed through an AI system, young people who know where to go for help, and young people whose report of harm was acted on, have no figure in any member and go to the survey.

**Indicators: Privacy and data protection.** Privacy and data protection is measured by four indicators from published data. Two describe institutions in all 56 members, from the World Bank's GovTech survey of 2025[45]: whether a data protection law is in force, and whether a data protection authority is operating. One describes what young people have done: the share who have used a data right, by asking an organisation to show them, update or delete their data (three members). One describes how young people feel: the share of internet users aged 15 to 29 who are very worried that their personal information will be stolen (27 members, 2021)[46], the only figure on this sub-pillar for young people in more than a handful of members. The law, a record of what is written down, scores at most 5: in force 5 (41 members), a draft 2 (seven) and none 0 (eight). The authority keeps the full scale, as it records practice: operational 10 (14 members), existing without a report that it is at work 5 (23) and none 0 (19). The data right is scored up to 18.6 per cent, the average of its three members: Australia scores 10, Malta 9 and Cyprus 5. Worry is scored turned round, on the share not very worried, so that less worry, read as less risk felt, scores higher; it reaches 10 at 75.82 per cent, the average of the five best members: scores run from 2 to 10, with two members at 10. Data strength is 7 out of 10 for the law and the authority, which describe institutions, 8 for the data right and 10 for worry. A member without a figure for young people has none. Three further indicators, young people whose personal data were misused, young people who have had a say over what AI services keep about them, and young people who know where to complain, have no figure in any member and go to the survey.

**Indicators: Fair treatment.** Fair treatment has one indicator from published data: the score for government action on fairness and non-discrimination in AI in the Global Index on Responsible AI (33 of the 56 members)[47]. It records what governments have written and done, not what happens to young people, and is labelled as such. It is scored in the same way as the safety score, in equal bands from 0 to 100 and not halved: scores run from 0 to 8, with none at 10, 12 at 0, every figure grading 7 out of 10 for data strength. No published source in any

member records whether a decision about a young person was made or helped by a machine, or whether it was fair. Five further indicators go to the survey: young people treated unfairly by an automated decision; students wrongly accused of using AI by a detection tool; young people who worry that AI is biased; young people who expect AI to discriminate more than people do; and bias against young people measured in a system in use. The first two have no figure in any member; the other three have a figure for the United Kingdom, and the first of them for Cyprus and Malta as well.

**Indicators: Transparency and redress.** Transparency and redress has four indicators from published data, none of them about young people. The first records whether the law gives a person a right about automated decisions, to be told, to have a person look again or to contest: a right is in force in 22 of the 56 members, passed but not in force or partial in seven, and absent in 21; six members have no figure, their law's text being unread. Two record government action on transparency and on redress in AI, from the Global Index on Responsible AI (33 members each)[48]. The fourth is a foundation indicator: the World Justice Project's score for complaint mechanisms (42 members)[49], which describes complaint routes in general and not AI. The right in law counts as what is written down: a right in force earns 5 points, one passed but not yet in force or partial 2, and none 0, while 10 is kept for dated evidence that the right is used, which no source holds for any member; 22 members score 5, seven score 2 and 21 score 0. The transparency and redress scores of the Global Index run in equal bands from 0 to their full mark of 100 and are not halved, because the Global Index already gives written frameworks at most 16 of an indicator's 22 points and keeps the other 6 for government initiatives that put them into effect[50]: on transparency, scores run from 0 to 8, with none at 10, 13 at 0; on redress, scores run from 0 to 6, with none at 10, 20 at 0. The complaint mechanisms score runs from 0 to its full mark of 1: scores run from 3 to 8, with none at 10. None of the four describes young people, so the age fit of each figure is 1 of 4; data strength is 7 out of 10 throughout, except Bangladesh's right in law, graded 6 because its category rests on a press report of an ordinance that was not read. No published source in any member records whether young people were told that a decision about them was automated, or whether they challenged one. Five further indicators go to the survey: a public register of the algorithms government uses, and young people who know when they are dealing with AI, who were told that a decision was automated, who know it can be looked at again, and whose challenge changed the decision.

**Indicators: Protection as children.** Protection as children has four indicators from published data. None is a figure about children themselves: all four describe law and government action. They are the score for government action on children's rights in AI in the Global Index on Responsible AI (33 of the 56 members)[51]; whether the law covers sexual images of children made by AI (21 members); the law on child abuse material against five standard tests (all 56 members), a foundation indicator that is not about AI; and whether the member has joined the child rights protocol on the sale of children, which binds the states that are party to it (all 56 members). The two laws and the protocol are scored as what is written down, worth at most 5 points until dated evidence shows a law used or the commitment kept. Where the law's wording covers AI-made images a member earns 5, where only a general definition might cover them 2, and where neither does 0: seven members score 5, 11 score 2 and three score

0. Each of the five tests met is worth a point: 13 members score 5, 34 score 4, four score 3, two score 2, one scores 1 and two score 0. A party to the protocol earns 5 and a member that has signed without ratifying 2. Forty-four members score 5, five score 2 and seven score 0. The children's rights score of the Global Index keeps the full scale from 0 to 100, like its transparency and redress scores: scores run from 0 to 8, with none at 10, 23 at 0. Each figure grades 7 out of 10 for data strength, describing law or government rather than children. Every published figure for ages 15 to 17 is for the United Kingdom. Five further indicators go to the survey: an age rule or age-check duty in force, and 15 to 17 year olds who have met an age check, whose use of AI is under a teen setting, parental control or school account, who know the age rules that apply to them, and who use AI tools they are too young for.

**Indicators: Participation.** Participation has four indicators from published data. Two describe how governments open AI policy to the public: the score for government mechanisms for including civil society in AI policy in the Global Index on Responsible AI (33 of the 56 members)[52], and whether the country has a process for meaningful public participation in its national AI policy (22 members)[53]. One counts the routes by which young people take part in international discussion of AI: a Commonwealth student cohort on AI governance and youth envoys to the ITU (all 56 members). The civil society score runs in equal bands from 0 to its full mark of 100 and is not halved for what is written down, as 70 per cent of it counts consultation held while AI policy was drafted and mechanisms working in practice[54]: scores run from 0 to 9, with none at 10, 19 at 0. The public participation code scores yes 10, partly 5 and no 0, a yes needing evidence that the government engaged with the public: ten members score 10 and 12 score 5. Both routes score 10, one 5 and neither 0: five members score 10, 30 score 5 and 21 score 0. None of the three is a share of young people, so each figure's age fit is 1 of 4 and its data strength 7 out of 10. The fourth is a foundation indicator: the share of members of parliament aged 30 and under (41 members)[55], which is not about AI. It reaches 10 at 6.34 per cent, the average of the five best members: scores run from 0 to 10, with two members at 10, 12 at 0. As a figure about members of parliament rather than young people, it takes 1 of 4 for age fit, so every figure's data strength is 7. No published source in any member records whether young people have been asked their view on AI rules, and that question is put to the survey.

### Pillar 7: Motivation and confidence

**Definition.** Young people's informed confidence in their ability to use AI, their sense that it can serve their own goals, and the anxieties that hold them back.

Motivation, the wish to engage and the belief that one can, is the first of four successive kinds of access to digital technology[56]. A person's belief in their own ability shapes their expectations of a technology, their anxiety about it and whether they use it[57], and attitudes form part of every AI competence[58].

**Sub-pillars.** The pillar is measured through three sub-pillars: **Motivation**, whether a young person wants to take these tools up, and sees them as serving their own goals; **Confidence**, whether a young person believes they can use these tools to do what they need; **Anxiety**, what worries young people about these tools, and whether those worries are well founded.

**Indicators.** The pillar has five indicators, each a share of young people. Motivation: those likely to use AI for education or work in the next 12 months, and those who think AI will mostly help people in their country. Confidence: those confident in controlling their interactions with AI. Anxiety: those who expect AI to mostly harm people in their country, and those who expect their job to be significantly changed or replaced by AI, both scored turned round, as the shares who do not expect these. Figures for ages 15 to 29 are worked out from the respondent files of two surveys[59]. In Australia the first of these surveys interviewed people aged 18 and over, so its figures there are for ages 18 to 29. Only these two surveys' own questions are scored; figures gathered for other members asked other questions, mostly of students or young volunteers, and are kept as supporting evidence. The five indicators reach seven, 27, seven, 27 and seven of the 56 members in that order, and 28 members have no figure on the pillar. Each reaches 10 at the average of its five best members. Likely use reaches 10 at 86.62 per cent: scores run from 7 to 10, with three members at 10; thinking AI will mostly help, at 54.36 per cent: scores run from 3 to 10, with three members at 10; confidence, at 60.82 per cent: scores run from 8 to 10, with two members at 10; not expecting AI to mostly harm people, at 80.68 per cent: scores run from 4 to 10, with three members at 10; and not expecting one's job to be significantly changed or replaced, at 55.64 per cent: scores run from 8 to 10, with two members at 10. Each figure grades 10 out of 10 for data strength, except Australia's three, for ages 18 to 29, at 9. Whether a young person believes they can use AI to do what they need, and whether young people's worries are well founded, cannot be measured from published sources and are put to the survey.

### Pillar 8: Critical judgement and human agency

**Definition.** A young person's ability and habit of judging what AI produces, deciding when and how far to rely on it, keeping their decisions and learning their own, and using it ethically.

Frameworks of AI literacy agree that using AI well takes judgement, sound reliance and ethics as well as knowledge[60]. Over-reliance is a habit rather than a gap in knowledge[61], so the pillar treats judgement and agency as habits shown in practice.

**Sub-pillars.** The pillar is measured through four sub-pillars: **Checking**, whether a young person actually checks what a machine tells them before acting on it; **Calibrated reliance**, whether a young person leans on these systems more where they are strong and less where they are weak; **Agency**, whether a young person keeps the thinking and the decision their own when a machine offers to do it for them; **Ethical use**, whether a young person is honest and fair in how they work with these systems, and weighs the effect on other people.

**Indicators.** The pillar's nine indicators with a published figure are filed as their sources report them and are not scored in this edition: none of the small youth states has a figure on any of them, and the pillar is left out of the index until the survey of young people reports (Three results). Every member's figures are held, labelled, and count in the Data Gap Index.

**Indicators: Checking.** Checking has one indicator from published data: the share of young people who use AI and say they check what it tells them against another source. Twenty-three of the 56 members have a figure. For 21 it comes from a UNICEF poll of young volunteers[62], labelled as such and graded C; for 14 of them the figure covers all who answered, as the

poll gives no age split for the member or too few answered at ages 15 to 30. The United Kingdom and Australia take a national survey of the same behaviour[63], with their figures from the volunteers' poll kept beside it. Thirty-three members have no figure and none is given a stand-in. Two further indicators, whether young people can tell AI-made content from content made by a person and whether they know how to verify an AI answer, have no figure in any member and go to the survey. Checking of ordinary online information is measured under Information and data in Pillar 2.

**Indicators: Calibrated reliance.** Calibrated reliance has three indicators, one for each part of its question: what young people use AI for, by task; how much they trust it, by task; and how often it has turned out wrong for them. For ten members all three come from the same respondents, university students aged 18 to 29 who use ChatGPT[64]; the United Kingdom's figure for error comes from a national survey of university students[65]. Canada has a national figure for trust, and 13 members with nothing by task take a volunteers' poll on trust in general[66], so the trust indicator reaches 25 of the 56 members and the other two 11. Thirty-one members have no figure and none is given a stand-in; figures for adults are supporting evidence only. The sub-pillar's measure is whether trust matches how often AI has been wrong, read from the three together.

**Indicators: Agency.** Agency has three indicators, one for each part of its question: whether young people could do the task without AI; whether they add their own ideas or pass AI output on as it came; and whether they have stopped doing things themselves because AI does it. The first has a figure for three members, from national surveys and a student survey in Bangladesh, Canada and the United Kingdom, and the third for 13, from surveys of students and young people[67]. The second has a survey figure for the United Kingdom and Bangladesh; for 26 other members it uses the share of conversations with one AI assistant in which the user hands the whole task over[68], a figure for all users, applied unchanged to the member's young people as one group and labelled. Twenty-seven members have no figure on any part and none is given a stand-in; figures for adults are supporting evidence only.

**Indicators: Ethical use.** Ethical use has three indicators, one for each part of its question: whether young people say when they have used AI; what they think counts as fair use; and whether they have seen AI treat someone unfairly. The first has a figure for 12 members: what young people say they do in Canada[69], and for 11 members a labelled view from a student survey on whether students should disclose their use[70]. The second has a figure for 16 members, on questions that differ between them. The third has no figure in any member and goes to the survey. Forty members have no figure on any part and none is given a stand-in; figures for adults and official counts of misconduct are supporting evidence only.

## Data sources and coverage

Candidate data were gathered by a systematic search of international statistical databases, household and labour force surveys, school assessments, the publications of national statistical offices, research surveys, platform data and policy trackers, with a separate search for sources that reach the small youth states. Each source is recorded in the study's source inventory with

what it measures, its publisher and latest edition, the members it covers and members of this group among them, the age band it publishes, how it can be obtained, and a grade for the strength of its evidence.

The inventory holds 1,128 sources, besides the 75 tables compiled from them for the index, one figure for each member. Of the sources, 476 are graded A (official statistics or nationally representative surveys), 406 B (usable stand-ins) and 215 C (weak or indicative), 31 are ungraded, and 1,051 have been checked against the source itself. Eighty cover all 56 members and 453 reach at least one of the small youth states. This evidence grade describes the source as a whole; it is separate from the data strength grade that each member's figure carries, which is described under Missing data.

Each source also records the age band it publishes and its route to the index's band of 15 to 29, as defined under Scope, in the table below.

| Route to ages 15 to 29 | Sources |
|---|---|
| Published for 15 to 29, or in five-year bands that together make it | 110 |
| Another youth or child band published (for example 15 to 24, 16 to 24, age 15) | 436 |
| No youth figure published, but person-level data released from which one can be computed | 94 |
| Whole population or working-age population only | 175 |
| Whole population at 100 per cent, so the same for every age band | 2 |
| Not about people (laws, prices, infrastructure, institutions) | 311 |

*Sources by route to the age band 15 to 29.*

One hundred and ten sources publish figures for the full band, but 51 of them are counts of the population by age, which the index uses to weight averages and to work out ranges. Only 59 describe young people themselves, most of them ILO youth labour market series, national labour force surveys and censuses, and European and British surveys of internet and AI use. The great majority of youth figures are for 15 to 24, which is why the data map records the reporting stage each figure covers.

A source counts for a member only where its member list names that member. Where a source's stated count and its member list disagree, the member list is used. Every source with a web address that could be collected is also kept as a dated copy, as described under Audit trail and reproducibility.

## Indicator construction

### Selection principles

Three principles decide what can be an indicator. First, an indicator must describe young people, or the conditions that shape what they can do with AI: the price of mobile data, the speed and reliability of a connection, the languages that AI tools work in. Where an indicator

counts people, the figure used is the one for young people aged 15 to 29. A figure for the whole population, such as internet use among all adults, is never presented as a figure for young people. Where it is all a member has, it may stand in under the rules for missing data: labelled as a stand-in, kept with the range the figure for young people must lie in, and graded low for data strength. Second, a policy is credited for what reaches young people in practice. Where the only evidence a member has is what is written down, such as a law, a strategy, a curriculum or a government's documents on AI, the indicator is kept, labelled as what is written down, and scored at most half marks: for the four laws and the treaty commitment scored in Rights, safety and participation, for a data protection authority not shown to be at work, for what national policy says about teachers, for computing in the official school curriculum and for a national youth employment strategy, what is written down earns no more than 5 of the 10 points, and the other 5 are kept for dated evidence that it is used, taught or reaches the people it is meant for.

Third, every score reads the same way: higher is better and lower is worse, for every indicator, every sub-pillar and every pillar. Each indicator is filed as its source reports it; where the measure runs the other way, such as the share of young people not in work, education or training, it is turned round for scoring.

**Foundation indicators.** Where no published figure describes what a sub-pillar defines for more than a few members, an indicator of the foundation it rests on may sit beside the direct indicators. In the Education and training provision pillar, the share of young people attending education, the general quality of schooling and the share of secondary teachers who are trained sit beside the few figures on the teaching of AI itself, because teaching about AI cannot reach a young person who is not in education, and is unlikely to be taught well where schooling is weak or where teachers have not been trained to teach. A foundation indicator is labelled as what it is, education in general and not AI, in its name and on every figure, and the direct figures it stands beside are supplied by the survey.

## Missing data: stand-ins and ranges

Few sources publish a figure for young people aged 15 to 29 in every member. The 111 indicators hold a figure for 3,287 of the 6,216 pairs of member and indicator, stand-ins included. Seventeen indicators have a figure for all 56 members and the thinnest has one for one. Where the figure for young people is missing and the sub-pillar allows a stand-in, the index uses the nearest figure published for the member, labels it as what it is, and gives the range within which the figure for young people must lie. The handbook on composite indicators of the OECD and the Joint Research Centre asks that the treatment of missing data be documented and its effect on the results reported[71]. The rules are set out here, and their effect on the scores is tested under Uncertainty and sensitivity.

### Figures for another age band

Each member's figure for ages 15 to 29 is found by the strongest method its data allows, and the method is recorded against the figure. A figure for exactly ages 15 to 29, whether published

or computed from a survey's own data files, is used as it is. Where the figure is for another youth band, and another survey of the same country publishes the age bands, the step between the published band and ages 15 to 29 in that survey is borrowed and applied to the figure:

$$\hat{x}_{cj} = x^{B}_{cj} + \left(z^{Y}_{c} - z^{B}_{c}\right)$$

Here $z^{Y}_{c}$ and $z^{B}_{c}$ are the second survey's figures for ages 15 to 29 and for band $B$. Where no such survey exists, the published figure is kept as a labelled stand-in and the figure for ages 15 to 29 is given as a range. For a band that lies inside ages 15 to 29, such as 15 to 24, the range runs from the case in which no one in the remaining ages has the attribute to the case in which all of them do:

$$b_c\, x^{B}_{cj} \;\le\; x_{cj} \;\le\; b_c\, x^{B}_{cj} + 100\,(1 - b_c)$$

A borrowed figure keeps its range beside it. If a borrowed figure falls outside its range, the range is used, and the test of band certainty runs on the range, so that it shows where the borrowed step is what decides a member's band. Carrying the nearest band over unchanged was considered and not adopted, because it understates the figure wherever the attribute is still rising with age. Borrowing the step from similar countries was also considered and not adopted.

**Figures for all adults, carried to young people by age.** Some surveys publish a member's figure for all adults and the pattern by age only across all their countries together. Where a figure for young people can be worked out from the two, it is, and it is labelled as worked out; an adult figure is never used as it stands. The survey's rates by age band, $g_a$, are laid over the member's own adult population by age, $n_{ca}$, and scaled by one factor so that they return the member's published adult figure, $x^{A}_{c}$. The figure for young people is the scaled rate over the youth ages $Y$:

$$\hat{x}_c = x^{A}_{c} \times \frac{\sum_{a \in Y} n_{ca}\, g_a \,/\, \sum_{a \in Y} n_{ca}}{\sum_{a \in A} n_{ca}\, g_a \,/\, \sum_{a \in A} n_{ca}}$$

where $A$ is all the adult ages the survey covers. The calculation rests on the age pattern having the same shape in every member. It is checked against any member for which the survey also publishes a youth figure, the result of that check is reported with the indicator, and every figure worked out in this way keeps beside it the range within which the figure for young people must lie whatever the pattern. It is used for the indicator on AI and the news in Civic and community life (Annex A). The population by age is the member's own, up to the oldest age the survey covers, while the survey's adults are those online, who are younger than the population as a whole. The younger they are, the closer the figure for young people comes to the adult figure, which it equals if use does not change with age. The range beside each figure holds where young people are at least as large a share of the survey's adults as of the population, as they are in a sample younger than the population.

### Members with no figure for young people

Where the sub-pillar allows a stand-in, a member with no figure for young people takes the whole-population figure as a labelled stand-in, until a figure for ages 15 to 29 is obtained. The

published value is kept as it stands and is not rounded: 99.9 per cent is not counted as 100. Beside it the index gives the range the figure for young people must lie in, with no assumption about who is left out:

$$\max\left(0,\ 100 - \frac{100 - x_{cj}^{W}}{a_c}\right) \ \leq\ x_{cj}\ \leq\ \min\left(100,\ \frac{x_{cj}^{W}}{a_c}\right)$$

The lower limit is the case in which everyone without the attribute is young; the upper limit is the case in which everyone with it is. The range is narrow where nearly everyone has the attribute and wide where many do not. Where young people are a quarter of the population, a whole-population figure of 99.9 per cent gives a range of 99.6 to 100 for young people, and one of 70 per cent gives a range of 0 to 100. Where the whole population is at 100 per cent, every age group is, and the figure applies to young people as published. A stand-in carries a low data strength grade, and the test of band certainty flags the member wherever the range crosses a band limit.

**Figures for all users of a service, carried to young people.** Some figures come from records of how a service is used and carry no ages at all. Where such a figure is used, it is applied to the member's population aged 15 to 29 as one group and labelled. With nothing known about age, young people are taken to behave as all users do, so the published figure is carried over unchanged. Beside it the index records the number of people aged 15 to 29 it is applied to, the share of people aged 15 to 29 in the member's population of the ages the service counts in the United Nations' figures, and the range given by the rule above with that share as $a_c$. Because the figure is a share of conversations, that range holds only where young people hold at least as large a share of the conversations as they do of the population. It is used for three indicators (Annex A): the share of AI conversations in which the user hands the whole task over, in Agency, and the shares of conversations with one AI assistant that are about health, wellbeing and money, in Health and personal development, and that produce software or a creative work, in Making things; in each the ages counted are 15 to 64.

### Figures on attitudes

Figures on what young people think and feel about AI follow a stricter rule. Young adults hold distinct views of AI[72], and the range worked out from an adult figure is close to 0 to 100, too wide to be used on its own. A figure for all adults is therefore never used as it stands. Figures that might stand in for a member with no figure for ages 15 to 29 were gathered and labelled: national samples of nearby youth bands, online panels, student samples and polls of young volunteers, some about technology in general rather than AI. None is scored, because each asks a different question, mostly of students or volunteers, and, if scored, they would have set the levels that the surveyed members are measured against. They stay in the record as supporting evidence, and a member with no figure from a survey of young people is a gap for the survey. Annex A lists them.

**Figures on the use of AI.** Figures on what young people do with AI are held to the same rule as figures on attitudes: a figure for all adults is not used as it stands. A member with no figure for young people may carry a student sample or a poll of young volunteers, graded C and labelled with its source type. No figure about the internet in general stands in for a figure

about AI: where nothing about AI exists for a member, it has no figure. Annex A lists the sources used for Learning and work.

### Data strength

The strength of the evidence never changes a member's score. It is published beside the index as a separate data strength score, in Annex E. Each member's figure for each indicator is graded by the type of evidence behind it, from an exact figure for ages 15 to 29 down to no figure at all; the grades are shown for each indicator and combined for each member. For the fit of the age band, an exact figure for ages 15 to 29 scores 4, a figure for a nearby youth band, used as published or carried to ages 15 to 29 by a borrowed step, scores 3, and a figure known only as a range is graded as a whole-population figure: 2 where the range is no wider than 5 points, and 1 otherwise. Adjusting each score by its data strength was considered and not adopted, because it would rank a member lower for weak statistics and not for weak readiness. This grade describes one member's figure; it is separate from the evidence grade of each source, set out under Data sources and coverage.

Each member's figure for each indicator is graded out of 10 in four parts.

| Part | Points | Levels |
|---|---|---|
| Age fit | 0 to 4 | 4 exactly ages 15 to 29, or the whole population at 100 per cent; 3 a nearby youth band, or a figure carried to ages 15 to 29 by a borrowed step; 2 a whole-population figure whose range for young people is no wider than 5 points; 1 any other whole-population figure. A figure known only as a range is graded as a whole-population figure. |
| Measure fit | 0 to 3 | 3 the indicator's own measure; 2 a close stand-in; 1 a partial measure |
| How it was produced | 0 to 2 | 2 measured by survey, census or records, including figures computed from survey files, figures the UN records as country data and averages of users' speed tests; 1 modelled or estimated, measured but marked by its publisher as unreliable or of low reliability, or an average of fewer than 100 speed tests in the year; 0 assumed |
| Recency | 0 to 1 | 1 within five years of the edition's reference year, 2026 |

A member with no figure scores 0. Age fit and measure fit follow the GRADE approach to rating evidence, which counts evidence as indirect when the population studied differs from the population of interest, or when the outcome measured stands in for the one that matters[73]. How a figure was produced follows the flag the UN SDG Global Database gives each figure: country data, estimated or modelled. Relevance and timeliness are principles 11 and 13 of the European Statistics Code of Practice[74]. Age fit carries most weight because a figure for young people is the purpose of the index; measure fit comes next. The weights are the project's judgement, not a published standard. Recency is counted from the reference year, not from the date of reading, so a grade does not change with the calendar. Measure fit and the route to the age band are graded once for each source by the project team, under this framework, and recorded on the source with the reason. Firms' reports of disruption to their own connections, for example, are graded a close stand-in for whether a young person's

connection keeps working. A figure about a group other than young people, such as firms, teachers or schools, takes 1 for age fit. Where one entry holds figures from several surveys that fit the measure differently, it is graded at the fit of its weakest figures, so that no figure is graded above its evidence. A figure for one year of age, such as PISA's 15 year olds, and a youth band that reaches into ages 15 to 29 from below, such as 9 to 18, count as nearby youth bands; a group with no upper age, such as students aged 18 and over, takes 1. A member's data strength for the index is the average of its grades across all the indicators, counting 0 for any indicator on which it has no figure; each indicator's grade is also shown.

$$d_{cj} = d_{cj}^{\text{age}} + d_{cj}^{\text{measure}} + d_{cj}^{\text{produced}} + d_{cj}^{\text{recency}}$$

$$D_c = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} d_{cj}$$

Here the four parts are those of the table above, $n$ is the number of indicators, and $d_{cj}$ is 0 where member $c$ has no figure on indicator $j$.

### Figures that stay missing

Where a member has neither a figure for young people nor a figure that can stand in, the indicator has no figure for that member, and the data map records it as missing. A stand-in does not close the gap: the data map still records the member as having no figure for young people, the gap goes to the survey, and the stand-in is replaced as soon as a figure for ages 15 to 29 is obtained.

**Where stand-ins are used.** Stand-ins are decided sub-pillar by sub-pillar. In the scored pillars they are used in Coverage, Electricity and Internet use (whole-population figures and figures for a narrower youth band, each with its range), in Learning and work (samples of students and volunteers), in Reach and Culture and identity (samples of students), and in Health and personal development and Making things (samples of students, and one AI assistant's records for all users, applied to ages 15 to 29 as one group); in Critical judgement and human agency, which is not scored, Checking carries a volunteers' poll, Calibrated reliance a volunteers' poll on trust in general, Agency one AI assistant's records for all users, applied to ages 15 to 29 as one group, and Ethical use a student survey's view on disclosure. In every other sub-pillar a member without a figure for young people has none, and the gap goes to the survey.

**Gaps in the index.** A gap of this kind is never given a score and never counted as zero: a member's sub-pillar score is the average of the indicators on which it has a score, its pillar score the average of its sub-pillars with a score, and its index the average of its pillars with one. A gap may instead be filled with an estimate, made in the order the ITU follows for its own estimates[75]: first the member's own figure from another year; then the same measure from another source; then a model that predicts the figure from related indicators the member does have, used only where, tested on figures held back, it proves accurate, as the ILO chooses its models[76]; and otherwise the average of the members most like it, those in the same Commonwealth region and of the same size, whether or not a member belongs to the relevant smaller-population peer group. The average of a group comes last because the ITU found such averages unsatisfactory where few members of a group have data[77], and an estimate is

made only where at least three members of the group have a figure. In this edition estimates fill 49 gaps on six indicators: firms whose connection was disrupted (seven members), not in work, education or training (two), looking for work for a year or more (seven), informal work (seven), unemployed after a job (20) and trained secondary teachers (six). An estimate is labelled as an estimate wherever it appears and names the step that produced it; it is graded as modelled or estimated under data strength; and it does not close the gap: the data map still records the member as having no figure for young people, the gap counts in the Data Gap Index, and it goes to the survey.

#### Use of stand-ins in findings

A stand-in shows what is known about a wider or a different group. It cannot show a member's young people doing better or worse than that group.

## Normalisation and aggregation

Every indicator is scored in the same way, on a categorical scale: the member's figure is placed in one of a fixed number of bands, and each band is worth a set number of points. Categorical scales are one of the standard methods of normalisation for composite indicators[78]. The bands of indicator $j$ are anchored on two fixed goalposts: the worst point, $L_j$, and the best point or the point that is enough, $U_j$. Goalposts are taken from published targets where they exist, and the direction of the indicator is stated with them. Every indicator measured on a scale has ten equal bands between its goalposts, so one rule sets every band limit (Figure 5). The other 12 indicators are recorded as categories.

Bands are used in place of an exact score against the goalposts because the evidence differs from member to member: an exact figure for young people, a figure for a nearby age band, a whole-population stand-in or a range. Coarse bands keep differences finer than this evidence can show from deciding a score. Fixed goalposts keep a member's score stable, since it changes only when the member's own figure changes. Scaling each indicator to the range observed among members was considered and not adopted, because every score would then shift whenever another member's data changed. Z-scores and ranks were also considered and not adopted.

Every indicator is scored from 0 to 10 points, the same scale for every indicator, so that indicators stand on an equal footing. Bands about 10 points wide on a measure running from 0 to 100 per cent are no finer than the best evidence: a survey of about 500 young people is accurate to roughly plus or minus 4 points. The band limits of each indicator follow from its goalposts and are recorded with it.

The goalposts follow one rule for every indicator. An indicator whose measure runs the other way is turned round first, so that higher is always better. The best goalpost, which scores 10, is a United Nations or Commonwealth target where one exists, such as the ITU's targets for 2030 for universal and meaningful connectivity[79]; otherwise universal access or zero deprivation, meaning every young person with something every young person should have, or none lacking something no young person should lack, or the full mark of another index's own

scale; otherwise the average of the five best members. For speed and delay the best goalpost is the point that is enough, set out below. The worst goalpost, which scores 0, is the natural zero; where there is none, it is the 2.5th percentile of the figures. This is the order in which the Sustainable Development Report sets the bounds of the SDG Index[80]. A figure's points are 10 times its distance from the worst goalpost as a share of the distance between the two goalposts, rounded down to a whole point. A figure at or beyond the best goalpost scores 10, and one at or beyond the worst scores 0.

$$s_{cj} = \min\left(10,\ \max\left(0,\ \left\lfloor 10\,\frac{x_{cj} - L_j}{U_j - L_j}\right\rfloor\right)\right)$$





*Figure 5. Points on an indicator against its figure. Ten equal bands lie between the worst goalpost and the best.*

Speed and delay are placed on a logarithmic scale first, so that each band needs the same proportional gain. For download speed on mobile networks each band needs a rise of about 8 per cent. The Internet Society's Internet Resilience Index treats the same measures of speed and delay in this way[81], and the ICT Development Index does so for data traffic[82]. A delay is turned round into how many times a second the network can answer, 1,000 divided by the delay in milliseconds, and scores 10 at a delay of 50 ms, which is good enough for common tasks such as video calls[83]; a download speed of 50 Mbps and an upload speed of 10 Mbps score 10, the speed Canada sets as necessary to take full advantage of the internet[84], beyond which newer studies find the gains from more speed shrink[85]. Categories score in equal steps, and prices are judged against the ITU's affordability target.

$$s_{cj} = \min\left(10,\ \max\left(0,\ \left\lfloor 10\,\frac{\ln x_{cj} - \ln L_j}{\ln U_j - \ln L_j}\right\rfloor\right)\right)$$

$$x_{cj} = \frac{1000}{\text{delay in ms}} \quad \text{for a delay}$$

Some shares that are turned round never come near 100 per cent in any country, such as the share of young people unemployed after having had a job, which runs from 0.2 to 28.3 per cent across 137 countries. With 100 per cent as the worst goalpost, almost the whole scale would lie over figures no country has, and nearly every member would score the same. Where the members' worst figure on such a share is below 50 per cent, the worst goalpost is therefore the realistic worst in the world: the 2.5th percentile of performance across every country in the same source, fixed at the figures held for this edition, as the SDG Index sets its lower bounds. A price set against income has no natural zero, so the price of mobile data keeps the 2.5th percentile of the members' own figures, 90.83 and 75.7 per cent of income left, as set out under Cost. Youth unemployment takes the same worst goalpost, 43.8 per cent unemployed across 176 countries, although Eswatini's 52.6 per cent is just above that line, because with 100 per cent as the worst, 34 of the 54 members would share one score. The scale then spans the range found in the world, not only among the members, and does not move when the members' figures change. The cost is that small differences count for more: where figures come from samples of a few hundred young people in each country, some differences between members lie within sampling error. For access to electricity, coverage and internet use the recorded figure enters the score where only a range for young people is known, and the range is used in the test of band certainty.

Indicator scores combine by a plain average at each level, with equal weight for each component: a sub-pillar's score is the average of its indicators' points, a pillar's the average of its sub-pillars' scores, and the index the average of its pillars, seven in this edition. A plain average lets strength in one part make up for weakness in another; a geometric mean would limit that, but a single score of zero, which several indicators give, would set it to zero[86]. Equal weight for each component keeps the pillars balanced as declared, so that a pillar does not count for more because it has more sub-pillars. No gap is given a score: each average is taken over the indicators, sub-pillars or pillars on which the member has one, and an estimate made under the rules for missing data enters labelled as an estimate (Three results). This is the most common way of combining an index's scores. The ITU's ICT Development Index averages its indicators into pillars and its pillars into the index, with equal weight at each level, which it calls the neutral choice[87], and the IMF's AI Preparedness Index is the simple average of its four dimensions, each the simple average of its indicators[88]. The Global Innovation Index likewise leaves a missing value out of the average, so that it does not count as a zero for the country[89].

$$S_{ck} = \frac{1}{|J_{ck}|} \sum_{j \in J_{ck}} s_{cj}$$

$$P_{cp} = \frac{1}{|K_{cp}|} \sum_{k \in K_{cp}} S_{ck}$$

$$I_c = \frac{10}{|Q_c|} \sum_{p \in Q_c} P_{cp}$$

Here $J_{ck}$ is the set of indicators of sub-pillar $k$ on which member $c$ has a score, $K_{cp}$ the sub-pillars of pillar $p$ on which it has a score, and $Q_c$ the scored pillars on which it has a score. $S_{ck}$, $P_{cp}$ and $I_c$ are its sub-pillar, pillar and index scores, the index out of 100.

Where the index parts from them is in whom it keeps. Each of them leaves out countries with too little data, and so does the Commonwealth's Youth Development Index, which weights its domains by expert judgement and fills gaps from the most similar countries: it requires half the data it needs, and its 2023 edition left out six members of the small youth states for that reason, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Nauru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tuvalu[90]. This index keeps all 56. The small youth states are where published evidence on young people is thinnest, and leaving them out would leave their young people unrepresented in a Commonwealth index and hide the very gaps the survey is meant to close. Kept in, with any estimate labelled and their data strength beside their scores, they show where surveys and the collection of data are most needed. Leaving a gap out of an average is not neutral either. The two pillars most often without a score, Motivation and confidence (28 members) and Purposeful use and creation (23), average 7.1 and 6.8 out of 10 among the members that have one, against 3.2 to 4.6 for Rights, safety and participation, Education and training provision and Decent work, enterprise and transitions, which every member has. A member scored without the first two leans more on the pillars where scores run low, so leaving its gaps out lowers its place; this is why gaps are filled with estimates wherever the rules for missing data allow, and why the Data Gap Index is published beside the index.

## Three results

The index is built to show where the evidence on young people and AI runs out, so that the survey of young people can fill the gaps. One pillar, Critical judgement and human agency, rests on surveys that have reached none of the small youth states: the published data on it are too limited and sparse to score, no published source found in this research holds this information, and the pillar is left out of the index until the survey reports. Two results are therefore published in this edition, and a third follows the survey.

| Result | Pillars | Members |
|---|---|---|
| The index | Seven | All 56 |
| Data Gap Index | All eight | All 56, ranked from the biggest gap in data to the smallest |
| The full index, after the survey | All eight | All 56 |

No gap is given a score, and no member is left out. A low score for lack of data would describe a member's statistics, not its young people, and would place the members the surveys have not reached at the foot of the index; leaving members out would hide the very gaps the survey is meant to close. Where a member has no figure, its scores rest on the indicators it has, or on an estimate made and labelled under the rules for missing data (Figures that stay missing). The gaps that leave a member with no score at all on a scored pillar are in Digital, data, media and AI capability for 16 members (seven of the small youth states), Purposeful use and creation for 23 (19) and Motivation and confidence for 28 (20).

Ranking every member on what can be measured for all of them follows the Sustainable Development Report for small island developing states, which brought all 38 into one ranking with a missing-data threshold of 30 per cent[91]. Publishing a measure of each member's data beside its score, instead of leaving members out, follows INFORM's Lack of Reliability Index[92].

## Data Gap Index

The Data Gap Index ranks members from the biggest gap in data to the smallest and shows in which pillars each member's gaps lie. It is the guide to where the survey is most needed. A member's gap is the share of the full eight-pillar index, out of 100, that rests on no figure for that member: each pillar carries one eighth, each sub-pillar an equal share of its pillar and each indicator an equal share of its sub-pillar, and a permitted stand-in counts as a figure. An estimate used to calculate a readiness score remains a gap in qualifying source evidence and is counted as such in the Data Gap Index. The ranking on the figures held for this edition is in Annex C. Eighteen of the 20 biggest gaps are among the small youth states, Antigua and Barbuda is eighth, and no member is free of gaps; Bangladesh, with the smallest gap, has 18 indicators without a figure, and the United Kingdom 18.

$$G_c = 100 \sum_{p=1}^{8} \frac{1}{8} \sum_{k \in K_p} \frac{1}{|K_p|} \sum_{j \in J_k} \frac{1}{|J_k|} m_{cj}$$

Here $K_p$ is the set of sub-pillars of pillar $p$, $J_k$ the indicators of sub-pillar $k$, and $m_{cj}$ is 1 where member $c$ has no figure on indicator $j$ or only an estimate, and 0 where it has one, a permitted stand-in counting as a figure.

## The readiness benchmark and illustrative economic opportunity

The published index can be classified using a fixed cut score of 53 out of 100. A member with a score of 53 or higher meets this study's benchmark. Below 53 it has not yet reached it. The line is derived from the index scores, informed by external measures; it is not an IMF cut-off. This additional classification does not alter an index score, country rank or the separate Data Gap Index.

### Establishing the cut score

The cut score was selected by comparing six recognised standard-setting approaches. Four relate the Commonwealth scores to external preparedness benchmarks, including the IMF AI Preparedness Index and the Oxford Insights Government AI Readiness Index. The other two use the Commonwealth score distribution and strength across its seven scored pillars. Each method was refitted 2,000 times on resamples of the members it is fitted on, 44 for the three IMF-based methods and 56 for the other three, to produce an empirical range around its estimated cut score[93].

For the 44 Commonwealth members with IMF AI Preparedness Index observations, the two scores are correlated at 0.85. The IMF index and the Oxford Insights index measure what

governments and economies have in place for AI. This index measures what young people themselves can reach, do, learn and earn, and what they think of AI, so the comparison shows how far youth readiness runs with national preparedness, and Table D5 in Annex D shows how far each pillar follows national income. The IMF world median of 0.465 on its 0 to 1 scale maps to a Commonwealth score of 51.6 (range 49.6 to 53.7). The IMF policy scenario level of 0.48 corresponds to approximately 52.9 on the Commonwealth scale. Classifying the 44 IMF-covered members into the IMF's more- and less-prepared halves gives a cut score of 51.5 where the shares of each half classified correctly, added together, are highest, or 56.0 at the point of equal probability of being in the more-prepared half. Using the Oxford Insights global median gives 50.7.

The index scores' own natural division is 53.2; the point at which a member has an even chance of scoring at least 50 on a majority of pillars is 56.3. The six method-specific estimates and uncertainty ranges are recorded below. Five of them overlap between 52.4 and 53.7, and 53 lies inside all five (Figure 6). The sixth, for a majority of pillars at 50 or more, runs from 54.0 to 58.4. The nearest members are Nigeria (54.5, 15th) and Seychelles (51.8, 16th); any integer cut score of 52, 53 or 54 produces the same present classification. Fifteen members are above and 41 below the adopted line. The line remains fixed between editions to permit progress against an unchanged standard; methods will be repeated as a diagnostic check. The Human Development Index, the ITU's Global Cybersecurity Index and the INFORM Risk Index fix their thresholds in the same way[94]. Progress against the line compares like with like while the index keeps the same pillars and indicators. A pillar or indicator added in a later edition changes what each score averages, so part of a member's change in score then comes from the new measure.

| Method | Cut | Range |
|---|---|---|
| IMF world median matched to this index | 51.6 | 49.6–53.7 |
| IMF halves: best balance of correct classification | 51.5 | 50.8–60.2 |
| IMF halves: 50% probability | 56.0 | 52.4–59.2 |
| Oxford Insights median: 50% probability | 50.7 | 46.9–55.0 |
| Natural separation in Commonwealth scores | 53.2 | 49.3–57.6 |
| At least 50 on a majority of pillars | 56.3 | 54.0–58.4 |

$$\bigcap_{m=1}^{5} [\ell_m,\, u_m] = [52.4,\ 53.7]$$

$$\text{benchmark met} \iff I_c \geq 53$$

Here $[\ell_m, u_m]$ is the range of method $m$ in the table above.





*Figure 6. The estimated cut score and range of each of the six methods. The shaded band, 52.4 to 53.7, is where five of the six ranges overlap.*

All six methods work from the index's own scores, three of them against the same IMF measure, so they are six readings of one set of scores. The benchmark is therefore a reporting line on the conditions the index measures.

The 56 members are the whole Commonwealth, so resampling them tests how far each cut rests on the few members that sit near it. Each method resamples the members it is fitted on. The three IMF-based methods draw from the 44 members with an IMF score, and the other three from all 56. Each of the 2,000 resamples draws as many members as the method uses, with replacement, from a fixed random seed (20261013) so that the same resamples are drawn every time, and each range runs from the 2.5th to the 97.5th percentile of the cuts they give. An even-chance cut has no finite answer when a resample's two groups separate completely, and such a resample is left out of that method's range. This happens in 657 of the 2,000 resamples for a majority of pillars, 218 for the IMF halves and five for Oxford Insights. The IMF scores are the 2023 values of its AI Preparedness Index for 165 economies, and the IMF line is the straight line through the 44 members that treats both scores alike, index = 9.90 + 89.65 × the IMF score. Oxford Insights' 2025 report prints six pillar scores for each of 195 countries, and each overall score is worked out from them with the weights in its methodology report. Annex G gives every member's index score, IMF and Oxford Insights scores and number of pillars at 50 or more, the figures all six methods start from.

### IMF economic groups and GDP-level scenarios

The financial comparison draws on the IMF working paper The Global Impact of AI: Mind the Gap. The IMF estimates the effect of AI on the level of GDP after ten years relative to its model baseline. Exposure to AI, preparedness and access to necessary technology influence

the magnitude of the result. Its model does not impose a binary threshold at 53, and its modelled effects are economy-wide rather than youth-specific[95].

The IMF economic group named in Annex II is retained for every country expressly listed there: Other advanced economies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom); EU and Switzerland (Cyprus, Malta); Emerging Asia (Brunei Darussalam, India, Malaysia, Pakistan); Emerging Latin America, Middle East and Africa (South Africa); and Low-income countries (Bangladesh, Cameroon, Nigeria). The remaining 41 Commonwealth members are assigned to the Rest of the World category. Of the 41 Rest of the World members, 38 are below the readiness benchmark; Pakistan, Bangladesh and Cameroon are also below it, although they belong to named IMF groups. The economic grouping is independent of the readiness classification.

| IMF economic group | Conservative | Moderate* | Optimistic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other advanced economies | 1.6% | 3.15% | 4.7% |
| EU and Switzerland | 1.5% | 2.95% | 4.4% |
| Emerging Asia | 1.0% | 2.0% | 3.0% |
| Emerging Latin America, Middle East and Africa | 1.1% | 2.15% | 3.2% |
| Low-income countries | 0.9% | 1.8% | 2.7% |
| Rest of the World | 0.7% | 1.45% | 2.2% |

* The moderate figure is the arithmetic midpoint of the IMF's low and high cases, introduced by this study rather than provided as a separate IMF scenario.

### Country calculations

For each member $i$ and scenario $s$, the illustrative dollar value equals GDP(i, current US$) × [IMF group percentage(s) / 100]. The GDP base is the World Bank's 2025 GDP (current US dollars, series NY.GDP.MKTP.CD), except The Bahamas, for which 2024 is used. The country's economic group determines the percentage; its distance from the 53-point line does not. Every result is listed in Annex F[96].

$$V_i^s = \mathrm{GDP}_i \times \frac{r_{g(i)}^s}{100}$$

$$r_g^{\text{moderate}} = \tfrac{1}{2}\left(r_g^{\text{conservative}} + r_g^{\text{optimistic}}\right)$$

Here $g(i)$ is the IMF economic group of member $i$ and $r_g^s$ its percentage for scenario $s$ in the table above.

Under this calculation, the 15 countries above the line have aggregate illustrative values of $196,945,084,056 (conservative), $389,171,759,839 (moderate) and $581,398,435,622 (optimistic). The corresponding values for the 41 below it are $14,412,317,501, $29,231,918,660 and $44,051,519,819. Small rounding differences may occur in the published table. The

illustrative UK values are approximately $64bn, $126bn and $188bn; for Malawi they are approximately $104m, $216m and $328m. The IMF percentages refer to GDP levels at the end of a ten-year model horizon; applying those percentages to a present GDP base does not convert them into annual cash flows or ten-year cumulative output.

#### Essential causal and interpretive qualification

The economic illustration uses a reporting assumption introduced by this study. For a member at or above 53, the full IMF group-level percentage is shown as an illustrative gain. For a member below 53, the same percentage is labelled an illustrative economic opportunity. This is not a causal estimate of what moving the member's index score across 53 would add to GDP. The IMF does not find that a country below that score receives no gains, nor that crossing the score would deliver the full group-level effect. In the IMF model, preparedness acts continuously alongside exposure and other complementary conditions.

Consequently the below-line totals must not be described as demonstrated losses, guaranteed future gains, or the increase attributable to passing the benchmark. To estimate an incremental gain from improved readiness would require modelling a country-specific current-preparedness outcome and a separately defined improved-preparedness counterfactual, accounting for its economic structure, exposure, complementary investments, timing and implementation. No such difference is calculated here. The classification is also based on youth-focused proxies, while IMF gains refer to an economy-wide model. These differences materially limit causal interpretation.

The figures are best read as transparent illustrations of the possible economic scale of AI adoption under the chosen IMF group scenarios. Neither the monetary calculation nor the benchmark classification changes the underlying index, data strength results, Data Gap Index or rankings. The benchmark and the economic assumptions should be reviewed openly whenever future editions and direct youth-survey evidence become available.

### Uncertainty and sensitivity

Because scores are given in bands, the first uncertainty tested is whether better evidence could move a member into a different band. Each member's score on each indicator is therefore tested for band certainty: whether its figure, or the range within which its figure for young people could lie, crosses a band limit. A member whose whole range lies inside one band keeps its score wherever in that range the figure for young people lies. A member whose range crosses a limit is flagged, because better data could move it to a different band. Where a figure has been carried from a nearby age band by a borrowed step, the test runs on its range, so that it shows where the borrowed step is what decides the member's band. An indicator defined on a band inside ages 15 to 29, such as high-skill jobs at ages 25 to 29 or the school lessons of 15 year olds, is tested on its figure as published.

Band certainty and data strength answer different questions. Data strength grades how closely the evidence fits the indicator, by age band, measure, method and year; band certainty says whether the figure for young people, anywhere in its range, could change the score. Members

whose band could change are flagged in the results, beside their data strength score. Band certainty takes each figure as published, so sampling error, rounding, the modelling or assumption behind a figure and the choice of who runs a speed test lie outside it.

Ranges round each member's rank are not published in this edition (Known methodological limitations).

The index is also worked out in three other ways, to show how far its ranking rests on the way scores are combined. In the first, every indicator counts the same: a member's score is the average of the points of every indicator with a figure, so that a pillar with more indicators counts for more. In the second, a strong pillar cannot fully make up for a weak one: the pillars are combined by a geometric mean, with 1 added to each pillar's score before the mean is taken and taken off after, so that a pillar scoring 0 can enter it. The third keeps the index's scores and applies the rule by which the Youth Development Index leaves out a country with less than half the data it needs[97]: a member with figures for fewer than half the indicators is shown without a rank. Its weights are not used: the Youth Development Index sets its six domains at 22, 22, 22, 14, 10 and 10 per cent by expert judgement, and its indicators within them by importance[98], but its domains are not this index's pillars, so here every pillar counts the same. The seven members at the top of the index are the top seven under all three. Counting every indicator the same moves 11 members more than ten places; the largest rises are The Bahamas' (30th to 15th) and Guyana's (31st to 18th), the largest falls Cameroon's (29th to 49th) and Sierra Leone's (33rd to 52nd). The geometric mean moves 43 of the 56 members two places or fewer; the largest falls are Sierra Leone's (33rd to 48th) and Papua New Guinea's (32nd to 44th), each with a pillar scoring below 1 out of 10. The Youth Development Index's rule leaves 20 members unranked, every one of them in a smaller-population peer group. Counting every indicator the same puts 20 members at or above the readiness benchmark of 53, and the geometric mean 13, against 15 in the index. Annex D gives every member's index and rank under each.

$$I_c^{\text{every}} = \frac{10}{|J_c|} \sum_{j \in J_c} s_{cj}$$

$$I_c^{\text{geometric}} = 10 \left[ \Big( \prod_{p \in Q_c} \big( P_{cp} + 1 \big) \Big)^{1/|Q_c|} - 1 \right]$$

Here $J_c$ is the set of indicators on which member $c$ has a figure.

The pillars were also weighted by budget allocation, the way the Youth Development Index sets its domain weights by expert judgement[99]. Four allocations were made as weight scenarios, one human and three model-generated, each sharing 100 points across the seven pillars from their names, questions and definitions. One was made by the project lead, one by the AI model used in building the index (Claude Opus 5.5), and two by the same model, run separately and told to answer as a labour economist and as a youth rights advocate who has worked in small island states, without any member's scores. The three model-generated scenarios are one model's answers to three prompts, so the exercise explores how the ranking responds to other weights. The average gives Meaningful access 20 per cent, Digital, data, media and AI capability 20, Decent work, enterprise and transitions 15.5, Education and training provision 13, Rights, safety and participation 12, Purposeful use and creation 11.75, and Motivation and

confidence 7.75. The allocations differ most on Decent work, enterprise and transitions (8 to 25 points) and on Digital, data, media and AI capability (16 to 30). A pillar with no score is left out of a member's weighted score and the other weights are scaled up to 100. The same ten members make the top ten, 35 of the 56 move two places or fewer, and 13 move more than five. The largest falls are Sierra Leone's (33rd to 45th), which scores 0 out of 10 on Digital, data, media and AI capability, and Pakistan's (24th to 34th), whose highest pillar, Motivation and confidence, carries the least weight. The largest rises, ten places each, are Antigua and Barbuda's (27th to 17th) and The Bahamas' (30th to 20th), which each have no score in three pillars, so more of the weight falls on their Meaningful access. These weights are not used in the index, in which every pillar counts the same.

$$I_c^w = 10 \frac{\sum_{p \in Q_c} w_p P_{cp}}{\sum_{p \in Q_c} w_p}$$

Here $w_p$ is the average allocation to pillar $p$.

Because a member's gaps are left out of its averages, members are scored on different numbers of pillars, from four (seven members) to all seven (20 members). The index is therefore also worked out on the four pillars that every member has, Meaningful access, Education and training provision, Decent work, enterprise and transitions, and Rights, safety and participation, each counting the same. Of the 56 members, 18 move two places or fewer and 17 move more than ten, and eight of the ten at the top of the index stay in the top ten. The largest falls are Fiji's (12th to 37th) and Zambia's (20th to 45th), whose high scores in Purposeful use and creation, 9.9 and 7.7 out of 10, are left out. The largest rises are Rwanda's (47th to 23rd) and Samoa's (41st to 21st), whose low scores in Digital, data, media and AI capability, 0.7 and 2.2, are left out. The four pillars show how far each rank rests on which pillars a member has, and the index keeps all seven. On the four pillars, 12 members are at or above the readiness benchmark. Annex D gives every member's score and rank on the four pillars, with the number of pillars and sub-pillars on which it has a score.

How the pillars move together is set out in Annex D (Table D5). Over the members with both scores, Meaningful access, Digital, data, media and AI capability and Education and training provision rise and fall together, correlated at 0.54 to 0.77, and each is correlated with the index at 0.70 to 0.85. Purposeful use and creation stands apart. It is correlated at 0.03 with Meaningful access, 0.07 with Digital, data, media and AI capability and 0.32 with the index, because its figures come from different questions asked of different samples in each member. The index is correlated at 0.57 with GNI per head on a logarithmic scale, against 0.85 with the IMF AI Preparedness Index. The pillars that follow income most closely are Meaningful access and Digital, data, media and AI capability, at 0.78 and 0.77. Rights, safety and participation, at 0.17, and Purposeful use and creation, at 0.14, follow it least.

## Data map method

The data map is the table of every indicator against every member. It shows whether a figure exists for each member and, if it does, where it comes from. It is published with the index and is the basis for the survey of young people.

For each indicator and member, each of the three reporting stages (15 to 17, 18 to 24 and 25 to 29) is given one of three states:

- **Published.** At least one source publishes, for the member, a youth figure whose age band overlaps the stage. The band is recorded beside the figure, so a figure for 16 to 24 counted in the 15 to 17 stage is shown as such. A pooled adult figure, such as one for ages 15 to 49 or 15 and over, does not count for any stage.
- **Computable.** No figure is published, but a source releases person-level data with each respondent's age, so the figure can be computed.
- **Missing.** Neither of the above.

Whole-population figures never fill a stage. Where one stands in under the rules for missing data, the cell carries the stand-in, its label and its range, but the stage is still recorded as having no youth figure.

Every missing stage is a question the survey has to answer in that member. The survey is therefore designed from the data map: its questionnaire covers the indicators with missing stages, and its sample covers the members where they are missing.

The data map is recalculated whenever a source is added or corrected, and the version used for each edition is published with it.

## Known methodological limitations

- **Few figures for the full youth band.** Apart from counts of the population by age, only 59 of 1,128 sources publish figures for ages 15 to 29, and most youth series stop at 24. Many indicators therefore start from a narrower band, and ages 25 to 29 are rarely observed directly. The band of every figure is recorded, the rules under Missing data decide how it is brought to ages 15 to 29, and the data map shows the 25 to 29 stage as missing wherever it is.
- **Self-reported skills.** Most skills figures, including the SDG 4.4.1 family and the MICS surveys, record what young people say they did in the last three months, not tested ability. Tested measures exist only for school pupils aged 15 (PISA, 13 members) and adults aged 16 and over (the OECD Survey of Adult Skills, four members).
- **Small youth samples in general surveys.** Surveys of the whole population interview few young people in each country: the Global Findex interviews about 1,000 adults per country, of whom 150 to 300 are aged 15 to 24, and Afrobarometer about 250 to 500 young respondents. Where a figure is computed from person-level data, its sample size is recorded beside it.
- **Old figures.** Some members' only youth figures are many years old. The only official youth internet figure for Antigua and Barbuda comes from the 2011 census, and several Pacific household surveys date from 2012 to 2019. The year of every figure is recorded and shown beside it.

- **Small youth states.** Their figures are missing more often. A member of this group has a figure for 43.0 of the 111 indicators on average, against 68.1 for the other members. The data strength score shows the difference member by member.
- **Rank ranges.** Full ranges round each member's rank were considered and are not published in this edition: they need an estimate for every gap and a tested spread for every data strength grade, neither of which the first edition has. They are planned for the edition that follows the survey. Annex D gives only the ranks a member's estimates allow.
- **Goalposts drawn from the members' own results.** Where an indicator has no published target, its top score is set at the average of the five highest members. This applies to 43 of the 102 scored indicators. A score of 10 on these indicators therefore measures a member against the Commonwealth's leading members on that measure. Fifteen of them have figures for fewer than ten members, so their goalpost rests on most of the figures available. The goalpost of every indicator, and how it was set, is given in Annex A. On 14 of these indicators a band is under 4 points wide, among them the use of AI for public services (1.75 points) and for health (2.44 points). Where such figures come from samples of a few hundred young people, a difference of one band between members can lie within sampling error.
- **Estimates from peer averages.** Where a member has no figure and no related measure predicts it reliably, the rules under Missing data give it the average of the members in its region and of its size. Such averages are approximate. Tested on members that do have a figure, the average for the reliability of connections gave the wrong points for 39 of the 47 members it could be tried on, and the averages on the other five indicators gave the wrong points for 68 to 89 per cent of members. The estimates are 49 of the 3,194 figures scored but fall on 31 members, five each for Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis and three for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Each is labelled as an estimate, carries the range of the figures averaged and a reduced data strength, and counts as missing evidence in the Data Gap Index. Left out of the index, the estimates would change 31 members' scores, by up to 5.3 points for Saint Kitts and Nevis, and move 33 members in the ranking, by up to nine places, Saint Kitts and Nevis from 43rd to 52nd and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines from 42nd to 51st. Across the range of the figures each averages, Dominica could rank anywhere from 25th to 52nd. In each run the same 15 members stay at or above the readiness benchmark at 53. Annex D gives every member's index and rank without the estimates, and the ranks its estimates allow.
- **Readings of direction.** Four kinds of figure are scored in a direction the evidence leaves open. They are young people's extra exposure to AI at work, worry about AI and about personal information, the use of AI for health, money and personal matters, and time in the same job. Annex A gives the reading behind each and what leaving it out would change. Leaving out Health and personal development would lift Sri Lanka from 49.9 to 54.9, above the readiness benchmark. With any other of them left out, the same 15 members stay at or above 53.

- **Data from companies.** Much of the evidence on young people's use of AI comes from AI companies and online platforms, which rely on self-declared age or record none. Figures on AI use drawn from companies' own platform data are graded B or C, never A.
- **Access is measured for everyone, not for young people.** In Meaningful access, network speed and delay come from tests run by users of every age, mobile coverage and electricity are known for the whole population, and the reliability of connections is known only for firms. Each figure keeps its range where one applies, but the pillar describes the conditions young people live in more than their own access. Once scored, this leaves the score uncertain for 30 of 56 members on electricity and 51 of 56 on coverage: their range for young people crosses a band limit.
- **Attitudes are asked differently in each survey.** No survey asks young people in every member the same question about AI. In the Motivation and confidence pillar, only two surveys that reach more than a few members ask young people the indicators' own questions, so three indicators are scored for seven members and two for 27, and 28 members have no figure on the pillar at all. The help and harm figures date from 2021, more than a year before ChatGPT was released. Their data strength still grades them as recent, because recency counts any figure within five years of the edition's reference year, 2026.
- **Use of AI is asked differently in each survey.** In Learning and work a member's figure may describe pupils aged 15, people aged 16 to 29 or 15 to 29, or workers aged 15 to 24, over a week, a month, three months or a year, and for some members it comes from a student or volunteer sample. Differences between members reflect the question asked as well as what young people do.
- **Checking rests on a volunteers' poll.** For 21 of the 23 members with a figure on checking AI answers, the figure comes from a poll of young volunteers, not a sample, and for 14 of them it cannot be limited to ages 15 to 29; the two national surveys used ask a different question. Differences between members reflect who answered and what was asked, as well as what young people do.
- **Youth figures worked out from adult data.** For seven members the figure on using AI chatbots for news is worked out from a figure for online adults, using the survey's age pattern across all its markets and the member's own population by age. The calculation reproduces the published youth figures of the two members that have one to within one point, but it cannot show a member whose young people differ from that pattern. On the same indicator, four of the five figures that set the level scoring 10, those of India, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, come from samples of younger English speakers online, which may put that level higher than samples of all online adults would.
- **Student samples on four indicators.** On translating with AI, asking it for personal advice and using it to help write code, every figure is a sample of university students who already use ChatGPT, as is every figure except the United Kingdom's on making creative things with AI. Polls of U-Report volunteers once stood in on whether AI fits a

young person's own place; where a member had both, survey and poll were up to 36.5 points apart, and the polls are not scored.

- **Calibrated reliance rests on one student survey.** Use by task and experience of error are known for 11 members only, from university students who already use ChatGPT, and trust for a further 14, most of them through a volunteers' poll that asks about trust in general. No published source asks how often AI has turned out wrong for the respondent task by task, so the match between trust and error cannot be measured until the survey reports.
- **Agency rests on thin and unlike sources.** A survey figure for young people exists for 13 members, and the questions differ between them. For 16 members the only figure is the share of conversations with one AI assistant in which the user hands over the whole task, which covers users of all ages and is applied to ages 15 to 29 unchanged. No published source asks young people what they have stopped doing themselves.
- **Ethical use is measured by views more than by conduct.** Only Canada has a figure on whether young people say when they have used AI; 11 members carry a student survey's view on whether students should. What counts as fair use is asked directly in two members, and whether young people have seen AI treat someone unfairly is asked in none. People who use AI expect to be judged for it, so stated honesty is likely to run above practice.
- **Records of one service's use as indicators.** In Health and personal development and in Making things, one indicator is a share of conversations with one AI assistant. It counts conversations, not people; it covers the adult users of one service, who differ from member to member; and it carries no ages, so it is applied to ages 15 to 29 unchanged, with a wide range beside it. In Health and personal development, ten of its 28 members have topics that are not published, so the figure is a floor, and the survey question on health and money counts AI met inside a service or an app.
- **Making things: use is measured, not what was made.** The indicators record that young people use AI for creative writing or for help with code. None records what was made, who it was for, whether anyone else used it, or whether it was accurate, useful or relevant where the young person lives, which is how the sub-pillar is defined.
- **The teaching of AI is measured for few members.** In the Education and training provision pillar the figures about AI come mostly from 15 year olds in school in the nine or ten members that took the relevant part of PISA 2025, and the figures on being taught about AI come from national surveys that each ask a different question. The indicators with wide coverage describe the foundation: attendance, the general quality of schooling and the written curriculum. Until the survey reports, differences between members on this pillar say more about their schooling than about their teaching of AI.
- **Teachers' preparation for AI is measured for few members, and not by one question.** Figures on teachers and AI exist for 12 members, from lower secondary teachers in the six members that took part nationally in the OECD's 2024 survey of teachers, from heads' reports in the nine members asked in PISA 2025, and from national sur-

veys in England and India. A head's report is not a teacher's answer, and no Caribbean member has any figure on teachers and AI.

- **Work is measured, not the effect of AI on it.** Of the 21 indicators of Decent work, enterprise and transitions, two touch AI: young people's exposure to generative AI compared with older workers' (38 members) and new entrepreneurs' expectation of AI (five members, all ages). The others measure entry into work, its quality and progression, which AI may change but which they do not tie to AI. No pay figure for young people exists for 13 of the 16 high-income members, and the measure of time in the job covers seven high-income members only.
- **Rights are measured through governments more than through young people.** Of the 21 indicators of Rights, safety and participation with a published figure, five describe young people themselves, and the widest of them reaches 27 members. The rest describe laws, governments' documents on AI, general complaint routes and parliaments, which record what is written down. Young people's own experience of harm, unfair decisions, redress and being consulted is carried in the data map as gaps for the survey.

## Audit trail and reproducibility

Every figure in the index can be traced to the source it came from, and every source collected is kept in the form it had on the day it was used. A reader who doubts a number can follow it back to a dated copy of the page or file, and can check that the copy has not been altered since.

### Permanent copies of sources

Each source in the inventory is downloaded and stored as a read-only file named by its SHA-256 digest[100], so any change to a file would change its name and be detected. Where a site refuses automated collection or the download fails, the source is collected by a person, who uploads the file or pastes the text; the copy is then stored and hashed in the same way. The evidence store holds 3,526 copies (14.76 GB).

### Independent timestamps

The digest of every copy is sent to two independent timestamping authorities, FreeTSA and DigiCert, under the Internet X.509 Time-Stamp Protocol[101]. Each returns a signed token stating that the digest existed at that moment. The tokens prove the date of a copy without relying on the project's own records, and two authorities are used so that the proof does not depend on either one. All 3,526 copies carry a granted timestamp, 3,516 of them from both authorities, and re-hashing the evidence store finds no mismatch between any file and its timestamped digest.

### Records that cannot be rewritten

All captured sources, timestamps and extracted text are kept as an immutable record. Nothing is deleted, so the record only grows, and every change to a source, indicator or decision is kept.

### From source to score

Each cell of the data file records the value, the year it refers to, the age band it describes, how the figure was produced, the source, the digest of the stored copy it was read from, the range for young people where one applies, and the data strength grade described under Missing data. The data file and the code that turns it into scores are published with the index, so that every score can be recomputed from the stored inputs.

### How scores are produced

Each indicator is scored member by member by an AI scorer, in two columns: the index points and the data strength. Both columns carry a written rubric generated from the indicator's agreed goalposts and bands. The evidence the scorer receives is the member's entry in the data file: the figure to score, its year, the age band it describes, how it was produced, the range for young people where one applies, and the source with its measure fit and the version of the entry. Any other figures held for the member are shown as context and are not scored. The scorer receives one fixed instruction for every score: apply the rubric exactly, use only the evidence supplied, do not adjust the figure, and return the score with a justification, the key findings and a confidence rating. The scorer is Claude Opus 5.5, run at its high level of reasoning.

Every score is stored with the evidence it was given, the full answer, the model and the time, and with fingerprints (SHA-256) of the instruction, the rubric and the entry it rests on. Where a member is scored again, the earlier score, its time and the reason are kept with the new one, and every run is kept as a file holding each prompt and answer. Each score is checked against the band its figure falls in and against the four parts of data strength worked out from the entry, and a score whose entry has changed since it was scored is listed as out of date and scored again. A score can also be made in a separately started run of the same model, given the identical prompt. It is recorded in the same way and labelled as such.

The 6,388 stored scores of the 102 scored indicators (a points score and a data strength for each of their 3,194 figures), 98 of them on estimates made under the rules for missing data, all agree with their rubrics. Each indicator was also scored a second time for ten members, or for every member where it has fewer: 1,848 of 1,854 answers came back identical, every difference a slip in adding up the four parts of data strength, which was scored again. Two hundred and eighteen answers from separately started runs, for one or two members of each indicator, all matched the stored scores. Where an answer was first wrong, the earlier answer is kept with the score.

# PART III | TECHNICAL ANNEXES

# ANNEX A: PILLARS, SUB-PILLARS AND INDICATORS

## Pillar 1: Meaningful access

### Rationale

Access is the first condition in every major account of digital inequality. Van Dijk's model of successive kinds of access places material access between motivation and skills: a person who wants to go online cannot build skills without the means to do so[102]. Helsper's corresponding fields model makes the same point from the other direction: disadvantage in offline life reaches digital life through access, skills and motivation[103].

Being online is not the same as having meaningful access. A representative survey in the Netherlands, one of the most connected countries in the world, found that the range of devices a person has, their peripherals and the ongoing cost of keeping them running still shaped skills, uses and outcomes after almost everyone was online[104]. Access through a phone alone offers less functionality, and it is linked to less content creation and less information seeking than access through a computer[105]. In the United States, interviews with 72 low-income adults, published in 2016, found access unstable. Periods of disconnection and broken hardware recurred, and keeping access going became work in itself[106].

The ITU defines meaningful connectivity as a level of connectivity that allows "a safe, satisfying, enriching and productive online experience at an affordable cost", and names five enablers: infrastructure, affordability, device, skills, and safety and security[107]. This pillar covers infrastructure, affordability and device as they reach young people.

### AI tools as part of access

Access to devices and the internet in general is already measured by the ITU. What an index of AI readiness adds is whether young people can reach AI tools themselves: at a cost they can bear, in a language they use, and at an age the rules allow. Language technologies represent only a small fraction of the world's more than 7,000 languages[108], so a connected young person may still be shut out of AI in their own language. Young people aged 15 to 17 are children under Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child[109]. AI services set minimum ages and national laws set different ages of digital consent, so for the youngest group, access depends on rules as well as resources.

### Quality of access among young people

Young people are already more connected than the rest of the population. In 2025, 82 per cent of people aged 15 to 24 worldwide used the internet, against 72 per cent of everyone else[110]. Whether a young person is online at all therefore separates countries less and less. What separates them is the quality of that access: whether it is dependable, whether the device is

their own or shared, whether it is a phone only or includes a computer, whether it can be used privately, and whether it stays affordable month after month. The pillar asks these questions of young people who are already online, as well as counting those who are not.

Accessibility is part of the definition because disability shapes access too. More than 2.5 billion people need one or more assistive products, and as few as 3 per cent have access to them in some low-income countries, against 90 per cent in some high-income countries. Software such as speech recognition and captioning counts as an assistive product[111].

### Relation to national income

Access is the dimension most likely to reproduce national wealth. An analysis of nine international AI readiness indicator systems found that their dominant shared component captures variance shared with national wealth[112]. The pillar is therefore framed around the quality of access among young people who are connected.

### Coverage

**Definition.** Whether an internet network reaches the places where young people aged 15 to 29 live, learn and work.

The ITU counts network coverage, by generation from 2G to 5G, among its infrastructure indicators[113], and its ICT Development Index includes 3G and 4G coverage[114]. In Tanzania, gaining 3G coverage raised household consumption and reduced poverty[115], and in Nigeria mobile broadband coverage did the same[116]. Coverage alone is not access: in the Commonwealth's low-income members, 89 per cent of people are covered by a mobile network but 16 per cent have access to the internet[117].

**Indicator.** Coverage is measured by the share of the population living within reach of at least a 4G mobile signal, SDG indicator 9.c.1 as published for 2024[118]. 4G is the level used because 3G coverage is near universal and no longer separates members, while 5G is absent from most of the small youth states. Every member has a figure: 41 reported by the national regulator and 15 estimated by the ITU (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Cameroon, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Nauru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Tuvalu). The United Nations lists Nauru's figure under its name in Nauruan, Naoero. The figures run from 31.3 per cent in Tuvalu to 100 per cent in Cyprus, Maldives, Malta, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Singapore.

No source publishes coverage by age, so each figure is the whole-population figure, labelled as a stand-in and kept with the range the figure for young people must lie in, as set out under Missing data. Where coverage is near 100 per cent the range is narrow; where it is low, as in Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Guyana, Kiribati and The Gambia, the range runs from 0 to 100. Coverage is where access starts, not access itself: being covered does not mean being online.

**Scoring.** Coverage is scored on equal 10-point bands between the goalposts 0 per cent and 100 per cent, everyone within reach of a 4G signal: 100 per cent scores 10, 90 to 99.9 per cent scores 9, and so on, down to 0 below 10 per cent. The best goalpost is the ITU's 2030 target of 100 per cent coverage by the latest mobile generation once it reaches 40 per cent

of the population[119], and the ICT Development Index scores 4G coverage between the same goalposts[120]. The recorded figure is scored, and the range for young people is used in the test of band certainty.

**Results.** Five members score 10: Cyprus, Maldives, Malta, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Singapore, at 100 per cent for the whole population, which applies to young people as published. Thirty score 9 and 13 score 8. Cameroon, Nauru and Papua New Guinea score 7, Kiribati and The Gambia 6, Guyana 5, and Solomon Islands and Tuvalu 3. Data strength averages 7.3 out of 10 across the 56 members: four grade 10 (100 per cent from country data), one grades 9 (Saint Kitts and Nevis, an ITU estimate of 100 per cent), 12 grade 8 (country data, with a range for young people no wider than 5 points), 27 grade 7 (country data with a wider range, or an ITU estimate with a narrow one) and 12 grade 6 (ITU estimates with a wide range). Only the five members at 100 per cent are certain of their band. For every other member the range for young people crosses at least one band limit, and for five it spans every band from 0 to 10, so their score says little about young people until a figure for ages 15 to 29 replaces it.

### Device

**Definition.** Whether young people aged 15 to 29 have a way to get online when they need it: a device of their own, a shared one, a connection at home, or a public place such as a school, library or internet café.

The ITU measures computer and mobile phone use and ownership, including smartphones and ownership from age 15[121], and counts connected households and connected schools among its measures of who is connected. The Alliance for Affordable Internet sets access to a smartphone, rather than ownership of one, as the minimum for meaningful connectivity[122]. Public access offers another way online. In a study of 25 developing countries published in 2014, people with no computer or internet at home went online at libraries, telecentres and internet cafés, and were moving from libraries towards commercial cafés[123]. In a survey of 117 college students in Botswana published in 2013, most internet access took place on campus[124]. Devices are often shared out of economic need[125], and among children aged 12 to 17 in five African countries, a device being used by someone else is a named barrier to going online[126]. Among young people in Ghana, Malawi and South Africa, phone ownership and use follow lines of gender and poverty[127].

**Indicator.** Device is measured by the share of young people who own a mobile phone. Forty-five of the 56 members have a figure from one or more of three kinds of source. The Demographic and Health Surveys give the share for ages 15 to 29 exactly in 20 members, worked out from their five-year age groups[128]. The Global Findex survey of 2024 gives it for ages 15 to 24 in 33 members[129]. National household surveys and censuses give it for ages 15 to 29 in Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica (women only), Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu, and for ages 15 to 24 in Tuvalu. Where a member has more than one, the Demographic and Health Survey matches the index's age band and the Global Findex survey is the more recent; the figure that grades higher on data strength is used, and the more recent one where both grade the same.

Eleven members have no figure for young people. For Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines only a figure for ages 15 and over is published, for Solomon Islands one for ages 12 and over, and for Brunei Darussalam one for all individuals; they are not used. Nothing is published for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and The Bahamas, and Seychelles has no usable figure.

Ownership is one part of the definition, which also counts a shared device, a connection at home and public places such as schools, libraries and internet cafés. Those parts are not measured in this edition.

**Scoring and results.** Universal ownership, the ITU's target for 2030, is the best goalpost and none the worst, a band to every 10 points. Every source asks whether the young person owns a mobile phone, the indicator's own measure. Of the 17 members with both surveys, the Demographic and Health Survey enters for those whose survey dates from 2021 or later, Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia, as a figure for ages 15 to 29 exactly outgrades one for 15 to 24; the Global Findex survey enters for the other eight, Cameroon, Gabon, India, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South Africa, The Gambia and Uganda, as the older survey costs the point for recency and the newer figure wins the tie. Bangladesh's survey of 2022 interviewed women only, so its figure, 71.1 per cent, is for young women. The Demographic and Health Surveys give women's and men's shares separately, and the figure is held with the range between them; for ten members that range crosses a band limit. Other household surveys give women's and men's figures too, and in Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu the two fall in different bands. The 25 figures for ages 15 to 24 are each kept with the range the figure for ages 15 to 29 must lie in, and every one of those ranges crosses a band limit. The 45 members spread as three members at 10, nine at 9, seven at 8, 12 at 7, six at 6, six at 5 and two at 4, from Australia, at 100 per cent, to Papua New Guinea, at 40.3, with a mean data strength of 9.3.

### Cost

**Definition.** Whether young people aged 15 to 29 can afford to get connected and to stay connected.

The ITU measures affordability as the price of entry-level broadband against average income and against the income of the poorest 40 per cent[130], and its ICT Development Index includes mobile and fixed broadband prices[131]. In South Africa, where data is expensive, mobile users surveyed in 2014 rationed it and switched off mobile data to save it[132]. In a United States study published in 2016, low-income clinic clients on prepaid plans regularly lost service when credit ran out[133]. Households in five Eastern Caribbean members named cost as the main factor in choosing broadband in four of the five[134].

Four measures were considered. Three set a price against the income of a national population, since no international series sets it against what young people themselves earn. They are the price of 5 GB of mobile data against average income, the same price against the income of the poorest 40 per cent, and the price of the cheapest internet-capable phone against income. The fourth, the share of young people who went without the internet because they could not

pay, describes young people directly, and it depends on survey answers. The first two share one price series and are the indicators of this edition.

**The first two indicators.** Both use one price: the ITU's data-only mobile broadband basket of 5 GB a month, its official basket from 2025, collected from the operator with the largest market share in each country[135]. The first indicator sets that price against average income, as a share of monthly gross national income per head. It has a figure for all 56 members for 2025, from 0.18 per cent in Singapore to 11.43 per cent in Papua New Guinea.

The second sets the same price against the income of the poorest 40 per cent. Their income per head is average income multiplied by their share of national income and divided by 40 per cent, so the price as a share of their income is the first indicator multiplied by 40 and divided by that share. The share is the sum of the income shares of the lowest and second fifths of the population[136], taken for the latest year available for each member. It has a figure for 46 members, from 0.57 per cent in Malaysia to 30.28 per cent in Papua New Guinea.

**Missing data.** Ten members have no published income shares and so no figure for the second indicator: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Guyana, New Zealand, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago. For eight members the income share is ten or more years old: Nauru (2012), Papua New Guinea (2009), Samoa (2013), Solomon Islands (2012), Tuvalu (2010), and Botswana, Namibia and Saint Lucia (2015). The income share comes from household surveys of income or of consumption, which differ between members, and for most members it refers to an earlier year than the price. No source gives the income of young people, so neither indicator states what a young person can afford; that question is carried to the survey.

**Scoring and results.** Both prices are turned round, to the share of income left after paying for 5 GB, and scored up to 98 per cent, the ITU's target of a price under 2 per cent of monthly income[137]. Neither has a natural zero, so 0 points sit at the 2.5th percentile of the members: 90.83 per cent of average income left, and 75.7 per cent of the poorest 40 per cent's income, computed over the 46 members with an income share. The ten members without an income share have no figure for the second indicator; the price against average income, from which it is computed, is not scored in its place. Both are the indicators' own measures and not about people of any age, so each takes 1 for age fit. The second is computed from two measured figures and dated by the older, the income share, so 27 of the 46 lose the point for recency. Average income spreads as 25 members at 10, five at 9, five at 8, two at 7, eight at 6, one at 5, three at 4, two at 3, two at 1 and three at 0, from Singapore, at 99.82 per cent of income left, to Papua New Guinea, at 88.57, with a mean data strength of 7; the poorest 40 per cent's as ten members at 10, six at 9, eight at 8, three at 7, two at 6, seven at 5, three at 4, one at 3, three at 2, one at 1 and two at 0, from Malaysia, at 99.43, to Papua New Guinea, at 69.72, with 6.4.

### Internet use

**Definition.** Whether young people aged 15 to 29 use the internet, and how often.

The ITU measures connected people by internet use and by how often people connect: daily, weekly or less[138], and its ICT Development Index includes internet use in the last three

months[139]. The Alliance for Affordable Internet sets daily use as the minimum for meaningful connectivity[140]. Use can be treated as a form of access in its own right, with determinants of its own[141], and it varies by degree, not simply between users and non-users[142].

**Indicator.** Internet use is measured as the share of young people aged 15 to 29 who used the internet in the past three months. This is the international standard for internet use (SDG indicator 17.8.1) and the measure in the ITU's ICT Development Index[143]. The Commonwealth's Global Youth Development Index counts young people aged 15 to 29 with five or more years' experience of using the internet, on ITU figures for 2013[144]; use in the past three months brings that count up to date and records current use.

How often young people connect is the second part of the definition. Published figures for daily use among young people reach 27 of the 56 members, so the indicator records use, and frequency is held as a candidate second indicator.

**Sources.** Every member has a figure, each brought to ages 15 to 29 by the route its data allows, and the route is recorded on the figure. The figure is for ages 15 to 29 exactly in Ghana (2021 census), Guyana and Kiribati[145] and India[146], and on a close measure in Nauru (use in the week before its 2021 census) and Tonga (use with no period stated, 2021 census). In 15 members (Bangladesh, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, The Gambia, Uganda and Zambia) the Global Findex figure for ages 15 to 24[147] is carried to ages 15 to 29 by the step between the two bands in the same country's household survey. In Maldives, Papua New Guinea and Rwanda the Demographic and Health Surveys give use in the past 12 months at ages 15 to 29[148], which is taken as the upper limit.

Twenty-one members carry a figure for a narrower youth band as a labelled stand-in, known as a range: ages 15 to 24 from the Global Findex survey in 13, ages 16 to 29 from Eurostat in Cyprus, Malta and the United Kingdom[149], and ages 15 to 25 from the Eastern Caribbean survey in Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines[150]. Eleven carry the whole-population figure as a labelled stand-in: the ITU's figure as published in the UN SDG database[151] for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, Jamaica, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas and Tuvalu, and Vanuatu's 2020 census for ages 15 and over. The figures for Samoa (2014) and Tuvalu (2017) are old.

**Scoring and results.** The ITU's target for 2030, universal use[152], sets the best goalpost at 100 per cent and the natural zero the worst, with a band for each 10 points between them. A member whose figure is a labelled stand-in is scored on that recorded figure, as Electricity is, and the range it carries for young people serves the test of band certainty. Age fit is graded 4 for the nine figures for ages 15 to 29 exactly, 3 for the 15 carried there from ages 15 to 24 by a borrowed step, and 2 or 1 for the 32 stand-ins, by how wide their range is; measure fit is 3 for figures on the same measure and 2 for the six on a close one. The 56 members spread as four members at 10, 18 at 9, seven at 8, five at 7, six at 6, one at 5, six at 4, four at 3, four at 2 and one at 1, from Canada, Malta, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Kingdom, at 100.0 per cent, to Papua New Guinea, at 19.1 per cent. The mean data strength is 7.7. Nine members

are certain of their band; the other 47 could move to another band once a figure for ages 15 to 29 is known.

### Electricity

**Definition.** Whether young people aged 15 to 29 have the electricity needed to get online.

In low-income countries from 2000 to 2010, extending electricity to more of the population significantly increased the number of internet users[153]. The Commonwealth Secretariat counts access to electricity as basic digital infrastructure[154]. Among children aged 12 to 17 in five African countries, lack of electricity is a named barrier to going online[155]. The ITU's framework for universal and meaningful connectivity treats electricity as a prerequisite for connectivity and leaves it outside its indicators[156].

**Indicator.** Electricity is measured by the share of young people with access to electricity, SDG indicator 7.1.1, for 2024[157]. All 56 members have a figure. Twenty-five members are at 100 per cent for the whole population, so the figure applies to every age group as published. Pakistan's figure, 96.3 per cent, is worked out for ages 15 to 29 from a research workbook built on the respondent file of its household survey of 2024 to 2025[158]. The other 30 members carry the whole-population figure as a labelled stand-in, kept with the range the figure for young people must lie in: Bangladesh, Belize and India between 99.5 and 99.9 per cent, where the range is narrow, and 27 members below that, down to Malawi at 15.6 per cent, where the figure for young people could lie anywhere from 0 to 52.5 per cent. The recorded figure is scored, and the range is used in the test of band certainty. Figures on connection to the grid for people aged 18 to 29 in 18 African members, from Afrobarometer, are held as supporting evidence.

**Scoring.** Access to electricity is scored on equal 10-point bands between the goalposts 0 per cent and 100 per cent, universal access being the SDG 7 target: 100 per cent scores 10, 90 to 99.9 per cent scores 9, and so on, down to 0 below 10 per cent. Finer bands near universal access were considered and not adopted, because most of the members they would separate have only a whole-population figure with a wide range for young people.

**Results.** Twenty-five members score 10, all at 100 per cent for the whole population, which applies to young people as published; for 14 high-income members the 100 per cent is assumed rather than measured. Twelve score 9: Pakistan, on its survey figure for ages 15 to 29; India, Bangladesh and Belize, at 99.5 to 99.9 per cent for the whole population; and eight other members on whole-population figures. Fifteen score between 5 and 8, and four between 1 and 4: Papua New Guinea, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Malawi. Data strength averages 7.3 out of 10: 12 members grade 9 (Pakistan, and the members at a modelled or estimated 100 per cent), 14 grade 8 (100 per cent assumed), eight grade 7 (the near-universal whole-population figures and the five members the UN records as country data) and 22 grade 6 (the other whole-population figures). Twenty-six members are certain of their band: the 25 at 100 per cent and Pakistan. For the 14 members whose 100 per cent is assumed, the score of 10 rests on that assumption, as any figure below 100 per cent scores 9 or less. Thirty are flagged: Bangladesh, Belize, India, Jamaica and Kiribati could score 9 or 10, and 14 could

score anywhere from 0 to 10, because the range for young people spans every band, so their score says little about young people until a figure for ages 15 to 29 replaces it.

### Network performance

**Definition.** Whether a young person's connection is fast and responsive enough for what they need to do online.

The GSMA's Mobile Connectivity Index measures network performance by download speed, upload speed and latency[159], and the Internet Society's Internet Resilience Index measures performance, the network's ability to give users seamless and reliable access, by latency, jitter, upload and download speeds[160]. The Alliance for Affordable Internet sets 4G as the minimum for a fast connection[161]. The arrival of fast internet raised employment in 12 African countries[162], and among university students in West Bengal, poor connectivity kept students from live lectures[163]. Beyond a certain speed the gains appear small. A review of the studies of the last decade finds the benefits of broadband subject to diminishing returns beyond a certain quality[164]. Across the EU, coverage at 100 Mbps or more no longer went with growth in urban regions and had not yet paid off in rural ones[165], and in Tennessee, counties with high-speed and ultra-high-speed broadband could not be told apart in their unemployment[166], as earlier US work found from 10 to 25 Mbps[167]. On mobile networks the gains go further in poorer countries: across 116 countries, 29 of them Commonwealth members, faster mobile speeds were followed a year later by higher labour productivity, a link that held only in non-OECD and low-income countries[168].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar is measured by download speed, upload speed and delay (latency), each on mobile networks and on fixed broadband: six indicators. All six are included. All six come from one source, the open map tiles of Speedtest results that Ookla publishes for each quarter[169]. Each tile is a map square of about 610 metres with the average download speed, upload speed and latency of the tests taken in it and the number of tests. A square carries no country, so each was placed in a member by its centre point using the Natural Earth 1:10m country boundaries, and a member's figure is the average across its squares in the four quarters of 2025, each square weighted by its number of tests. Every measure has a figure for all 56 members.

Mobile download speed runs from 22.63 Mbps in Pakistan to 222.99 Mbps in Singapore, and fixed download speed from 20.32 Mbps in Namibia to 500.09 Mbps in Singapore. Mobile upload speed runs from 8.33 Mbps in Saint Kitts and Nevis to 44.76 Mbps in Brunei Darussalam, and fixed upload speed from 7.71 Mbps in The Gambia to 391.81 Mbps in Singapore. Delay on mobile networks runs from 22.3 ms in Lesotho to 155.7 ms in Nauru, and on fixed broadband from 5.2 ms in Singapore to 162.3 ms in Kiribati. Mobile and fixed networks are kept as separate indicators, as in the Internet Society's index[170], because a young person who goes online by phone and one who uses a home line depend on different networks.

Three properties of these figures bear on how they are read. They are averages, which a small number of very fast tests can raise; the Internet Society's index uses medians[171], while the GSMA's takes its speed figures from Ookla's Speedtest Intelligence[172]. They come from tests that users choose to run, which lean towards people checking or repairing a connection and

are hard to compare between testing services[173]; a measured speed also reflects the plan a user has bought and the device and Wi-Fi in use, not only what the network can deliver[174]. For that reason, within each indicator, one testing service is used for all 56 members. And they describe the connection of the average user of any age: no source reports speed or delay by age. In the smallest members a figure rests on few tests; the number of tests behind every figure is recorded with it.

Upload speed and delay are measured because download speed alone does not answer the sub-pillar's question. In measurements of United States home broadband summarised in 2023, web pages loaded little faster once download speed passed about 20 Mbps, and every 200 milliseconds less delay cut more than a second from the time a page took to load[175]; for short transfers and live conversation, adding bandwidth makes little or no difference[176]. Video calls use between 0.8 and 1.9 Mbps in each direction[177], and the Commonwealth Secretariat notes that operators tend to limit upload speed in favour of download, which impairs services that need a two-way exchange of data[178]. The Commonwealth Secretariat publishes no measure of speed or delay by member. The yearly averages of the same tests that the World Bank republishes for 2024[179] are kept as a check on the download figures.

**Scoring and results.** All six indicators are scored. Each delay is scored as the number of answers the network can give in a second, 1,000 over the delay in ms, on the logarithmic scale that the Internet Society's index also uses[180]. Twenty answers a second, a delay of 50 ms, scores 10: Opensignal's 2026 method takes a delay below 50 ms as one of the conditions for everyday tasks such as video calls to run without frustration[181]. The figure that scores 0 is the members' 2.5th percentile: 7.05 answers a second for mobile networks, 7.86 for fixed broadband. The average of the five best members was considered for the figure that scores 10 and not chosen: on fixed broadband it would stand at a delay of about 7 ms, marking members down for differences nobody would notice. On mobile networks 35 members score 10 and Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu score 0; on fixed broadband 43 score 10 and Kiribati and Nauru score 0. No range for young people applies, so the uncertainty in these figures is that of the tests behind them, set out above. Each figure's data strength is 7 out of 10: 1 for age fit, as a measurement of the network rather than of people; 3 for the indicator's own measure; 2 because users' tests measure it; and 1 for recency. Tuvalu's mobile figure, which rests on 25 tests in the year, takes 1 for how it was produced, and so 6. The four speed indicators are scored against 50 Mbps down and 10 up, Canada's objective for every household, on the same log scale from the members' 2.5th percentile: 23.49 Mbps for mobile download, 20.85 for fixed download, 8.86 for mobile upload and 9.36 for fixed upload. Scoring 0 are Kiribati, Pakistan, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and The Gambia on mobile download, Namibia, Pakistan and The Gambia on fixed download, Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis on mobile upload, and Cameroon and The Gambia on fixed upload. Tuvalu's mobile figures, again on 25 tests, take 6 for data strength.

### Reliability

**Definition.** Whether a young person's connection keeps working when they need it, without dropping or cutting out.

The ITU defines reliability as the probability that an item can perform a required function under stated conditions for a given time interval[182]. Among 748 college students in the United States surveyed in 2014 and 2015, about one in five struggled to keep access working[183]. Among 844 university students in Bangladesh, 75 per cent lacked a stable connection during online classes[184]. Households in five Eastern Caribbean members ranked reliability among the two most important factors in choosing broadband[185].

**Indicator.** The sub-pillar is measured by the share of firms that experienced disruptions to their internet connection, including complete downtime, over the last complete fiscal year, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys[186]. The latest survey for each member is used, and 49 of the 56 members have a figure, from 2.0 per cent in Singapore (2023) to 79.7 per cent in Jamaica (2024). No survey reports it for Dominica, Guyana, Nauru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, South Africa, The Bahamas and Tuvalu. It is the only published figure found that asks directly whether a connection kept working and that reaches most members: no United Nations, ITU or Commonwealth indicator of reliability exists.

The figure has three limits. It describes firms, not people, and no published source reports reliability for young people. It counts any disruption, so firms that depend more heavily on their connection may report more. And survey years run from 2022 to 2025. It therefore stands as the indicator unless a better measure is found. Evidence from people shows the same problem in the members it covers. In the GSMA's 2025 consumer survey, inconsistent coverage, such as connection drops, or no coverage at all was named as the single most important barrier to using mobile internet more by between 2 and 19 per cent of mobile internet users in the eight members surveyed[187]. Reliability matters beyond the hours lost. Across 7,998 home connections in the United States measured between 2011 and 2015, frequent periods of high packet loss reduced the traffic of 58 per cent of users even when the connection was working[188]. Government-ordered shutdowns are a different matter from spontaneous outages, with different timing and duration[189], and are not counted here.

**Scoring.** The figure is turned round, so that higher is better: the score is given to the share of firms whose connection was not disrupted, 100 minus the published figure. Equal 10-point bands run between 0 and 100 per cent, the best goalpost being no firm disrupted: 0 per cent disrupted scores 10; more than 0 and up to 10 per cent scores 9; more than 10 and up to 20 per cent scores 8; and so on, down to 0 where more than 90 per cent of firms were disrupted. For the seven members without a figure, the index makes its own estimate in the order set out under Missing data and labels it with the step that made it. The first step finds nothing: the World Bank's series, held in full (1,951 figures for 163 economies, from 2021 to 2026), has none for any of the seven in any year. Nor does the second: the other two sources on this sub-pillar, Opensignal's test results and the GSMA's consumer survey, measure something else and cover none of the seven. The third finds no model that holds up. Each related indicator was tested by predicting every member's figure with that member's own figure held back: the speeds and delays of mobile and fixed connections missed by 16.8 to 17.5 percentage points

on average, and electricity, internet use and 4G coverage by 17.7 to 18.0, against 17.6 for the plain average of all members; the price of mobile data came closest, missing by 15.4 and giving the wrong points for 36 of the 49 members. The fourth step therefore applies. For the four Caribbean members, the eight smaller-population Caribbean peers with a figure average 51.9 per cent, their figures running from 35.0 to 79.7; for Nauru and Tuvalu, the seven smaller-population Pacific peers average 50.1 per cent, from 8.8 to 71.2; and for South Africa, the 12 other African members outside the smaller-population peer group average 38.6 per cent, from 11.0 to 76.0. Tested the same way, an average of this kind missed a member's own figure by 15.6 percentage points on average and gave the wrong points for 39 of the 47 members it could be tried on, which is why an estimate of this kind carries a wide range. An estimate takes 1 of 4 for age fit, 2 of 3 for measure fit, 1 of 2 for how it was produced, being estimated, and 1 of 1 for recency, the surveys averaged running from 2023 to 2025: a data strength of 5. For data strength the figure takes 1 of 4 for age fit, because it describes firms and no age band; 2 of 3 for measure fit, as a close stand-in, because it records the same thing, disruption to an internet connection, but for firms' own connections, and counts any disruption in a year rather than how often a connection fails when it is needed; 2 of 2 for how it was produced, a survey; and 1 of 1 for recency, the surveys running from 2022 to 2025. Each of the 49 members therefore has a data strength of 6.

**Results.** Forty-nine members are scored: four at 9, three at 8, 11 at 7, eight at 6, seven at 5, five at 4, six at 3, five at 2. Singapore, Cyprus, India and Kiribati score 9, with 2.0 to 8.8 per cent of firms disrupted. Fiji, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Togo, Cameroon and Jamaica score 2, with 71.2 to 79.7 per cent. No member scores 10, which would need no firm disrupted at all. On their estimates, South Africa scores 6 and the six smaller-population peers 4 each; the 50.1 per cent for Nauru and Tuvalu is 0.1 percentage points from the limit for 5 points. These seven scores rest on no figure of the members' own: they are labelled as estimates, and the seven still count as gaps in the data map and the Data Gap Index.

### AI tools

**Definition.** Whether the tools themselves are open to a young person: in a language they use, and at an age the rules allow.

Why language and age decide whether AI tools are open to a young person is set out above, under AI tools as part of access. The gap shows in quality as well as price: across 22 languages, speakers of many supported languages obtained poorer results from the same service[190].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar is measured by language, where members differ; the age rules of the leading AI services are nearly the same in every member, and all three leading services are offered in all 56, so neither separates members and the age gate is left to the survey. The first indicator is whether the member's main language is well served by AI. Misra et al. label every country a high-, mid- or low-resource language country, from the amount of text available in its dominant language and the performance of frontier models in it[191]. Of the 56 members, 25 are high-resource, five mid-resource (Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, India and Malaysia) and 26 low-resource. The same study finds that low-resource language countries have a share of AI users about 20 per cent lower than their baseline, after allowing for income,

electricity, internet use and age structure, and people in places whose languages the models served poorly are found to switch to English to use a chatbot[192].

The second indicator is the digital language support score in the GSMA's Mobile Connectivity Index, which aggregates the digital capabilities of all living languages in a country[193]. It has a score for 49 members in 2025, from 9.2 in Papua New Guinea to 99.7 in the United Kingdom; none is published for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Nauru, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Tuvalu. The two are read together because each corrects the other. The label looks at one dominant language, so a member where English or French is official but is not what most people speak at home is labelled high-resource. The score counts every language spoken, so such a member scores low; but it describes language technology in general, not AI models alone. No source reports which language young people themselves use with AI.

> **Where the two indicators disagree.** For 18 of the 49 members that have both, the indicators point in opposite directions. Twelve members carry the high-resource label but a digital language support score under 40: Barbados, Cameroon, Fiji, Gabon, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, The Bahamas, The Gambia and Togo. English or French is official there, so the label is high, while the score counts the creoles and local languages people speak. Six members carry the low-resource label but a score of 60 or more: Lesotho, Malta, Rwanda, Samoa, South Africa and Sri Lanka. Their main language is poorly served by AI models but well supported by language technology in general. The two are averaged, as the indicators of every sub-pillar are; a question to young people on the language they use with AI would show which reading is right for each member.

**Scoring and results.** High earns 10 points, Mid 5 and Low 0, the three labels in equal steps; Misra et al. assign it by a fixed rule from a published record, the dominant language in the CIA World Factbook matched to their lists of high- and mid-resource languages, so it counts as measured from records. The digital language support score keeps the GSMA's 0 to 100 range, with a band to every 10 points. As neither describes people of any age, every figure grades 7 for data strength. The label gives 25 members 10, five members 5 and 26 members 0; the support score spreads as five members at 9, three at 8, five at 7, three at 6, six at 5, four at 4, nine at 3, six at 2, seven at 1 and one at 0, from the United Kingdom, at 99.7, to Papua New Guinea, at 9.2.

## Pillar 2: Digital, data, media and AI capability

### Rationale

Access gives a young person the opportunity to use AI. Capability decides what they can do with it. A systematic review of 75 studies identified seven core digital skills: technical, information management, communication, collaboration, creativity, critical thinking and problem solving, together with five contextual skills: ethical awareness, cultural awareness, flexibility, self-direction and lifelong learning[194]. The European Union's digital competence framework organises the same ground into five areas: information search, evaluation and management; communication and collaboration; content creation; safety, wellbeing and responsible use; and problem identification and solving[195].

### AI competence within digital capability

The current version of the European framework no longer treats AI as a separate layer on top of digital skills. DigComp 3.0 builds AI competence into all 21 of its competences. Of its 362 competence statements, 14 per cent mention AI explicitly, 68 per cent concern it implicitly, and 18 per cent do not involve it, and the framework was mapped against the draft AI literacy framework of the European Commission and the OECD[196]. Capability for AI readiness therefore includes understanding what AI is, how it works and where it fails, alongside the general digital, data and media capabilities on which that understanding rests.

### Capability and frequency of use

Frequent use does not make a young person capable. Information skills are learned, and a young person who has always known digital media still has to learn them[197]. A systematic review of research on 12 to 17 year olds found that digital skills were associated with more online opportunities and information benefits, and indirectly with greater exposure to online risks, although any link to harm was unclear. Technical skills on their own were linked with mixed or even negative outcomes, while information skills were linked with positive ones[198]. What counts is the range of a young person's capability, not their familiarity with devices.

### Judging information and media

Judging sources and content can be taught. A preregistered experiment modelled on the world's largest media literacy campaign improved adults' ability to tell mainstream from false news headlines, by 26.5 per cent in a representative sample in the United States and by 17.5 per cent in a highly educated online sample in India. The effect was still measurable several weeks later in the United States but not in India, and there was no effect in a largely rural sample in northern India[199]. The capability is real and can be taught, but how far teaching reaches depends on context.

### Limits shared by the capability figures

The figures for Technical operation, Information and data, Creation and communication and Safety and security are mostly activities that young people report having done in the last three months, from the household-survey question behind SDG indicator 4.4.1. Two limits apply to all of them. They are self-reported, and asking what people have done correlates with skill without measuring it; men and younger people in particular overstate their skills against objective tests[200]. And most describe computer tasks, so in members where young people go online almost entirely by phone the figures are low without saying much about what they can do with a phone. For these reasons the survey asks for tested tasks on the respondent's own device.

### Figures on a close wording

Eight members take figures from surveys whose questions are close to the indicators' but not identical, and every such figure is labelled. For Cyprus and Malta the index uses the 2025 figures of the European Union's household survey for ages 16 to 29[201], which are newer and

nearer its age band than the UN's figures for ages 15 to 24. The questions are the European wording: downloaded or installed software or apps, for installing software; used spreadsheet software, for the spreadsheet measure; checked the truthfulness of information or content found on internet news sites or social media, for verifying information; copied or moved files between folders, devices or on the cloud, for copying or moving a file; created files integrating elements such as text, pictures, tables, charts, animations or sound, for making a presentation; and wrote code in a programming language, for writing a program. Eurostat has no matching item for connecting a device or for sending a file, where the UN figure is kept. For Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines the figures for ages 15 to 24 come from the Digital Inclusion Survey 2024 of the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority[202], which asks the UN's question but reports the share of respondents who used a device, not of all young people, so its figures read somewhat high. That survey has no item for copying or moving a file. For Trinidad and Tobago the figures for ages 15 to 24 on verifying information, setting up security measures and changing privacy settings come from its National Digital Inclusion Survey of 2021[203], which asks individuals which of the activities they are capable of performing.

### Technical operation

**Definition.** Whether a young person can work a device, an application and an account, and get somewhere when the task is unfamiliar.

Operational skill is the first of the five types of internet skill in the validated Internet Skills Scale, alongside information navigation, social, creative and mobile skills[204]. A systematic review of 75 studies puts technical skill among the seven core digital skills, with problem solving as another[205], and problem identification and solving is one of the five areas of the European framework[206].

Operating a device is where capability starts rather than where it ends, for the reasons set out above under Capability and frequency of use.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar is measured by two items of SDG indicator 4.4.1, asked in nearly the same words by the national household surveys that report it[207]: the share of young people who, in the last three months, found, downloaded, installed and configured software or an app, and the share who connected and installed a new device such as a camera or printer. The first has a figure for 33 of the 56 members, from 2.0 per cent in Sierra Leone to 85.2 per cent in Singapore; the second for 33, from 2.2 per cent in Sierra Leone to 73.7 per cent in Malaysia.

The figures come mainly from two places; the figures on a close wording are set out above. The UN SDG database publishes both items for ages 15 to 24 for 11 members. For 18 members the survey findings report of the UNICEF-supported Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey[208] is held in the project, and its tables of ICT skills by age give the figure for ages 15 to 29 directly: for each sex the age groups 15 to 19, 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 are weighted by their number of respondents, and the result is the simple mean of women and men. Where a member has both, the UN figure for both sexes is used and the report's figure is recorded beside it. Fifteen of the 33 figures are therefore for ages 15 to 29 exactly; the rest are for a nearby youth band. Rwanda's figures, from its EICV7 youth report, are for ages 16 to 30[209]. Three of the survey

reports held have only the women's table (Bangladesh, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago). Bangladesh and Jamaica take the UN figure for both sexes; the figure for Trinidad and Tobago is for women only and is labelled as such. The UN's figures for the United Kingdom are for 2014 on connecting a device and 2017 on installing software. No figure exists for 23 members, among them Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand, whose surveys either stopped asking or report all ages only.

The limits these figures share with the other capability figures are set out above; in Ghana, Sierra Leone and Malawi, where young people go online almost entirely by phone, the figures are under 10 per cent.

**Missing data.** No published source gives either item for young people in 23 members. For 13 of them (Belize, Cameroon, Gabon, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia), the Global Findex survey of 2024 gives the share of people aged 15 to 24 who can change the PIN or password on their mobile phone without help[210], from 21.3 per cent in Tanzania to 64.9 per cent in Kenya, and it stood in on both indicators until they were scored. It was then dropped: in the 11 members holding both kinds of figure it averages 44.3 per cent, where installing software averages 16.8 and connecting a device 15.6, and, if kept, it would have given four of the 13 a score of 10 on installing software. None of the 23 is scored on these indicators; in the full index their gaps are estimated under the rules for missing data, where the UN's figures for all ages come first for South Africa (2019) and Togo (2017).

**Scoring and results.** Both indicators run from 0 to 10 in equal steps of 5 percentage points between 0 and 50 per cent, the ITU's goal for 2030 for intermediate ICT skills. On installing software, Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Malaysia, Malta, Singapore and the United Kingdom score 10 and Malawi, Nigeria and Sierra Leone score 0; on connecting a device, Cyprus, Malaysia, Malta and the United Kingdom score 10 and Bangladesh, Malawi, Nigeria, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Sierra Leone score 0. Three of the four top scores on connecting a device, those of Cyprus, Malta and the United Kingdom, rest on UN figures for 2014 and take 0 for recency. Bangladesh's UN figure for installing software dropped from 39.6 per cent in 2023 to 1.8 per cent in 2024. All nine of its skill figures fell sharply that year while its figures for social networking and internet calls rose, so Bangladesh is scored on its 2023 figures for all nine. The cause of the fall is unknown. On five items Pakistan's figures for 2024 are three to twelve times those for 2020, and are used as published. Scored on its 2024 figures, Bangladesh's index score would move from 48.7 to 46.0 and its rank from 21st to 24th, and with the nine figures left out to 46.8 and 23rd. The same 15 members stay at or above the readiness benchmark either way. Data strength is graded at 2 of 3 for measure fit on every figure, because the five Eastern Caribbean figures, the Eurostat items for Cyprus and Malta on installing software and the United Kingdom's 12-month figure differ a little from the UN question; it averages 8.1 out of 10 on each indicator.

### Information and data

**Definition.** Whether a young person can find what they need, tell a sound source from an unsound one, keep track of it, and make sense of figures and claims.

Information management is one of the seven core digital skills identified across 75 studies[211], and information navigation is one of the five validated types of internet skill[212]. Information search, evaluation and management is the first of the five areas of the European framework[213].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has three indicators, each an activity in the household-survey question behind SDG indicator 4.4.1[214], and each the share of young people who did it in the last three months. For making sense of figures: used a basic arithmetic formula in a spreadsheet, with a figure for 34 of the 56 members, from 1.3 per cent in Sierra Leone to 69.2 per cent in Malta. For telling a sound source from an unsound one: verified the reliability of information found online, with a figure for 16 members, from 3.6 per cent in Pakistan to 91.1 per cent in Singapore. For keeping track of information: copied or moved a file or folder, with a figure for 22 members, from 1.3 per cent in Bangladesh to 82.0 per cent in the United Kingdom. The verified-reliability measure sits here and not under Checking in Pillar 8, which concerns what young people do with the answers AI gives them.

The figures come from three places. The UN SDG database publishes the spreadsheet measure for ages 15 to 24 for 13 members and the verified-reliability measure for eight; it does not publish the file measure. For members with a survey findings report of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey held in the project[215], the figure for ages 15 to 29 is worked out from the report's table of ICT skills by age, as for Technical operation: 15 members for the spreadsheet measure and 17 for the file measure. Tuvalu's report gives only ages 15 to 24, and its two figures are for that band. Only the 2024 form of that survey asks about verifying information, and Tonga's is the one such report held. Three national sources fill gaps with a nearby youth band: Rwanda for ages 16 to 30[216], the United Kingdom for ages 16 to 24[217] and Canada for internet users aged 15 to 24 in 2018[218]. The age band is recorded on every figure; 14 of the 34 spreadsheet figures and 16 of the 22 file figures are for ages 15 to 29 exactly.

The verified-reliability figures run from 3.6 to 91.1 per cent, a spread wide enough to suggest the question is understood differently from one survey to the next. Bangladesh's figure fell from 14.2 to 0.6 per cent in a single year, and its 2023 figure is used. No figure of any kind exists for 22 members.

Tested ability is known for few members and is used here as supporting evidence only. In the OECD's Truth Quest survey of 2024, in which adults judge whether online news items are true or false, people aged 18 to 24 scored below all adults in each of the three members that took part: 57.9 against 60.3 in Australia, 59.0 against 61.0 in Canada and 60.6 against 64.4 in the United Kingdom[219]. No published source measures whether a young person can find what they need, or read a chart, a rate or a percentage, outside school assessments at ages 14 and 15. The survey therefore sets tasks: finding a named fact and giving its source, choosing the sounder of two sources, finding a file saved earlier, and reading a figure off a simple chart.

**Scoring and results.** The spreadsheet formula and copying a file are scored against the ITU's targets for 2030, 50 per cent for intermediate skills and 70 per cent for basic ones[220], each

activity's level as the ITU names it; no target names verifying information, so its best goalpost is the average of the five best members, 54.52 per cent (Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Malta, Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago), fixed at the figures used in this edition. The natural zero is the worst, with ten equal bands between. The UN, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey and national figures ask the indicator's own question, but the five Eastern Caribbean figures, from the Digital Inclusion Survey 2024 of the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority, are shares of those who used an ICT device in the last three months rather than of all young people; Cyprus's and Malta's Eurostat items word the activities their own way, the United Kingdom's spreadsheet figure counts any use of spreadsheet software, and Canada's figure for copying a file counts internet users only. Trinidad and Tobago's figure counts internet users who say they are capable of the activity. Each entry is therefore graded a close stand-in. The formula spreads as six members at 10, one at 8, one at 7, one at 6, four at 5, one at 4, six at 3, five at 2, four at 1 and five at 0, from Malta, at 69.2 per cent, to Sierra Leone, at 1.3, with a mean data strength of 8.1; verifying information as one member at 10, one at 9, two at 8, one at 7, two at 5, two at 4, one at 3, four at 2, one at 1 and one at 0, from Singapore, at 91.1 per cent, to Pakistan, at 3.6, with 8.1; and copying a file as three members at 10, one at 9, one at 7, three at 5, two at 4, one at 3, two at 2, five at 1 and four at 0, from the United Kingdom, at 82 per cent, to Bangladesh, at 1.3, with 8.2.

### Creation and communication

**Definition.** Whether a young person can make something and reach other people with it.

Social and creative skills are two of the five validated types of internet skill[221]. Communication, collaboration and creativity account for three of the seven core digital skills found across 75 studies[222], and the European framework gives communication and collaboration, and digital content creation, an area each[223].

This is also where the research runs out. The systematic review of digital skills outcomes among 12 to 17 year olds found little research at all on the outcomes of communication or creative digital skills, and recommended that the dimensions of digital skill be examined separately in future[224]. The thinness of the evidence is a reason to measure it rather than to leave it out.

**Indicators.** Its three indicators are activities in the same household-survey question as Information and data, the one behind SDG indicator 4.4.1[225], and each the share of young people who did it in the last three months. For making something: created an electronic presentation, with a figure for 35 of the 56 members, from 1.0 per cent in Sierra Leone to 80.0 per cent in the United Kingdom; and wrote a computer program, with a figure for 34 members, from 0.4 per cent in Malawi to 41.9 per cent in Malaysia. For reaching people with it: sent an email or message with a file attached, with a figure for 35 members, from 2.0 per cent in Malawi to 97.0 per cent in Canada. The sub-pillar measures ability; what young people make with AI is measured under Making things in Pillar 3.

The figures come from the same places as those for Technical operation and Information and data. The UN SDG database publishes the three activities for ages 15 to 24 for 12, 13 and 12 members. For 16 further members (15 for programs, Malawi taking the UN figure) the figure

for ages 15 to 29 is worked out from the survey findings report of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey[226]. India publishes the presentation and attachment figures for ages 15 to 29 from its 2025 telecom survey[227], and Rwanda publishes all three for ages 16 to 30[228].

The attachment question changed in 2020. Earlier surveys asked about an email with an attached file, while the current wording counts any message with a file, including messaging services on a phone, which is why India's figure of 85.1 per cent stands far above figures from the earlier wording. No figure of any kind exists for 21 members.

Whether a young person has published something of their own is the centre of the sub-pillar's question and is known for four members only. In 2020, 76.0 per cent of people aged 16 to 29 in Cyprus and 58.8 per cent in Malta had shared or published something they had made in the last three months[229]; 56 per cent of those aged 16 to 24 in Great Britain had uploaded their own content to a website in 2019[230], and 22.8 per cent in Canada in 2022[231]. Among internet-using children aged 12 to 17, the share who say they do not know how to create videos or music runs from 12.9 per cent in Malta to 54.1 per cent in Tanzania across the seven members surveyed[232]. These figures support the text and are not indicators. The survey therefore sets tasks on the respondent's own device: making a short document or picture, sending it to a named person, and saying whether they have published something of their own in the last year.

**Scoring and results.** A presentation is an intermediate skill and an attachment a basic one, so their best goalposts are the ITU's targets of 50 and 70 per cent, with the natural zero the worst and ten equal bands between. Both entries are graded close stand-ins, for the Eastern Caribbean figures' narrower base, as in Information and data; for presentations, Cyprus's and Malta's Eurostat item also counts any file that combines text, pictures or sound, and the United Kingdom's figure covers the last 12 months. Presentations spread as six members at 10, one at 9, one at 7, two at 6, two at 5, two at 4, four at 3, five at 2, four at 1 and eight at 0, from the United Kingdom, at 80 per cent, to Sierra Leone, at 1, with a mean data strength of 8.1; attachments as nine members at 10, two at 9, five at 8, three at 6, three at 4, two at 3, one at 2, four at 1 and six at 0, from Canada, at 97 per cent, to Malawi, at 2, with 8.1. Writing a program, which no ITU target names, has as its best goalpost the average of the five best members, 24.04 per cent (Canada, Malaysia, Nauru, Singapore and the United Kingdom), fixed at the figures used in this edition. Its entry is graded a close stand-in for the same two reasons as presentations, the Eastern Caribbean base and the United Kingdom's 12 months, and because Cyprus's and Malta's Eurostat item asks about writing code. It spreads as one member at 10, one at 9, two at 8, two at 5, one at 4, three at 3, four at 2, ten at 1 and ten at 0, from Malaysia, at 41.9 per cent, to Malawi, at 0.4, with a mean data strength of 8.1; 20 of the 34 members score 0 or 1, as in each of them fewer than one young person in twenty wrote a program in the last three months.

### Safety and security

**Definition.** Whether a young person can protect themselves, their device and their data while using it.

Safety, wellbeing and responsible use is one of the five areas of the European digital competence framework, and in its current version AI runs through that area as it does through the rest[233].

Protective skill has to be measured rather than assumed to arrive with general skill: greater digital skill is linked, indirectly, with greater exposure to online risks, as set out above under Capability and frequency of use. A more capable young person meets more of the internet, which is a reason to ask what they can do to protect themselves rather than to infer it from their skill level.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has three indicators. Two are activities in the household-survey question behind SDG indicator 4.4.1[234], each the share of young people who did it in the last three months. For protecting the device and the account: set up effective security measures, such as strong passwords or log-in alerts, with a figure for 15 of the 56 members, from 7.3 per cent in Pakistan to 97.0 per cent in Singapore. For protecting data: changed privacy settings on a device, account or app to limit the sharing of personal data, with a figure for 17 members, from 9.7 per cent in Saint Lucia to 96.5 per cent in Singapore. The third is the share of young people with at least basic safety skills, a level built from the protective actions a person reports, with a figure for six members, from 70.6 per cent in Brunei Darussalam to 99.1 per cent in Singapore. A fourth indicator is defined and held in consideration: the share of young people who know what an application or AI tool collects about them. It has no published figure for any member and is carried to the survey.

The UN SDG database publishes the two activities for ages 15 to 24 for eight members (Bangladesh, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Malaysia, Malta, Pakistan and Singapore). Trinidad and Tobago takes both from its National Digital Inclusion Survey[235], for ages 15 to 24. Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines take both from the Digital Inclusion Survey 2024 of the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority[236], for ages 15 to 24. Only the newest form of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey asks about them[237]; Tonga's survey of 2024 is the one such report held, and its table by age gives the figure for ages 15 to 29 directly. On the privacy indicator, Cyprus, Malta and the United Kingdom take a close measure, labelled as such: the share of people aged 16 to 24 who limited access to their profile or content on social networks[238], for 2025 for Cyprus and Malta and for 2020 for the United Kingdom, the last year in which Eurostat published a figure for it. For Malta the close measure replaces the UN's figure on the indicator's own wording, 38.0 per cent for 2019, as the newer figure. The safety skill level is published by the UN for ages 15 to 24 for Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Malaysia and Singapore, and by Eurostat for ages 16 to 29 for Cyprus and Malta[239]. The two build it from different lists: the UN's safety area has two activities, so at least basic means either of them; Eurostat's has six, among them checking that a website is secure and refusing the use of personal data for advertising.

The activities are actions taken in the last three months, whatever the device[240], so a young person who set a strong password or fixed their privacy settings earlier is counted as not having done so. Bangladesh's figures fell sharply from one year to the next (17.2 for 2023, 0.4 for 2024, for security measures), and its 2023 figures are used. No figure of any kind exists for 39 members.

What young people say they can do runs ahead of what they can do. In Australia, people aged 18 to 24 rated their knowledge of their privacy rights the highest of any age group and scored lower than most when tested[241]. Among internet-using children aged 12 to 17, the share who say they do not know how to change their privacy settings runs from 7.3 per cent in Malta to 52.8 per cent in Uganda across the seven members surveyed[242]. They support the text and are not indicators. The survey therefore checks rather than asks: whether the respondent's own device locks and their main account has a password of its own and a second step at log-in, whether they can find and change who sees their profile, whether they can pick the deceptive message out of a set, and what they know about what an application and an AI tool they use collect about them.

**Scoring and results.** The best goalpost is every young person holding at least basic safety skills, since none should lack them, and the worst none at all, with a band for each 10 points. Two lists sit behind the figures, the UN's two protective actions and Eurostat's six, so the entry is graded on its weaker lines, as a close stand-in. Every figure is for a youth band, comes from a household survey and is recent, which gives each member a data strength of 8. The six members spread as three members at 9 and three at 7, from Malta, Canada and Singapore, at 90.5 to 99.1 per cent, to Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus and Malaysia, at 70.6 to 74.7 per cent. No target names setting up security measures or changing privacy settings, so the best goalpost of each is the average of its five best members, fixed at the figures used in this edition: 81.16 per cent for security measures (Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Malaysia, Malta and Singapore), five of the 15 members with a figure, and 72.14 per cent for privacy settings (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Malta, Singapore and the United Kingdom); each scores 0 where no young person did it and rises in ten equal steps. Both entries are graded close stand-ins: Canada's security figure counts anyone who has used security features such as two-factor authentication or a password manager, and Cyprus's, Malta's and the United Kingdom's privacy figures come from Eurostat's item on limiting who can see their profile or content on social networks or shared online storage. Trinidad and Tobago's figures count internet users who say they are capable of each activity. The Eastern Caribbean figures are graded close stand-ins for their narrower base, as in Information and data. Security measures spread as three members at 10, one at 8, one at 7, one at 6, one at 5, one at 3, two at 2, four at 1 and one at 0, from Singapore, at 97 per cent, to Pakistan, at 7.3, with a mean data strength of 8.0; privacy settings as one member at 10, four at 9, one at 8, one at 6, one at 5, two at 3, one at 2 and six at 1, from Singapore, at 96.5 per cent, to Saint Lucia, at 9.7, with 8.0.

### Understanding AI

**Definition.** Whether a young person knows what these systems are, how they work and where they fail.

Public understanding of AI is limited even as it becomes embedded in everyday technology, and a defined set of competencies is needed for people to interact with it and evaluate it. Long and Magerko draw those competencies together from interdisciplinary research into a single framework of AI literacy[243]. A review grounded in 30 peer-reviewed articles proposes four aspects for building it: know and understand, use and apply, evaluate and create, and ethical issues[244].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has two indicators, both what young people say about themselves. The first is the share who say they know a lot or some about AI, with a figure for nine of the 56 members, from 29.0 per cent in the United Kingdom to 59.5 per cent in South Africa. The second is the share who have heard or read a lot about it, with a figure for 12 members, from 7 per cent in Bangladesh to 68 per cent in Australia. Both speak to the first part of the sub-pillar's question, whether a young person knows what AI is. Neither shows whether they know how it works or where it fails.

The first comes from the UNDP's 2025 survey[245], which asked how much the respondent knows about AI and whose respondent file records exact age. The share answering a lot or some is worked out for ages 15 to 29 in the seven members surveyed (Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa), on between 144 and 455 young respondents in each; Australia's sample starts at age 18. Two members carry a national survey with a different question, labelled as such: New Zealand, the share of people aged 18 to 29 who know a lot or a fair amount about AI[246], and the United Kingdom, the share aged 18 to 34 who say they could explain what AI is in detail[247], a stricter test. The second indicator comes from the Pew Research Center's survey of spring 2026, which publishes the answer for ages 18 to 34 in 13 members[248]. Figures for all adults are not used as stand-ins. Forty-one members have no figure on either indicator.

What people say they know about AI is a weak guide to what they know. In a sample of 514 adults, a tested scale of AI competence correlated at 0.04 with a self-report scale[249], and of 16 validated scales of AI literacy only three test performance[250]. No published source tests what young people in any member know about how AI works or where it fails. The survey therefore asks each respondent to say in their own words what an AI assistant is doing when it answers, and tests whether they know that it can be confidently wrong and that it learns from data that can be skewed.

**Scoring and results.** Every young person knowing at least some about AI is the best goalpost and the natural zero the worst, 10 points to a band. The UNDP asked the same question wherever it surveyed, but New Zealand's figure counts a lot or a fair amount and the United Kingdom's asks who could explain AI in detail, so the entry as a whole is graded as a close stand-in. Six of the nine figures describe ages 15 to 29 exactly and earn 4 for age fit; the other three, for 18 to 29 or 18 to 34, earn 3. The nine members spread as three members at 5, two

at 4, three at 3 and one at 2, from Fiji, Australia and South Africa, at 50.8 to 59.5 per cent, to the United Kingdom, at 29.0 per cent, and their mean data strength is 8.7.

Having heard or read a lot about AI is the Pew Research Center's own question, asked in 13 members, none of them a small youth state, for ages 18 to 34, a nearby youth band; each figure grades 9 for data strength. Nigeria's figure for ages 18 to 34, 33 per cent, appears only in a chart of the Pew report, and the index takes its figures from the report's table by age. Hearing a lot about AI is not expected of everyone, so 10 points go to 62 per cent, averaged over its five best members (Australia, Canada, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom). The 12 members spread as four members at 10, two at 7, one at 5, one at 4, three at 3 and one at 1, from Australia, at 68 per cent, to Bangladesh, at 7.

## Pillar 3: Purposeful use and creation

### Rationale

Access and capability do not by themselves produce results. Research on the third-level digital divide, which concerns the tangible outcomes people obtain from going online, found in a representative Dutch sample, in a study published in 2015, that the internet remains more beneficial for those with higher social status, not because they use it more extensively but because of what they achieve as a result[251]. In a 2014 survey of Dutch internet users, those who achieved outcomes in one domain of life could still miss them in another[252]. What young people achieve with AI therefore has to be measured directly, and in more than one domain.

### What counts as purposeful use

Research on the outcomes of internet use groups them into four domains: economic (education, employment and income), social (civic and political participation, and ties to others), cultural (belonging and identity) and personal (health, leisure and self-development), and treats uses that bring chances in education, work and society as more beneficial than uses that are mainly consumptive or entertaining[253]. The ITU's framework likewise separates connectivity from what it is used for, listing learning, work, civic participation, information, commerce and entertainment, and leaves those uses outside its own measures[254]. The pillar counts use of AI for learning and work, civic and community life, culture and identity, and health and personal development, together with making things with AI. Use that is mainly for entertainment is left out of the count. Even so, it has a part to play. In a national UK survey of 9 to 19 year olds in 2004, entertainment and communication were the route into broader uses, with creative and civic uses taken up last[255].

### AI and the results of use

In a preregistered experiment with 453 college-educated professionals, access to ChatGPT cut the time taken on mid-level writing tasks by 40 per cent, raised the quality of the output by 18 per cent and narrowed the gap between workers[256]. Among 5,172 customer-support agents, AI assistance raised productivity by 15 per cent on average; less experienced and lower-skilled workers improved in both speed and quality, while the most experienced saw small gains in

speed and small declines in quality[257]. Gains for individuals can come at a collective cost. In an experiment on short stories, ideas from AI made stories more creative, better written and more enjoyable, most of all for less creative writers, but made them more similar to one another[258].

### Public benefit

Public benefit is not scored as a separate outcome, because at country level it cannot be traced reliably to young people. It is counted through the purposes in the social and cultural domains, civic and community life and culture and identity, and through the local relevance of what young people make. Local relevance matters because AI tends to pull creative work towards sameness, as set out under AI and the results of use.

### Learning and work

**Definition.** What young people get done with AI in their studying, their training and their paid work.

This sub-pillar covers the economic domain: education, employment and income.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has three indicators: the share of young people who use AI for their studies, the share who use AI for their work, and the share who use AI for either, counted once. No survey asks the same question in every member, and no international indicator of AI use exists yet: a subgroup of the ITU's expert group on household indicators made draft recommendations in August 2026 that surveys ask about the knowing use of AI and then its purpose, as work, formal education or personal, and proposed that it be renewed in 2027 to recommend indicators for the ITU's core list[259]. Each member therefore takes the best published figure for young people, labelled with its question, age band and year. Use for study has a figure for 16 of the 56 members, from 28.0 per cent in Bangladesh to 65.6 per cent in Singapore; use for work for ten, from 10.0 per cent in Canada to 49.3 per cent in Fiji; and use for either for ten, from 31.8 per cent in Bangladesh to 92.0 per cent in Malta.

The figures come from six sources. Eurostat's survey of 2025 asks people aged 16 to 29 in Cyprus and Malta whether they used generative AI in the last three months for formal education and for work, the split the ITU group recommends[260]. The United Nations Development Programme's survey asks whether, in the past 30 days, a person interacted with AI through educational platforms or learning apps and through work-related tools or software; the figures for ages 15 to 29 are worked out from its respondent file for Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa, where the youngest respondents in Australia are 18[261]. The OECD's PISA 2025 asks pupils aged 15 how often they use AI chatbots for their school work to help them learn; the share doing so at least weekly is worked out from its respondent file for Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom[262]. Statistics Canada reports the share of workers aged 15 to 24 who used generative AI at work in the past 12 months[263]. The Office for National Statistics reports the share of people aged 16 to 29 in Great Britain who used AI in their work or education in the past 12 months, as one answer[264], and the Eurobarometer of February 2026 the share aged 15 to 24 in Cyprus and Malta who use generative AI in their work or their

studies[265]. Where a member has two figures, the one whose age band is nearest to 15 to 29 is used and the other is recorded beside it, so Australia and Malta take the survey figure and not the PISA figure. PISA supplies the study figure for Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom. The Eurobarometer figures rest on weighted bases of 57 people in Malta and 61 in Cyprus, and both lie above the highest share that Eurostat's 2025 figures for ages 16 to 29 allow, 71.9 per cent in Malta and 61.7 in Cyprus.

**Stand-ins.** A member with no such figure may carry a stand-in, labelled on the figure and graded low. For study, four members (Ghana, Tanzania, The Gambia and Zambia) carry the share of university students aged 18 to 29 who use ChatGPT for study help, from a global survey of students who already use it[266]; Sierra Leone and Uganda carry the share of young volunteers aged 18 to 35 who use AI for academic support[267]; and Papua New Guinea carries the share of 77 students at one university who use AI tools at least weekly[268]. Figures on using the internet to learn or to look for a job[269] are kept as supporting evidence and are not scored.

On the combined indicator, a member with a figure for study alone carries that figure (13 members), since the share using AI for study or work cannot be lower. Their study figure therefore counts twice, the second time against the higher bar for either, which lowers the Learning and work score of nine of them and raises Canada's. Without the 13 carried figures, ten members' index would change by up to 1.7 points (Brunei Darussalam), ten would move by one to four places, and no member would cross the readiness benchmark at 53. With these stand-ins the three indicators reach 23, ten and 23 members. Thirty-three members have neither a figure nor a stand-in on any of the three and are left to the survey: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Cameroon, Dominica, Eswatini, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, The Bahamas, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

Four limits are recorded with the figures. The questions differ: a pupil's weekly use of a chatbot for school work, any use for formal education in three months, and contact with AI through a learning app in 30 days are not the same measure, and the form of the question alone can move a figure by about 20 points. In Brazil in 2025, 43.4 per cent of 10 to 17 year olds reported using AI in one national survey and 64.2 per cent in another, where the question was put differently[270]. Differences between members on these indicators therefore reflect the question asked as well as what young people do. Second, use is not a result. Research on the outcomes of internet use measures uses and outcomes separately[271], and among Danish workers in occupations exposed to AI, wide reported use of chatbots and reported time savings went with no change in earnings or recorded hours[272]. What young people finished or gained through AI is published for no member and is put to the survey. Third, work is measured less well than study. Research on adoption asks about use for one's job and outside it separately[273], but for young people such figures exist for few members; Canada's is a share of workers, not of all young people. Surveys of adult employees exist for eight members and are not used,

because they do not describe young people. Fourth, platform data describe what a service is used for, not how many young people use it: the share of Claude conversations classified as coursework or as work is published for 28 members[274] and is held as possible stand-in data, not as an indicator.

**Scoring and results.** No target names a share of young people using AI for study or work, and not every young person is expected to, so each indicator scores 10 at the average of the five highest own figures among its members and 0 at none, in ten equal bands. Only figures from surveys of young people in general count towards that average; the student and volunteer samples, and study figures carried to the combined indicator, are scored against it but do not set it, as four of the five best study figures would otherwise have been student samples and the fifth a volunteer sample. The averages are 58.86 per cent for study (Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa), 35.72 for work (Australia, Cyprus, Fiji, India and Malta) and 73.98 for either (Australia, Cyprus, Fiji, Malta and the United Kingdom). Study spreads as eight members at 10, two at 9, two at 8, three at 7, four at 6, three at 5 and one at 4; work as three members at 10, two at 6, one at 5, one at 4, one at 3 and two at 2; either as five members at 10, three at 9, four at 8, three at 7, three at 6, four at 5 and one at 4. Data strength is 9 or 10 for a member's own figure and 5 or 7 for a stand-in, the lowest being Papua New Guinea's, whose 77 students give no ages.

### Civic and community life

**Definition.** What young people do with AI in public life and in the groups and communities they belong to.

This sub-pillar covers the social domain: civic and political participation, and ties to other people.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has two indicators: the share of young people who use AI to deal with government and public services, and the share who use AI chatbots to follow the news. They cover the two civic uses of AI for which any member has a published figure. No survey in any member asks young people whether they used AI to take part in public or community life, and the ITU expert group's proposed classes of AI activity include none that is civic[275].

The first indicator comes from the United Nations Development Programme's survey, which asks whether a person interacted with AI through government services, such as taxes or the courts, in the past 30 days[276]. The figure for ages 15 to 29 is worked out from the respondent file for seven members, from 5.4 per cent in Pakistan to 29.6 per cent in Australia; the youngest respondents in Australia are 18.

The second comes from the Reuters Institute's Digital News Report, which asks online adults in nine members whether they used generative AI chatbots as a source of news in the last week[277]. It publishes each member's figure for adults only, and the pattern by age only across all 48 of its markets together: 17 per cent of those aged 18 to 24, 15 per cent of those aged 25 to 34, 11, 8 and 5 per cent in the older bands. The national reports publish a figure for young people in two members: 16 per cent of those aged 18 to 24 in Australia[278] and 14 per cent of those aged 18 to 34 in Canada[279], and these are used as published. For India, Kenya,

Malaysia, Nigeria, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom the figure for ages 18 to 29 is worked out from the adult figure, by the method set out under Missing data: the age pattern is laid over the member's own adult population by age[280], scaled so that it returns the member's adult figure, and read for ages 18 to 29. Applied to Australia and Canada, the same calculation gives 15.9 per cent for those under 25 and 13.4 per cent for ages 18 to 34, against the 16 and 14 per cent published. The nine figures run from 6.9 per cent in the United Kingdom to 37.4 per cent in Nigeria. Each worked-out figure is labelled as such and keeps beside it the range the figure for young people must lie within.

Three limits are recorded with the news figures. They come from online panels, and in India, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa the samples represent younger English speakers online and not the whole population; in Kenya and Nigeria they stop at age 50. The worked-out figures rest on the age pattern having the same shape in every member, which the two published youth figures support but cannot prove. And following the news through a chatbot is one narrow part of civic life.

**Stand-ins.** Figures about the internet were gathered for members with no figure about AI and labelled as stand-ins; they are not scored. For public services: the share of people aged 15 to 24 who used government services or information online, from the Global Findex survey of 2024 (16 members)[281], and the official figures for Cyprus and Malta at ages 16 to 29[282] and for Canada at ages 15 to 24[283]. For the news: the share aged 15 to 24 who read news online (19 members), and Eurostat's figure for Cyprus and Malta at ages 16 to 29[284]. They measure use of the internet, not of AI, and run far higher: on one scale with the figures about AI, the five best members on each indicator would all have been stand-ins, and Australia, highest on AI and public services at 29.6 per cent, would have scored 4. They are kept as supporting evidence. The two indicators are therefore scored for seven and nine members, and only 12 members have a figure on either: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Fiji, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom. The other 44 are left to the survey.

**What goes to the survey.** Published data on AI reach only the edges of the social domain. Whether a young person used AI to find out about an election or a political question, to contact an official, sign a petition, organise, volunteer or run a group, and what came of it, is published for no member in a comparable form and is put to the survey. The one member with figures shows the scale: in the United Kingdom, 42.5 per cent of people aged 18 to 34 used an AI chatbot or AI search for election information in the week before the elections of May 2026, against 18.2 per cent of all adults[285]. The Commonwealth's Youth Development Index measures civic participation at ages 15 to 29 by three questions, on recognition for helping the community, voicing an opinion to an official and volunteering time, none of them about the internet or AI[286].

**Scoring and results.** No target names either use, and not every young person is expected to deal with government or follow the news through AI, so each indicator scores 10 at the average of its five best members and 0 at none, with equal bands between. Public services reaches 10 at 17.54 per cent, the average of Australia, Fiji, India, Nigeria and South Africa: Australia and Fiji score 10, South Africa 7, India 6, Nigeria 4, and Bangladesh and Pakistan, at 5.5 and

5.4 per cent, 3. The news reaches 10 at 28.52 per cent, the average of India, Kenya, Nigeria, Singapore and South Africa: India, Kenya and Nigeria score 10, South Africa 9, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore 5, Canada 4 and the United Kingdom, at 6.9 per cent, 2. Each public-services figure has a data strength of 10, Australia's 9 for ages 18 to 29. On the news, the seven figures worked out from adult figures are graded as modelled and have 8, the two published for a youth band 9; the ranges kept beside the worked-out figures cross several band limits, so their bands are flagged as uncertain, as set out under Uncertainty and sensitivity.

How far the news scores rest on the calculation was tested two ways. Taking each member's adult figure as its figure for young people, which is what the calculation gives if use does not change with age, the level scoring 10 falls to 22.80 per cent. Australia then scores 7 and Canada 6, India 9, South Africa 7, Malaysia and Singapore 4 and the United Kingdom 1, and no member's index moves by more than 0.7 points or one place. Scoring only the two youth figures published, for Australia and Canada, moves no member's index by more than 1.8 points or two places. In both, the same 15 members are at or above the readiness benchmark.

### Culture and identity

**Definition.** What young people do with AI that belongs to their own language, place and sense of who they are.

This sub-pillar covers the cultural domain: belonging and identity.

There is a specific reason to watch it: AI tends to pull creative work towards sameness, as set out above under AI and the results of use, and that matters most where culture and identity are concerned.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has two indicators: the share of young people who say AI fits their own place, and the share who use AI to translate. They are the two parts of the sub-pillar for which any member has a figure. No survey in any member asks young people which language they use with AI, or what they use it for in their own culture.

The first indicator comes from the United Nations Development Programme's survey, which asks people who use AI tools how often they feel the responses sound like they come from a person from the place they currently live[287]. The share answering always or most of the time is worked out for ages 15 to 29 from the respondent file for seven members, from 16.6 per cent in Pakistan to 40.6 per cent in Fiji; the youngest respondents in Australia are 18. The figure records what young people notice and expect of AI, and is not a test of the tools. The answers of OpenAI's GPT models sit closest to the values of English-speaking and Protestant European countries[288], yet Australia reads lower on this question than Fiji, India or Nigeria. The figure cannot therefore be read as a measure of how well the tools fit a place.

The second comes from a global survey of university students, which asks those who use ChatGPT how often they use it for translating[289]. The share of students aged 18 to 29 answering sometimes, often or always is worked out from the open respondent file for 11 members with at least 30 answers, from 25.3 per cent in the United Kingdom to 70.7 per cent in Tanzania. Every figure is a convenience sample of students who already use ChatGPT, so it reads high beside a figure for all young people, and it is labelled as a student sample and graded

low. The question does not name the languages, and translating is often into or out of English, so it is a narrow sign of use in a young person's own language. In the United Kingdom a large school survey gives 30.1 per cent of those aged 13 to 18 who use generative AI at least monthly[290], against 25.3 per cent of the students; the student figure is used so that all members rest on one question.

**Stand-ins.** On the first indicator, members with no survey figure do not carry the UNICEF U-Report polls, which asked a different question and are kept as supporting evidence. U-Report's Life Online poll of 2026 asked volunteers who use AI whether the information they get from AI feels specific to their country[291]: Canada, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia ran it on their own platforms with age bands, 12.2 to 53.3 per cent answering yes at ages 15 to 30, and 12 more members appeared in the global poll, which has no age split by country, at 22.7 to 67.2 per cent. Volunteers choose to answer, and the question is not the UNDP survey's: where a member had both figures the gap between them ran from 1.9 points in India (36.1 per cent in the survey, 34.2 in the poll) to 36.5 in Pakistan (16.6 and 53.1). Without the polls the first indicator reaches seven members and the second 11. Forty-two members have no figure on either: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Dominica, Eswatini, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, The Bahamas, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda and Vanuatu.

**What goes to the survey.** Two parts of the sub-pillar are published for no member in a comparable form and are put to the survey: the language young people use with AI, and what they use AI for in their own culture, such as keeping or learning a heritage language or making and finding the stories, music, faith and history of their own community. One volunteer survey of people aged 18 to 35 shows the scale of the first. In India 44 per cent used Hindi with AI and 15 per cent a local language, in Kenya 33 per cent used Swahili, in Uganda 6.6 per cent and in Sierra Leone 3.3 per cent used their mother tongue, and in Zambia 3.4 per cent mixed English with a local language, while in Nigeria 99 per cent used English[292]. The reason to ask is given by experiment: AI writing suggestions moved Indian writers towards Western styles and helped them less than American writers[293]. The ITU expert group's proposed classes of AI activity include only "translate text"[294]. Platform data are held as possible stand-in data and are not in use: translation is under 1.4 per cent of Claude conversations in each of 28 members[295].

**Scoring and results.** No target names either share; in ten equal bands, each runs from 0 at none to 10 at the average of its five highest members. Whether AI fits a young person's own place reaches 10 at 33.72 per cent (Australia, Fiji, India, Nigeria and South Africa), on the UNDP survey's figures alone; translating reaches 10 at 64.68 per cent (Bangladesh, Ghana, Malaysia, Pakistan and Tanzania), every figure being a student sample. The first spreads as three members at 10, one at 9, one at 6, one at 5 and one at 4, the second as two members at 10, three at 9, two at 8, two at 7, one at 5 and one at 3. The UNDP figures are the indicator's

own measure and grade 10 for data strength, Australia's 9 as its sample starts at 18; the student samples, a partial measure, grade 7.

### Health and personal development

**Definition.** What young people do with AI for their own health, wellbeing and development.

This sub-pillar covers the personal domain: health, leisure and self-development.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators: the share of young people who use AI for their health, the share who use AI for their money, the share who ask AI for advice on personal matters, and the share of conversations with one AI assistant that are about health, wellbeing and money. The first three rest on surveys of young people; the fourth rests on a service's own records and covers all its users.

Health and money come from the United Nations Development Programme's survey, which asks whether a person interacted with AI in the past 30 days through healthcare services or applications, and through financial services or banking[296]. The figures for ages 15 to 29 are worked out from the respondent file for seven members: for health from 11.7 per cent in India to 39.3 per cent in Fiji, and for money from 14.4 per cent in India to 43.6 per cent in Australia; the youngest respondents in Australia are 18. The question counts AI met inside a service or an app as well as a question put to an AI assistant, so it is wider than asking AI about one's own health or money. Great Britain has an official figure for ages 16 to 29 on a different question, the areas of life in which a person used AI in the last 12 months, with 21 per cent for health and wellbeing and 13 per cent for finances[297]. It is used for the United Kingdom and labelled as a different question. A poll of the same year gives 25 per cent of people aged 18 to 29 who have used AI chatbots to make decisions about their personal finances[298].

Advice on personal matters comes from a global survey of university students, which asks those who use ChatGPT how often they use it for advice on personal topics[299]. The share of students aged 18 to 29 answering sometimes, often or always is worked out from the open respondent file for 11 members with at least 30 answers, from 35.6 per cent in the United Kingdom to 80.8 per cent in Nigeria. Every figure is a convenience sample of students who already use ChatGPT, so it reads high beside a figure for all young people; it is labelled as a student sample and graded low.

The fourth indicator is the share of conversations with the Claude assistant in May 2026 that were about medical questions, wellness and fitness, emotional wellbeing and support, or buying and investing, added together[300]. It is published for 28 members. Eighteen have all four topics published, from 2.81 per cent in Cameroon to 10.38 per cent in Canada; for Botswana, Jamaica, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and Zambia some topics are not published because too few conversations were sampled, and the figure adds up the published topics only and is labelled as a floor. The figure is a share of conversations, not of people; it describes the adult users of one service, who differ from member to member; and it carries no ages. It is included as published, labelled as covering all users, and is applied to ages 15 to 29 as one group, as set out under Missing data.

**Missing data.** Fourteen members have a figure about young people on at least one of the first three indicators. Sixteen more have only the all-users figure. Twenty-six members have nothing: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Eswatini, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. No figure about the internet is used as a stand-in, and nothing stands in for these members.

**What goes to the survey.** Three parts of the sub-pillar are published for too few members to compare and are put to the survey. The first is turning to AI for mental health or emotional support. A figure for young people exists in two members: in Canada 15 per cent of people aged 16 to 24 used an AI tool for advice or support with their mental health in the past 12 months, against 8 per cent of all ages[301]; in England and Wales 24.9 per cent of children aged 13 to 17 have used AI chatbots as a source of advice or support[302]. Among adults the share who used AI for companionship or support, including mental health support, in the last 12 months runs from 20 per cent in Canada to 59 per cent in India across seven members[303]; adult figures are not used. The second and third are what young people did with the answer and whether anyone else was involved. One member has a figure for adults: in Canada 24 per cent of people aged 16 and over have used an AI chatbot for medical advice instead of contacting a health professional[304]. A survey of people aged 12 to 21 in the United States asks the whole chain: whether they used AI chatbots for mental health advice, how often, how helpful it was, and whether they told anyone[305]; it is the model for the survey's questions.

The direction of these measures is not settled by the evidence. Randomised trials of chatbots with people aged 15 to 39 show small to moderate falls in distress, with results for generative chatbots inconclusive[306]. Among 39,761 school pupils in Ontario, 21.1 per cent used AI for emotional support or advice[307]. Over 12 months, adults who felt less connected went on to use chatbots more, and more use predicted more loneliness on one of two measures[308]. The index reads more use as better, as it does for every purpose the pillar counts. The scores record how far young people turn to AI for their health, their money and personal matters. Whether the answer was accurate, useful and safe goes to the survey, with what they did with it. The ITU expert group's proposed classes of AI activity have no class for health or money and place personal use under companionship and emotional support[309].

**Scoring and results.** The share of one AI assistant's conversations about health, wellbeing and money is scored as follows. No target names it, so the figure that scores 10 is 9.29 per cent of conversations, the average of its five highest members (Canada, Cyprus, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom), held at the figures used in this edition. It counts conversations for all users, not young people, so it is graded a partial measure with 1 for age fit; Anthropic counts it from a sample of the service's conversation records, so it takes 2 for how it was produced. Data strength is 5 for 22 members and 6 for the six whose range for young people is narrower (Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Togo), 5.2 on average. For ten members some of the four topics were too rare to publish, so for them the sum covers only the topics published and understates the share. The 28 members spread as

three members at 10, one at 9, three at 8, one at 7, two at 6, two at 5, three at 4, seven at 3, four at 2, one at 1 and one at 0, from Canada, at 10.38 per cent, to Rwanda, at 0.92.

The other three follow the same rule, the five highest members setting the 10: health reaches it at 24.44 per cent (Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, South Africa and the United Kingdom), money at 30.32 per cent (Australia, Fiji, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa) and personal advice at 74.66 per cent (Cyprus, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia). Health spreads as two members at 10, one at 8, one at 7, three at 5 and one at 4; money as three members at 10, two at 6, one at 5 and two at 4; personal advice as two members at 10, four at 9, two at 8, two at 7 and one at 4. The UNDP figures grade 10 for data strength and Australia's 9; the United Kingdom's, a different question from the ONS, is a close stand-in and grades 8; the student samples on personal advice grade 7. Left out of the index, the sub-pillar would move 38 members by one to 15 places, Rwanda the most, from 47th to 32nd. It would lift Sri Lanka from 49.9 to 54.9, above the readiness benchmark at 53, and the 15 members now at or above it would stay there.

### Making things

**Definition.** What young people produce with AI, and whether it is accurate, useful and relevant where they live.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has three indicators: the share of young people who make creative things with AI, the share who use AI to help write code, and the share of conversations with one AI assistant that produce software or a creative work. The first two rest on a survey of students; the third rests on a service's own records and covers all its users. None says what was made, who it was for, or whether it was any good.

The first two come from a global survey of university students, which asks those who use ChatGPT how often they use it for creative writing and for help with programming[310]. The shares of students aged 18 to 29 answering sometimes, often or always are worked out from the open respondent file for members with at least 30 answers: for creative writing ten members, from 30.1 per cent in The Gambia to 65.5 per cent in Ghana; for help with code 11 members, from 22.9 per cent in The Gambia to 66.4 per cent in Ghana. As in Health and personal development, every figure is a student sample that reads high beside a figure for all young people, labelled and graded low. On the first indicator the United Kingdom has an official figure and uses it, labelled as a different question: 34.4 per cent of all people aged 16 to 24 have used AI for fun or creative tasks such as creating images or songs[311], worked out from the survey's respondent file, which gives age in bands. Beside it, 32 per cent of people aged 16 to 29 used AI in their hobbies or interests in the last 12 months[312].

The third indicator is the share of conversations with the Claude assistant in May 2026 whose main output was software or code, or a creative work: an image, a video, audio or music, or creative writing[313]. The publisher gives each conversation one output type, so the shares add. It is published for 28 members, from 12.28 per cent in the United Kingdom to 22.54 per cent in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Most of it is software: creative works are between 1.96 and 5.65 per cent of conversations. Like the Health and personal development figure, it counts

conversations rather than people among the adult users of one service, carries no ages, and is included as published and applied to ages 15 to 29 as one group.

**Missing data.** Eleven members have a figure about young people on the first or second indicator. Eighteen more have only the all-users figure. Twenty-seven members have nothing: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Figures that are not about AI, such as the share of young people who wrote a computer program, are not used as stand-ins, and nothing stands in for these members.

**What goes to the survey.** The sub-pillar is defined by what young people produce and whether it is accurate, useful and relevant where they live. No source in any member asks young people what they made with AI, who it was for, or whether anyone else used it, and none measures the quality or local fit of what was made. These are put to the survey. The nearest evidence on quality comes from makers themselves: among people who make and share creative content, 72 per cent in India and 60 per cent in Australia say their AI output typically needs moderate or extensive editing before it is ready to share[314]. Experiments give the reason to ask about fit. Writing from AI-generated ideas shrank the variety of what a group produced and left the extra variety that non-native English writers bring too small to detect, while using AI only to refine one's own ideas kept it[315]; and among students the sameness persisted after the tool was taken away[316]. In Kenya, small-business owners given an AI assistant may have gained if they were already doing well and did worse if they were doing poorly, and the difference lay in which advice they chose to act on[317].

Official measurement is moving towards making. Two of the ITU expert group's five proposed classes of AI activity are creating, editing or analysing media, and data analysis or coding[318], with no country data yet. The OECD and European Commission's AI literacy framework has a domain called Create with AI, which feeds the PISA 2029 assessment[319]. The Commonwealth publishes no measure: its Youth Awards of 2026 drew 977 entries, and three of the 20 regional finalists build with AI[320].

**Scoring and results.** The share of the assistant's conversations whose main output is software or a creative work has no target, so its figure that scores 10 is 22.21 per cent, averaged over the five highest members (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Togo) at the figures used in this edition. Graded as the conversations about health are, as a partial measure for all users counted from conversation records, each member's figure has a data strength of 5. Its 28 members spread as three members at 10, five at 9, eight at 8, four at 7, six at 6 and two at 5, from Pakistan and Sri Lanka, at 22.54 per cent, to the United Kingdom, at 12.28.

Creative things and code are scored on the student survey's own scale: each reaches 10 at the average of its five highest members, 56.16 per cent for creative things (Bangladesh, Ghana, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan) and 58.6 for code (Cyprus, Ghana, Malaysia, Nigeria and Tanzania), as no target names either. The United Kingdom's figure on creative things, Ofcom's for all people aged 16 to 24 on a different question, is scored against the same bar and graded a close stand-in, with a data strength of 8; each student figure, a partial measure, has 7. Creative

things spread as two members at 10, three at 9, one at 8, three at 7, one at 6 and one at 5; code as two members at 10, three at 9, one at 8, one at 7, three at 6 and one at 3.

## Pillar 4: Education and training provision

### Rationale

A young person's capability with AI is partly produced by the education and training they receive, so measuring capability without measuring provision would present gaps in provision as gaps in young people. Programmes do change what young people know about AI. A three-level meta-analysis of 59 studies, 172 effect sizes and 7,211 participants found a large overall effect of AI literacy interventions ($g = 0.84$)[321].

### Reach and quality of provision

The same meta-analysis found substantial variation between programmes: the 95 per cent prediction interval ran from −0.29 to 1.97, so a programme in a new setting may do little good or even harm. Programmes focused on knowledge outperformed those aimed at skills, attitudes or ethics, and effects were larger in East Asia and Europe than in North America, which the authors read as a need for programmes fitted to local context[322]. A systematic review of 28 studies of teaching AI in schools between 2019 and 2022 found that most reported better learning outcomes, but on a limited empirical base and without consistent measures of what was learned[323]. Provision is therefore judged by how many young people it reaches and how well it is taught. Where only what is written down is known, such as a curriculum, it is labelled as such and scores at most half marks.

### Teachers

Teachers are the main route by which provision reaches young people. UNESCO's AI competency framework for teachers sets out 15 competences in five dimensions, a human-centred mindset, the ethics of AI, AI foundations and applications, AI pedagogy and AI for professional learning, at three levels: acquire, deepen and create[324]. Evidence that developing teachers improves learning comes from other subjects: a meta-analysis of 60 causal studies of teacher coaching found effects of 0.49 standard deviations on teaching and 0.18 on pupils' achievement, although the effects of larger programmes were only a fraction of those of small trials[325]. How well prepared teachers are, and whether that preparation reaches them at scale, is part of the pillar.

### Reach

**Definition.** How many young people are actually taught about AI, in school, in technical and vocational training, in higher education and outside formal education.

Counting policies instead of people would not work, because the same intervention does very different things in different places, as the meta-analysis set out above under Reach and quality of provision found. The existence of a curriculum or a strategy therefore says nothing about what any young person received.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators. Two are about AI and reach few members. Two describe the foundation that teaching about AI rests on, and reach most or all of them.

The first is the share of young people who say they have been taught about AI or have completed AI training. No survey asks this of young people in more than a few members, so each member takes the figure of the survey that asks it there, with its question and age group recorded beside it. Six of the 56 members have a figure. In the United Kingdom 55.8 per cent of 13 to 18 year olds said they had learned about AI in school[326]. In New Zealand 53 per cent of school students reported that AI is taught at their school[327]. In Australia 48 per cent of 8 to 25 year olds had been taught to use generative AI by others[328]. In South Africa 18 per cent of 16 to 24 year olds named formal education among their sources of information on AI, in a national probability sample[329]. In Canada 53 per cent of students aged 18 and over said they had received formal instruction on using AI responsibly for academic work[330]. In India 32 per cent of respondents aged about 18 to 31 said they had completed AI training[331]. The questions and ages differ and only South Africa's sample is a probability sample, so these figures show what is known in each member and do not yet compare members like for like.

The second is the share of 15 year olds whose school lessons had them judge what an AI chatbot produced. PISA 2025 asked students how often, this school year, they assessed the quality of information generated by AI chatbots in their school lessons[332]. The indicator is the share answering sometimes, often or very often, worked out from the public student file with the survey's weights. Ten members have a figure, from 42.4 per cent in the United Kingdom to 81.0 per cent in Singapore. Mauritius, Rwanda and Zambia took part and were not asked the question. Cyprus took part but is not in the public file; its figure is the OECD's as reported in the national press[333]. It is the one question about AI in lessons asked in the same words across members, and it describes students in school at age 15 only.

The third is the share of people aged 15 to 29 attending school, college, university or other education, from national labour force and household surveys as harmonised by the ILO[334]. It counts education in general and says nothing about AI. It is included as the foundation: formal teaching about AI cannot reach a young person who is not in education. Fifty-one members have a figure for ages 15 to 29 exactly, from 18.5 per cent in Tanzania to 57.5 per cent in Gabon. For Solomon Islands the figure comes from the 2019 census[335] and for New Zealand from the national labour force survey as published in the OECD's Education at a Glance database[336], because the ILO table has no recent figure for either. For nine members a large share of young people have no attendance status recorded, and the figure is given with the range it could lie in.

The fourth is the place of computing in the official school curriculum in 2024, coded for every country from official documents found online[337]. The curriculum shows no evidence of computing in 17 members. Computing is planned or being piloted in eight members. It is in place in some schools or districts in 14 members. It is compulsory at primary or at secondary level only in 12 members. It is compulsory at both primary and secondary level in five members. The coding records what is written down, not what is taught, and computing in general, not AI. It is labelled as what is written down and counts as one of Reach's four indicators, as each indicator of a sub-pillar does.

Forty-four members have no figure about AI teaching of either kind. The survey asks every respondent whether they have been taught about AI, where, for how long and whether as part of a subject, and whether their lessons asked them to use AI or to judge what it produced.

**Scoring and results.** For both indicators about AI the goalposts are 0 and 100 per cent, the best being teaching that reaches every young person. The taught-about-AI entry gathers six surveys that ask six questions. New Zealand's figure records whether AI is taught at the student's school and South Africa's whether formal education was a source of information on AI, neither whether the young person was taught, so the whole entry takes the partial grade for measure fit. Its age fit is 3 for the youth bands, including 8 to 25, 9 to 18 and 13 to 18, which reach into ages 15 to 29 from below, and 1 for Canada's students aged 18 and over, who have no upper age. Its six members spread as three members at 5, one at 4, one at 3 and one at 1, from Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, at 53.0 to 55.8 per cent, to South Africa, at 18.0 per cent, with a mean data strength of 6.7. The lessons indicator is PISA 2025's own question, and age 15 counts as a nearby youth band, so each figure grades 9 for data strength. Its ten members spread as one member at 8, two at 7, four at 6, two at 5 and one at 4, from Singapore, at 81.0 per cent, to the United Kingdom, at 42.4 per cent. Attending education, a foundation indicator, has no target, and not every 15 to 29 year old is meant to be in education, so it scores 10 at 50.12 per cent, the average of its five highest members (Australia, Gabon, Malta, Sri Lanka and Togo), held at the figures used in this edition. The ILO harmonises members' labour force and household surveys to the indicator's own question, but Solomon Islands' figure comes from its 2019 census, which counts formal institutions only, and New Zealand's from the OECD, so the entry is graded a close stand-in. Where part of the age group has no attendance recorded, the figure is held with the range it could lie in; for nine members that range crosses a band limit. The 51 members spread as two members at 10, four at 9, nine at 8, 11 at 7, 11 at 6, ten at 5, two at 4 and two at 3, from Gabon, at 57.5 per cent, to Tanzania, at 18.5, with a mean data strength of 8.9.

The curriculum is scored on the publisher's eight categories in their order of provision, at half marks for what is written down: the steps are equal from the lowest, no computing, at 0 to the highest, compulsory at both levels, at 5, and points are rounded down, so planned scores 0, taught across other subjects 1, in some schools or districts 2, an elective everywhere 3 and compulsory at one level 4. Scores of 6 to 10 wait for dated evidence that computing is taught as the curriculum says. The publisher's own numbers are not a ranking: its last category, compulsory at primary level only, sits with compulsory at one level. As a record of what is written down, not about people of any age, each figure grades 7 for data strength. The 56 members spread as five members at 5, 12 at 4, 14 at 2 and 25 at 0.

### Quality of teaching

**Definition.** How well what reaches young people is taught, and whether it is fitted to where they are.

The evidence base underneath is thinner than the volume of activity suggests, as the review set out above under Reach and quality of provision found, so quality has to be observed rather than assumed from the presence of a programme.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has three indicators. One is about AI, one is a tested result of digital teaching, and one describes the foundation: the quality of schooling in general.

The first is the share of 15 year olds whose school lessons often had them judge what an AI chatbot produced. It uses the PISA 2025 question that Reach uses, on how often students assessed the quality of information generated by AI chatbots in their school lessons[338], but counts only those answering often or very often. Reach counts pupils whose lessons did this at all; this indicator counts pupils whose lessons did it regularly, which separates teaching in substance from teaching touched on. Nine members have a figure, from 17.4 per cent in the United Kingdom to 51.4 per cent in Singapore. Because the two indicators rest on one question they move together, and they are read as a pair.

The second is the mean score of 15 year olds on the PISA 2025 test of computational problem solving, part of its assessment of learning in the digital world[339]. It is a tested result and not a self-report, worked out from the public student file as the weighted mean of the ten plausible values. Nine members have a score, from 278 in Kenya to 563 in Singapore. It tests problem solving with digital tools, not knowledge of AI. A tested score is both a young person's ability and the result of the teaching they received. It is counted once, here, because it is measured in school at age 15; the capability pillar rests on what people aged 15 to 29 report doing.

The third is the World Bank's harmonised learning score, which places national and international school tests on one scale on which 300 is minimal attainment and 625 advanced[340]. It measures how well schools teach in general and says nothing about AI; it is included as the foundation and labelled as such on every figure. Fifty-three members have a score, from 240.0 in Sierra Leone to 594.2 in Singapore. The scores for Belize (2010), Guyana (2015), Mozambique (2015) and Sri Lanka (2015) are older than 2019. Barbados, Maldives and The Bahamas have no score. For smaller-population members the score often rests on a regional test or an early-grade reading test placed on the common scale.

Four national sources show what a fuller measure looks like and are used as supporting evidence. Australia's national sample test found 37 per cent of Year 10 students at the proficient standard in ICT literacy in 2025, down from 46 per cent in 2022, and only about one student in ten reporting a large extent of teaching about AI tasks[341]. In New Zealand 57 per cent of teachers said they teach students about AI and 4 per cent said they do so to a great extent[342]. Inspectors in Wales, visiting 21 schools chosen for their use of AI, found secondary staff beginning to teach pupils to use AI responsibly and critically in a few cases, meaning fewer than one in five[343]. In Canada 46 per cent of educators agreed that students receive enough education about responsible AI use[344].

Forty-seven members have no figure on how well AI is taught. What learners say of the teaching they received is asked differently in every survey found, and self-rated measures of AI literacy have not been shown to hold across cultures[345]; on a validated test, students' scores were unrelated to how useful they found AI and fell with how often they used it[346]. The survey therefore asks how far the teaching went and what it covered, and sets a short tested task on AI itself.

**Scoring and results.** Judging AI output often has no target, so 10 points go to 41.04 per cent, what its five best members reach on average (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Malta and Singapore), and 0 to none. The PISA test has no natural zero, so 0 points sit at 315, the 2.5th percentile of the nine members, and 10 points at 534.8, the five best members' average (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom). The harmonised learning score scores 0 at 298.35, worked out the same way, and 10 at 625, the highest level on the World Bank's scale. The two PISA indicators use PISA's own question and test, for age 15, a nearby youth band; every figure on them grades 9 for data strength. The learning score is the World Bank's own measure, but it describes school pupils rather than young people and is graded 1 for age fit, like the figures on teachers; the four scores from before 2021 lose the point for recency. Judging AI output often spreads as two members at 10, two at 9, two at 8, two at 6 and one at 4, from Singapore, at 51.4 per cent, to the United Kingdom, at 17.4; the test as one member at 10, four at 9, one at 8, one at 7, one at 6 and one at 0, from Singapore, at 563 points, to Kenya, at 278, below the worst goalpost; the learning score as one member at 9, four at 6, two at 5, five at 4, 13 at 3, nine at 2, ten at 1 and nine at 0, from Singapore, at 594.2, to Sierra Leone, at 240, with a mean data strength of 6.9.

### Teacher preparation

**Definition.** How well prepared the people doing the teaching are, and whether that preparation reaches them at scale.

Evidence that developing teachers changes what pupils learn comes from other subjects, and large programmes achieve only a fraction of the effects of small trials (see Teachers above), which is why this measures preparation that reaches teachers at scale rather than the existence of a training offer.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has six indicators. Three are about AI, one is about digital teaching in general, one describes the foundation, and one records what is written down. The people measured are teachers, not young people, so no figure carries an age band.

The first is the share of teachers whose training in the last 12 months covered using AI. The OECD's survey of teachers asked lower secondary teachers in 2024 whether their professional learning in the last 12 months included using AI for teaching and learning[347]. The figures are worked out from the public teacher file with the survey's weights, by a method that returns the OECD's published figure on the neighbouring question for every member. Six members took part nationally, from 37.4 per cent in Malta to 75.7 per cent in Singapore. Two members take a national survey with its own question, labelled on the figure. In England 35 per cent of secondary teachers in state schools had training on how to use generative AI between the start of the previous school year and early 2025[348]; the figure is used for the United Kingdom and labelled England. In India 9 per cent of teachers who use education technology, in ten states and in Grades 1 to 12, most of them primary, attended training on AI tools in the previous 12 months[349]. Canada took part in the OECD survey through Alberta alone; a figure for one province is recorded and not used, and Canada has no figure. Teachers of primary classes, asked separately in three members, are not used. India's survey gives no figure by phase, and its figures are kept.

The second is the share of schools where most or all teachers had training on dealing with pupils' use of AI chatbots. PISA 2025 asked the heads of schools with 15 year old pupils how many of their teachers took part, in the last academic year, in professional development on dealing with students' access to AI chatbots[350]. The indicator is the share of schools answering most, or all or nearly all, with each school counted once. Nine members have a figure, from 22.2 per cent in Kenya to 59.1 per cent in Malta. As under Reach, Mauritius, Rwanda and Zambia took part without being asked. It is the head's report, not the teachers', and it asks about one kind of training; it is the one published measure of whether preparation reaches a school's teachers at scale.

The third is the share of teachers who used AI in their teaching in the last 12 months, from the same OECD survey[351]. Six members have a figure from that question, from 31.5 per cent in Cyprus to 74.9 per cent in Singapore; England (46 per cent of secondary teachers use generative AI at least sometimes) and India (51 per cent of teachers who use education technology, Grades 1 to 12) again take their national surveys, labelled. Use is not preparation; it runs ahead of training in five of the eight members where both are measured, and behind it in Cyprus, Singapore and South Africa.

The fourth is the share of heads who agree that their teachers have the technical and pedagogical skills to integrate digital devices in instruction[352]. It describes digital teaching in general and says nothing about AI, and is labelled as such on every figure. Twelve members have a figure, from 57.9 per cent in Kenya to 90.8 per cent in Singapore.

The fifth is the share of teachers in secondary education with the minimum required qualifications, SDG indicator 4.c.1[353]. It counts teachers' training in general and says nothing about AI; it is included as the foundation and labelled as such on every figure. Forty-six members have a figure for a year from 2010 on, from 34.5 per cent in Togo to 100.0 per cent in Cyprus. Each country sets its own minimum, so the figures are not strictly comparable. Australia, Botswana, Canada, Gabon, New Zealand, Samoa, Tanzania, Uganda, the United Kingdom and Zambia have no figure.

The sixth records whether what national policy says about teachers names AI. UNESCO's country profiles on technology in education describe, member by member, what is written about teacher standards, initial training and in-service training[354]. Fifty-two members have an English-language national profile with a section on teachers; it names AI for India and Malta. Singapore's profile does not, but its ministry stated in 2026 that all new polytechnic and technical institute lecturers are required to train in AI[355], and that newer statement is used. The indicator records what is written down, not what is delivered. Each member's figure is a code, not a score. It is labelled as what is written down.

Two further figures from the OECD survey are supporting evidence. Between 22.4 per cent (New Zealand) and 39.0 per cent (Malta) of lower secondary teachers report a high need for training in AI skills, and among teachers who did not use AI, between 57.0 per cent (South Africa) and 75.3 per cent (Australia) say they lack the knowledge and skills[356]. Need is not the mirror of training: across the survey's systems, teachers with a high need for AI training were no more likely to have had it[357].

Forty-four members have no figure on teachers and AI, and no survey of teachers on AI was found for any Caribbean member. Whether teachers feel able to teach about AI has no comparable measure: in New Zealand about a quarter of secondary teachers agreed that they feel confident guiding students' use of generative AI[358], on a question asked nowhere else. These gaps need a question set for teachers: the training they have had on AI, whether it was part of their initial training, whether they use AI in lessons, how confident they are to teach about it, and what stops them.

**Scoring and results.** Four of the six indicators are scored against goalposts of none and every teacher, or every school's teachers, 10 points to a band. Teachers and schools, not young people, are what these figures describe, so each takes 1 for age fit. Training that covered AI is graded on its weakest line, India's survey of teachers who use education technology, as a partial measure; the TALIS figures themselves ask its question of lower secondary teachers only. The heads' two reports and the qualification rate are exactly what their indicators define and take the full grade for measure fit. Training that covered AI spreads as one member at 7, three at 5, three at 3 and one at 0, from Singapore, at 75.7 per cent, to India, at 9.0 per cent. Schools where most or all teachers had chatbot training spread as four members at 5, three at 4, one at 3 and one at 2, from Malaysia, Canada, New Zealand and Malta, at 50.5 to 59.1 per cent, to Kenya, at 22.2 per cent. Heads' view of digital skills spreads as one member at 9, six at 7, three at 6 and two at 5, from Singapore, at 90.8 per cent, to Kenya and Zambia, at 57.9 to 58.3 per cent. Trained secondary teachers spread as seven members at 10, nine at 9, six at 8, three at 7, ten at 6, six at 5, four at 4 and one at 3, from the seven members, at 100.0 per cent, to Togo, at 34.5 per cent. Mean data strength is 5.0, 7.0, 7.0 and 6.7 in that order, the last held down by ten figures from before 2021 and by Malawi and Mozambique, where the UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimated the figure. For the ten members without a qualification rate, the rules for missing data are applied in order. Botswana's own figures stop in 2007, before the earliest year used, 2010, and the rest have none; no other source gives the rate; and of the four related indicators that could be tested on figures held back, none came close, the best giving the wrong points for 40 of 46 members. Botswana and Gabon therefore take the mean of the smaller-population African peers with a figure, 79.5 per cent, Samoa that of the smaller-population Pacific peers, 75.8 per cent, and Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia that of the other African members, 74.7 per cent; all six score 7, with data strength 6 for the first two and 5 for the rest, their averaged figures going back to 2012 or 2013. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, with no member of their group holding a figure, are not estimated.

**Teachers' use of AI and the policy code.** Use is scored in equal bands from none to 61.68 per cent, the average of the five best members, Australia, India, New Zealand, Singapore and South Africa, as no target names it and not every teacher is expected to use AI; India's figure among them answers its own question, of teachers who use education technology in ten states. Australia, New Zealand and Singapore score 10, India 8, Malta, South Africa and the United Kingdom 7, and Cyprus, at 31.5 per cent, 5. Graded on its weakest line as a partial measure, like training, each figure has a data strength of 5. The code earns 5 where the profile, or for Singapore the ministry, names AI, and 0 where it does not; 10 needs dated evidence that the policy is funded and reaches teachers, which is what the recommendation on written

policies asks, so no member can pass 5 on the code alone. India, Malta and Singapore score 5. Cameroon, Gabon and Togo, whose profiles are in French only, and the United Kingdom, whose profiles are given for each of its four nations, are not scored here. Not about people, each code takes 1 for age fit and has a data strength of 7.

## Pillar 5: Decent work, enterprise and transitions

### Rationale

Task-based economic theory separates two effects of automation. Automation displaces workers from tasks they used to perform, while the creation of new tasks in which people have the advantage brings labour back[359]. Which effect dominates is not fixed by the technology. Recent technological change has been biased towards automation, and the direction AI takes is a choice with consequences for labour demand, the share of income going to labour and inequality[360]. The ILO's refined global index of occupational exposure estimates that one worker in four is in an occupation with some exposure to generative AI, and that 3.3 per cent of global employment falls in the highest exposure category. Because most occupations keep tasks that require human input, the transformation of jobs is the most likely impact[361].

### Young workers

The early evidence on employment concerns young workers. In United States payroll data covering millions of workers, employment of 22 to 25 year olds in occupations exposed to AI stood 19 per cent below where it would have been had it kept pace with that of less-exposed peers. The declines are concentrated in occupations where AI mainly substitutes for people's tasks; where it mainly complements them, employment is flat or rising, especially for experienced workers. The authors describe these findings as early descriptive indicators rather than causal estimates[362].

### Support for transitions

Help with moving into work does not guarantee results. A review of 113 impact evaluations of youth employment programmes, drawing 3,105 effect estimates, found that only a third of the estimates were positive and significant, and that average effects were small for both employment (Hedges' g = 0.05) and earnings (g = 0.04). Programmes did better in low- and middle-income countries, design and delivery mattered more than the type of programme, programmes that combined several services and followed each participant were more successful, and effects grew over the longer term[363]. The pillar therefore judges employment services by whether they reach young people and how they are delivered.

### Entry

**Definition.** Whether young people are getting hired as AI changes what jobs consist of.

The clearest early signal of AI in the labour market falls on people entering it, as set out above under Young workers; the adjustment runs through reduced hiring of young workers rather than through more people losing jobs[364].

That is what the task framework set out above under Rationale predicts. A young person with no track record is the cheapest part of that adjustment to postpone.

Exposure is uneven across the Commonwealth, because it rises with national income: 11 per cent of total employment in low-income countries against 34 per cent in high-income[365]. Entry has to be read against how exposed young people's jobs are, but the share exposed on its own mostly shows what kind of economy a member has, so the sub-pillar compares young people's exposure with older workers' in the same member.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators, each for young people aged 15 to 29. The first is the share who are not in work, education or training. It is the measure of young people's entry into work in the Commonwealth's Youth Development Index and in SDG indicator 8.6.1, both for ages 15 to 24[366], and in the G20's youth goal for ages 15 to 29[367]. It has a figure for 54 of the 56 members, from 7.0 per cent in Singapore to 49.9 per cent in Nauru. The second is the unemployment rate: of young people in work or looking for it, the share without a job. It has a figure for 54 members, from 1.3 per cent in Solomon Islands to 52.6 per cent in Eswatini. The third is the share of unemployed young people who have been looking for work for a year or more, taken among those whose length of search is recorded, with a figure for 42 members, from 4.6 per cent in Singapore to 76.2 per cent in Grenada. The unemployed with no recorded length of search are left out of the share, as the OECD leaves them out of its incidence of long-term unemployment[368], and the share left out is stated on each member's line. It is above a quarter in six members, from 26 per cent in Cameroon to 95 per cent in Pakistan. The fourth compares young people's exposure to generative AI with older workers': the proportion of young workers aged 15 to 29 in occupations exposed on the ILO's index of occupational exposure, counting all four gradients[369], divided by the share of workers aged 30 and over, minus one, from the ILO's tables of employment by age and exposure[370]. It has a figure for 38 members, from 45.8 per cent less exposed in Mozambique to 71.2 per cent more exposed in Maldives.

Each indicator answers a different part of the question. The first counts every young person who has not found a way in, whether or not they are looking: for every young person counted as unemployed there are about three more who are out of work and out of education[371]. The second counts those who are looking and have not been hired. The third shows how long the search lasts. The fourth is the only published measure that ties entry to AI member by member. The ILO applies the same index to the jobs held by 15 to 29 year olds and finds 6.1 per cent of them worldwide in the two most exposed gradients, 14.3 per cent in high-income countries and 0.9 per cent in low-income countries[372]; the share in those two gradients is recorded beside each member's figure and runs from 0.3 per cent in Mozambique and Sierra Leone to 21.1 per cent in Mauritius. Read on its own, that share would rank members by income whichever way it was read, so the indicator compares it with older workers' and reads young people's extra exposure as a risk to their entry, as the same report finds hiring of young workers slowing in exposed occupations[373].

The figures come from the ILO's youth labour market tables[374], which are worked out from each member's own labour force survey, household survey or census and publish ages 15 to 29 directly. Fifty-one of the 54 figures on the first indicator, 53 of the 54 on the second, 40 of the

42 on the third and 30 of the 38 on the fourth are for that band exactly; the other eight on the fourth, for Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea and Togo, compare ages 15 to 24 with 25 and over from ILO estimates, as the youth tables do not cover those members. Three exceptions are recorded on the figures themselves. New Zealand is not in the youth tables: its first indicator comes from the OECD's table of young people by education and work status[375], its unemployment rate is worked out from the ILO's counts by five-year age group, and its third indicator is for ages 15 to 24. Malaysia's newest figures in the youth tables date from 2000, so its 2022 survey figures are used, for ages 15 to 24 on the first and third indicators. And where a member has no survey figure, the ILO's modelled estimate for ages 15 to 24 is used and labelled as modelled: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and The Bahamas on the first indicator and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on the second. Fifty of the 54 figures on the first indicator are for 2021 or later; the oldest in use are Barbados (2016), Sierra Leone (2018) and Solomon Islands (2013).

Three limits are recorded with the figures. Members' surveys use two definitions of employment, and the newer one does not count subsistence farming as a job, which raises the first two indicators where it applies; the figures are used as the ILO publishes them. The unemployment rate reads low where few young people can afford to be without any work: it is 1.3 per cent in Solomon Islands. And the first three indicators measure entry, not the effect of AI on it. Hiring itself is published for few members: in four of the six for which the OECD reports it, the share of employees aged 15 to 24 who had been hired in the past 12 months fell every year from 2022 to 2025, from 48.5 to 35.9 per cent in Australia, from 52.5 to 41.9 per cent in Canada, from 58.0 to 44.7 per cent in New Zealand and from 48.7 to 38.2 per cent in the United Kingdom[376], and in these four it was lower in 2025 than in 2022 for employees aged 25 to 54 as well.

> **Gap: jobs exposed to AI.** The fourth indicator has no figure for 18 of the 56 members: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Dominica, Gabon, Jamaica, Malaysia, Malta, Namibia, New Zealand, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa and Trinidad and Tobago. The ILO publishes it only where it holds the member's survey file with detailed occupation codes, so the members without a figure include several of the largest and richest. For these members no published measure ties young people's entry into work to AI, and the gap is put to the survey, which records each young person's occupation and main tasks.

Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis have no figure on any of the four indicators. No published source in any member records whether a young person was turned down for a job, was screened by an automated system or was asked for AI skills when applying; these questions are put to the survey.

**Scoring and results: the first and third indicators.** Both are turned round so that more is better: the first becomes the share of young people in work, education or training, and the third the share of the unemployed who have looked for under a year. For the first, the worst goalpost is the realistic worst in the world, 48.7 per cent out of work, education and training, the 97.5th percentile across 167 countries in the ILO's youth tables, with none as the best, so each of its ten bands spans 4.87 points. The third keeps the natural goalposts, every unemployed young person looking for under a year at best and none at worst, 10 points to a band. Both come

from members' own surveys and censuses as the ILO tabulates them; a figure for ages 15 to 29 takes 4 for age fit and one for 15 to 24 takes 3. The first spreads as three members at 8, nine at 7, 11 at 6, six at 5, ten at 4, four at 3, six at 2, four at 1 and one at 0, from Singapore, Malta and Solomon Islands, at 7.0 to 7.4 per cent not in work, education or training, to Nauru, at 49.9 per cent, with a mean data strength of 9.8; the third as four members at 9, eight at 8, eight at 7, four at 6, four at 5, five at 4, six at 3 and three at 2, from Singapore, Canada, New Zealand and Malaysia, at 4.6 to 8.7 per cent of the young unemployed, to Ghana, South Africa and Grenada, at 72.4 to 76.2 per cent, with a mean data strength of 9.8; the four figures the ILO marks as unreliable (Belize, Malta, Samoa and Singapore) take 1 for how they were produced. The members without a figure are filled under the rules for missing data. On the first, the ILO's youth, general and modelled tables hold nothing for Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis in any year, no other source in the project reports the measure for them, and the one related indicator that could be tested on figures held back, whether the member runs a youth employment strategy, gave the wrong points for 39 of 53 members; each therefore takes the mean of the ten smaller-population Caribbean peers with a figure, 21.6 per cent (14.4 to 31.5), which scores 5, with 7 for data strength, since two of the figures averaged are for ages 15 to 24 and the earliest dates from 2016. On the third, the youth tables' newest year has no count of those looking for a year or more for Barbados or Saint Lucia, but an earlier year has, and is used as the index's estimate at the first step of the rules for missing data: Barbados's own figure for 2021 is 9.8 per cent, 117 of the 1,197 unemployed whose length of search is recorded, with the length of search unrecorded for 79 per cent of them and the ILO marking the count unreliable, and Saint Lucia's for 2016 is 38.5 per cent, 1,589 of 4,128, with 48 per cent unrecorded. The figures already used include some as thinly based, so these two are taken at the first step and score 9 and 6, with data strength 9 and 8. The unrecorded cases set the range these two scores could take. Were all of them looking for under a year, or all for a year or more, Barbados would score from 1 to 9 and Saint Lucia from 3 to 8. At the low ends Barbados's index would fall by 1.0 point, from 34th to 37th, and Saint Lucia's by 0.4, from 49th to 50th, and every member would stay on the same side of the readiness benchmark at 53. No related indicator held up (16 tested; the best gave the wrong points for 34 of 42), so Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago take the smaller-population Caribbean peers' mean, 36.6 per cent (22.2 to 76.2), and score 6 with data strength 9, and India takes that of the five other Asian members outside the smaller-population peer group, 17.0 per cent, and scores 8 with data strength 8. Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu stay without a score, as only Fiji and Samoa among the smaller-population Pacific peers have a figure.

**Scoring and results: unemployment.** The second indicator is turned round too, scoring the employed part of the young labour force. It reaches 10 at 97.6 per cent, the average of Belize, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu, since zero unemployment is not attainable, and 0 at 56.2 per cent, the realistic worst in the world: 43.8 per cent unemployed, the 97.5th percentile of 176 countries in the ILO's youth tables. The worst goalpost is set in this way where every member's figure is below 50 per cent; Eswatini is at 52.6, but with 0 at everyone unemployed 34 of the 54 members would have scored 9, from 2.6 to 11.8 per cent unemployed, so the rule is extended to this indicator. Three members score 10, 12 score 9, 14

score 8, 15 score 7, three score 6, one scores 3, one scores 2, one scores 1 and four score 0. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, Namibia and Eswatini, at 41.9 to 52.6 per cent, score 0. Data strength is 10 out of 10 for 50 members, 9 for Maldives, Sierra Leone and Solomon Islands, whose figures predate 2021, and 8 for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, an ILO estimate for ages 15 to 24. Nigeria's figure comes from its labour force survey, published as the Unemployment, Under-employment Watch.

**Scoring and results: young people's exposure compared with older workers'.** The fourth indicator is turned round so that more is better: the score is given to 100 minus how much more exposed young people's jobs are, so that young people no more exposed than older workers reach 100 and score 10. Reading extra exposure as a risk is a precautionary choice. Exposure marks the tasks AI may change, which in many jobs means new work alongside the old, so the score records where young people carry more of that uncertainty than their elders. A comparison between age groups has no natural worst, so 0 is at the 2.5th percentile of the members, 63.89 per cent more exposed. Nineteen members score 10, two score 9, four score 8, one scores 7, five score 6, one scores 5, one scores 4, two score 2 and three score 0; Sri Lanka, Barbados and Maldives, where young people's jobs are 59.8 to 71.2 per cent more exposed than older workers', score 0, and the United Kingdom, at 11.4 per cent, scores 8. For data strength, the 30 figures for ages 15 to 29 take 4 for age fit and the eight ILO estimates 3 for age fit and 1 for how they were produced; data strength averages 9.4 out of 10. Half the members score 10, so the indicator separates members only where young people are more exposed than their elders. Left out of the index, the indicator would move 15 members by one to three places, change no member's index by as much as one point, and move no member across the readiness benchmark at 53.

### Decent work

**Definition.** Whether the jobs young people hold are fairly paid and reasonably secure.

Counting jobs without counting their quality would miss the mechanism set out above under Rationale: automation can lower the share of income going to labour even while it raises productivity. A young person can be in work and still be on the losing side of that.

Exposure also falls unevenly between women and men: the highest exposure category holds 4.7 per cent of female employment against 2.4 per cent of male, and the gap widens with national income[377]. Pay and security are therefore reported by sex.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators: two for security, one for pay and one for young people's own judgement of their work. The first is the share of young workers aged 15 to 29 whose job is informal, the measure behind SDG indicator 8.3.1[378]. The informal-work indicator has a figure for 41 of the 56 members, from 8.4 per cent in Seychelles to 98.1 per cent in Nigeria. The second is the share of young employees aged 15 to 29 on a temporary contract, with a figure for 44 members, from 6.2 per cent in Mauritius to 91.5 per cent in Tanzania. The third is the working poverty rate at ages 15 to 24: the share of employed young people living in a household below the international poverty line, the one global measure of pay that is defined for young people[379]. The working-poverty indicator has a figure for 34 members, from 0.1 per cent in Malaysia, Maldives and Trinidad and Tobago to 80.5 per cent

in Mozambique. The fourth is the share of school leavers aged 15 to 29 in work whose job is stable, or is temporary or self-employed work they are satisfied with and do not want to change. The stable-work indicator has a figure for 29 members, from 18.9 per cent in Kenya to 100.0 per cent in Malta.

The two security indicators are read together, because each fits a different kind of labour market. Informal work is not measured in seven high-income members (Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Malta, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom), where what separates a secure job from an insecure one is the contract. The temporary share says little where few young people are employees at all, and there informal work is the measure. Between them the two give a security figure to 48 members; they combine by the sub-pillar's plain average.

The first, second and fourth indicators come from the ILO's youth labour market tables[380], which are worked out from each member's own labour force survey, household survey or census and publish ages 15 to 29 directly. The temporary share is taken among employees whose type of contract is recorded, and where it is unrecorded for many the figure says so. New Zealand, which is not in the youth tables, takes the OECD's figure for ages 15 to 24. The working poverty rate is a modelled estimate by the ILO for ages 15 to 24, published mainly for low- and middle-income countries. Thirty-four of the 41 informal-work figures and 37 of the 44 temporary-contract figures are for 2021 or later.

Other measures of the quality of young people's work reach too few members, or say too little on their own, to be indicators, and are used as supporting evidence. The share of young workers aged 15 to 29 who want more hours of work than they have is published for 30 members, from 0.4 per cent in Samoa to 28.4 per cent in Kiribati; the share working 49 hours or more a week for 46, from 0.8 per cent in Jamaica to 53.4 per cent in India. In the 2025 World Risk Poll, whose respondent file is public, the share of employed 15 to 29 year olds who work part time and want full-time work runs from 4.2 per cent in Pakistan to 48.5 per cent in South Africa across 31 members, on samples of 68 to 418 employed young people a member[381]. Young employees' pay as a share of adults' was considered and not used: it compares ages 15 to 24 with prime-age employees, and a young worker earning less than an older one is partly a matter of experience. The Commonwealth's Youth Development Index measures the quality of young people's work by one indicator, the number of 15 to 24 year olds who want more hours[382].

None of the four indicators measures the effect of AI. The evidence so far is from outside the Commonwealth and does not agree: in the United States, moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of exposure to generative AI is associated with a 10.76 per cent fall in starting wages, with the largest declines among junior workers[383], while in Denmark no effect on earnings or hours larger than 2 per cent could be found two years after the launch of ChatGPT[384]. No published source in any member records young workers' pay or security by how exposed their job is to AI.

**Gap: pay.** The working-poverty indicator has no figure for 22 of the 56 members: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Malta, Nauru, New Zealand, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Singapore, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu, the United Kingdom and Vanu-

atu. They include 13 of the 16 high-income members, because the ILO models the working poverty rate mainly for low- and middle-income countries, and the OECD's table of low pay has no split by age. For these members the index has no published measure of whether young people's work is fairly paid, and the gap is put to the survey.

Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have no figure on any of the four indicators. What young people are paid, whether they have a contract, and whether AI has changed their pay, hours or security are put to the survey.

**Scoring and results.** Informal work and working poverty are turned round, into the shares of young workers with a formal job and of employed young people above the international poverty line, and scored from none to all with a band to every 10 points; their best goalposts are SDG target 8.5, decent work for all, and SDG target 1.1, the end of extreme poverty. Each is the indicator's own measure. Informal work comes from members' own surveys and censuses for ages 15 to 29; working poverty is the ILO's modelled estimate for ages 15 to 24, which costs it a point for age fit and one for how it was produced. Informal work spreads as one member at 9, three at 8, two at 7, three at 6, four at 5, three at 4, two at 3, four at 2, three at 1 and 16 at 0, from Seychelles, at 8.4 per cent in informal work, to the 16 members, at 90.5 to 98.1 per cent, its mean data strength 9.8. Working poverty spreads as 13 members at 9, three at 8, four at 7, four at 6, five at 5, two at 4, one at 3, one at 2 and one at 1, from the 13 members, at 0.1 to 8.3 per cent in poverty, to Mozambique, at 80.5 per cent, each figure grading 8 for data strength. For informal work, the ILO's youth tables have no figure in any year for the 15 members without one, and no other source in the project measures it for them. Of 16 related indicators tested on figures held back, the closest, working poverty, gave the wrong points for 20 of 29 members, so none is used. Belize, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago therefore take the mean of the seven smaller-population Caribbean peers with a figure, 38.9 per cent informal (17.5 to 74.8), and score 6, with data strength 8, the figures averaged reaching back to 2016; Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands take the smaller-population Pacific peers' mean, 49.7 per cent (23.7 to 78.6), and score 5, with data strength 9. Singapore and Malaysia are not estimated: their region-and-size group holds figures only for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which would put both at 82.8 per cent. Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Malta, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have no member of their group with a figure.

The temporary contract is turned round as well, to the share of young employees not on one. Some temporary work is normal, so the top of its scale is 90.04 per cent, the five best members' average (Antigua and Barbuda, Mauritius, Nauru, Samoa and the United Kingdom); its worst stays at 0 per cent, as the realistic worst does not apply: Tanzania has 8.5 per cent of its young employees not on a temporary contract. Stable or satisfactory work takes its best goalpost the same way, 98.22 per cent (Cyprus, Jamaica, Malta, Seychelles and the United Kingdom). Both are worked out from the ILO's counts, the indicators' own measures; New Zealand's temporary-contract figure, from the OECD, covers ages 15 to 24. The temporary contract spreads as two members at 10, ten at 9, 12 at 8, four at 7, two at 6, four at 5, two at 4, four at 3, two at 2, one at 1 and one at 0, from Mauritius, at 93.8 per cent not on a temporary contract, to Tanzania, at 8.5, with a mean data strength of 9.8; stable or satisfactory work as two members

at 10, 12 at 9, four at 8, two at 7, two at 6, three at 5, two at 4, one at 3 and one at 1, from Malta, at 100 per cent, to Kenya, at 18.9, with 9.7.

### Enterprise

**Definition.** Whether young people can start something of their own and keep it going.

New tasks, not the absence of automation, are what bring labour back, and whether AI is directed towards replacing people or towards creating work for them is a choice, as set out above under Rationale; young people starting things of their own are one of the places that choice gets made.

It matters most where employment is thin: where jobs are transformed rather than removed, the most likely effect set out above under Rationale, and formal employment is scarce, transformation is more likely to be met through self-employment than through a payroll.

Self-employment is counted here as a result only when it lasts and pays, which is why it is measured alongside informal employment and working poverty rather than on its own.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has six indicators: two for young people who run something of their own, three for starting a business and keeping it going, and one for AI. The first is the share of employed 15 to 29 year olds who are employers: they work for themselves and pay at least one other person. The young-employers indicator has a figure for 47 of the 56 members, from 0.3 per cent in Cyprus to 8.1 per cent in Guyana. The second is, of 15 to 29 year olds who work for themselves, the share who employ others. The employing-others indicator has a figure for 47 members, from 0.7 per cent in Zambia to 52.1 per cent in Nauru. Both are worked out from the ILO's youth labour market tables[385], which draw on each member's own labour force survey, household survey or census and publish ages 15 to 29 directly; 40 of the 47 figures are for 2021 or later.

The two are used in place of the plain share of young workers who work for themselves, which the same tables give for 47 members and which runs from 2.5 per cent in Tuvalu to 71.8 per cent in Zambia. A high figure there mostly means that few jobs are on offer. A review of surveys of young people in 28 countries concluded that self-employment "is not necessarily a favourable employment status for young people"[386]. Paying someone else is the firmest published sign that a young person's venture has got past survival. Both indicators still read higher in poorer members, where more young people work for themselves, and both rest on small numbers of young employers. The figures for Guyana, Kiribati, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Samoa, The Bahamas and Tuvalu moved sharply between two surveys and are marked to be read with caution, and the ILO marks ten of the 47 young-employer figures as unreliable.

The third, fourth and fifth indicators come from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor's adult population survey, the one international survey that separates starting a business from keeping one going[387]. The third is the share of 18 to 29 year olds who are setting up a business or own and manage one less than three and a half years old; the fourth is the share who own and manage a business that has paid wages or income for more than three and a half years; the fifth is, of those starting or running a new business, the share who say they do so to earn a living because jobs are scarce. The starting-a-business indicator has a figure for 24 members,

from 3.9 per cent in Pakistan to 50.4 per cent in Vanuatu. The established-business indicator has a figure for the same 24 members, from 0.8 per cent in South Africa to 20.6 per cent in Uganda. The jobs-are-scarce indicator has a figure for seven members, from 40.2 per cent in Australia to 90.9 per cent in South Africa; the question has been asked in these words since 2019 only.

The survey interviews adults aged 18 to 64, about 2,000 in each member in each year used, and nobody younger, so ages 15 to 17 are not covered. Its respondent files are made public three years after each survey. The figures for ages 18 to 29 are worked out from those files with the survey's own weights, and the same working reproduces the survey's published figures for ages 18 to 24 in every year used. Each member takes the newest year in which it took part: six members have a figure for 2022 (Canada, Cyprus, India, South Africa, Togo and the United Kingdom); the rest date from 2010 to 2019. No Caribbean or Pacific island member has taken part since 2016. A high share starting a business does not by itself mean opportunity: in Togo 24.7 per cent of 18 to 29 year olds are starting or running a new business and 83.9 per cent of them say they do so because jobs are scarce; in Canada the figures are 27.0 and 58.7 per cent. The third indicator is therefore read beside the fifth; the two combine by the sub-pillar's plain average.

The sixth indicator is the only published measure that joins enterprise and AI. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor's 2025 survey asked people starting or running a new business how important they expect AI tools to be to their business in the next three years[388]. The AI-expectation indicator has a figure for five members, from 34.0 per cent in Canada to 49.2 per cent in South Africa. The figure is for entrepreneurs of all ages from 18 to 64: the report does not split it by age, and the 2025 respondent file is not public until 2028. It records an expectation, not use.

The evidence on helping young people into business is cautious. Start-up grants to groups of young adults in Uganda raised earnings by 38 per cent after four years, but after nine years those who had not received a grant had caught up[389]. A review of 37 evaluations found that entrepreneurship programmes have "a positive and large impact for youth and on business knowledge and practice, but no immediate translation into business set-up and expansion or increased income"[390]. Other published measures reach too few members, or are not about young people, and are held as supporting evidence: whether 15 to 24 year olds borrowed to start or run a business (16 members, all low- or middle-income); the ease of registering a business (29 members, not about young people); young people's share of business owners (seven members, each defined differently); and the survival of new businesses (Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, none by the age of the owner). The Commonwealth's Youth Development Index has no measure of enterprise[391].

**Gap: enterprise and AI.** The AI-expectation indicator has a figure for five of the 56 members: Canada, Cyprus, India, South Africa and the United Kingdom. It is for entrepreneurs of all ages, not for young people, and it records what they expect, not what they do. No published source in any member records whether young people's businesses use AI. The gap is put to the survey.

**Gap: starting and keeping going.** The three Global Entrepreneurship Monitor indicators have no figure for 32 of the 56 members, and 16 of the 24 figures they do have are older

than 2019: Bangladesh (2011), Barbados (2015), Belize (2016), Botswana (2015), Cameroon (2016), Ghana (2013), Jamaica (2016), Malawi (2013), Malaysia (2017), Namibia (2013), Nigeria (2013), Singapore (2014), Trinidad and Tobago (2014), Uganda (2014), Vanuatu (2010) and Zambia (2013). No published source in any member records whether young people's businesses survive.

Dominica, Gabon, Malta, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have no figure on any of the six indicators. Whether young people run or are starting something of their own, whether they do so by choice, whether it earns enough to live on, whether AI is part of it and what stopped those who gave up are put to the survey.

**Scoring and results.** The share starting because jobs are scarce is turned round, to the share of young business starters who did not start because jobs are scarce, and scored on bands of 10 points, with no young person starting only for want of a job as the best goalpost. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor's respondent files give it for ages 18 to 29, its own measure, so each figure takes 3 for age fit; the samples are small, 37 to 165 young business starters a member. The seven members spread as one member at 5, three at 4, two at 1 and one at 0, from Australia, at 40.2 per cent starting because jobs are scarce, to South Africa, at 90.9 per cent, with a mean data strength of 8.9. The two shares the index computes for ages 15 to 29 from the ILO's counts, of young workers who are employers and of young people working for themselves who employ others, are the indicators' own measures. Neither has a target, and not every young worker is meant to run a business, so each best goalpost is the average of its five best members: 5.68 per cent for employers (Grenada, Guyana, Nigeria, Samoa and Tanzania) and 39 per cent for employing others (Australia, Grenada, Guyana, Nauru and Seychelles), fixed at the figures used in this edition. The ILO marks ten of the young-employer figures and ten of the others as unreliable, as they rest on few respondents; they are used as published, and each takes 1, not 2, for how it was produced. Employers spread as two members at 10, one at 9, one at 7, two at 5, three at 4, two at 3, 11 at 2, 17 at 1 and eight at 0, from Guyana, at 8.1 per cent, to Cyprus, at 0.3, with a mean data strength of 9.6; employing others as two members at 10, one at 9, three at 6, three at 5, three at 4, six at 3, five at 2, 13 at 1 and 11 at 0, from Nauru, at 52.1 per cent, to Zambia, at 0.7, with 9.6.

Starting or running a new business and owning an established one are the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor's own measures, computed for ages 18 to 29 from its respondent files with their weights, so each figure takes 3 for age fit; 18 of the 24 are from before 2021 and lose the point for recency. Not every young person is meant to start or own a business, so the figures that score 10 are the averages of the five best members, 40.62 per cent for starting (Botswana, Nigeria, Uganda, Vanuatu and Zambia) and 14.02 per cent for an established business (Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Vanuatu and Zambia). Starting spreads as two members at 10, two at 9, two at 7, six at 6, two at 5, five at 3, four at 2 and one at 0, from Vanuatu, at 50.4 per cent, to Pakistan, at 3.9, with a mean data strength of 8.2; an established business as two members at 10, one at 9, one at 7, two at 6, three at 4, three at 3, four at 2, four at 1 and four at 0, from Uganda, at 20.6 per cent, to South Africa, at 0.8, with 8.2.

New entrepreneurs' expectation of AI is scored as published. With five members, the average of the five best is the average of all five, 40.48 per cent, as no target names it and AI need not

matter to every new business. South Africa and the United Kingdom score 10, India 9, and Canada and Cyprus 8. Each figure is the indicator's own measure, but for all ages from 18 to 64, so it takes 1 for age fit, for a data strength of 7. In the report's table South Africa's share is 49.2 per cent both for new entrepreneurs and for owners of established businesses; the first is the one used. The indicator stays in the index, scored.

### Staying and progressing

**Definition.** Whether young people keep the job they get and move up in it as its tasks change.

Because the most likely effect of generative AI is that jobs are transformed rather than removed, as set out above under Rationale, a job that changes underneath the person holding it is a different problem from a job that disappears, and it is invisible to any measure that counts only whether someone is employed.

Experience appears to be what protects people: the gap in AI-exposed occupations falls on the youngest workers, while experienced workers show none, as set out above under Young workers. If the protection is experience, then whether a young person accumulates any is the thing to measure.

The task framework set out above under Rationale gives the reason to watch this over time rather than once: the task content of production keeps moving.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has five indicators: two for keeping a job, two for moving up and one for being trained at work. The first is the share of employees aged 15 to 29 who have been in their current job for less than 12 months, the standard measure of how long workers stay. The new-to-the-job indicator has a figure for seven of the 56 members, from 24.4 per cent in Malta to 39.3 per cent in Cyprus. It is worked out from the counts in the OECD's job tenure table for ages 15 to 24 and 25 to 29[392] and, for Singapore, from the Ministry of Manpower's labour force report, which covers residents only[393]. The members are Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Malta, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom; neither the ILO nor the World Bank publishes job tenure by age, so no other member has a figure. A high figure is not plainly bad. In the United Kingdom, moving between jobs in search of a better match has become an increasingly important way for young people to advance their careers and raise their pay, and the share of workers aged 16 to 24 changing employer each quarter recovered quickly after the pandemic, passing its pre-pandemic level in 2021[394]; what matters is whether a move is to a better job or a lost one, which the published figures do not say.

The second indicator is the widest published sign of young people not keeping a job: unemployed 15 to 29 year olds who have worked before, as a share of the labour force of that age. The out-of-work-after-a-job indicator has a figure for 35 members, from 0.4 per cent in Togo to 15.8 per cent in South Africa. It misses those who lost a job and stopped looking, and it does not say why the job ended.

The third and fourth indicators measure moving up. The third is the share of employed 25 to 29 year olds working as managers, professionals or technicians, the occupations the ILO classes as high-skill: where young people have got to by the end of youth. The high-skill-jobs indicator has a figure for 50 members, from 3.5 per cent in Tanzania to 77.3 per cent in

Singapore. It reflects how rich the economy is as much as how young people progress within it. The fourth is the step up: that share at ages 25 to 29 minus the same share at ages 20 to 24, in the same year. The step-up indicator has a figure for 50 members, from 1.0 percentage points in Grenada to 32.1 percentage points in Singapore. It compares two age groups in one year and does not follow the same people; part of the gap is graduates entering work, not promotion.

The fifth indicator is the only wide measure of being trained at work: 15 to 29 year olds in apprenticeships, internships and traineeships, per 1,000 people of that age. The work-based-learning indicator has a figure for 31 members, from 1.1 per 1,000 in Lesotho to 84.3 per 1,000 in Nigeria. Members count different things: some record apprentices only and others do not record the type of trainee, so the levels are not closely comparable, and the measure does not cover the training of ordinary employees. The second to fifth indicators are worked out from the ILO's youth labour market tables[395], which draw on each member's own labour force survey, household survey or census; 46 of the 50 high-skill figures are for 2021 or later.

The research gives reasons to watch training in particular. Temporary workers in Britain received less work-related training and lower pay than permanent workers, although fixed-term contracts were "a stepping stone to permanent work"[396]. In Uganda, vocational training raised young workers' employment by 21 per cent and training provided by firms by 14 per cent, and the vocationally trained received more job offers because their skills were certified[397]. A theoretical account holds that juniors pay for their training by doing routine work, that AI now does a growing share of that work, and that below a threshold "advances in AI threaten wholesale apprenticeship collapse"[398]. Whether a job that AI has changed is better or worse for the person holding it depends on whether the tasks that remain need more expertise or less[399].

Other published measures reach too few members, or say too little about young workers, to be indicators, and are held as supporting evidence: young workers who changed job or were promoted in the past year (Australia, Singapore, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom to 2019); job-related training of young workers (eight members, each defined differently); the share of firms offering formal training (54 members, not about young people); and participation in education or training in the past 12 months, SDG indicator 4.3.1[400], which at ages 15 to 24 is mostly school and college attendance. The Commonwealth's Youth Development Index has no measure of staying in work, progression or training[401].

**Gap: the job changing under them.** Whether young workers' tasks have changed, whether they were trained for the change, and whether pay or responsibility moved with it, are not published for any member. South Africa is the only member that publishes what becomes of the same young workers from one quarter to the next (ages 15 to 34, from its labour force survey panel); Cyprus has experimental rates of job moves at ages 15 to 24, and the search found no such figure for young workers in any other member[402]. None of the five indicators measures any of this, and all of it is put to the survey.

**Gap: AI at work.** Whether young workers use AI at work is published by age for three members only. In 2025, 23.1 per cent of 16 to 29 year olds in Cyprus and 38.5 per cent in Malta had used generative AI for work in the past three months[403]. In Canada, in March 2026, 39.1 per cent of workers aged 15 to 24 in the occupations most exposed to AI and most helped

by it had used it at work in the past 12 months[404]. Whether young workers were trained to use it is published for none. The gap is put to the survey.

**Gap: staying in a job.** The new-to-the-job indicator has a figure for seven of the 56 members, all of them high-income; no Caribbean, Pacific island, African or South Asian member has one.

Dominica, Malaysia, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have no figure on any of the five indicators. Whether young people are in the same job as a year ago, whether their tasks have changed and how, whether they were trained for the change, whether their pay or responsibility moved with it, and whether they use AI at work are put to the survey.

**Scoring and results.** Unemployment after a job is turned round, to the share of the young labour force not in that position. Its worst goalpost is the realistic worst in the world, 15.7 per cent of the young labour force, the 97.5th percentile across 137 countries the ILO tabulates; the best is none, and a band covers 1.57 points. The figures are worked out from the ILO's counts for ages 15 to 29, the indicator's own measure, and take 4 for age fit; ten from before 2021 lose the point for recency. The 35 members spread as nine members at 9, five at 8, four at 7, six at 6, five at 5, two at 4, one at 1 and three at 0, from the nine members, at 0.4 to 1.5 per cent of the young labour force, to Namibia, Barbados and South Africa, at 14.5 to 15.8 per cent, and their mean data strength is 9.7. Under the rules for missing data, Guyana's rows in the youth tables, from 2018 to 2024, leave the work history of nearly all its young unemployed unrecorded, which the indicator's own rule does not accept, so no member gains a figure of its own from another year; no other source measures it, and of 16 related indicators tested on held-back figures the best, the exposure of young people's jobs to generative AI, gave the wrong points for 13 of 17. Twenty members therefore take the mean of their region-and-size group: the smaller-population Pacific peers 1.9 per cent and the Asian members outside the smaller-population peer group 1.9 per cent, scoring 8 (Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; India and Malaysia); the African members outside the smaller-population peer group 4.1 per cent, scoring 7 (Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Zambia); the smaller-population African peers 7.3 per cent and the smaller-population Caribbean peers 7.6 per cent, scoring 5 (Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Seychelles; Dominica, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and The Bahamas). Each estimate grades 8 for data strength, the averaged figures reaching back before 2021. New Zealand, whose group holds only Australia's figure, is not estimated.

High-skill jobs at ages 25 to 29 are computed from the same tables, the indicator's own measure, for an age band that counts as a nearby youth band. Not every job is high-skill, so 10 points go to 58.62 per cent or more, the average of the five best members (Australia, Canada, Malta, Singapore and the United Kingdom) at the figures used in this edition. The 50 members spread as two members at 10, three at 8, three at 7, three at 6, four at 5, eight at 4, seven at 3, nine at 2, eight at 1 and three at 0, from Singapore, at 77.3 per cent, to Tanzania, at 3.5, with a mean data strength of 8.9. The step up between ages 20 to 24 and 25 to 29, in percentage points, comes from the same counts; its figure that scores 10 is 23.66 points, the average of the five largest (Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Singapore and the United Kingdom), and a member whose share falls with age scores 0. It compares two age groups inside ages 15 to 29, which counts as a nearby youth band. Its 50 members spread as two members at 10, three at 8, three

at 6, three at 5, seven at 4, five at 3, ten at 2, 11 at 1 and six at 0, from Singapore, at 32.1 percentage points, to Grenada, at 1, with a mean data strength of 8.9. Apprenticeships, internships and traineeships, per 1,000 young people, take the average of their five best members, 74.42 per 1,000 (Antigua and Barbuda, Cameroon, Nigeria, Seychelles and Vanuatu). Ghana, Kenya and the United Kingdom record apprentices only and most members leave the kind of trainee unrecorded, which makes the entry a close stand-in, and the ILO marks Lesotho's and Nauru's figures as unreliable. Its 31 members spread as three members at 10, one at 9, one at 8, three at 7, two at 4, one at 2, eight at 1 and 12 at 0, from Nigeria, at 84.3 per 1,000, to Lesotho, at 1.1, with 8.8.

For the new-to-the-job indicator, the figure scored is 100 minus the published share: the share of young employees who have been in the same job for 12 months or more. The index reads more time in the job as better, on the assumption that it marks experience gained, which appears to be what protects young workers. Every member's published share is below half, from 24.4 per cent new to the job in Malta to 39.3 in Cyprus, so the realistic worst applies: 0 sits at 53.2 per cent, as 46.8 per cent new to the job is the 97.5th percentile across the 41 countries for which the OECD's tenure table gives both age groups, each worked out for ages 15 to 29 as the members' figures are, and 10 at 68.84 per cent, the average of the five best members (Australia, Canada, Malta, New Zealand and the United Kingdom; Singapore ties with New Zealand at 63.1, which gives the same average). A band covers 1.56 points; with 0 at every young employee new to the job, all seven members would have scored 8 to 10. Malta and the United Kingdom score 10, Australia 9, Canada 8, New Zealand and Singapore 6, and Cyprus 4. Each figure is the indicator's own measure for exactly ages 15 to 29, for 2024 or 2025, and grades 10 for data strength. Left out of the index, the indicator would change no member's index by as much as half a point, and move no member in the ranking or across the readiness benchmark at 53.

### Employment support

**Definition.** Whether the services meant to help young people find work and change jobs actually reach them.

Two things follow. A member is credited for services that reach young people and are delivered in the ways the evidence supports, not for having a scheme. And because effects grow over the longer term, a programme is not judged by its first-year figures.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has two indicators. The first is the measure that fits the definition: of unemployed young people, the share who registered with, or looked for work through, a public employment service. The employment-service indicator has a figure for four of the 56 members, from 7.9 per cent in Singapore to 14.3 per cent in Cyprus. In Singapore, 7.9 per cent of unemployed residents aged 15 to 29 registered with a government or union career centre, or sought help from a self-help group, in 2025[405]; in Canada, 10.7 per cent of unemployed 15 to 24 year olds looked for work through a public employment agency[406]; in Cyprus and Malta, 14.3 and 11.6 per cent of 15 to 24 year olds unemployed for under a year were registered at the employment office or receiving benefit[407]. The three sources word the question differently, and three of the four figures are for ages 15 to 24. No other member publishes it for young

people: the ILO's tables carry nothing on how people look for work, and the labour force reports of 16 other members were read and hold no such table by age.

The second indicator records whether a system exists. SDG indicator 8.b.1 scores each country from 0 to 3 on whether it has a national strategy for youth employment: none, being developed, adopted, or in operation[408]. The youth-strategy indicator has a figure for 55 members, all for 2025: 16 have a strategy in operation, 24 have adopted one, 14 are developing one and one (Tuvalu) has taken no steps. It is classified by the ILO from the documents each government supplies. It shows that a strategy exists, not that it reaches anyone.

The research explains why reach and design matter more than the existence of a programme. Across more than 200 evaluations of programmes for all ages, average effects are "close to zero in the short run, but become more positive 2-3 years after completion of the program"[409]. The European Union's Youth Guarantee is the one framework found that measures follow-up: how many young people are still waiting after four months, and where they are six, 12 and 18 months later[410].

Other published measures are held as supporting evidence. The same registration question was asked of unemployed 15 to 29 year olds in the ILO's school-to-work transition surveys of 2012 and 2013[411]: 1.0 per cent in Malawi to 44.3 per cent in Tanzania, across eight members; the figures are now more than ten years old. In PISA 2022, the share of 15 year olds who had spoken to a career adviser at school ran from 29.5 per cent in Singapore to 67.5 per cent in Malta, across nine members[412]; the 2025 round asked head teachers instead, which counts schools. The share of unemployed people who receive unemployment benefit, SDG indicator 1.3.1, is published for all 56 members but for all ages, and is zero in 43 of them[413]. Young people aged 15 to 24 who looked for a job online are recorded for 24 members, which shows them searching for themselves, not a service reaching them. Counts of young people on named programmes exist for seven members, each counting a different thing and none as a share of young people out of work. The Commonwealth's Youth Development Index has no measure of employment support[414].

> **Gap: employment support.** The first indicator is the right measure, and it has a figure for four of the 56 members: Canada, Cyprus, Malta and Singapore. The survey asks every member's young people who are unemployed or looking for work whether they have registered with, or used, a public employment service, in the same words, so that the indicator can be completed for the other 52.
>
> **Gap: what the service did.** No published source in any member records whether an employment service followed a young person up or whether it helped, and none says, member by member, whether employment services use AI to match or profile young jobseekers. No member publishes the number of young people on employment or training programmes as a share of young people who are out of work.

Nauru has no figure on either indicator. Whether young people have used an employment service, a training scheme or a careers service, what it did, whether anyone followed up and whether it led to anything are put to the survey.

**Scoring and results.** Reaching every unemployed young person is the best goalpost and reaching none the worst, a band to every 10 points. Singapore's and Canada's figures ask

the indicator's question; Cyprus's and Malta's count registration at an employment office or receipt of benefit among those unemployed for under a year, so the entry is graded on those lines, as a close stand-in. The four members spread as three members at 1 and one at 0, from Canada, Malta and Cyprus, at 10.7 to 14.3 per cent, to Singapore, at 7.9 per cent, and their mean data strength is 8.0, Malta's figure, which Eurostat marks as of low reliability, taking 1 for how it was produced.

The youth employment strategy code is scored as what is written down. The ILO assigns it from the records and documents each government supplies and gives no test for a strategy being operationalised, so the code shows what is reported, not that a strategy is paid for or reaches young people. Its four codes run in equal steps from 0 to 5, points rounded down: none 0, being developed 1, developed and adopted 3, operationalised 5; 10 waits for dated evidence of funding and reach. The 55 members spread as 16 members at 5, 24 at 3, 14 at 1 and one at 0; Nauru has no code. A national policy is not an age group, so its age fit is the lowest, 1 of 4, and each code's data strength is 7.

## Pillar 6: Rights, safety and participation

### Rationale

A young person can know how AI works, judge what it produces and use it well, and still be harmed by a system used to make decisions about them over which they have no control: in admissions and assessment, recruitment, public services, credit or policing. Duties that fall on those systems and the institutions that run them are therefore measured in their own pillar. The need is not hypothetical. When examinations were cancelled in 2020, England issued school leavers' grades calculated by an algorithm. The policy came undone in the face of appeals, protest and legal action, in what a study of the episode describes as probably the education system's greatest policy failure of modern times[415].

### International standards

UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, adopted by all 193 member states in November 2021, sets out principles that include safety and security, privacy and data protection, fairness and non-discrimination, transparency and explainability, human oversight and determination, and responsibility and accountability, and calls for oversight, impact assessment, audit and due diligence mechanisms. It holds that the participation of diverse stakeholders is necessary for inclusive approaches to AI governance[416]. The European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act classes as high-risk the AI systems used in education and vocational training, employment and the management of workers, access to essential private and public services, including creditworthiness and public assistance, and law enforcement[417].

### Children aged 15 to 17

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child applies four general principles to children's rights in the digital environment: non-discrimination, the best interests of the child, the right to life, survival and development, and respect for the views of the child. It warns that discrim-

ination "can arise when automated processes that result in information filtering, profiling or decision-making are based on biased, partial or unfairly obtained data concerning a child"[418]. UNICEF's updated guidance turns these obligations into ten requirements for child-centred AI: regulatory frameworks, oversight and compliance; safety; data protection and privacy; non-discrimination and fairness; transparency, explainability and accountability; respect for human and child rights in the way AI is built and used; children's best interests, development and wellbeing; inclusion of and for children; preparing and skilling children for present and future developments in AI; and an enabling environment for child-centred AI[419].

### Fairness in practice

Evidence on how fair these systems are in practice is still limited. A systematic review of 36 studies of algorithmic decision-making in recruitment and staff development found that it can lead to the unfair treatment of certain groups and to implicit discrimination, and that these risks remain mostly unexplored[420].

### Protections that are enforced

Because these standards are widely adopted, adoption alone cannot tell members apart. A protection known only as what is written down is labelled as such. The four laws and the treaty scored in this pillar earn at most half the points until dated evidence shows them used. The pillar counts protections that are enforced and reach young people: regulators that work, decisions that can be challenged, children's protections that are applied, and young people who are consulted.

### Safety

**Definition.** Whether young people are protected from harm done through these systems, and can get help when it happens.

Safety and security is one of the principles of UNESCO's Recommendation, and safety one of the ten requirements of UNICEF's guidance, both set out above under International standards and Children aged 15 to 17.

For a young person, whether a protection exists matters less than whether there is somewhere to go. That is why this counts reporting routes and help that reach young people alongside the duties placed on systems.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators from published data and three more that are defined and held in consideration.

Two indicators record harm as young people report it, each from one question asked in the same words in every country by the Global Findex survey of 2024[421]: the share of people aged 15 to 24 who, in the past 12 months, received unwanted and offensive messages, photos or videos on their mobile phone, and the share who received a call or text message from someone they did not know asking them to send money. The first has a figure for 12 of the 56 members, from 10.1 per cent in Togo to 26.7 per cent in Ghana; the second for 21, from 7.9 per cent in Botswana to 42.8 per cent in Tanzania. Both are filed as published and are scored turned

round, so that higher is better. The survey asked these questions in low- and middle-income economies only, so no high-income member has a figure, and neither question is about AI. The second records an attempt, not a loss: online risk carries a probability of harm, and harm does not always follow[422].

One indicator records whether help is sought: the share of young people harmed online who told someone or reported it. One member has a figure within the index's age band. In Australia in 2026, 64.6 per cent of people aged 16 to 18 who had been sexually victimised online before the age of 18 told at least one other person; 13.2 per cent told the authorities and 18.7 per cent told an AI system[423]. Surveys of children aged 12 to 17 are not used as figures, because most of the children they describe are younger than 15. They show what the indicator is for: in Pakistan in 2025, none of the children surveyed who had been sexually exploited or abused online reported it to a helpline, a social worker or the police[424].

One indicator records what governments have done about the safety of AI itself: the Safety and Security score of the Global Index on Responsible AI 2026, which scores from 0 to 100 whether a government framework on AI safety exists, how much it covers and the evidence of government action[425]. It has a score for 33 members, from 0 in 12 of them to 73.9 in Nigeria. It describes governments, not young people, and a framework does not show that young people are protected; it is the only measure specific to AI that reaches more than a handful of members.

Helplines and reporting lines are recorded and are not indicators, because their existence says little about their use. An evaluation in 2025 of the Internet Watch Foundation's national reporting portals found that most countries record fewer than ten reports a year, and that 81 per cent of the portals' partner organisations surveyed named lack of awareness that the portal exists as a barrier to reporting[426].

**Indicators without a published figure.** Published data do not reach the centre of the sub-pillar: harm done through AI, and help that works. Three indicators are therefore defined and held in consideration; none has a published figure for any member, and all three are carried to the survey. The first is the share of young people harmed through an AI system in the past 12 months: a sexual or humiliating fake image, video or voice recording made of them; money or personal information lost to a scam that used AI; advice from a chatbot or AI companion that led them to harm themselves or someone else; or harassment or threats made with material generated by AI. The second is the share who know where to go for help: who can name a helpline, a reporting line, a regulator or a police unit in their country that takes such reports. The third is, among those who reported harm, the share whose report was acted on. Each is reported separately for ages 15 to 17, who are children in law, so that the protection of children can be read on its own. What is published on harm through AI covers few members, and no two sources ask the same question. UNICEF reports that between 0.4 and 4.3 per cent of children in 11 countries surveyed in 2025 had sexual images of them made with AI in the past year, with Pakistan the only member among them[427]; in Australia in 2026, 3.9 per cent of people aged 16 to 18 had been sexually victimised online with AI involved before they turned 18, or had a friend who had[428].

**Missing data.** Thirty-five members have no figure on either harm indicator: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, The Bahamas, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, the United Kingdom and Vanuatu. No member has a harm figure for ages 25 to 29. Twenty-three members have no score for government action on AI safety: Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Namibia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Every member but Australia lacks a figure on telling someone or reporting it.

**Scoring and results.** Both harm indicators are turned round, into the shares of young people spared unwanted and offensive messages and spared requests for money from a stranger. Their worst goalposts are the realistic worst in the world, 23.7 and 40.7 per cent, the 97.5th percentile across the 34 and 54 economies where the Global Findex survey asked each question, with none as the best, so their bands span 2.37 and 4.07 percentage points. Help is scored on its natural goalposts, nobody told and everyone told or reported, 10 points to a band. The Global Findex figures are each indicator's own measure, for ages 15 to 24, a data strength of 9 apiece. Australia's figure on telling someone is a close stand-in, since it covers one kind of harm, sexual victimisation online before the age of 18, and grades 8. Offensive messages spread as three members at 5, two at 4, two at 3, two at 2, one at 1 and two at 0, from Togo, Nigeria and Eswatini, at 10.1 to 11.0 per cent, to Kenya and Ghana, at 22.8 to 26.7 per cent; requests for money as two members at 8, four at 7, four at 6, two at 5, two at 4, one at 2, one at 1 and five at 0, from Botswana and South Africa, at 7.9 to 8.1 per cent, to Zambia, Kenya, Mozambique, Ghana and Tanzania, at 37.1 to 42.8 per cent. Australia scores 6 for telling someone or reporting it, at 64.6 per cent. The Safety and Security score is banded in tens from 0 to 100 and used as published, like the Global Index's other scores (the reason is set out under Transparency and redress). It spreads as two members at 7, two at 6, two at 5, one at 4, four at 3, six at 1 and 16 at 0: Kenya and Nigeria, at 70.5 and 73.9, score 7, and the 12 members published at 0 score 0, as do Belize, Jamaica, Mozambique and South Africa, below 10. Each of its figures grades 7 for data strength.

### Privacy and data protection

**Definition.** Whether what is known about a young person is protected, and whether they have any say over it.

Privacy and data protection is one of the principles of the UNESCO Recommendation, which holds that privacy must be protected and promoted throughout the AI lifecycle and that adequate data protection frameworks should be established[429]. Data protection and privacy is one of the ten requirements for child-centred AI[430].

The distinction that matters for scoring is between a law and a working regime.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators from published data. Two describe the institutions that protect personal data in each member, one records a data right that young people have used, and one records young people's worry about their personal information. Three more are under consideration and have no published figure.

The first is whether a data protection law is in force. The figure is the World Bank's GovTech survey of 2025, in which each government, or the World Bank where a government did not answer, records whether a data protection or privacy law is in effect, in draft or absent[431]: 41 members have a law in effect, seven a draft (Fiji, Grenada, Maldives, Mozambique, Pakistan, Samoa and The Gambia) and eight none (Dominica, Namibia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Tuvalu). UNCTAD's Global Cyberlaw Tracker, which records whether a law has been passed[432], is kept beside each figure; the two differ for ten members. For Kiribati, Samoa, Vanuatu and Saint Lucia the category is read from the law itself. Kiribati's Data Protection Act 2025 and Vanuatu's Data Protection and Privacy Act No. 13 of 2024 are in force, Saint Lucia's Data Protection Act 2011 is in force in part, and Samoa is drafting its first general data protection law.

The second is whether a data protection authority is operating. The figure is the same survey's answer to whether the authority is operational and effectively overseeing data governance, recorded as yes, or as no or unknown[433]: 14 members have an authority reported as operational, 23 one that exists, or exists in law only, without that report, and 19 none. Accreditation by the Global Privacy Assembly, which is voluntary[434], is kept beside each figure. The reports of 11 authorities on their own work are held; they show that an authority acts and are not comparable between members. An authority named in law is not always at work: the Information Commission of Seychelles reports that the Data Protection Act 2023 "remains at risk of being largely unenforced"[435]. Both are scored by their categories, as set out below.

The third is the share of young people who have used a data right. In 2025, in Cyprus 11.0 per cent and in Malta 17.8 per cent of people aged 16 to 24 asked a website or provider, in the last three months, for access to the data held about them in order to update or delete it[436]. In Australia in 2026, 27 per cent of people aged 18 to 24 have at some time asked an organisation for access to their personal information, against 9 per cent of those aged 25 and over[437]. The questions differ in the period they cover and in what was asked for, and each figure is labelled with its question.

The fourth is the share of young people who are very worried that their personal information could be stolen when they use the internet or social media. It is worked out for ages 15 to 29 from the respondent file of the World Risk Poll of 2021, which put the question to internet users[438], and has a figure for 27 members, from 14.9 per cent in the United Kingdom to 79.3 per cent in Mozambique. The poll also asked about personal information being used by the government and by companies without permission; those figures are recorded beside it. The figure is filed as published and scored turned round, as the share who are not very worried.

> Worry about personal information was kept when the indicators were scored, because it is the only figure on this sub-pillar that describes young people in more than a handful of members. Worry is not protection: a high figure may reflect real risk, greater awareness or both, and a low figure may reflect safety or unawareness. The index reads less worry as better, as it does

for worry about AI, on the assumption that worry follows the risk young people face, and the figure carries its limits: the question was asked in 2021, was not repeated in 2023 or 2025, and was put only to internet users. Left out of the index, the indicator would move nine members by one or two places, change no member's index by as much as half a point, and move no member across the readiness benchmark at 53.

The research supports measuring what happens in practice and not the statute alone. Across nearly two million Android apps, 88.44 per cent contained at least one tracker in 2017 and 91.37 per cent in 2020, after the European Union's data protection regulation took effect[439]. An analysis of the privacy policies of six developers of AI models found that all six appear to use their users' chat data to train their models by default[440]. Research on young people's privacy has mostly concerned privacy between people: of 105 studies with under-18s, 10 per cent dealt only with the commercial use of their data[441]. The Commonwealth's law ministers approved model provisions on data protection as a Commonwealth model law in 2022[442]; no record is published of which members have adopted them.

**Indicators without a published figure.** Three indicators are defined and held in consideration, because no member has a published figure: the share of young people whose personal data were misused, leaked or used without their permission in the past 12 months; the share who have refused the use of their data to train AI, or asked an AI service to delete what it holds about them; and the share who can name the body in their country to which they can complain. Each would be reported separately for ages 15 to 17, who are children in law. They are carried to the survey.

**Missing data.** Only Cyprus, Malta and Australia have a figure on a data right used. Twenty-nine members have no figure on worry about personal information: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, The Gambia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

**Scoring and results.** The law records what is written down and scores at most 5, as the other laws do: in force 5, a draft 2 and none 0, with 10 kept for dated evidence that the law is used. The survey also records whether the law is actively enforced (16 members); that answer is not counted here, because whether the law is enforced in practice is what the authority indicator measures. The authority keeps the full scale: an authority reported as operational scores 10 (Australia, Canada, Cyprus, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Singapore, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and the United Kingdom), one with no such report, including one set up in law but not yet at work, 5, as what is written down does, and no authority 0. The survey records no and unknown alike, so the 23 at 5 may include authorities at work: five of them, those of Gabon, Ghana, Jamaica, Nigeria and South Africa, are accredited by the Global Privacy Assembly. The data right reaches 10 at 18.6 per cent, the average of the three members with a figure, as fewer than five have one: Australia scores 10, Malta 9 and Cyprus 5; Australia's figure counts anyone who has ever asked, the other two only those who asked in the last three months. Worry, turned round, scores 10 when 75.82 per cent are not very worried, as the average of the United Kingdom, Australia, Tanzania, Pakistan and Canada is; Malaysia, where 74.2 per cent are very worried, scores 3 and Mozambique, at

79.3 per cent, 2. For data strength the law and authority figures have 7 out of 10, describing institutions and not people; the data right 8, its questions covering different periods; and worry 10.

### Fair treatment

**Definition.** Whether decisions made about young people by machine are free of bias against them.

Fairness and non-discrimination, one of the UNESCO principles, asks AI actors to promote social justice and fairness and to take an inclusive approach so that the benefits of AI are accessible to all[443]. Non-discrimination and fairness is one of the ten requirements for child-centred AI[444].

The evidence on how these systems actually behave is thin, as the review set out above under Fairness in practice found.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has one indicator from published data. Five more are defined and held in consideration, with no figures or figures for one to three members, and are carried to the survey.

The one indicator records what governments have done about fairness in AI: the Fairness and Non-discrimination score of the Global Index on Responsible AI 2026[445]. Researchers in each country record the government's laws, strategies and guidelines on AI, and each document is coded on three points: whether it promotes fair outcomes, whether it guards against bias on protected grounds, age among them, and whether it places a duty on those who build and use AI systems to find, measure and reduce bias. Whether the document is binding, and what the government has done beyond it, also count. The fairness score exists for 33 members, from 0 in 11 of them to 83.0 in Nigeria. It describes governments, not young people, and it rewards documents more than enforcement. A binding instrument is on file for Botswana, Canada and the United Kingdom only, and of these only Canada is coded as placing a duty to find and reduce bias: its directive requires an automated decision system to be tested for unintended bias before it is used[446]. Nigeria scores highest on a strategy that is not binding. It is the only measure of fair treatment by AI that reaches more than a handful of members.

**Indicators without a published figure.** No published source for any member records whether a machine made or helped a decision about a young person, or whether it was fair. Two indicators are defined for the survey and have no figure for any member. The first is the share of young people who, in the past 12 months, had a decision about a place in education, a job application, money or benefits made or helped by an automated system and judged it unfair, with the share screened out of a job application by such a system recorded beside it. The second is the share of students accused of using AI on the strength of a detection tool when they had not used it. It matters most where English is a second language: in a test of seven AI-writing detectors run in 2023, on average 61 per cent of essays by non-native English writers were wrongly classed as written by AI[447]. Studies of how fair people find automated decisions ask one plain rating question or borrow scales made for decisions by people, and no validated scale for automated decisions exists[448], so the survey asks plainly.

Three further indicators have a figure for one to three members. Young people who worry that AI is biased: in the United Kingdom in 2025/26, 36.2 per cent of people aged 16 to 24 name bias among their concerns about AI, 31.1 per cent at ages 16 to 19 and 40.5 at ages 20 to 24[449]; in Cyprus and Malta in 2026, 23 and 19 per cent of people aged 15 to 24 name bias in AI tools as a reason for not using them more, a different question put to about 60 young people in each[450]. Young people who expect AI to discriminate more than people do: in the United Kingdom in 2024, 38.5 per cent of people aged 18 to 29 expected AI to be more likely than a person to discriminate in at least one of three decisions, against 29.7 per cent of all adults. The shares were 17.3 per cent for eligibility for welfare benefits, 21.7 for the risk of a loan not being repaid and 20.8 for face recognition in policing, each higher than among all adults; the figures are worked out from the survey's respondent file[451]. Bias against young people measured in a system in use: the United Kingdom's benefits department tested the model that flags requests for an advance payment for possible fraud, and found that claimants aged 16 to 24 were referred 1.67 times as often as those aged 35 to 44 in the year to March 2025, and 1.24 times as often as those aged 25 to 34 in the year after[452]. It is the only published test found in any member that reports a result for a youth age band. A test of the police's national face search found wrong matches for 5.2 per cent of test subjects aged 21 to 29, against 0.1 per cent of those aged 42 to 76[453].

Court rulings show what the indicators are for. In Kenya the High Court held in December 2024 that the scoring model used to place university students in funding bands, which scored them on the type of school they had attended among other things, was discriminatory[454]; the ruling is suspended while an appeal is heard[455]. In South Africa the High Court in January 2025 declared invalid the rules under which applications for a grant for people without means were refused on automated checks against government databases and bank accounts[456]. Polls of adults on whether they trust AI not to discriminate exist for eight members[457] and are not used: they describe adults, and trust is not fair treatment.

**Missing data.** Twenty-three members have no fairness score: Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Namibia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. No member has a figure on the two indicators defined for the survey. Every member but the United Kingdom lacks a figure on expecting AI to discriminate and on measured bias, and every member but the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Malta lacks one on worry about bias.

**Scoring and results.** The fairness score is treated like the safety score, in ten-point bands up to its top mark of 100. It spreads as one member at 8, one at 7, six at 6, two at 5, four at 4, one at 3, two at 2, four at 1 and 12 at 0, from Nigeria, at 83, to the 11 members published at 0 and Jamaica, below 10, which scores 0 with them. Its figures describe governments, so each is graded 1 of 4 on age fit and 7 in all for data strength.

### Transparency and redress

**Definition.** Whether a young person can find out that a machine decided, and get the decision looked at again.

Transparency and explainability, and human oversight and determination, are separate principles of the UNESCO Recommendation, and transparency, explainability and accountability is one of UNICEF's ten requirements for child-centred AI; both are set out above under International standards and Children aged 15 to 17.

What happens when redress is absent is documented: England's grading algorithm of 2020, set out above under Rationale, came undone under appeal, protest and legal action, while Ireland, starting from a similar position but taking a different approach before and after results, emerged relatively unscathed[458].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators from published data. None describes young people: three describe law and government action, and one describes complaint routes in general. Five more are defined and held in consideration, and carried to the survey.

The first indicator records whether the law gives a person a right about decisions made about them solely by automated means: to be told, to have a person look at the decision again, or to contest it. It is held as three categories. A right is in force in 22 members: Barbados, Botswana, Cyprus, Eswatini, Gabon, Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, the United Kingdom, Vanuatu and Zambia. It is passed but not in force, or partial, in seven: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Samoa and Sri Lanka. Eight members have a data protection law without such a right, and 13 have no data protection law. Each member's category rests on the law itself where it was read, or on a dated coding of it[459]. Six members have no figure, the text of their law being unread: Antigua and Barbuda, Cameroon, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Seychelles. The indicator records law on paper. No source shows the right being used in any member, and in Nigeria the regulator itself reports that the requirement of human review is widely not honoured, most of all in credit scoring, and that people hardly know automated decisions exist[460].

Two indicators record what governments have done, from the Global Index on Responsible AI 2026[461]. The Transparency and Explainability score covers whether government frameworks promote clarity about how AI systems work, oblige those who build and use them to explain their outputs, and give people a right to an explanation. The transparency score exists for 33 members, from 0 in 12 of them to 81.4 in Ghana. The Access to Redress and Remedy score covers whether there is a route to remedy for harm done by AI through the courts, through state complaint bodies and through complaint routes that companies must provide. The redress score exists for 33 members, from 0 in 19 of them to 69.7 in Australia. Both describe governments, not young people, and reward documents more than enforcement.

The fourth is a foundation indicator: the complaint mechanisms score of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2025[462], which scores from 0 to 1 whether people can bring complaints to the government about public services and officials. The complaint mechanisms score exists for 42 members, from 0.36 in Tanzania and Togo to 0.84 in Australia. It is not

about AI and not about young people: it describes the general route that a complaint about an automated decision would have to take, and is labelled as such. The World Justice Project's scores for due process in administrative proceedings and for access to civil justice are recorded beside it.

**Indicators without a published figure.** No published source for any member records whether young people were told a decision about them was automated, or whether they challenged one. Four indicators are defined for the survey: young people who know when they are dealing with AI; who were told that a decision about them was automated; who know that they can have it looked at again, and where to complain; and, among those who challenged an automated decision, the share whose challenge changed it. What is published describes adults and is not used as a figure for young people. In 2026, between 37 and 81 per cent of adults in eight members say they know which products and services use AI[463]. In the United Kingdom in 2026, 46 per cent of adults would feel confident challenging a decision made by a computer that they thought was wrong[464], and in Australia in 2026, 81 per cent of adults call a right to human review essential before AI decides about them[465]. In Cyprus and Malta in 2024, 48 and 59 per cent of workers had been told by their employer that AI or digital tools manage their work, and 19 and 12 per cent had been given an explanation of their rights[466]. Being told is not the same as being able to challenge: in a trial with 8,860 adults in the United Kingdom reported in 2025, fuller explanations of credit decisions made people worse at spotting the wrong ones, and those aged 18 to 24 were the least accurate[467]. Where an appeal route exists, few appeals may succeed. In South Africa 1,779,958 appeals against refusals of a grant decided by automated checks were lodged in 2025, and 11,535 were upheld[468].

A fifth indicator, a public register of the algorithms government uses, is defined and held in consideration. A register was found in three members. The United Kingdom has 152 published records[469], Canada has 39 published assessments[470], and Australia has a central register of AI transparency statements from 114 agencies[471]. A mapping of such registers across the world found none in Africa or Asia and also lists New Zealand's Algorithm Hub, a repository of health algorithms[472].

**Missing data.** Twenty-three members have no transparency or redress score: Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Namibia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Fourteen members have no complaint mechanisms score: Brunei Darussalam, Eswatini, Fiji, Kiribati, Lesotho, Maldives, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. No member has a figure for young people on any of the four indicators defined for the survey.

**Scoring and results.** The right in law is worth 5 points where a right is in force, 2 where it has been passed without coming into force or is partial, and 0 where there is none; the top 5 points are reserved for dated evidence that people use the right, such as a regulator's count of requests for a person to look again at an automated decision, and no such count is published for any member. Of the 50 members read, 22 members score 5, seven score 2 and 21 score 0. Bangladesh's category rests on a press report, the ordinance itself not having been read,

so it is graded as an estimate and its data strength is 6; every other line grades 7. The two Global Index scores are banded in tens from 0 to 100. Within each of its policy indicators the Global Index gives written frameworks up to 16 of 22 points and government initiatives that implement them up to 6[473], so it already discounts what is only written, and its scores are used as published. On transparency, Ghana's 81.4 is the only score to reach 8, and Zambia, above 0 but below 10, scores 0 like the 12 published at 0; on redress, Australia's 69.7 heads the eight members on 6. The complaint mechanisms score is banded in tenths from 0 to 1: Australia, Canada and New Zealand score 8, and Tanzania and Togo 3. Like the right in law, these scores grade 7 for data strength and take 1 of 4 for age fit, as they do not describe young people.

### Protection as children

**Definition.** Whether the extra safeguards owed to 15 to 17 year olds exist and are applied.

The youngest of the three reporting bands is made up of children in law, and the principles and requirements that apply to them are set out above under Children aged 15 to 17.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators from published data. All four describe law and government action; none is a figure about children. Five more are defined and go to the survey.

The first is the Children's Rights score of the Global Index on Responsible AI 2026[474], which scores the safeguards a government's frameworks and initiatives put in place to protect minors in the design and use of AI systems, for their privacy, safety and developmental needs. The children's rights score exists for 33 members, from 0 in 21 of them to 88.0 in the United Kingdom. It describes governments and rewards documents more than enforcement.

The second records whether the criminal law covers sexual images of children made by computer or by AI. It rests on one question put in the same words to a law firm in each country[475], and is held as three categories. The law's wording covers computer-generated material in seven members: Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Guyana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and the United Kingdom. In 11 there is no express wording and such material is covered, if at all, by a general definition: Belize, Canada, Gabon, Ghana, India, Malaysia, Malta, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Togo. In Togo the offences protect only children under 15. In three it is not covered: Bangladesh, Maldives and Namibia. The answers review enacted law only, and firms differ in how generously they read a general definition. No questionnaire exists for the other 35 members.

The third is a foundation indicator: the number of the five standard tests met by the law on child sexual abuse material, as reviewed in 2023[476]. The tests are a law specific to the material, a definition of it, offences committed by technology, simple possession as an offence, and a duty on internet providers to report. All five tests are met by 13 members and four by 34; nine fall below four, the review's line for "sufficient": Lesotho (0); Maldives (1); Namibia (2); Rwanda (3); Saint Kitts and Nevis (3); Solomon Islands (3); Sri Lanka (3); The Gambia (2); Tuvalu (0). The review covers all 56 members. It does not test AI-made material, it reads the law as written, and no newer edition exists.

The fourth records whether the member is a party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography[477]. Forty-four members are parties, five have signed and not ratified (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Singapore and Zambia) and seven have taken no action (Barbados, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago and Tuvalu). Only six members are parties to the protocol that lets children bring complaints to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. A ratification is a commitment on paper. Whether each party has sent the report the protocol requires is the test of delivery; the indicator counts only whether a member has joined.

**Indicators without a published figure.** Every published figure for ages 15 to 17 is for the United Kingdom, and none is about AI. Four indicators are defined for the survey, each for ages 15 to 17: those who have met an age check; those whose use of AI is under a teen setting, a parental control or a school account; those who know the age rules that apply to them; and those who use AI tools they are too young for. In the United Kingdom in 2026, 82 per cent of 16 to 17 year olds have come across an age check online and 49 per cent an advanced one[478]; in 2025/26, 84.6 per cent of 15 to 17 year olds know there is a minimum age for a social media profile, and 23.7 per cent have a parent who uses parental controls[479]. The last two are worked out from the survey's respondent file. Surveys that pool ages 12 or 13 to 17 are not used, because most of the children they describe are younger than 15.

A fifth indicator, an age rule or age-check duty in force, is defined and held in consideration, with no direction set. A rule is in force in five members: Australia, Gabon, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom. The rules of Australia, Gabon and Malaysia stop at 16, so within the index's band they bind 15 year olds only. Enforcement is documented for two: Australia's regulator reports about 4.7 million accounts removed or restricted by mid-December 2025[480], and the United Kingdom's had opened 23 investigations by July 2026[481]. Whether an age ban protects children or shuts them out is contested, which is why the indicator has no direction.

**Missing data.** Twenty-three members have no children's rights score: Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Namibia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Thirty-five members have no reading of the law on AI-made images. No member but the United Kingdom has a figure for ages 15 to 17 on any of the four indicators defined for the survey.

**Scoring and results.** The law on AI-made images, the five tests and the protocol are each worth at most 5 points for what is written down; the rest waits for dated evidence that the law is used, such as a prosecution for AI-made material, or that the commitment is kept, such as the reports the protocol requires. The law's wording covering computer-generated material earns 5, a general definition 2 and no cover 0: seven members score 5, 11 score 2 and three score 0. On the five tests a point is earned for each test met, so the 13 members meeting all five score 5 and Lesotho and Tuvalu, meeting none, score 0. A party to the protocol scores 5, a signatory 2 and a member that has taken no action 0. The children's rights score of the Global Index is banded in tens from 0 to 100, on the same footing as the Global Index's other scores: the United Kingdom's 88 scores 8, and New Zealand and Sri Lanka, with published

scores above 0 but below 10, score 0. Every figure on the four grades 7 of 10 for data strength: each describes law or government, not children, and takes 1 of 4 for age fit.

### Participation

**Definition.** Whether young people have a say in how these systems are governed where they live.

Participation is a requirement of both standards rather than a courtesy: the UNESCO Recommendation holds that the participation of diverse stakeholders is necessary for inclusive AI governance, respect for the views of the child is one of the four principles the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child applies, and inclusion of and for children is among UNICEF's requirements, as set out above under International standards and Children aged 15 to 17.

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has four indicators from published data. None is a figure about young people's own say in how AI is governed where they live, which no published source records.

The first is the score of the Global Index on Responsible AI 2026 for government mechanisms for including civil society in AI policy and governance[482]: consultations on AI policy open to civil society, provisions that require them, and standing bodies in which civil society organisations have a seat. The civil society inclusion score exists for 33 members, from 0 in 17 of them to 90.0 in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. It concerns civil society in general, not young people.

The second records whether the country has established a process for meaningful public participation in the development of its national AI policy, as coded by the AI and Democratic Values Index 2026[483]. Of the 22 members it covers, ten are coded yes (Australia, Canada, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom) and 12 partly; none is coded no. It too concerns the general public.

The third counts two routes by which a member's young people take part in international discussion of AI and digital governance: a national or regional cohort of the Commonwealth Student Community for AI Governance, launched between February and August 2026[484], and youth envoys nominated by the government to the ITU's Generation Connect for 2026 to 2030[485]. Twenty-two members have a student cohort and 18 have at least one envoy; five have both and 21 have neither. Both are platforms abroad, and the student cohorts are of university students; neither shows that young people are heard on AI in their own country.

The fourth is a foundation indicator: the share of members of the lower or single chamber of parliament aged 30 and under, at 31 July 2025[486]. The young members score exists for 41 members, from 0 in 11 of them to 10.0 per cent in Malta. It describes young people's place in law-making in general, not AI.

Two sources are supporting evidence. In 2024 and 2025, among people aged 18 to 29 in 18 African members, between 3.5 per cent (South Africa) and 16.1 per cent (Kenya) had contacted a member of parliament in the past year, worked out from the survey's respondent files[487]. The Global Youth Participation Index scores 37 members on youth participation in

political and civic life, and its dataset holds scores for four more that fell below its threshold for comparable data[488].

**Missing data.** Twenty-three members have no civil society inclusion score: Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Namibia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Thirty-four members are not covered on public participation in AI policy. Fifteen members have no figure for young members of parliament: Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Gabon, Grenada, Kiribati, Mozambique, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, The Bahamas, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. No member has a figure for young people on being asked their view on AI rules.

**Scoring and results.** No target exists for young members of parliament, those aged 30 and under, so the figure that scores 10 is 6.34 per cent, averaged over the five best members (Maldives, Malta, Namibia, Tanzania and The Gambia) at the figures used in this edition, with ten equal bands from none. It is the Inter-Parliamentary Union's own measure, counted from records that national parliaments provide; as a figure about members of parliament rather than young people it takes 1 for age fit, as the teacher figures do, so each member's data strength is 7. The 41 members spread as two members at 10, one at 8, one at 7, two at 6, four at 5, five at 4, three at 3, six at 2, five at 1 and 12 at 0, from Malta, at 10 per cent, to the 11 members with no member of parliament aged 30 and under. The civil society inclusion score is banded in tens from 0 to 100. In the Global Index it combines consultation while AI policy was drafted, 30 per cent, provisions for continued participation, 30 per cent, halved while the policy is a draft, and mechanisms working in practice, 40 per cent[489], so it is used as published: Nigeria and the United Kingdom, at 90, score 9, and the 17 members published at 0 score 0, as do Bangladesh and Lesotho, below 10. Public participation scores 10 for yes and 5 for partly: the ten members coded yes score 10 and the 12 coded partly 5. The routes score 10 for both, 5 for one and 0 for neither, so India, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda score 10, 30 members with one route 5 and 21 with neither 0. Each figure on the three grades 7 for data strength.

## Pillar 7: Motivation and confidence

### Rationale

Van Dijk's model of digital inequality sets out four successive kinds of access: motivational, material, skills and usage[490]. Helsper's corresponding fields model likewise holds that disadvantage offline reaches digital life through access, skills, and attitudinal or motivational aspects[491]. Motivation comes first: the wish to engage, and the belief that one can.

### Interest and confidence among young people

Belief in one's own ability matters. In the study that developed a measure of computer self-efficacy, that belief influenced people's expectations of the outcomes of using computers, their emotional reactions to them, including anxiety, and their actual use[492]. The unified theory of

acceptance and use of technology, which integrates eight earlier models including a motivational model, identifies four core determinants of intention and use, among them the performance and the effort a person expects from a technology[493].

### Attitudes towards AI

The AI literacy framework of the European Commission and the OECD builds attitudes into every competence, alongside knowledge and skills[494]. Teaching changes knowledge of AI more readily than attitudes: in a meta-analysis of AI literacy interventions, programmes focused on knowledge outperformed those aimed at skills, attitudes or ethics[495]. Young adults' views of AI are distinct. In a 2026 survey of 42,151 people in 36 countries, those aged 18 to 34 were more likely than those aged 50 and over to have heard a lot about AI, tended to be equally concerned and excited about it, and were more likely to say it will affect jobs negatively[496].

### What the pillar measures

The pillar measures young people's confidence in their own ability to use AI, their sense that AI can serve their goals, and the anxieties that hold them back. Concern that rests on an accurate reading of AI's risks is part of informed confidence.

**How the pillar is measured.** No survey puts the same question about AI to young people in every member. The widest recent question, whether the growing use of AI leaves a person more concerned than excited, covers 13 of the 56 members[497]. The pillar therefore scores only the questions of the two surveys described next, which ask young people what each indicator asks, and labels every figure with the question asked, who answered, the year and the age group.

The figures for young people aged 15 to 29 come from two surveys that publish their respondent-level files: the United Nations Development Programme's survey of 21 countries, seven of them members, carried out between November 2024 and January 2025, which in Australia interviewed people aged 18 and over, so its figures there are for ages 18 to 29[498]; and the World Risk Poll, which asked its questions on AI in 27 members in 2021 and has not asked them since[499]. The indicators of each sub-pillar are set out under it below.

No adult figure is used, and no figure that answers another question is scored, so a member with no figure from these two surveys is a gap for the survey; in the full index its gap is estimated as any other is. The 2021 figures carry their year, being collected before ChatGPT was released.

**Missing data.** Twenty-eight members have no figure from the two surveys on this pillar: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Eswatini, The Gambia, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Their figures are put to the survey.

**Stand-ins for members without a youth figure.** Three kinds of figure were gathered to stand in where a member has no figure from the two youth surveys, each labelled with its source

type and carrying its own data quality grade. The first is a national sample of a nearby youth band: ages 16 to 29 in Great Britain[500], ages 15 to 24 in Cyprus and Malta[501] and ages 18 to 34 in six members[502]. These are grade B. The second is a polling company's survey or a student sample for a youth band: ages 18 to 34 in Canada, Kenya and New Zealand[503], higher education students in Mauritius[504] and university students in Brunei Darussalam[505]. These are grade C. The third is young volunteers who answer UNICEF's U-Report polls: whether they feel equipped to work in jobs that use AI, ages 15 to 24, in Belize, Ghana, Jamaica and Vanuatu[506]. These are grade C. Where nothing about AI exists for a member on a sub-pillar, a young volunteers' poll about technology in general stands in, grade C and labelled as such. In seven Caribbean members the question is whether technology's effect on the world over the next ten years leaves them mostly excited or mostly worried, and how much control they feel over it[507]. In Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu the question is whether digital technologies are a good thing for island countries[508]. A figure for all adults is never used as it stands. One member, Malta, carries a figure worked out from an adult figure by its own youth gap: the share of adults aware of AI whom AI makes feel worried[509], carried to ages 15 to 29 by the gap between young people and all adults on the harm question in 2021[510], with the range the youth figure must lie in beside it. None of them is scored: each asks something other than the indicator's question, mostly of students or young volunteers, and, if kept, they would have set the top of four of the five scales, the five best figures on confidence among them. They remain in the record as supporting evidence.

**Student samples.** Two further student sources were gathered, both grade C. The first is the second wave of a global survey of university students about ChatGPT, run in classrooms and university channels between October 2024 and February 2025[511]. Its open respondent file gives each student's age and country of study, so the figures are for students aged 18 to 29 who use ChatGPT, and only where at least 30 of them answered and no other stand-in covers the member on that indicator. Three of its statements are used: that using ChatGPT is interesting to them, for the intention to use AI (Cyprus, Ghana, Malaysia, Tanzania, The Gambia, the United Kingdom and Zambia); that using ChatGPT is under their control, for confidence (Malaysia, Tanzania, The Gambia and Zambia); and that ChatGPT will reduce the number of jobs, filed as the share who agree (Ghana, Tanzania, The Gambia and Zambia). These are convenience samples of students who already use the tool, so they lean towards the interested and the confident, which is one reason they are not scored. The second is a survey of 70 Library and Information Science students at the University of Eswatini in July 2025, of whom 93 per cent wanted AI integrated into their academic work[512]: one department of one university, and the only figure found for Eswatini.

### Motivation

**Definition.** Whether a young person wants to take these tools up, and sees them as serving their own goals.

**Indicators.** Motivation has two indicators: the share of young people who say they are likely to use AI for education or work in the next 12 months, from the United Nations Development Programme's survey, and the share who think AI will mostly help people in their country, from the World Risk Poll. The first reaches seven of the 56 members and the second 27.

**Scoring and results.** Neither indicator has a target, and not every young person is expected to plan to use AI or to think it will help, so on each the five best members' average sets 10 and none sets 0, in equal bands. Likely use reaches 10 at 86.62 per cent, the average of Fiji, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa: India, Nigeria and South Africa score 10, Fiji and Pakistan 9, Bangladesh 8 and Australia, at 68.8 per cent for ages 18 to 29, 7. Thinking AI will mostly help reaches 10 at 54.36 per cent, the average of Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Mauritius and Singapore: Australia, Mauritius and Singapore score 10, and Gabon, Jamaica, Pakistan and Tanzania, at 16.5 to 21.5 per cent, score 3, the lowest.

### Confidence

**Definition.** Whether a young person believes they can use these tools to do what they need.

Belief in one's own ability is not a by-product of skill; it acts on its own, as set out above under Interest and confidence among young people. The same study found that self-efficacy and outcome expectations were raised by the encouragement of others in a person's group and by seeing others use the technology[513], which makes confidence something a country can act on rather than a fixed trait.

**Indicators.** Confidence has one indicator: the share of young people who are confident in their ability to control their interactions with AI systems, from the United Nations Development Programme's survey. It reaches seven of the 56 members. Whether a young person believes they can use AI to do what they need has no published measure; control over one's interactions with AI is the nearest published question, and the full question is put to the survey.

**Scoring and results.** With no target to set it, confidence reaches 10 at 60.82 per cent, the average of Fiji, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa: Fiji and Nigeria score 10, Australia, India, Pakistan and South Africa 9, and Bangladesh, at 51.2 per cent, 8. With seven members, the five best are most of them, so the scale separates them little.

### Anxiety

**Definition.** What worries young people about these tools, and whether those worries are well founded.

Young people's worries are distinctive and measurable, as set out above under Attitudes towards AI; in 19 of the 36 countries surveyed, people aged 18 to 34 were 30 percentage points or more likelier than those aged 50 and over to have heard or read a lot about AI[514].

The scores count the share who do not expect harm, and set it beside the share who expect help.

**Indicators.** Anxiety has two indicators: the share of young people who think AI will mostly harm people in their country, from the World Risk Poll, and the share who think it likely that their current job will be significantly changed or replaced by AI, from the United Nations Development Programme's survey. Both are turned round at scoring, so that the score rises as worry falls. They reach 27 and seven of the 56 members. Whether young people's worries are well founded cannot be measured from published sources and is put to the survey.

**Scoring and results.** Not expecting AI to mostly harm people reaches 10 at 80.68 per cent, the average of Bangladesh, Jamaica, Mozambique, New Zealand and Singapore: Jamaica, New Zealand and Singapore score 10, and Tanzania, where 59.7 per cent of young people expected harm in 2021, scores 4, the lowest. On jobs, the share who do not expect AI to change or replace their current job significantly reaches 10 at 55.64 per cent, the average of Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, India and Nigeria: Australia and Bangladesh score 10, Fiji, India and Nigeria 9, and Pakistan and South Africa, where about half expect it, 8.

The figures on harm and on help come from one World Risk Poll question, so a young person with no opinion counts against a member on help and for it on harm. In Jamaica 64.9 per cent of young people gave neither answer, and the member scores 3 on expecting help and 10 on not expecting harm. For the 21 members with only these two figures, the pillar therefore reads the balance between expected help and expected harm. The job question asks about a significant change or replacement together, as one question. Leaving the Anxiety sub-pillar out of the index moves 25 members' scores, by up to 5.0 points for Jamaica, and 36 members in the ranking, by up to eight places for Mozambique, and the same 15 members stay at or above the readiness benchmark. Annex D gives every member's index and rank without it.

## Pillar 8: Critical judgement and human agency

### Rationale

Frameworks of AI literacy agree that using AI well takes more than knowing how to operate it. A systematic review of 47 publications from 2019 to 2023 identified six recurring constructs of AI literacy: recognise; know and understand; use and apply; evaluate; create; and navigate ethically[515]. An earlier synthesis framed AI literacy as the competencies people need to interact with AI effectively and to evaluate it critically[516]. UNESCO's AI competency framework for students sets a human-centred mindset and the ethics of AI alongside AI techniques and system design[517]. The AI literacy framework of the European Commission and the OECD combines knowledge, skills and attitudes across four domains, engaging with, creating with, managing and shaping AI, and states the aim that learners maintain agency over how AI might shape their lives[518]. This pillar takes the parts of AI literacy that concern judgement, reliance and ethics.

### Judging when to rely on AI

AI assistance does not improve decisions automatically. A preregistered meta-analysis of 106 experiments, reporting 370 effect sizes, found that combinations of people and AI performed significantly worse on average than the better of the two working alone (Hedges' g = −0.23, 95 per cent confidence interval −0.39 to −0.07), with losses in tasks that involved making decisions and greater gains in tasks that involved creating content. Where people outperformed the AI on their own, the combination gained; where the AI outperformed people, the combination lost[519]. The value of AI assistance therefore depends on judging when, and how far, to rely on it.

### Agency and learning

Young people's own learning is at stake. In a field experiment with nearly a thousand high school mathematics students, unrestricted access to GPT-4 raised grades on practice problems by 48 per cent, but when access was then removed those students performed 17 per cent worse than students who had never had it, having used the tool as a "crutch". A version designed to safeguard learning largely removed the harm[520]. Keeping decisions and learning one's own is therefore part of readiness for AI.

### Judgement and agency as habits

Over-reliance is not simply a gap in knowledge. A review of research on automation found that automation bias occurs in novices and experts alike and cannot be prevented by training or instructions[521]. The pillar therefore treats judgement and agency as habits shown in practice, not only as knowledge that can be tested.

### Checking

**Definition.** Whether a young person actually checks what a machine tells them before acting on it.

Evaluate is one of the six recurring constructs of AI literacy set out above under Rationale.

Knowing that one should check is not the same as checking. In an experiment with 199 participants, people often accepted an AI suggestion even when it was wrong, including when the AI explained its suggestion, and earlier studies suggest explanations can increase that over-reliance. Designs that made people think before relying on the AI, by deciding first, asking to see the suggestion or waiting for it, cut over-reliance significantly compared with explanations alone, and those were the designs participants liked least[522].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar has one indicator from published data; two more are defined and held in consideration. The first is the share of young people who use AI and say they check what it tells them against another source. It has a figure for 23 of the 56 members, from 14.1 per cent in Papua New Guinea to 60.8 per cent in Malaysia. Checking of ordinary online information, such as verifying the reliability of something found online, is measured under Information and data in Pillar 2; this sub-pillar keeps what young people do with the answers AI gives them.

For 20 members the figure comes from Life Online, a poll opened in January 2026 by UNICEF's U-Report[523], and for Namibia from U-Report Namibia's Safer Internet Day poll of February 2026[524]. Life Online asked those who use AI, "How do you treat information you get from AI?" The four answers offered were "I trust it", "I check another source", "I ask follow-up questions" and "I'm not sure what to do". Namibia's poll asked what they think of the AI information they get. Its fourth answer is "I don't know AI", and those answers are left out of Namibia's figure. The figure is the share who chose "I check another source". For seven members (Bangladesh, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, The Gambia and Uganda) the national poll page gives the answers by age, and the figure is for ages 15 to 30, the poll's own age bands. For the other 14 the figure is for all who answered, because the poll gives no age

split for the member or too few answered at ages 15 to 30; about 57 per cent of all answers with a known age came from people aged 15 to 24. A member carries a figure only where 30 or more people answered. U-Reporters are volunteers who enrol through messaging apps, not a sample of young people, so every figure is labelled as a volunteers' poll and graded C.

For the United Kingdom and Australia a national survey of the same behaviour is used in place of the volunteers' poll. In Great Britain, 43 per cent of university students who use AI said in April 2026 that they usually or always check or verify its output before using it[525]. In Australia, 17 per cent of people aged 18 to 25 said in 2025 that they always check the accuracy of AI and 33 per cent that they do so most of the time, which is 55 per cent of those who use it[526]. Both surveys ask how often a young person checks, where U-Report asks what they do with an answer, so these two figures are not strictly comparable with the others. The U-Report figures for the two members (26.5 per cent of 49 answers in the United Kingdom, 57.6 per cent of 33 in Australia) are kept beside them.

Three limits are recorded with the figures. They are what young people say they do, and people check less than they say: in an experiment published in 2023, 70.8 per cent of people using a chatbot accepted a false statement it gave them[527], and in a survey of 319 knowledge workers published in 2025, greater confidence in the AI went with less critical checking of its output[528]. The U-Report question takes one answer, so a young person who asks follow-up questions and also checks is counted once. And the poll remains open, so its counts are those of the dated copy held by the study. The stakes are real: when journalists at 22 public broadcasters in 18 countries assessed AI assistants' answers to questions about the news in 2025, 45 per cent of the answers had at least one significant problem[529].

Other published figures are supporting evidence and are not used as stand-ins. Among adults in work surveyed in 2024 and 2025, the share who say they have relied on AI output without evaluating its accuracy is India 81, Nigeria 72, Singapore 69, South Africa 63, the United Kingdom 58, Australia 57, Canada 55 and New Zealand 51 per cent[530]; no figure by age is published for a member. In Canada, in a survey of 2026, 49 per cent of adult AI users always or often verify an AI answer with another source[531]. In the United Kingdom, in 2026, 52.3 per cent of AI users aged 13 to 18 check its outputs[532] and in November 2025, 54 per cent of those aged 8 to 17 often check whether what AI tells them is correct[533]. In Bangladesh, in 2026, 39.1 per cent of 1,104 university students agreed that they verify AI-generated information before using it[534].

Two further indicators are defined and held in consideration; they have no published figure for any member and are carried to the survey. The first is the share of young people who can tell AI-made content from content made by a person, in a short test. What is published is self-rated and asked differently in each place: 63 per cent of people aged 15 and over in Kenya said in April 2026 that they cannot identify AI-generated content[535], and 38.1 per cent of 113 young volunteers in Canada said in April 2026 that they can usually tell[536]. The second is the share of young people who know how to verify an AI answer, as a tested question. One such question has been published: asked what to do next with an AI summary of a research paper, 69.0 per cent of students in Singapore, 56.9 per cent in Brunei Darussalam and 50.0 per cent in Malaysia chose to cross-check it against the paper[537].

**Missing data.** No figure on checking AI answers exists for 33 members: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nauru, New Zealand, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. They are left without a figure and go to the survey, which asks the U-Report question unchanged in every member, how often a young person checks, and how often they have used an AI answer without evaluating it, and sets the two tests.

### Calibrated reliance

**Definition.** Whether a young person leans on these systems more where they are strong and less where they are weak.

Help from AI does not improve a result by itself: as set out above under Judging when to rely on AI, combinations of people and AI do worse on average than the better of the two alone, gaining where people are the stronger partner. Whether AI helps therefore turns on where a young person leans on it.

Getting that wrong is the common case rather than the exception, and it persists when the AI explains its suggestions, as the experiment described under Checking shows.

Managing AI is one of the four domains of the AI literacy framework of the European Commission and the OECD, alongside engaging with, creating with and shaping AI[538].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar asks what young people use AI for and what they will not use it for, how much they trust it for each of those, and whether that trust matches how often it has turned out wrong for them. It has three indicators, one for each part of that question: what young people use AI for, by task; how much they trust it, by task; and how often it has turned out wrong for them. Each is filed as its source reports it. Whether a young person's trust matches how often AI has been wrong for them is the score: it is worked out from the three together when the indicators are scored, and it reads higher as better.

For ten members (Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, The Gambia and Zambia) all three parts come from one source, in which the same young people answer each, and for the United Kingdom the first two do, its figure for error coming from a national survey of university students[539]. The shared source is the second wave of a global survey of university students about ChatGPT, run between October 2024 and February 2025[540]. Its open respondent file gives each student's age and country of study, so the figures are for students aged 18 to 29 who use ChatGPT, and only where 30 or more of them answered. For use, the survey asks how often the student uses it for each of 12 tasks. The figure shown is the share who often or always use it to find information for research papers, from 15.7 per cent in The Gambia to 47.8 per cent in Nigeria. For trust, it asks whether ChatGPT can do each of ten things; the figure shown is the share who agree it can provide reliable information. For error, it asks whether ChatGPT might mislead with inaccurate information. In the United Kingdom 22.6 per cent of students think it gives reliable information and 77.1 per cent think it might mislead; in the other ten members between 47.0 per cent (Ghana) and 71.8 per cent (The

Gambia) think it reliable, and between 19.1 per cent (Zambia) and 37.8 per cent (Malaysia) think it might mislead. The share for every task is recorded beside each figure, so that trust can be set against use and against error task by task.

Three other sources add to these. In Great Britain, 85 per cent of university students who use AI said in April 2026 that they had found a problem in work or content it produced, most often factual errors (37 per cent)[541]; this is used as the member's figure for error. The Office for National Statistics asked people aged 16 to 29 in Great Britain in May and June 2026 which tasks they would trust AI to carry out: 31 per cent named customer service, 22 per cent scientific research, 12 per cent medical diagnoses and 10 per cent legal or financial advice, and 36 per cent would trust it with no task[542]; these figures are recorded beside the United Kingdom's. In Canada, in 2026, 38 per cent of people aged 18 to 24 trust the accuracy of information from AI tools completely or most of the time[543]. For 13 members with nothing by task (Australia, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Togo and Uganda), the trust figure is the share of volunteers who answered "I trust it" when UNICEF's U-Report asked how they treat information from AI, for ages 15 to 30 in Australia, Namibia, South Africa and Uganda and for all who answered in the other nine[544]. It is trust in general, labelled as a volunteers' poll and graded C. With these, the trust indicator has a figure for 25 of the 56 members and the other two for 11.

Three limits are recorded with the figures. The student survey is a convenience sample of students who already use one tool, so it leans towards the confident. The sources ask different questions, and each figure carries its question, sample, ages and year. And the published questions ask whether AI might mislead, not how often it has in fact been wrong for the respondent. The research measures calibrated reliance by test: a person is shown right and wrong AI answers, and the measure is the share of wrong ones accepted and of right ones rejected[545]. In such a test 432 undergraduates in the United States followed 86 per cent of misleading suggestions and rejected 2 per cent of correct ones[546]. No survey in any member collects this.

Figures for adults are supporting evidence and are not used as stand-ins. The share of adults polled in 2025 who trust an AI tool a great deal or a fair amount to give accurate information is Nigeria 94, India 86, South Africa 78, Singapore 77, Australia 54, the United Kingdom 50 and Canada 38 per cent[547]. The share of adults in work surveyed in 2024 and 2025 who say they have made mistakes in their work because of AI is India 73, Singapore 68, Nigeria 61, Australia 59, South Africa 56, the United Kingdom 54, Canada 52 and New Zealand 46 per cent[548]. In the United Kingdom, 30 per cent of AI-search users aged 18 to 34 often or always use AI in place of a health professional[549]. When Which? tested the tools in September 2025 on 40 consumer questions, ChatGPT scored 64 out of 100, Copilot 68 and Gemini 69[550].

**Missing data.** No figure for young people exists on any part of the question for 31 members: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nauru, New Zealand, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. They are left without a figure. The survey asks every young respondent,

for one fixed list of tasks, how often they use AI for it, how far they trust what it gives them, and how often it has turned out wrong for them.

### Agency

**Definition.** Whether a young person keeps the thinking and the decision their own when a machine offers to do it for them.

The cost of handing the work over shows up only when the tool is removed, as the experiment described above under Agency and learning found: the gain and the loss came from the same tool used in two different ways.

The frameworks treat this as a requirement rather than a preference. The AI literacy framework of the European Commission and the OECD states that across all AI uses humans must exercise agency and preserve the capacity to make intentional and autonomous decisions[551]. A human-centred mindset is one of the four dimensions of UNESCO's framework for students, which sets out 12 competencies across a human-centred mindset, the ethics of AI, AI techniques and applications, and AI system design[552].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar asks whether young people could do the task without the tool, whether they add their own ideas or pass the output on as it came, and whether they have stopped doing something themselves because AI does it. Three indicators follow the three parts of that question, each filed as its source reports it and unscored in this edition.

*Whether young people could do the task without AI.* Three members have a figure, each on a different question. In Bangladesh, in 2026, 37.6 per cent of 1,104 university students agree that they can study and complete tasks effectively without any AI support[553]. In Canada, in 2026, 52 per cent of people aged 18 to 24 feel they are becoming more dependent on AI tools, against 34 per cent of all adults[554]. In the United Kingdom, in 2026, pupils aged 13 to 18 were offered a generative AI tool for a simple written exercise, and 72 per cent of them decided not to use it[555]. The other 53 members have no figure.

*Whether young people add their own ideas or pass AI output on.* Two members have a survey of young people. In the United Kingdom, in 2026, 24.1 per cent of 13 to 18 year olds say they simply copy what AI gives them when using it for homework, and 56.5 per cent add their own thoughts[556]; 12 per cent of undergraduates have put AI-generated text directly into assessed work, up from 8 per cent in 2025 and 3 per cent in 2024[557]. In Bangladesh, in 2026, 54.2 per cent of university students often use AI responses without major changes[558]. For 26 other members the figure comes from records of use, not from a survey: the share of conversations with one AI assistant in May 2026 in which the user handed the whole task over, with little or no input of their own[559]. It runs from 29.0 per cent in New Zealand to 42.5 per cent in Uganda. The publisher gives it for all users and gives nothing by age. It is therefore mapped to each member's population aged 15 to 29 as one group, and labelled: young people are taken to hand tasks over at the same rate as all users, so the published share is carried over unchanged, and beside it are recorded the number of people aged 15 to 29 it is applied to, the share of people aged 15 to 29 in the member's population aged 15 to 64 in the United Nations' figures (from 23.8 per cent in Malta to 55.5 per cent in Uganda)[560], and the limits within which the figure

for young people would lie if they held at least as large a share of the conversations as they do of the population. Those limits are wide. The figure describes the users of one assistant, who differ from member to member, and what the publisher's software judged each conversation to be.

*Whether young people have stopped doing things themselves because AI does it.* No source asks this directly. For 11 members the figure is the share of university students aged 18 to 29 who agree that ChatGPT might hinder learning by doing the work for students, from 37.2 per cent in Malaysia to 75.6 per cent in the United Kingdom[561]. In Canada, in a survey of July and August 2026, 51 per cent of students say their critical thinking skills have deteriorated since they started using AI[562]. In New Zealand, in 2026, 32 per cent of secondary school students say AI is making their critical thinking worse[563]. The first is a belief about students in general and the other two are about the respondent; each figure carries its question.

Experiments published since 2025 measure the same thing by test. In an experiment by researchers at the University of New South Wales, undergraduates who solved coding problems with AI help scored higher on the task (89 per cent against 69) but lower on a quiz about it 48 hours later (39 per cent against 52), and felt less ownership of the code they submitted[564]. In a randomised experiment with undergraduates, students who used AI to explain concepts kept their gains a week later, while the gains of those who used it to generate text vanished once AI was removed[565]. In Nigeria, six weeks of guided AI tutoring raised secondary students' English results by 0.23 standard deviations in a randomised trial[566]. The way the tool is used decides whether skill is built or lost, which is what the three indicators ask about.

Adult figures are again supporting evidence only. The share of adults in work surveyed in 2024 and 2025 who felt they could not complete their work without the help of AI is India 67, Nigeria 56, South Africa 49, Singapore 45, the United Kingdom 39, Australia 38, Canada 33 and New Zealand 31 per cent[567].

**Missing data.** A survey figure for young people exists on at least one part of the question for 13 members, and 16 more have only the records-of-use figure. The other 27 members, which have no figure on any part, are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, The Bahamas, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. They are left without a figure. The survey asks every young respondent whether they could do the tasks they give to AI without it, what they did with the last thing AI produced for them, and what they have stopped doing themselves.

### Ethical use

**Definition.** Whether a young person is honest and fair in how they work with these systems, and weighs the effect on other people.

Navigating ethically is one of the six recurring constructs of AI literacy set out above under Rationale.

Both of the frameworks written for schools give ethics standing of its own: the ethics of AI is one of the four dimensions of UNESCO's framework for students[568], and the framework of the European Commission and the OECD treats ethical use as depending on system design, on how a system was developed and on a user's own intentions[569].

**Indicators.** The sub-pillar asks whether young people say when they have used AI, what they think counts as fair use in schoolwork and at work, and whether they have seen AI treat someone unfairly. The three parts of that question give the three indicators, filed as their sources report them and not scored in this edition.

*Whether young people say when they have used AI.* One member has a figure on what young people do. In Canada, in 2026, 45 per cent of people aged 18 to 24 say that when they use AI at work or school they acknowledge it in the document, and 34 per cent say they do not; among all adults 32 per cent do[570]. For 11 members (Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, The Gambia, the United Kingdom and Zambia) the figure is a view, and is labelled as one: the share of university students aged 18 to 29 who agree that students should disclose their use of ChatGPT to their professors, from 30.2 per cent in Malaysia to 72.0 per cent in the United Kingdom[571]. It stands in until the survey asks young people what they themselves do. Stated disclosure is likely to run above practice: in four experiments with more than 4,400 participants, people who used AI tools were judged less competent and less motivated by others, and expected to be judged so[572].

*What young people think counts as fair use.* Two members ask which uses are cheating. In Canada, in 2026, 79 per cent of 18 to 24 year olds call it cheating when AI produces most of the final answer, 68 per cent when it produces part of it, 33 per cent when it edits or improves their work and 34 per cent when it generates ideas only; 45 per cent say the current rules are clear, against 20 per cent of all adults[573]. In the United Kingdom, in 2026, 44 per cent of 13 to 18 year olds think it is cheating to use AI to complete all of their homework[574]; among undergraduates, in 2026, 15 per cent think it acceptable to include AI-generated text directly in assessed work and 81 per cent say their institution has a clear policy[575]. The same survey rates each use in turn. Fifty-eight per cent think it acceptable to use AI to explain concepts, 50 per cent to summarise a relevant article, 43 per cent to structure their thoughts and 23 per cent to generate text they then edit, so undergraduates are divided on lighter uses and few accept handing in text that AI wrote[576]. For ten other members the figure is the share of students aged 18 to 29 who agree that ChatGPT might encourage students to cheat, from 37.8 per cent in Tanzania to 50.0 per cent in Pakistan; in the same survey between 18.1 and 42.3 per cent of students in those members say their institution has a policy or code of ethics on ChatGPT, against 93.9 per cent in the United Kingdom[577]. Two members have a figure on conduct: in Australia, in 2024, 40 per cent of university students had used AI in an assessment when

they were not supposed to[578], and in New Zealand, in 2026, 19 per cent of secondary school students have used AI for assessments in ways they know they should not[579]. Two members of the smaller-population peer groups carry the nearest published figure, labelled: in Malta, in 2025, 72 per cent of people aged 15 to 24 say schools and universities should have clear guidance on how and when to use AI[580], and in Mauritius, in October and November 2024, 53 per cent of higher education students believe AI raises ethical issues[581]. The questions differ, and each figure carries its own.

*Whether young people have seen AI treat someone unfairly.* No survey in any member asks this and reports it by country. The indicator is defined and held in consideration; it has no published figure for any member and is carried to the survey. Published figures on worry that AI is biased measure a different thing and are used under Fair treatment in Pillar 6, so they are not entered here a second time.

Official counts and figures for adults are supporting evidence and are not used as stand-ins. In England, 100 proven cases of plagiarism in GCSE, AS and A level in summer 2025 involved the misuse of AI, against 85 in 2024[582]. The Caribbean Examinations Council recorded 128 irregularity cases across the region in 2026, up from 80 in 2025, with misuse of AI among the leading kinds; it gives no figure by member[583]. The share of adults in work surveyed in 2024 and 2025 who have presented AI-generated content as their own is India 79, Nigeria 69, Singapore 63, South Africa 56, Australia 51, the United Kingdom 47, Canada 46 and New Zealand 43 per cent[584].

**Missing data.** Forty members have no figure for young people on any part: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Dominica, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, The Bahamas, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda and Vanuatu. They are left without a figure. The survey asks every young respondent whether they said so the last time they used AI for schoolwork or work, which of a graded set of uses they count as fair, and whether they have seen AI treat someone unfairly.

# ANNEX B: POPULATION AGED 15 TO 29, BY MEMBER

This annex gives the number of people aged 15 to 29 in each member in 2024, with the three reporting bands, the whole population and the figure used for each member (Table B1). The rule for choosing between the national statistics office's figure and the United Nations figure is set out at the end of this annex. United Nations figures are the medium variant of the World Population Prospects 2024 for 1 July 2024, with the January 2026 update for Togo[585].

**Table B1.** Population aged 15 to 29 and by reporting band, Commonwealth members, 2024, with the figure used for each member.

| Member | Aged 15 to 29 | Aged 15 to 17 | Aged 18 to 24 | Aged 25 to 29 | Whole population | Aged 15 to 29, per cent of population | Figure used |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antigua and Barbuda | 20,398 | 4,004 | 9,190 | 7,204 | 93,772 | 21.8 | United Nations |
| Australia | 5,443,799 | 999,347 | 2,450,710 | 1,993,742 | 26,713,205 | 20.4 | Australian Bureau of Statistics: official estimate for 30 June 2024, with the whole population from the United Nations for 1 July 2024 |
| Bangladesh | 48,280,897 | 10,229,021 | 22,934,340 | 15,117,536 | 173,562,364 | 27.8 | United Nations |
| Barbados | 54,900 | 11,142 | 25,804 | 17,954 | 282,467 | 19.4 | United Nations |
| Belize | 112,351 | 24,387 | 54,852 | 33,112 | 410,919 | 27.3 | Statistical Institute of Belize: official mid-year estimate for 2024 |
| Botswana | 737,827 | 145,726 | 345,536 | 246,565 | 2,521,139 | 29.3 | United Nations |
| Brunei Darussalam | 112,300 | 17,574 | 52,226 | 42,500 | 455,500 | 24.7 | Department of Economic Planning and Statistics: official estimate for 2024, rounded to hundreds |
| Cameroon | 8,029,153 | 1,944,587 | 3,832,943 | 2,251,623 | 29,123,744 | 27.6 | United Nations |
| Canada | 8,034,533 | 1,355,543 | 3,664,892 | 3,014,098 | 41,162,593 | 19.5 | Statistics Canada: official estimate for 1 July 2024 |
| Cyprus | 232,938 | 40,034 | 101,515 | 91,389 | 1,358,282 | 17.1 | United Nations |

| Member | Aged 15 to 29 | Aged 15 to 17 | Aged 18 to 24 | Aged 25 to 29 | Whole population | Aged 15 to 29, per cent of population | Figure used |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dominica | 13,656 | 2,609 | 6,187 | 4,860 | 66,205 | 20.6 | United Nations |
| Eswatini | 356,466 | 78,772 | 170,210 | 107,484 | 1,242,822 | 28.7 | United Nations |
| Fiji | 229,382 | 49,948 | 106,167 | 73,267 | 928,784 | 24.7 | United Nations |
| Gabon | 632,832 | 146,472 | 296,007 | 190,353 | 2,538,952 | 24.9 | United Nations |
| Ghana | 9,303,588 | 2,140,439 | 4,479,925 | 2,683,224 | 34,427,414 | 27.0 | United Nations |
| Grenada | 25,988 | 5,212 | 11,712 | 9,064 | 117,208 | 22.2 | United Nations |
| Guyana | 219,318 | 44,406 | 99,366 | 75,546 | 831,086 | 26.4 | United Nations |
| India | 381,836,875 | 75,999,145 | 181,367,682 | 124,470,048 | 1,450,935,791 | 26.3 | United Nations |
| Jamaica | 716,149 | 130,930 | 325,846 | 259,373 | 2,839,175 | 25.2 | United Nations |
| Kenya | 16,741,622 | 4,010,436 | 8,059,892 | 4,671,294 | 56,432,944 | 29.7 | United Nations |
| Kiribati | 34,851 | 7,841 | 15,436 | 11,574 | 134,518 | 25.9 | United Nations |
| Lesotho | 665,068 | 148,368 | 313,708 | 202,992 | 2,337,423 | 28.5 | United Nations |
| Malawi | 6,457,716 | 1,590,683 | 3,099,807 | 1,767,226 | 21,655,286 | 29.8 | United Nations |
| Malaysia | 8,917,500 | 1,595,402 | 4,285,798 | 3,036,300 | 34,052,100 | 26.2 | Department of Statistics Malaysia: official mid-year estimate for 2024 |
| Maldives | 148,736 | 20,935 | 54,591 | 73,210 | 571,891 | 26.0 | Maldives Bureau of Statistics: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2022 census, with resident foreigners raised to 2025 administrative records |
| Malta | 104,932 | 13,600 | 40,601 | 50,731 | 568,846 | 18.4 | Eurostat: official estimates for 1 January 2024 and 1 January 2025, averaged |
| Mauritius | 262,416 | 46,824 | 123,632 | 91,960 | 1,245,449 | 21.1 | Statistics Mauritius: official estimate for 1 July 2024 |
| Mozambique | 9,703,016 | 2,349,445 | 4,637,918 | 2,715,653 | 34,631,766 | 28.0 | United Nations |
| Namibia | 801,507 | 174,533 | 370,154 | 256,820 | 3,030,131 | 26.5 | United Nations |

| Member | Aged 15 to 29 | Aged 15 to 17 | Aged 18 to 24 | Aged 25 to 29 | Whole population | Aged 15 to 29, per cent of population | Figure used |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nauru | 2,961 | 797 | 1,307 | 857 | 11,947 | 24.8 | United Nations |
| New Zealand | 1,024,730 | 213,200 | 460,780 | 350,750 | 5,289,900 | 19.4 | Stats NZ: official estimate for 30 June 2024 |
| Nigeria | 65,662,536 | 16,130,271 | 31,798,657 | 17,733,608 | 232,679,478 | 28.2 | United Nations |
| Pakistan | 70,216,299 | 16,504,056 | 33,432,865 | 20,279,378 | 251,269,164 | 27.9 | United Nations |
| Papua New Guinea | 2,911,154 | 635,883 | 1,381,989 | 893,282 | 10,576,502 | 27.5 | United Nations |
| Rwanda | 4,040,084 | 958,421 | 1,993,523 | 1,088,140 | 14,256,567 | 28.3 | United Nations |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 9,876 | 1,887 | 4,438 | 3,551 | 46,843 | 21.1 | United Nations |
| Saint Lucia | 41,933 | 7,389 | 18,852 | 15,692 | 179,744 | 23.3 | United Nations |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 21,755 | 4,577 | 9,948 | 7,230 | 100,616 | 21.6 | United Nations |
| Samoa | 52,491 | 13,945 | 24,726 | 13,820 | 218,019 | 24.1 | United Nations |
| Seychelles | 27,213 | 4,878 | 11,752 | 10,583 | 130,418 | 20.9 | United Nations |
| Sierra Leone | 2,504,953 | 579,383 | 1,204,463 | 721,107 | 8,642,022 | 29.0 | United Nations |
| Singapore | 1,477,602 | 178,140 | 697,142 | 602,320 | 5,832,387 | 25.3 | United Nations |
| Solomon Islands | 224,130 | 51,125 | 108,263 | 64,742 | 819,198 | 27.4 | United Nations |
| South Africa | 16,040,911 | 3,260,497 | 7,201,604 | 5,578,810 | 64,007,187 | 25.1 | United Nations |
| Sri Lanka | 4,776,102 | 1,080,083 | 2,323,561 | 1,372,458 | 21,781,800 | 21.9 | Department of Census and Statistics: census count, 19 December 2024 |
| Tanzania | 19,238,951 | 4,578,858 | 9,269,141 | 5,390,952 | 68,560,157 | 28.1 | United Nations |
| The Bahamas | 89,175 | 17,333 | 39,835 | 32,007 | 401,283 | 22.2 | United Nations |

| Member | Aged 15 to 29 | Aged 15 to 17 | Aged 18 to 24 | Aged 25 to 29 | Whole population | Aged 15 to 29, per cent of population | Figure used |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Gambia | 720,931 | 177,172 | 350,866 | 192,893 | 2,422,712 | 29.8 | Gambia Bureau of Statistics: census count, May and June 2024, preliminary results |
| Togo | 2,236,043 | 565,488 | 1,061,736 | 608,819 | 8,406,558 | 26.6 | United Nations |
| Tonga | 27,317 | 7,075 | 13,981 | 6,261 | 104,176 | 26.2 | United Nations |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 288,565 | 57,096 | 132,021 | 99,448 | 1,507,782 | 19.1 | United Nations |
| Tuvalu | 2,345 | 529 | 1,078 | 738 | 9,646 | 24.3 | United Nations |
| Uganda | 13,398,864 | 3,279,018 | 6,472,293 | 3,647,553 | 45,905,417 | 29.2 | Uganda Bureau of Statistics: census count, night of 9 May 2024 |
| United Kingdom | 12,747,524 | 2,465,107 | 5,736,476 | 4,545,941 | 69,138,192 | 18.4 | Office for National Statistics: official estimate for 30 June 2024, with the whole population from the United Nations for 1 July 2024 |
| Vanuatu | 82,463 | 19,903 | 37,921 | 24,639 | 327,777 | 25.2 | United Nations |
| Zambia | 6,282,026 | 1,551,408 | 3,038,314 | 1,692,304 | 21,641,442 | 29.0 | Zambia Statistics Agency: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2022 census |
| All 56 members | 732,379,648 | 155,670,884 | 348,164,179 | 228,544,585 | 2,758,538,710 | 26.5 | |

Table B2 sets each national figure used beside the United Nations figure it replaces, with what each rests on.

**Table B2.** National figures used, and the United Nations figures they replace.

| Member | National figure, aged 15 to 29 | Source | What it rests on | United Nations figure | Difference, per cent | What the United Nations figure rests on |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 5,443,799 | Official estimate for 30 June 2024 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2026) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 5,065,082 | +7.5 | 2021 census, official estimates to 2022 |
| Belize | 112,351 | Official mid-year estimate for 2024 (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2026) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 117,969 | −4.8 | 2010 census, official estimates to 2023 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 112,300 | Official estimate for 2024, rounded to hundreds (Brunei Darussalam, Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, 2025) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 108,013 | +4.0 | 2021 census |
| Canada | 8,034,533 | Official estimate for 1 July 2024 (Statistics Canada, 2026c) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 7,397,564 | +8.6 | 2016 census |
| Malaysia | 8,917,500 | Official mid-year estimate for 2024 (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2026) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 9,070,878 | −1.7 | 2020 census, official estimates to 2022 |
| Maldives | 148,736 | Official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2022 census, with resident foreigners raised to 2025 administrative records (Maldives Bureau of Statistics, 2026) | Official counts or records to 2025 | 119,899 | +24.1 | 2022 census |
| Malta | 104,932 | Official estimates for 1 January 2024 and 1 January 2025, averaged (Eurostat, 2026i) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 85,820 | +22.3 | 2021 census |
| Mauritius | 262,416 | Official estimate for 1 July 2024 (Statistics Mauritius, 2025) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 276,832 | −5.2 | 2022 census |
| New Zealand | 1,024,730 | Official estimate for 30 June 2024 (Stats NZ, 2026) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 1,010,156 | +1.4 | 2018 census, official estimates to 2022 |
| Sri Lanka | 4,776,102 | Census count, 19 December 2024 (Sri Lanka, Department of Census and Statistics, 2026) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 5,153,647 | −7.3 | 2012 census, official estimates to 2022 |
| The Gambia | 720,931 | Census count, May and June 2024, preliminary results (Gambia Bureau of Statistics, 2024) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 789,348 | −8.7 | 2013 census, official estimates to 2019 |

| Member | National figure, aged 15 to 29 | Source | What it rests on | United Nations figure | Difference, per cent | What the United Nations figure rests on |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uganda | 13,398,864 | Census count, night of 9 May 2024 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2024) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 15,075,926 | −11.1 | 2014 census, official estimates to 2023 |
| United Kingdom | 12,747,524 | Official estimate for 30 June 2024 (Office for National Statistics, 2026b) | Official counts or records to 2024 | 12,535,395 | +1.7 | 2011 census, official estimates to 2021 |
| Zambia | 6,282,026 | Official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2022 census (Zambia Statistics Agency, 2026) | Official counts or records to 2022 | 6,123,806 | +2.6 | 2010 census, official estimates to 2021; 2022 census for the total only |

Table B3 lists the national figures that were found and not used, with the reason in each case. A national projection is not used where the evidence it rests on is no newer than the evidence behind the United Nations figure.

**Table B3.** National figures found and not used.

| Member | National figure, aged 15 to 29 | What it is | United Nations figure (used) | Difference, per cent | Why the United Nations figure is used |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antigua and Barbuda | 22,999 | Statistics Division: official projection for 2024, made in 2021 | 20,398 | +12.8 | Projection from evidence of 2011; the United Nations figure rests on the 2011 census and official estimates to 2021 |
| Botswana | 602,753 | Statistics Botswana: official projection for 2024 from the 2022 census | 737,827 | −18.3 | Projection from evidence of 2022; the United Nations figure rests on the 2022 census and official estimates to 2023 |
| Cameroon | 7,925,580 | Institut National de la Statistique: official projection for 2024 from the 2005 census | 8,029,153 | −1.3 | Projection from evidence of 2005; the United Nations figure rests on the 2005 census and official estimates to 2023 |
| Cyprus | 167,346 | Statistical Service of Cyprus: official estimate for 1 January 2024 | 232,938 | −28.2 | The national figure counts a different population: it covers the government-controlled area only, while the United Nations figure is for the whole island |
| Fiji | 229,089 | Pacific Community: projection for 1 July 2024 | 229,382 | −0.1 | The regional figure is a reworking of the United Nations' own figures, not a national one |
| Gabon | 567,212 | Direction Générale de la Statistique: official projection for 2024 from the 2013 census | 632,832 | −10.4 | Projection from evidence of 2013; the United Nations figure rests on the 2013 census |
| Kiribati | 34,700 | Pacific Community: projection for 1 July 2024 | 34,851 | −0.4 | The regional figure is a reworking of the United Nations' own figures, not a national one |

| Member | National figure, aged 15 to 29 | What it is | United Nations figure (used) | Difference, per cent | Why the United Nations figure is used |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lesotho | 584,336 | Lesotho Bureau of Statistics: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2016 census | 665,068 | −12.1 | Projection from evidence of 2016; the United Nations figure rests on the 2016 census and official estimates to 2021 |
| Malawi | 5,912,880 | National Statistical Office: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2018 census | 6,457,716 | −8.4 | Projection from evidence of 2018; the United Nations figure rests on the 2018 census and official estimates to 2023 |
| Namibia | 788,163 | Namibia Statistics Agency: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2023 census | 801,507 | −1.7 | Projection from evidence of 2023; the United Nations figure rests on the 2023 census |
| Nauru | 2,923 | Pacific Community: projection for 1 July 2024 | 2,961 | −1.3 | The regional figure is a reworking of the United Nations' own figures, not a national one |
| Papua New Guinea | 2,891,410 | Pacific Community: projection for 1 July 2024 | 2,911,154 | −0.7 | The regional figure is a reworking of the United Nations' own figures, not a national one |
| Rwanda | 3,891,708 | National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2022 census | 4,040,084 | −3.7 | Projection from evidence of 2022; the United Nations figure rests on the 2022 census |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 22,680 | Statistical Office: census count, 15 June 2023 | 21,755 | +4.3 | The national figure is not for 2024 |
| Singapore | 705,247 | Singapore Department of Statistics: official estimate for 30 June 2024 | 1,477,602 | −52.3 | The national figure counts a different population: the tables by age cover citizens and permanent residents only and leave out about 1.86 million non-residents |
| Solomon Islands | 226,002 | Solomon Islands National Statistics Office: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2019 census | 224,130 | +0.8 | Projection from evidence of 2019; the United Nations figure rests on the 2019 census and official estimates to 2022 |
| South Africa | 15,255,258 | Statistics South Africa: official modelled mid-year estimate for 2024 (July 2024 release) | 16,040,911 | −4.9 | Projection from evidence of 2022; the United Nations figure rests on the 2022 census |
| Tanzania | 17,490,675 | National Bureau of Statistics: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2022 census | 19,238,951 | −9.1 | Projection from evidence of 2022; the United Nations figure rests on the 2022 census |
| The Bahamas | 95,400 | Bahamas National Statistical Institute: official projection for 1 July 2024 from the 2010 census | 89,175 | +7.0 | Projection from evidence of 2010; the United Nations figure rests on the 2022 census |

| Member | National figure, aged 15 to 29 | What it is | United Nations figure (used) | Difference, per cent | Why the United Nations figure is used |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Togo | 2,429,000 | Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques et Démographiques: official projection for 1 January 2024 from the 2010 census | 2,236,043 | +8.6 | Projection from evidence of 2010; the United Nations figure rests on the 2022 census |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 346,341 | Central Statistical Office: provisional mid-year estimate for 2024, which applies the 2011 census age pattern unchanged to the 2024 total | 288,565 | +20.0 | Projection from evidence of 2011; the United Nations figure rests on the 2011 census and official estimates to 2021 |
| Tuvalu | 2,288 | Tuvalu Central Statistics Division: official estimate for 2023 | 2,345 | −2.4 | The national figure is not for 2024 |

## How the figure for each member was chosen

The Data Sources volume of the Prospects lists, country by country, the censuses and official estimates each figure rests on[586].

For Canada the age figures rest on censuses up to 2016, while Statistics Canada's estimate for 1 July 2024 rests on the 2021 census carried forward with recorded births, deaths and migration, and counts 8.6 per cent more people aged 15 to 29[587]. For Malta the difference is 22.3 per cent[588]. The United Nations itself replaced its figures for Togo in January 2026, after that country's 2022 census. The index already draws each indicator from the strongest source each member has and records what every figure is; the population is treated in the same way.

The national figure is used where it meets five conditions. A copy of the source is held, so that the figure can be checked. It is for 2024. It counts ages 15 to 29 exactly, from single ages or from the five-year groups 15 to 19, 20 to 24 and 25 to 29. It covers the same population as the United Nations figure. The one small difference is Mauritius, whose figure leaves out Agalega and St Brandon, two outer islands with 330 residents at the 2022 census. And it rests on newer evidence, which means one of three things: an official estimate built from a census and carried to 2024 with recorded births, deaths and migration; a census taken within a year of 1 July 2024; or a projection resting on a census or official records more recent than anything the United Nations figure rests on. In every other case the United Nations figure is used: where the national office publishes nothing by age for 2024, where it publishes only a projection from a census the United Nations figure already rests on, and where it counts a different population. The last applies to Cyprus, whose official figures cover the government-controlled area, and to Singapore, whose tables by age cover citizens and permanent residents only.

National figures are used for 14 members (Table B2): official estimates for Australia, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand and the United King-

dom; census counts for Sri Lanka (19 December 2024), The Gambia (May and June 2024, preliminary results) and Uganda (9 May 2024); and projections for Maldives, where the number of resident foreigners is raised to 2025 administrative records, and Zambia, whose projection rests on the ages counted in the 2022 census, a census the United Nations used for the total only. These figures differ from the United Nations figures by between −11.1 per cent (Uganda) and +24.1 per cent (Maldives). The United Nations figure is used for the other 42 members. For one of them, Seychelles, the national office publishes an estimate for 2024 by age but no copy of the source is yet held, so the first condition is not met. National figures that were found and not used are listed with the reason in Table B3.

The United Nations figures are the sum of the 15 single ages from 15 to 29. They were checked against the five-year age group file of the same revision, which agrees for every member to within five people, and against the World Bank's series of population by five-year age group and sex[589], which agrees to within four people for 46 members; for the other ten the World Bank's own total population differs from the United Nations'. Census counts are used as counted on the census date and are not moved to 1 July. The reporting bands 15 to 17, 18 to 24 and 25 to 29 are exact where single ages are published. Where a national office publishes five-year groups, the 15 to 19 group is divided between 15 to 17 and 18 to 19 in the proportions of the United Nations single ages for that member, which leaves the figure for ages 15 to 29 unchanged. All the files used are held as dated copies with their digests, as described under Audit trail and reproducibility, and the figures are recomputed from those copies by the study's code.

With the United Nations figure for every member the total would be 733,223,239, 0.1 per cent higher. The five largest members (India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Tanzania) have 80 per cent of the Commonwealth's young people, and 15 members have fewer than 100,000. Young people are between 17.1 per cent of the population (Cyprus) and 29.8 per cent (Malawi).

# ANNEX C: DATA GAP INDEX

The Data Gap Index measures the extent of missing source evidence across all 56 Commonwealth member states. It expresses the gaps across the full eight-pillar framework as a weighted score out of 100, with each pillar contributing a maximum of 12.5 points. The table shows both the overall data gap for each country and how that gap is distributed across the eight pillars. A permitted stand-in drawn from qualifying published evidence counts as an available figure.

An estimate remains a data gap, even when it has been used to calculate a country's readiness score. This distinction is reflected in the published calculations for all 56 countries. A higher Data Gap Index score indicates more missing evidence, rather than necessarily lower AI readiness. Countries with the same score share a rank. Asterisks identify the small youth states, the 21 Commonwealth members outside Europe with total populations below one million. Each pillar's points are rounded, so the pillar columns can differ from the Gap by up to 0.2.

**Table C1.** The Data Gap Index.

| Rank | Member | Gap | Indicators lacking evidence (of 111) | Meaningful access | Digital, data, media and AI capability | Purposeful use and creation | Education and training provision | Decent work, enterprise and transitions | Rights, safety and participation | Motivation and confidence | Critical judgement and human agency |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Bahamas * | 78.5 | 78 | 3.9 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 10.1 | 5.7 | 8.9 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 2 | Solomon Islands * | 75.6 | 77 | 1.6 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 8.9 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 3 | Dominica * | 75.1 | 79 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 8.7 | 11.2 | 8.9 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 3 | Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 75.1 | 79 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 8.7 | 11.2 | 8.9 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 5 | Seychelles * | 73.1 | 73 | 1.6 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 4.5 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 6 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 72.1 | 76 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 8.7 | 10.0 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 7 | Maldives * | 71.4 | 70 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 9.0 | 4.0 | 8.3 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 8 | Antigua and Barbuda * | 70.6 | 70 | 3.1 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 5.7 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 9 | Barbados * | 70.5 | 69 | 1.6 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 9.0 | 5.8 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 10 | Nauru * | 69.2 | 69 | 2.3 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 7.0 | 8.9 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 11 | Tuvalu * | 69.1 | 70 | 2.3 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 6.4 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 12 | Papua New Guinea | 67.9 | 72 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 10.8 | 7.6 | 7.2 | 8.9 | 12.5 | 8.3 |
| 13 | Gabon | 67.1 | 69 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 9.0 | 5.5 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 12.5 |
| 14 | Kiribati * | 66.9 | 68 | 0.8 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 5.8 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 15 | Grenada * | 66.2 | 66 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 5.2 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 16 | Guyana * | 65.5 | 64 | 2.3 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 4.4 | 7.8 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 17 | Belize * | 65.2 | 62 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 18 | Samoa * | 65.1 | 65 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 8.3 | 4.0 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 19 | Vanuatu * | 64.7 | 64 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 4.3 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 20 | Tonga * | 62.8 | 62 | 0.0 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 4.7 | 8.9 | 12.5 | 12.5 |

| Rank | Member | Gap | Indicators lacking evidence (of 111) | Meaningful access | Digital, data, media and AI capability | Purposeful use and creation | Education and training provision | Decent work, enterprise and transitions | Rights, safety and participation | Motivation and confidence | Critical judgement and human agency |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21 | Eswatini | 62.7 | 61 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 3.9 | 7.8 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 22 | Saint Lucia * | 61.6 | 60 | 1.6 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 7.0 | 3.6 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 23 | Mozambique | 58.1 | 57 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 11.0 | 7.6 | 4.5 | 2.6 | 8.3 | 11.5 |
| 24 | Trinidad and Tobago | 56.6 | 54 | 0.8 | 3.3 | 11.0 | 7.6 | 6.2 | 3.6 | 12.5 | 11.5 |
| 25 | Brunei Darussalam * | 56.3 | 54 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 10.8 | 2.4 | 4.0 | 8.3 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| 26 | Namibia | 56.2 | 56 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 11.0 | 7.6 | 3.7 | 5.7 | 8.3 | 7.3 |
| 27 | Lesotho | 54.9 | 55 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 8.3 |
| 28 | Cameroon | 53.9 | 54 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 11.0 | 8.3 | 3.8 | 2.6 | 8.3 | 7.3 |
| 29 | Botswana | 53.8 | 49 | 0.0 | 4.2 | 11.0 | 8.3 | 3.7 | 2.6 | 12.5 | 11.5 |
| 30 | Malawi | 53.0 | 51 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 12.5 | 7.6 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 12.5 | 8.3 |
| 31 | Sri Lanka | 52.7 | 54 | 0.0 | 11.2 | 11.0 | 7.6 | 4.5 | 2.6 | 8.3 | 7.3 |
| 32 | Togo | 51.8 | 50 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 11.0 | 8.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 8.3 | 7.3 |
| 33 | Jamaica | 51.2 | 49 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 11.0 | 7.6 | 4.3 | 2.6 | 8.3 | 11.5 |
| 34 | Rwanda | 50.2 | 48 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 11.0 | 6.9 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 12.5 | 7.3 |
| 35 | New Zealand | 50.1 | 53 | 0.8 | 11.2 | 9.4 | 0.7 | 8.2 | 2.6 | 8.3 | 8.9 |
| 36 | Uganda | 50.0 | 48 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 9.4 | 8.3 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 8.3 | 7.3 |
| 37 | Mauritius | 49.4 | 48 | 0.0 | 6.7 | 11.0 | 6.9 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 8.3 | 9.9 |
| 38 | Fiji * | 47.9 | 52 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 6.2 | 7.6 | 3.9 | 8.9 | 4.2 | 12.5 |
| 39 | Sierra Leone | 46.5 | 46 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 10.8 | 7.6 | 3.9 | 1.6 | 8.3 | 8.3 |
| 40 | Kenya | 42.9 | 43 | 0.0 | 11.2 | 8.1 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 1.6 | 8.3 | 7.3 |
| 41 | The Gambia | 41.9 | 41 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 7.3 | 7.6 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 12.5 | 2.1 |
| 42 | Malta | 41.4 | 41 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 8.5 | 1.0 | 4.9 | 6.2 | 8.3 | 9.9 |
| 43 | Tanzania | 41.0 | 41 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 5.8 | 8.3 | 3.4 | 1.6 | 8.3 | 1.0 |
| 44 | Zambia | 40.5 | 40 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 5.8 | 7.6 | 3.1 | 2.1 | 8.3 | 1.0 |
| 45 | Singapore | 37.7 | 35 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 8.1 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 2.1 | 8.3 | 11.5 |
| 46 | Cyprus | 34.1 | 30 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 1.2 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 4.2 |

| Rank | Member | Gap | Indicators lacking evidence (of 111) | Meaningful access | Digital, data, media and AI capability | Purposeful use and creation | Education and training provision | Decent work, enterprise and transitions | Rights, safety and participation | Motivation and confidence | Critical judgement and human agency |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 47 | South Africa | 32.0 | 34 | 1.6 | 10.0 | 3.5 | 5.2 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 7.3 |
| 48 | Canada | 31.8 | 29 | 0.0 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 2.1 | 3.0 | 2.1 | 8.3 | 5.2 |
| 49 | Ghana | 31.7 | 30 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 5.8 | 7.6 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 8.3 | 1.0 |
| 50 | Malaysia | 29.0 | 32 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 4.6 | 3.5 | 7.9 | 1.6 | 8.3 | 1.0 |
| 51 | Australia | 26.2 | 31 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 3.5 | 0.7 | 4.7 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 5.7 |
| 52 | India | 20.7 | 25 | 0.0 | 8.3 | 0.0 | 5.2 | 4.0 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| 53 | United Kingdom | 20.1 | 18 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 8.3 | 0.0 |
| 54 | Nigeria | 17.4 | 21 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 0.0 | 7.6 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| 55 | Pakistan | 15.7 | 19 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 7.6 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| 56 | Bangladesh | 14.4 | 18 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 7.6 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

# ANNEX D: THE INDEX WORKED OUT IN OTHER WAYS

This annex presents each member's published index score and rank alongside its results under the three alternative methods of combining scores described under Uncertainty and sensitivity (Table D1). Scores are out of 100. Under the Youth Development Index's rule the scores are those of the index, so only the rank is shown; a dash marks a member with figures for fewer than half of the 102 indicators. The small youth states are marked with an asterisk. Members are listed in the order of the index.

**Table D1.** The index worked out in three other ways.

| Member | Index | Rank | Every indicator counts the same | Rank | Strong pillars cannot fully make up for weak ones | Rank | Rank under the Youth Development Index's rule | Indicators with a figure (of 102) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Singapore | 77.6 | 1 | 71.3 | 2 | 75.1 | 1 | 1 | 75 |
| Malta | 75.0 | 2 | 75.6 | 1 | 74.1 | 2 | 2 | 68 |
| Australia | 71.0 | 3 | 70.1 | 4 | 69.9 | 3 | 3 | 76 |
| United Kingdom | 70.8 | 4 | 70.5 | 3 | 69.3 | 4 | 4 | 84 |
| Canada | 70.2 | 5 | 68.0 | 5 | 68.3 | 5 | 5 | 76 |
| Malaysia | 69.0 | 6 | 67.1 | 6 | 67.1 | 6 | 6 | 72 |
| Cyprus | 67.4 | 7 | 66.6 | 7 | 66.0 | 7 | 7 | 74 |
| Mauritius | 64.4 | 8 | 61.0 | 10 | 61.3 | 8 | 8 | 61 |
| New Zealand | 63.9 | 9 | 66.2 | 8 | 60.9 | 9 | 9 | 55 |
| Brunei Darussalam * | 62.3 | 10 | 61.8 | 9 | 56.9 | 11 | 10 | 57 |
| India | 60.6 | 11 | 60.9 | 11 | 58.5 | 10 | 11 | 80 |
| Fiji * | 56.9 | 12 | 59.0 | 13 | 50.2 | 14 | 12 | 60 |
| South Africa | 56.8 | 13 | 55.7 | 17 | 53.7 | 13 | 13 | 75 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 56.5 | 14 | 56.9 | 16 | 54.1 | 12 | 14 | 58 |
| Nigeria | 54.5 | 15 | 58.9 | 14 | 47.0 | 17 | 15 | 82 |
| Seychelles * | 51.8 | 16 | 60.3 | 12 | 49.8 | 15 | – | 39 |
| Ghana | 51.2 | 17 | 50.3 | 28 | 47.0 | 18 | 16 | 73 |
| Jamaica | 50.7 | 18 | 50.8 | 23 | 48.0 | 16 | 17 | 61 |
| Sri Lanka | 49.9 | 19 | 53.7 | 20 | 47.0 | 19 | 18 | 54 |
| Zambia | 48.8 | 20 | 46.8 | 37 | 46.3 | 21 | 19 | 65 |
| Bangladesh | 48.7 | 21 | 50.6 | 25 | 44.0 | 23 | 20 | 84 |
| Kenya | 48.7 | 22 | 51.4 | 21 | 46.7 | 20 | 21 | 66 |
| Uganda | 47.0 | 23 | 51.0 | 22 | 46.2 | 22 | 22 | 61 |
| Pakistan | 46.4 | 24 | 47.1 | 33 | 43.8 | 24 | 23 | 84 |
| Tanzania | 45.5 | 25 | 50.5 | 26 | 42.6 | 27 | 24 | 63 |
| Gabon | 45.3 | 26 | 50.5 | 27 | 43.2 | 25 | – | 43 |
| Antigua and Barbuda * | 45.2 | 27 | 50.2 | 29 | 39.2 | 33 | – | 41 |
| Maldives * | 44.9 | 28 | 53.9 | 19 | 40.9 | 30 | – | 41 |
| Cameroon | 44.9 | 29 | 39.8 | 49 | 42.7 | 26 | 25 | 54 |
| The Bahamas * | 44.7 | 30 | 58.6 | 15 | 40.2 | 32 | – | 35 |

| Member | Index | Rank | Every indicator counts the same | Rank | Strong pillars cannot fully make up for weak ones | Rank | Rank under the Youth Development Index's rule | Indicators with a figure (of 102) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Guyana * | 44.5 | 31 | 54.7 | 18 | 41.3 | 29 | – | 49 |
| Papua New Guinea | 44.1 | 32 | 40.0 | 47 | 35.3 | 44 | – | 38 |
| Sierra Leone | 43.6 | 33 | 38.8 | 52 | 33.7 | 48 | 26 | 64 |
| Barbados * | 43.0 | 34 | 50.7 | 24 | 38.8 | 34 | – | 43 |
| Belize * | 42.8 | 35 | 49.2 | 31 | 37.9 | 37 | – | 50 |
| Namibia | 42.7 | 36 | 43.7 | 42 | 41.5 | 28 | 27 | 52 |
| Togo | 42.6 | 37 | 42.4 | 44 | 40.7 | 31 | 28 | 58 |
| Grenada * | 41.7 | 38 | 46.9 | 36 | 38.3 | 36 | – | 45 |
| Nauru * | 41.6 | 39 | 47.3 | 32 | 35.4 | 43 | – | 44 |
| Dominica * | 41.3 | 40 | 47.0 | 34 | 36.2 | 42 | – | 37 |
| Samoa * | 41.0 | 41 | 49.6 | 30 | 38.7 | 35 | – | 47 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 39.5 | 42 | 43.9 | 41 | 37.0 | 38 | – | 38 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 39.0 | 43 | 41.6 | 45 | 34.3 | 45 | – | 37 |
| Mozambique | 38.9 | 44 | 38.7 | 53 | 36.4 | 41 | 29 | 53 |
| Botswana | 38.9 | 45 | 42.5 | 43 | 36.9 | 39 | 30 | 63 |
| Kiribati * | 38.4 | 46 | 41.1 | 46 | 36.7 | 40 | – | 44 |
| Rwanda | 38.1 | 47 | 44.7 | 39 | 33.9 | 46 | 31 | 60 |
| Tonga * | 37.9 | 48 | 46.9 | 35 | 33.9 | 47 | – | 49 |
| Saint Lucia * | 37.5 | 49 | 38.7 | 54 | 32.7 | 50 | 32 | 52 |
| The Gambia | 37.3 | 50 | 39.5 | 50 | 32.0 | 52 | 33 | 63 |
| Vanuatu * | 37.1 | 51 | 46.2 | 38 | 32.6 | 51 | – | 48 |
| Eswatini | 36.9 | 52 | 44.5 | 40 | 32.8 | 49 | 34 | 51 |
| Solomon Islands * | 32.0 | 53 | 39.4 | 51 | 29.3 | 53 | – | 36 |
| Tuvalu * | 31.6 | 54 | 40.0 | 48 | 25.4 | 54 | – | 42 |
| Lesotho | 27.8 | 55 | 36.2 | 55 | 24.8 | 55 | 35 | 55 |
| Malawi | 26.3 | 56 | 35.4 | 56 | 21.8 | 56 | 36 | 59 |

Table D2 gives each member's score and rank on the four pillars that every member has, described under Uncertainty and sensitivity, and the number of the seven pillars and 35 sub-pillars on which it has a score.

**Table D2.** The four pillars every member has.

| Member | Index rank | Four pillars every member has | Rank | Pillars with a score (of 7) | Sub-pillars with a score (of 35) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Singapore | 1 | 68.2 | 3 | 7 | 33 |
| Malta | 2 | 69.5 | 2 | 7 | 28 |
| Australia | 3 | 65.1 | 5 | 7 | 31 |
| United Kingdom | 4 | 70.0 | 1 | 7 | 34 |
| Canada | 5 | 64.1 | 6 | 7 | 32 |
| Malaysia | 6 | 61.7 | 7 | 7 | 34 |

| Member | Index rank | Four pillars every member has | Rank | Pillars with a score (of 7) | Sub-pillars with a score (of 35) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cyprus | 7 | 61.6 | 8 | 7 | 30 |
| Mauritius | 8 | 53.0 | 12 | 7 | 29 |
| New Zealand | 9 | 66.0 | 4 | 7 | 27 |
| Brunei Darussalam * | 10 | 52.0 | 13 | 6 | 24 |
| India | 11 | 53.6 | 11 | 7 | 32 |
| Fiji * | 12 | 42.4 | 37 | 7 | 31 |
| South Africa | 13 | 45.8 | 22 | 7 | 31 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 14 | 54.5 | 9 | 6 | 28 |
| Nigeria | 15 | 53.9 | 10 | 7 | 34 |
| Seychelles * | 16 | 51.8 | 14 | 4 | 18 |
| Ghana | 17 | 48.8 | 15 | 7 | 32 |
| Jamaica | 18 | 47.1 | 19 | 7 | 29 |
| Sri Lanka | 19 | 47.3 | 18 | 7 | 27 |
| Zambia | 20 | 39.0 | 45 | 6 | 28 |
| Bangladesh | 21 | 44.0 | 29 | 7 | 35 |
| Kenya | 22 | 48.0 | 16 | 7 | 29 |
| Uganda | 23 | 44.2 | 28 | 6 | 27 |
| Pakistan | 24 | 41.2 | 40 | 7 | 35 |
| Tanzania | 25 | 38.7 | 46 | 6 | 28 |
| Gabon | 26 | 46.6 | 20 | 5 | 22 |
| Antigua and Barbuda * | 27 | 45.2 | 24 | 4 | 21 |
| Maldives * | 28 | 44.9 | 26 | 4 | 19 |
| Cameroon | 29 | 37.4 | 48 | 6 | 26 |
| The Bahamas * | 30 | 44.7 | 27 | 4 | 18 |
| Guyana * | 31 | 47.8 | 17 | 5 | 23 |
| Papua New Guinea | 32 | 31.4 | 55 | 5 | 20 |
| Sierra Leone | 33 | 36.3 | 49 | 7 | 28 |
| Barbados * | 34 | 43.0 | 34 | 4 | 20 |
| Belize * | 35 | 42.8 | 35 | 4 | 22 |
| Namibia | 36 | 39.1 | 43 | 6 | 25 |
| Togo | 37 | 35.2 | 50 | 6 | 26 |
| Grenada * | 38 | 44.9 | 25 | 5 | 23 |
| Nauru * | 39 | 39.7 | 42 | 5 | 22 |
| Dominica * | 40 | 40.1 | 41 | 5 | 22 |
| Samoa * | 41 | 45.8 | 21 | 5 | 23 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 42 | 43.8 | 31 | 5 | 22 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 43 | 43.9 | 30 | 5 | 22 |
| Mozambique | 44 | 32.1 | 53 | 6 | 26 |
| Botswana | 45 | 41.5 | 39 | 6 | 28 |
| Kiribati * | 46 | 42.6 | 36 | 5 | 23 |
| Rwanda | 47 | 45.5 | 23 | 6 | 27 |
| Tonga * | 48 | 37.7 | 47 | 5 | 24 |
| Saint Lucia * | 49 | 41.5 | 38 | 5 | 25 |
| The Gambia | 50 | 39.0 | 44 | 6 | 29 |
| Vanuatu * | 51 | 43.4 | 32 | 5 | 23 |
| Eswatini | 52 | 43.3 | 33 | 5 | 24 |
| Solomon Islands * | 53 | 32.0 | 54 | 4 | 19 |

| Member | Index rank | Four pillars every member has | Rank | Pillars with a score (of 7) | Sub-pillars with a score (of 35) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tuvalu * | 54 | 30.4 | 56 | 5 | 23 |
| Lesotho | 55 | 32.6 | 52 | 5 | 25 |
| Malawi | 56 | 32.9 | 51 | 5 | 25 |

Table D3 gives each member's index and rank with the Anxiety sub-pillar left out, as described under Anxiety in Annex A.

**Table D3.** The index without the Anxiety sub-pillar.

| Member | Index | Rank | Without the Anxiety sub-pillar | Rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Singapore | 77.6 | 1 | 77.6 | 1 |
| Malta | 75.0 | 2 | 74.2 | 2 |
| Australia | 71.0 | 3 | 70.6 | 3 |
| United Kingdom | 70.8 | 4 | 69.4 | 5 |
| Canada | 70.2 | 5 | 70.2 | 4 |
| Malaysia | 69.0 | 6 | 68.3 | 6 |
| Cyprus | 67.4 | 7 | 67.4 | 7 |
| Mauritius | 64.4 | 8 | 65.9 | 8 |
| New Zealand | 63.9 | 9 | 61.8 | 10 |
| Brunei Darussalam * | 62.3 | 10 | 62.3 | 9 |
| India | 60.6 | 11 | 60.8 | 11 |
| Fiji * | 56.9 | 12 | 57.1 | 12 |
| South Africa | 56.8 | 13 | 57.0 | 13 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 56.5 | 14 | 56.5 | 14 |
| Nigeria | 54.5 | 15 | 54.7 | 15 |
| Seychelles * | 51.8 | 16 | 51.8 | 16 |
| Ghana | 51.2 | 17 | 49.8 | 17 |
| Jamaica | 50.7 | 18 | 45.7 | 24 |
| Sri Lanka | 49.9 | 19 | 49.2 | 18 |
| Zambia | 48.8 | 20 | 47.2 | 21 |
| Bangladesh | 48.7 | 21 | 48.1 | 19 |
| Kenya | 48.7 | 22 | 48.0 | 20 |
| Uganda | 47.0 | 23 | 46.1 | 23 |
| Pakistan | 46.4 | 24 | 46.6 | 22 |
| Tanzania | 45.5 | 25 | 44.7 | 27 |
| Gabon | 45.3 | 26 | 43.3 | 32 |
| Antigua and Barbuda * | 45.2 | 27 | 45.2 | 25 |
| Maldives * | 44.9 | 28 | 44.9 | 26 |
| Cameroon | 44.9 | 29 | 44.1 | 31 |
| The Bahamas * | 44.7 | 30 | 44.7 | 28 |
| Guyana * | 44.5 | 31 | 44.5 | 29 |
| Papua New Guinea | 44.1 | 32 | 44.1 | 30 |
| Sierra Leone | 43.6 | 33 | 42.2 | 35 |
| Barbados * | 43.0 | 34 | 43.0 | 33 |
| Belize * | 42.8 | 35 | 42.8 | 34 |
| Namibia | 42.7 | 36 | 41.1 | 39 |
| Togo | 42.6 | 37 | 40.9 | 41 |
| Grenada * | 41.7 | 38 | 41.7 | 36 |
| Nauru * | 41.6 | 39 | 41.6 | 37 |

| Member | Index | Rank | Without the Anxiety sub-pillar | Rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dominica * | 41.3 | 40 | 41.3 | 38 |
| Samoa * | 41.0 | 41 | 41.0 | 40 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 39.5 | 42 | 39.5 | 42 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 39.0 | 43 | 39.0 | 43 |
| Mozambique | 38.9 | 44 | 35.6 | 52 |
| Botswana | 38.9 | 45 | 38.9 | 44 |
| Kiribati * | 38.4 | 46 | 38.4 | 45 |
| Rwanda | 38.1 | 47 | 38.1 | 46 |
| Tonga * | 37.9 | 48 | 37.9 | 47 |
| Saint Lucia * | 37.5 | 49 | 37.5 | 48 |
| The Gambia | 37.3 | 50 | 37.3 | 49 |
| Vanuatu * | 37.1 | 51 | 37.1 | 50 |
| Eswatini | 36.9 | 52 | 36.9 | 51 |
| Solomon Islands * | 32.0 | 53 | 32.0 | 53 |
| Tuvalu * | 31.6 | 54 | 31.6 | 54 |
| Lesotho | 27.8 | 55 | 27.8 | 55 |
| Malawi | 26.3 | 56 | 26.3 | 56 |

Table D4 gives each member's index and rank with the index's 49 estimates left out and, for each of the 31 members with an estimate, the lowest and highest rank its estimates allow, at the ends of the range of the figures each averages, as described under Estimates from peer averages.

**Table D4.** The index without its estimates.

| Member | Index | Rank | Estimates left out | Rank | Ranks its estimates allow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Singapore | 77.6 | 1 | 77.6 | 1 | – |
| Malta | 75.0 | 2 | 75.0 | 2 | – |
| Australia | 71.0 | 3 | 71.0 | 3 | – |
| United Kingdom | 70.8 | 4 | 70.8 | 4 | – |
| Canada | 70.2 | 5 | 70.2 | 5 | – |
| Malaysia | 69.0 | 6 | 68.5 | 6 | 6 |
| Cyprus | 67.4 | 7 | 67.4 | 7 | – |
| Mauritius | 64.4 | 8 | 64.4 | 8 | – |
| New Zealand | 63.9 | 9 | 63.9 | 9 | – |
| Brunei Darussalam * | 62.3 | 10 | 62.3 | 10 | – |
| India | 60.6 | 11 | 59.9 | 11 | 11 |
| Fiji * | 56.9 | 12 | 56.5 | 14 | 12 |
| South Africa | 56.8 | 13 | 57.2 | 12 | 12 to 14 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 56.5 | 14 | 57.1 | 13 | 12 to 14 |
| Nigeria | 54.5 | 15 | 54.5 | 15 | – |
| Seychelles * | 51.8 | 16 | 51.9 | 16 | 16 |
| Ghana | 51.2 | 17 | 51.2 | 17 | – |
| Jamaica | 50.7 | 18 | 50.7 | 18 | – |
| Sri Lanka | 49.9 | 19 | 49.9 | 19 | – |
| Zambia | 48.8 | 20 | 47.5 | 22 | 20 to 22 |
| Bangladesh | 48.7 | 21 | 48.7 | 20 | – |
| Kenya | 48.7 | 22 | 48.3 | 21 | 20 to 22 |

| Member | Index | Rank | Estimates left out | Rank | Ranks its estimates allow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uganda | 47.0 | 23 | 45.0 | 27 | 23 to 24 |
| Pakistan | 46.4 | 24 | 46.4 | 23 | – |
| Tanzania | 45.5 | 25 | 43.6 | 31 | 24 to 31 |
| Gabon | 45.3 | 26 | 43.0 | 34 | 24 to 32 |
| Antigua and Barbuda * | 45.2 | 27 | 45.2 | 25 | – |
| Maldives * | 44.9 | 28 | 44.9 | 28 | – |
| Cameroon | 44.9 | 29 | 44.9 | 29 | – |
| The Bahamas * | 44.7 | 30 | 46.1 | 24 | 25 to 33 |
| Guyana * | 44.5 | 31 | 45.1 | 26 | 26 to 33 |
| Papua New Guinea | 44.1 | 32 | 44.6 | 30 | 31 to 33 |
| Sierra Leone | 43.6 | 33 | 43.3 | 33 | 33 |
| Barbados * | 43.0 | 34 | 42.3 | 37 | 34 |
| Belize * | 42.8 | 35 | 43.6 | 32 | 34 to 37 |
| Namibia | 42.7 | 36 | 42.7 | 35 | – |
| Togo | 42.6 | 37 | 42.6 | 36 | – |
| Grenada * | 41.7 | 38 | 41.7 | 38 | – |
| Nauru * | 41.6 | 39 | 41.7 | 39 | 34 to 40 |
| Dominica * | 41.3 | 40 | 38.8 | 41 | 25 to 52 |
| Samoa * | 41.0 | 41 | 38.7 | 42 | 38 to 41 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 39.5 | 42 | 34.9 | 51 | 37 to 52 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 39.0 | 43 | 33.8 | 52 | 34 to 52 |
| Mozambique | 38.9 | 44 | 38.9 | 40 | – |
| Botswana | 38.9 | 45 | 36.8 | 48 | 42 to 47 |
| Kiribati * | 38.4 | 46 | 37.9 | 44 | 46 |
| Rwanda | 38.1 | 47 | 38.1 | 43 | – |
| Tonga * | 37.9 | 48 | 37.9 | 45 | – |
| Saint Lucia * | 37.5 | 49 | 37.4 | 46 | 49 |
| The Gambia | 37.3 | 50 | 37.3 | 47 | – |
| Vanuatu * | 37.1 | 51 | 36.7 | 49 | 51 |
| Eswatini | 36.9 | 52 | 36.6 | 50 | 50 to 52 |
| Solomon Islands * | 32.0 | 53 | 31.0 | 54 | 53 to 54 |
| Tuvalu * | 31.6 | 54 | 32.0 | 53 | 53 to 54 |
| Lesotho | 27.8 | 55 | 27.4 | 55 | 55 |
| Malawi | 26.3 | 56 | 25.8 | 56 | 56 |

Table D5 gives the correlation between each pair of pillars, between each pillar and the index, and between each of them and GNI per head on a logarithmic scale, so that a doubling of income counts the same at every level. Each is worked out over the members with a score on both, 56 for the index and the four pillars every member has, 40 for Digital, data, media and AI capability, 33 for Purposeful use and creation and 28 for Motivation and confidence, as described under Uncertainty and sensitivity.

**Table D5.** How the pillars, the index and national income move together.

| | **Meaningful access** | **Digital, data, media and AI capability** | **Purposeful use and creation** | **Education and training provision** | **Decent work, enterprise and transitions** | **Rights, safety and participation** | **Motivation and confidence** | **The index** | **GNI per head** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meaningful access | 1.00 | 0.77 | 0.03 | 0.54 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.78 |
| Digital, data, media and AI capability | 0.77 | 1.00 | 0.07 | 0.75 | 0.55 | 0.27 | 0.41 | 0.85 | 0.77 |
| Purposeful use and creation | 0.03 | 0.07 | 1.00 | 0.19 | 0.33 | −0.21 | 0.02 | 0.32 | 0.14 |
| Education and training provision | 0.54 | 0.75 | 0.19 | 1.00 | 0.44 | 0.36 | 0.43 | 0.81 | 0.52 |
| Decent work, enterprise and transitions | 0.43 | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.44 | 1.00 | 0.26 | 0.51 | 0.64 | 0.56 |
| Rights, safety and participation | 0.40 | 0.27 | −0.21 | 0.36 | 0.26 | 1.00 | 0.22 | 0.53 | 0.17 |
| Motivation and confidence | 0.60 | 0.41 | 0.02 | 0.43 | 0.51 | 0.22 | 1.00 | 0.65 | 0.53 |
| The index | 0.70 | 0.85 | 0.32 | 0.81 | 0.64 | 0.53 | 0.65 | 1.00 | 0.57 |

*Source: the index and pillar scores in Annex E, and GNI per head from World Bank (2026h), Atlas method, 2025 (2024 for The Bahamas).*

# ANNEX E: COMPLETE PILLAR-SCORE TABLE

Table E1 gives each member's score out of 10 on each of the seven pillars, with its index score out of 100. A dash marks a pillar on which the member has no score, and in both tables the small youth states are marked with an asterisk.

**Table E1.** Pillar scores, by member.

| Rank | Member | Meaningful access | Digital, data, media and AI capability | Purposeful use and creation | Education and training provision | Decent work, enterprise and transitions | Rights, safety and participation | Motivation and confidence | Total score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Singapore | 9.4 | 9.6 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 10.0 | 77.6 |
| 2 | Malta | 8.9 | 9.2 | 8.0 | 6.1 | 7.1 | 5.7 | 7.5 | 75.0 |
| 3 | Australia | 8.7 | 7.5 | 7.2 | 6.4 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 9.0 | 71.0 |
| 4 | United Kingdom | 9.3 | 8.9 | 4.7 | 5.5 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 8.0 | 70.8 |
| 5 | Canada | 9.4 | 9.4 | 6.1 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 8.0 | 70.2 |
| 6 | Malaysia | 8.6 | 8.5 | 7.6 | 5.7 | 6.6 | 3.8 | 7.5 | 69.0 |
| 7 | Cyprus | 9.2 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 7.0 | 67.4 |
| 8 | Mauritius | 8.3 | 7.9 | 7.0 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 3.0 | 9.0 | 64.4 |
| 9 | New Zealand | 8.9 | 3.0 | 6.8 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 4.2 | 8.5 | 63.9 |
| 10 | Brunei Darussalam * | 8.3 | 7.6 | 9.0 | 5.8 | 4.9 | 1.8 | – | 62.3 |
| 11 | India | 8.5 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 8.3 | 60.6 |
| 12 | Fiji * | 7.2 | 3.6 | 9.9 | 3.8 | 4.3 | 1.6 | 9.3 | 56.9 |
| 13 | South Africa | 7.8 | 6.0 | 7.6 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 7.8 | 56.8 |
| 14 | Trinidad and Tobago | 9.2 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 3.3 | – | 56.5 |
| 15 | Nigeria | 7.1 | 0.8 | 7.2 | 2.7 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 8.7 | 54.5 |

| Rank | Member | Meaningful access | Digital, data, media and AI capability | Purposeful use and creation | Education and training provision | Decent work, enterprise and transitions | Rights, safety and participation | Motivation and confidence | Total score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 | Seychelles * | 7.2 | – | – | 3.0 | 5.9 | 4.7 | – | 51.8 |
| 17 | Ghana | 7.0 | 1.6 | 8.7 | 3.8 | 4.9 | 3.8 | 6.0 | 51.2 |
| 18 | Jamaica | 7.4 | 3.2 | 7.0 | 3.7 | 5.0 | 2.8 | 6.5 | 50.7 |
| 19 | Sri Lanka | 8.1 | 3.0 | 6.5 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 6.5 | 49.9 |
| 20 | Zambia | 5.6 | – | 7.7 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 6.0 | 48.8 |
| 21 | Bangladesh | 7.9 | 2.3 | 5.5 | 2.2 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 8.7 | 48.7 |
| 22 | Kenya | 7.0 | 3.0 | 7.4 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 48.7 |
| 23 | Uganda | 5.8 | – | 6.0 | 3.7 | 4.8 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 47.0 |
| 24 | Pakistan | 6.5 | 2.9 | 5.7 | 2.5 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 46.4 |
| 25 | Tanzania | 5.4 | – | 8.3 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 45.5 |
| 26 | Gabon | 7.5 | – | – | 4.7 | 2.7 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 45.3 |
| 27 | Antigua and Barbuda * | 8.4 | – | – | 2.8 | 5.3 | 1.6 | – | 45.2 |
| 28 | Maldives * | 8.1 | – | – | 4.0 | 3.7 | 2.1 | – | 44.9 |
| 29 | Cameroon | 5.3 | – | 5.5 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 2.1 | 6.5 | 44.9 |
| 30 | The Bahamas * | 8.2 | – | – | 2.0 | 4.6 | 3.1 | – | 44.7 |
| 31 | Guyana * | 7.4 | 3.1 | – | 2.7 | 6.0 | 3.0 | – | 44.5 |
| 32 | Papua New Guinea | 3.3 | – | 9.5 | 3.5 | 5.3 | 0.5 | – | 44.1 |
| 33 | Sierra Leone | 5.3 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 3.0 | 4.3 | 2.0 | 6.0 | 43.6 |
| 34 | Barbados * | 8.0 | – | – | 2.8 | 4.2 | 2.3 | – | 43.0 |
| 35 | Belize * | 8.0 | – | – | 2.0 | 4.7 | 2.4 | – | 42.8 |
| 36 | Namibia | 5.7 | – | 4.0 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.7 | 6.0 | 42.7 |
| 37 | Togo | 5.2 | – | 5.5 | 2.5 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 6.0 | 42.6 |

| Rank | Member | Meaningful access | Digital, data, media and AI capability | Purposeful use and creation | Education and training provision | Decent work, enterprise and transitions | Rights, safety and participation | Motivation and confidence | Total score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 38 | Grenada * | 8.0 | 2.9 | – | 2.7 | 4.7 | 2.6 | – | 41.7 |
| 39 | Nauru * | 6.5 | 4.9 | – | 2.8 | 6.0 | 0.6 | – | 41.6 |
| 40 | Dominica * | 7.8 | 4.6 | – | 1.7 | 4.9 | 1.8 | – | 41.3 |
| 41 | Samoa * | 6.2 | 2.2 | – | 3.5 | 5.5 | 3.1 | – | 41.0 |
| 42 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 6.9 | 2.3 | – | 2.5 | 3.8 | 4.3 | – | 39.5 |
| 43 | Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 8.4 | 2.0 | – | 2.5 | 4.4 | 2.3 | – | 39.0 |
| 44 | Mozambique | 4.7 | – | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 1.8 | 7.0 | 38.9 |
| 45 | Botswana | 7.2 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.9 | – | 38.9 |
| 46 | Kiribati * | 5.7 | 2.2 | – | 3.2 | 3.3 | 4.9 | – | 38.4 |
| 47 | Rwanda | 6.8 | 0.7 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.8 | – | 38.1 |
| 48 | Tonga * | 7.0 | 3.9 | – | 2.8 | 4.1 | 1.1 | – | 37.9 |
| 49 | Saint Lucia * | 7.5 | 2.1 | – | 3.5 | 4.4 | 1.2 | – | 37.5 |
| 50 | The Gambia | 5.0 | 0.5 | 6.3 | 2.2 | 5.0 | 3.5 | – | 37.3 |
| 51 | Vanuatu * | 5.4 | 1.2 | – | 1.7 | 5.4 | 4.9 | – | 37.1 |
| 52 | Eswatini | 7.1 | 1.2 | – | 3.0 | 2.8 | 4.4 | – | 36.9 |
| 53 | Solomon Islands * | 4.0 | – | – | 3.5 | 4.3 | 1.0 | – | 32.0 |
| 54 | Tuvalu * | 5.5 | 3.6 | – | 2.8 | 3.8 | 0.0 | – | 31.6 |
| 55 | Lesotho | 5.8 | 0.9 | – | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.4 | – | 27.8 |
| 56 | Malawi | 4.2 | 0.0 | – | 2.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | – | 26.3 |

Table E2 gives each member's data strength, worked out as set out under Data strength in Part II, beside the number of indicators on which it has a figure and the number of its figures whose band could change, as tested under Uncertainty and sensitivity. In all, 478 of the 3,194 figures scored could change band.

**Table E2.** Data strength, by member.

| Rank | Member | Data strength (of 10) | Figures scored (of 102) | Figures whose band could change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Singapore | 5.7 | 75 | 16 |
| 2 | Malta | 5.2 | 68 | 15 |
| 3 | Australia | 5.9 | 76 | 15 |
| 4 | United Kingdom | 6.4 | 84 | 16 |
| 5 | Canada | 5.8 | 76 | 18 |
| 6 | Malaysia | 5.4 | 72 | 20 |
| 7 | Cyprus | 5.7 | 74 | 17 |
| 8 | Mauritius | 4.6 | 61 | 12 |
| 9 | New Zealand | 4.0 | 55 | 10 |
| 10 | Brunei Darussalam * | 4.4 | 57 | 15 |
| 11 | India | 6.3 | 80 | 8 |
| 12 | Fiji * | 4.9 | 60 | 3 |
| 13 | South Africa | 6.0 | 75 | 10 |
| 14 | Trinidad and Tobago | 4.4 | 58 | 8 |
| 15 | Nigeria | 6.6 | 82 | 9 |
| 16 | Seychelles * | 3.0 | 39 | 2 |
| 17 | Ghana | 5.6 | 73 | 7 |
| 18 | Jamaica | 4.6 | 61 | 11 |
| 19 | Sri Lanka | 4.1 | 54 | 5 |
| 20 | Zambia | 5.0 | 65 | 8 |
| 21 | Bangladesh | 6.7 | 84 | 15 |
| 22 | Kenya | 5.1 | 66 | 12 |
| 23 | Uganda | 4.7 | 61 | 8 |
| 24 | Pakistan | 6.7 | 84 | 15 |
| 25 | Tanzania | 4.8 | 63 | 7 |
| 26 | Gabon | 3.3 | 43 | 6 |
| 27 | Antigua and Barbuda * | 3.1 | 41 | 3 |
| 28 | Maldives * | 3.1 | 41 | 1 |
| 29 | Cameroon | 4.1 | 54 | 9 |
| 30 | The Bahamas * | 2.6 | 35 | 3 |
| 31 | Guyana * | 3.8 | 49 | 4 |
| 32 | Papua New Guinea | 2.7 | 38 | 5 |

| Rank | Member | Data strength (of 10) | Figures scored (of 102) | Figures whose band could change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | Sierra Leone | 4.8 | 64 | 7 |
| 34 | Barbados * | 3.1 | 43 | 3 |
| 35 | Belize * | 3.7 | 50 | 5 |
| 36 | Namibia | 4.0 | 52 | 8 |
| 37 | Togo | 4.5 | 58 | 9 |
| 38 | Grenada * | 3.5 | 45 | 11 |
| 39 | Nauru * | 3.5 | 44 | 3 |
| 40 | Dominica * | 2.7 | 37 | 10 |
| 41 | Samoa * | 3.6 | 47 | 3 |
| 42 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 2.8 | 38 | 12 |
| 43 | Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 2.7 | 37 | 9 |
| 44 | Mozambique | 4.0 | 53 | 8 |
| 45 | Botswana | 4.7 | 63 | 16 |
| 46 | Kiribati * | 3.4 | 44 | 3 |
| 47 | Rwanda | 4.6 | 60 | 6 |
| 48 | Tonga * | 3.9 | 49 | 1 |
| 49 | Saint Lucia * | 3.9 | 52 | 10 |
| 50 | The Gambia | 4.8 | 63 | 6 |
| 51 | Vanuatu * | 3.8 | 48 | 5 |
| 52 | Eswatini | 4.0 | 51 | 6 |
| 53 | Solomon Islands * | 2.6 | 36 | 3 |
| 54 | Tuvalu * | 3.0 | 42 | 10 |
| 55 | Lesotho | 4.2 | 55 | 4 |
| 56 | Malawi | 4.5 | 59 | 7 |

# ANNEX F: COUNTRY-LEVEL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ESTIMATES

Table F1 gives illustrative figures in US$ millions. The GDP base is 2025 (2024 for The Bahamas). "Above" denotes an illustrative gain for the IMF group, while "Below" denotes an illustrative economic opportunity under the study's reporting assumption. These are ten-year GDP-level illustrations applied to reference-year GDP, not cumulative or guaranteed annual benefits. See Part II, the Technical Methodology, for calculation, country-group and interpretation rules. The small youth states are marked with an asterisk.

**Table F1.** Illustrative economic estimates, by member, US$ millions.

| Rank | Member | Score | Position | IMF group | GDP year | Conservative $m | Moderate $m | Optimistic $m |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Singapore | 77.6 | Above | Other advanced economies | 2025 | 9,662 | 19,022 | 28,382 |
| 2 | Malta | 75.0 | Above | EU and Switzerland | 2025 | 417 | 819 | 1,222 |
| 3 | Australia | 71.0 | Above | Other advanced economies | 2025 | 28,776 | 56,653 | 84,530 |
| 4 | United Kingdom | 70.8 | Above | Other advanced economies | 2025 | 64,041 | 126,082 | 188,122 |
| 5 | Canada | 70.2 | Above | Other advanced economies | 2025 | 37,118 | 73,077 | 109,035 |
| 6 | Malaysia | 69.0 | Above | Emerging Asia | 2025 | 4,722 | 9,444 | 14,166 |
| 7 | Cyprus | 67.4 | Above | EU and Switzerland | 2025 | 618 | 1,216 | 1,814 |
| 8 | Mauritius | 64.4 | Above | Rest of the World | 2025 | 113 | 234 | 355 |
| 9 | New Zealand | 63.9 | Above | Other advanced economies | 2025 | 4,225 | 8,318 | 12,411 |
| 10 | Brunei Darussalam * | 62.3 | Above | Emerging Asia | 2025 | 150 | 301 | 451 |
| 11 | India | 60.6 | Above | Emerging Asia | 2025 | 39,561 | 79,121 | 118,682 |

| Rank | Member | Score | Position | IMF group | GDP year | Conservative $m | Moderate $m | Optimistic $m |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | Fiji * | 56.9 | Above | Rest of the World | 2025 | 43 | 90 | 136 |
| 13 | South Africa | 56.8 | Above | Emerging Latin America, Middle East and Africa | 2025 | 4,699 | 9,184 | 13,670 |
| 14 | Trinidad and Tobago | 56.5 | Above | Rest of the World | 2025 | 182 | 376 | 571 |
| 15 | Nigeria | 54.5 | Above | Low-income countries | 2025 | 2,617 | 5,234 | 7,851 |
| 16 | Seychelles * | 51.8 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 17 | 35 | 53 |
| 17 | Ghana | 51.2 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 799 | 1,656 | 2,513 |
| 18 | Jamaica | 50.7 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 159 | 329 | 500 |
| 19 | Sri Lanka | 49.9 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 762 | 1,578 | 2,394 |
| 20 | Zambia | 48.8 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 202 | 419 | 635 |
| 21 | Bangladesh | 48.7 | Below | Low-income countries | 2025 | 4,107 | 8,214 | 12,321 |
| 22 | Kenya | 48.7 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 952 | 1,971 | 2,991 |
| 23 | Uganda | 47.0 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 434 | 899 | 1,364 |
| 24 | Pakistan | 46.4 | Below | Emerging Asia | 2025 | 4,073 | 8,146 | 12,219 |
| 25 | Tanzania | 45.5 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 631 | 1,307 | 1,983 |
| 26 | Gabon | 45.3 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 150 | 311 | 471 |
| 27 | Antigua and Barbuda * | 45.2 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 16 | 34 | 51 |
| 28 | Maldives * | 44.9 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 54 | 112 | 170 |
| 29 | Cameroon | 44.9 | Below | Low-income countries | 2025 | 530 | 1,061 | 1,591 |
| 30 | The Bahamas * | 44.7 | Below | Rest of the World | 2024 | 111 | 230 | 348 |

| Rank | Member | Score | Position | IMF group | GDP year | Conservative $m | Moderate $m | Optimistic $m |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | Guyana * | 44.5 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 190 | 393 | 596 |
| 32 | Papua New Guinea | 44.1 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 227 | 471 | 715 |
| 33 | Sierra Leone | 43.6 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 52 | 108 | 164 |
| 34 | Barbados * | 43.0 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 56 | 116 | 176 |
| 35 | Belize * | 42.8 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 23 | 48 | 73 |
| 36 | Namibia | 42.7 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 106 | 219 | 332 |
| 37 | Togo | 42.6 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 83 | 172 | 262 |
| 38 | Grenada * | 41.7 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 10 | 21 | 31 |
| 39 | Nauru * | 41.6 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| 40 | Dominica * | 41.3 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 5 | 10 | 16 |
| 41 | Samoa * | 41.0 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 9 | 19 | 28 |
| 42 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 39.5 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 9 | 18 | 28 |
| 43 | Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 39.0 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 8 | 17 | 26 |
| 44 | Mozambique | 38.9 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 156 | 324 | 491 |
| 45 | Botswana | 38.9 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 139 | 289 | 438 |
| 46 | Kiribati * | 38.4 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 2 | 5 | 8 |
| 47 | Rwanda | 38.1 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 115 | 237 | 360 |
| 48 | Tonga * | 37.9 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 5 | 10 | 15 |
| 49 | Saint Lucia * | 37.5 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 19 | 39 | 58 |
| 50 | The Gambia | 37.3 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 18 | 38 | 57 |
| 51 | Vanuatu * | 37.1 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 9 | 20 | 30 |
| 52 | Eswatini | 36.9 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 36 | 75 | 114 |
| 53 | Solomon Islands * | 32.0 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 12 | 25 | 38 |

| Rank | Member | Score | Position | IMF group | GDP year | Conservative $m | Moderate $m | Optimistic $m |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 54 | Tuvalu * | 31.6 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 55 | Lesotho | 27.8 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 18 | 37 | 57 |
| 56 | Malawi | 26.3 | Below | Rest of the World | 2025 | 104 | 216 | 328 |

*Source: Cerutti et al. (2025), IMF Working Paper 25/76, p. 16 and Annex II; World Bank World Development Indicators, GDP (current US$), series NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Values have been rounded to the nearest US$ million; the underlying spreadsheet retains full precision.*

# ANNEX G: FIGURES BEHIND THE READINESS BENCHMARK

This annex gives the figures from which the six methods described under "Establishing the cut score" set the readiness benchmark (Table G1). The IMF AI Preparedness Index runs from 0 to 1, and a dash marks the 12 members without a value. Oxford Insights' Government AI Readiness Index is out of 100. The small youth states are marked with an asterisk.

**Table G1.** Figures behind the readiness benchmark.

| Member | Index | IMF AI Preparedness Index 2023 | Oxford Insights 2025 | Pillars at 50 or more (of 7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Singapore | 77.6 | 0.80 | 76.4 | 6 |
| Malta | 75.0 | 0.66 | 61.5 | 7 |
| Australia | 71.0 | 0.73 | 75.7 | 7 |
| United Kingdom | 70.8 | 0.73 | 77.7 | 6 |
| Canada | 70.2 | 0.71 | 74.7 | 7 |
| Malaysia | 69.0 | 0.63 | 62.3 | 6 |
| Cyprus | 67.4 | 0.63 | 59.7 | 7 |
| Mauritius | 64.4 | 0.53 | 52.8 | 5 |
| New Zealand | 63.9 | 0.75 | 62.7 | 5 |
| Brunei Darussalam * | 62.3 | 0.50 | 40.5 | 4 |
| India | 60.6 | 0.49 | 66.6 | 4 |
| Fiji * | 56.9 | 0.45 | 37.3 | 3 |
| South Africa | 56.8 | 0.50 | 53.9 | 4 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 56.5 | 0.44 | 32.7 | 3 |
| Nigeria | 54.5 | 0.34 | 50.8 | 5 |
| Seychelles * | 51.8 | 0.53 | 27.2 | 2 |
| Ghana | 51.2 | 0.43 | 47.4 | 3 |
| Jamaica | 50.7 | 0.43 | 40.1 | 3 |
| Sri Lanka | 49.9 | 0.44 | 45.6 | 3 |
| Zambia | 48.8 | 0.37 | 43.9 | 3 |
| Bangladesh | 48.7 | 0.38 | 48.4 | 3 |
| Kenya | 48.7 | 0.45 | 52.6 | 2 |
| Uganda | 47.0 | 0.35 | 35.8 | 2 |
| Pakistan | 46.4 | 0.37 | 45.4 | 3 |
| Tanzania | 45.5 | 0.35 | 41.4 | 2 |
| Gabon | 45.3 | 0.32 | 28.4 | 1 |
| Antigua and Barbuda * | 45.2 | – | 25.0 | 2 |

| Member | Index | IMF AI Preparedness Index 2023 | Oxford Insights 2025 | Pillars at 50 or more (of 7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maldives * | 44.9 | – | 26.4 | 1 |
| Cameroon | 44.9 | 0.34 | 34.9 | 3 |
| The Bahamas * | 44.7 | 0.46 | 31.2 | 1 |
| Guyana * | 44.5 | 0.42 | 25.5 | 2 |
| Papua New Guinea | 44.1 | 0.29 | 28.0 | 2 |
| Sierra Leone | 43.6 | 0.30 | 19.7 | 3 |
| Barbados * | 43.0 | 0.50 | 23.3 | 1 |
| Belize * | 42.8 | 0.42 | 22.7 | 1 |
| Namibia | 42.7 | 0.42 | 37.1 | 2 |
| Togo | 42.6 | 0.32 | 30.6 | 3 |
| Grenada * | 41.7 | – | 19.4 | 1 |
| Nauru * | 41.6 | – | 22.5 | 2 |
| Dominica * | 41.3 | – | 19.8 | 1 |
| Samoa * | 41.0 | – | 23.5 | 2 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines * | 39.5 | 0.34 | 21.5 | 1 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis * | 39.0 | – | 20.8 | 1 |
| Mozambique | 38.9 | 0.26 | 22.3 | 1 |
| Botswana | 38.9 | 0.41 | 37.1 | 1 |
| Kiribati * | 38.4 | – | 23.9 | 1 |
| Rwanda | 38.1 | 0.44 | 48.5 | 1 |
| Tonga * | 37.9 | – | 23.1 | 1 |
| Saint Lucia * | 37.5 | 0.37 | 26.7 | 1 |
| The Gambia | 37.3 | 0.36 | 23.6 | 2 |
| Vanuatu * | 37.1 | – | 28.6 | 2 |
| Eswatini | 36.9 | 0.31 | 27.7 | 1 |
| Solomon Islands * | 32.0 | – | 22.3 | 0 |
| Tuvalu * | 31.6 | – | 20.9 | 1 |
| Lesotho | 27.8 | 0.36 | 29.0 | 1 |
| Malawi | 26.3 | 0.34 | 24.2 | 0 |

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